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ABSTRACT 
 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is now a 
significant piece of the international climate agreement. This present dissertation 
aims to investigate the overall framework of REDD+ development as a national 
strategy in Brazil. Moreover, it focuses on identifying the major challenges and policy 
constraints of this development design process. A further aim is at the end of the 
research to proffer pathways for improvement of domestic forest governance in 
Brazil. Using the sustainable forest landscape governance approach as the 
overarching conceptual for an effective REDD+ implementation within the Brazilian 
context and, building on this analysis, the conclusions advance some considerations 
on what features should be prioritised in the development and establishment of the 
Brazilian REDD+ national strategy. This dissertation is a grounded theoretical 
analysis and is centered on the conception that although REDD+ is strongly treated 
by the Federal Government as an expansion of its actions with regard to sustainable 
development, by turning forests into an economic asset and strengthening 
institutions and laws, it is much more likely that Brazil can deal with the 
environmental challenges it has been facing.  
 
Key Words: REDD+, landscape approach, forest governance, Brazil, grounded 
analysis, sustainable development, policy constraint, national strategy 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Reduktion von Emissionen aus Entwaldung und Schädigung der Wälder (REDD+) ist 
mittlerweile ein wichtiger Bestandteil des internationalen Klimaabkommens. Die vorliegende 
Dissertation zielt darauf ab, den Gesamtrahmen der Entwicklung des REDD+ Mechanismus 
als nationale Strategie in Brasilien zu untersuchen. Darüber hinaus werden die wichtigsten 
Herausforderungen und politischen Einschränkungen dieses Entwicklungsdesign-Prozesses 
identifiziert. Desweiteren wird am Ende dieser Forschungsarbeit eine Empfehlung für die 
Ablauforganisation des REDD+ Mechanismus im brasilianischen Kontext ausgesprochen. 
Als übergeordnetes Konzept für die wirksame Umsetzung von REDD+ in Brasilien werden 
mehrstufige und nachhaltige Ansätze zur politischen Steuerung von Landschaften verwendet. 
Aufbauend auf dieser Analyse werden als Schlußfolgerung einige Überlegungen angestellt, 
welchen Funktionen in der Entwicklung und Etablierung der brasilianischen REDD+ 
Strategie Priorität eingeräumt werden sollte. Diese Dissertation ist eine grundlegende 
theoretische Analyse und basiert auf der Auffassung, dass, obwohl die brasilianische 
Regierung REDD+ als Ansatz zur Ausweitung der staatlichen Maßnahmen bezüglich 
nachhaltiger Entwicklung forciert, die Umwandlung der Wälder in ein Wirtschaftsgut und die 
Stärkung von Institutionen und Gesetzen die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöht, dass Brasilien die 
ökologischen Herausforderungen mit denen es konfrontiert ist, bewältigen kann. 
 
RESUMO 
Redução de Emissões por Desmatamento e Degradação Florestal (REDD+) se tornou um 
pedaço siginificativo do acordo internacional sobre o clima. A presente dissertação tem 
como principal objetivo investigar o atual cenário do desenvolvimento do mecanismo de 
REDD+ como estratégia nacional no Brasil. Além disso, o estudo identificará os principais 
desafios e restrições políticas deste processo de concepção e desenvolvimento. Sendo 
também um outro objetivo, ao final da pesquisa a sugestão de princípios para se atingir um 
nível melhorado da governança florestal no contexto doméstico brasileiro. A análise se 
constrói baseando-se no conceito de governança de paisagens florestais sustentáveis para 
uma efetiva implementação do REDD+ no Brasil. Neste sentido, as conclusões apontam 
quais funcionalidades devam ser priorizadas no desenvolvimento e estabelecimento da 
estratégia brasileira de REDD+. Esta dissertação desenvolve-se alicerçada na teoria 
fundamentada e está centrada no questionamento de que embora o REDD+ seja fortemente 
abordado pelo Governo Federal como uma extensão de suas ações ligadas ao 
desenvolvimento sustentável, por meio da transformação de florestas em ativos economicos 
e do fortalecimento de leis e instituições, eventualmente, seja muito mais provável que o 
Brasil possa lidar com os desafios ambientais que o mesmo vem enfrentando. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 This first chapter of the present dissertation outlines the objective of the research 
in its context, providing also an insight into the problem statement and research 
justification; it describes the aims, the main research questions and the methodological 
approach. 
 
 
1.1 Research context 
Currently, one of the major problems that concerns environmentalists, political 
authorities and society in general is the warming of the atmosphere, which brings 
potentially irreparable changes to the planet's climate balance. Global warming may 
threat sustainable development because of its impacts on health system, infrastructure, 
settlements, agriculture, food security as well as forest ecosystems (van Bodegom et al., 
2009). The temperature increase on Earth directly raises the ocean levels due to thermal 
expansion of water and melting glaciers, endangering coastal areas, cities below the sea 
level and some offshore islands (Manfrinato et al., 2005). According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), another risk can be the changes in 
rainfall regimes, causing floods or severe droughts, resulting in the reduction of crops 
productivity (IPCC, 2014). In the case of Brazil, the country is already experiencing shifts 
in precipitation patterns and changes in regional temperatures (IPCC, 2014). For 
instance, recent droughts and floods have been partially attributed to the consequences 
of climatic change, and their frequency may escalate in the future (Fraundorfer and 
Rabitz, 2015). 
As another example, a study developed by Marcovitch (2010), foresees the 
effects of climate change in Brazil concluding that if the predictions about climate change 
are correct, especially those regarding rainfall regimes, it will reduce up to 2.3% of the 
Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the next 40 years, causing the loss of an 
entire year of the country’s GDP. In addition, Brazil may lose about US$ 4 billion per 
year in its production from 2020. Almost all commercial plant varieties in areas with low 
production potential will suffer loss in productivity, particularly soyabeans (30-34%), 
coffee (17-18%) and maize (15%). Productivity will fall mainly in subsistence crops in the 
Northeast region, which is coincidently the region in Brazil that most faces strong human 
and environmental development obstacles. 
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This scenario can even be worsened by the difficulty in forecasting weather. 
Moreover, one of the main consequences of global warming can be an intensification of 
occurrences of natural phenomena such as hurricanes and cyclones, which may 
become more frequent and even less predictable (IPCC, 2014). The IPCC has 
concluded that most of the warming observed over the last half of the 20th century can 
be attributed to human activities that have increased greenhouse gas (GHG) 1 
concentrations in the atmosphere, mainly by human perturbations to the global carbon 
cycle (Apps, 2003). They also warned that these changes will continue to drive 
accelerated climate change for several centuries to come. On the other hand, the 
existence of historical documents proving that the climate fluctuates naturally is one of 
the main arguments used by scientists contesting the findings of the IPCC in relation to 
global warming and the influence of human activity (Neves, 2012). Molion (2008) argues 
that it is not possible to confirm (as the IPCC claims) that the 35% increase of CO2 
concentration in the past 150 years has caused the increase in temperature.  
Nevertheless, the Industrial Revolution had a big part to play in the amount of 
CO2 being released in the atmosphere (Lallanilla, 2015). The search for the most 
appropriate source of energy to meet the market development determined the 
replacement of charcoal by fossil fuels derived from organic compounds containing 
carbon and hydrogen (hydrocarbons). Such fuels as oil (petroleum), coal and natural gas 
used today, for example, in thermoelectric plants, industrial plants and vehicles in 
circulation are not renewable throughout human time scale (Gebara, 2005). Before, CO2 
fluctuated between about 180 ppm (part per million) during ice ages and 280 ppm during 
interglacial warm periods (NOAA, 2013). Currently, the mean concentration level of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere surpassed the 400 ppm (NOAA, 2016). 
Climate change is a phenomenon which has a global impact, but conflictingly, 
nations will be affected to different degrees. It is commonly argued that although the 
problem is a global one, developed nations who are more heavily industrialised – 
                                                 
1 A greenhouse gas is any gaseous compound in the atmosphere that is capable of absorbing infrared 
radiation, thereby trapping and holding heat in the atmosphere. The GHGs are largely responsible for the 
greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect is therefore one of the leading causes of global warming. The 
most significant GHGs are water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N2O). Fluorinated gases (gases to which the element fluorine was added), including hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride, are created during industrial processes and are also considered 
GHGs. Though they are present in very small concentrations, they trap heat very effectively, making them 
high "global-warming potential" (GWP) gases. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), once used as refrigerants and 
aerosol propellants until they were phased out by international agreement, are also GHGs. Some GHGs, like 
methane, are produced through agricultural practices including livestock manure management. Others, like 
CO2, largely result from natural processes like respiration and from the burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil 
and gas (Lallanilla, 2015). 
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historically – have released more GHG per capita than developing ones.2  Thus, in 
response to the evidence of human activities’ responsibility for climate change and 
environmental damage, the United Nations (UN) during the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) at that time in 1992 adopted, along with two 
other Conventions, the United Nations Framework on Climate Change – UNFCCC3 (see 
further details in Chapter three).  
The international community signed the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in 1997, with the 
objective of ‘the stabilisation and reconstruction of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’, as described in the article 2 of the document (UNFCCC, 1998). The 
agreement recognised the main responsibilities of developed countries on higher CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere and adopted the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ (UNFCCC, 1998). In order to assist developed nations to 
achieve their reduction targets the Kyoto Protocol adopted Flexibility Mechanisms (also 
known as Flexible Mechanisms or Kyoto Mechanisms) in which developing countries 
could participate by providing ways to reduce global emissions by means of additional 
and certified operations which were part of a global market scheme known as the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).  
Developing countries had no reduction commitments4 for the first and second 
period 5  of the Kyoto Protocol (respectively, 2008-2012 and 2013-2020) and could 
                                                 
2 There is no convention by the UN system that defines a developing country (except Least Developed 
Countries – LDC). However, commonly, a developing country is defined as a nation with a lower living 
standard, underdeveloped industrial base and low Human Development Index (HDI) relative to other 
countries. 
3 Parties to the UNFCCC are classified as: 
 Annex I: there are 43 countries to the UNFCCC listed in Annex I of the Convention, including the 
European Union. These countries are classified as industrialised (developed) countries and 
"economies in transition" (EITs). The 14 EITs are the former centrally-planned (Soviet) economies 
of Russia and Eastern Europe; 
 Annex II: consist of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
members of Annex I, but not the EIT countries. Annex II Parties are required to provide financial 
and technical support to the EITs and developing countries to assist them in reducing their GHG 
emissions (climate change mitigation) and manage the impacts of climate change (climate change 
adaptation); 
 Annex B: while Annex I refers to the countries included in the UNFCCC, Annex B is an adjusted list 
of the countries identified under Kyoto Protocol. Annex B countries have their reduction targets 
formally stated; 
 Least Developed Countries (LDCs): 49 Parties are LDCs, and are given special status under the 
treaty in view of their limited capacity to adapt to the effects of climate change; 
 Non-Annex I: Parties to the UNFCCC not listed in Annex I of the Convention are mostly low-
income, “developing countries”. Developing countries may volunteer to become Annex I countries 
when they are sufficiently developed. 
4 Brazil as well as China and India were considered into the category of a developing country and, therefore, 
they had no mandatory GHG reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol approach. 
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develop and host governmentally approved CDM projects. Carbon credits (CER) from a 
CDM project could be generated not only from emissions reduction, but also from 
initiatives that led to carbon sequestration from the atmosphere. However, the 
agreement excluded the possibility of development of forest conservation and/or 
prevention of deforestation projects, mainly because of concerns about technical 
difficulties in accurately measuring GHG emissions/reductions from such actions (Streck 
and Scholz, 2006). This fact rendered little relevance for the conservation of native 
forests like the Amazon within the Kyoto Protocol scope, creating no benefit from this 
type of activity using market mechanisms. What remained on forestry was "Afforestation 
and Reforestation" (CDM A/R) sectoral scope 14 of the CDM scheme. This means, only 
reforestation projects (planting forest in areas that were deforested before 1990) and 
afforestation actions (planting forest in areas where there was previously no forest 
vegetation for at least 50 years) aimed at sequestering carbon from the atmosphere 
were eligible under the KP scope. 
Nevertheless, the preservation of remaining natural forested areas constitutes a 
key-issue in combating climate change; if forests store large amounts of carbon – 
directly contributing to micro-climate regulation – on the other hand, deforestation 
releases GHG and aggravates global warming (Gil, 2010). Within this scenario, Brazil 
must be highlighted, since the country has almost 456 million hectares of natural forests 
(54% of its territory), or in other words, about one-third of the world's remaining 
rainforests (SFB, 2013). In this context, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD/REDD+) has emerged as a prominent strategy, because it 
opens up the possibility to maintain standing native forests while reducing GHG 
emissions. In addition, it is expected that the REDD+ mechanism could encourage 
reforestation activities, preserve wild fauna and flora and promote the improvement of 
livelihoods that depends on natural resources as well as protecting the rights of 
indigenous people (IPAM, 2011). REDD/REDD+ refers to reducing emissions by 
preserving existing threatened forests, avoiding their deforestation and degradation (see 
further details in Chapter four). However, the issue of REDD/REDD+ was not addressed 
in the Kyoto Protocol framework and consequently REDD/REDD+ initiatives were not 
eligible under the CDM scope.  
                                                                                                                                                 
5 In 2012 an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was agreed, the Doha Amendment, establishing a second 
commitment period from 2013 to 2020. However, until currently it has not entered into force (see further 
details item 4.2.1.3). 
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The reduction of deforestation in tropical countries leads to a discussion about 
the economic value of forests and their inclusion in a market mechanism for the carbon 
storage provided by them (Carvalho, 2010). This brings into discussion, a currently 
highly commented topic, the term “Environmental Services” (ES), which means a series 
of services provided by nature, arising from the vigorous functioning of ecosystems, 
which may be the result of human actions or simply a balanced state of nature 
(Constanza et al., 1997). These services are the result of ecological processes and 
functions that keep the equilibrium of ecosystems and contribute directly to the survival 
and well-being of the whole society (Myers, 1996). On the other hand, some authors like 
Chomitz et al. (1999) have adopted the concept of ES only as a human activity that 
contributes to the maintenance of or increases the provision of environmental benefits.  
 Manfrinato6 (2014, personal communication) follows the same concept declaring 
that: “Environmental Services are not provided by nature but by those protecting the 
nature. In economics you have products and services, and services are an 
anthropogenic thing. A tree does not provide an environmental service; it is part of an 
ecosystem”. Differently from benefits of material goods (that accrue to individuals, e.g. 
producers and consumers), the value of ES pertain to the society remaining mostly 
unmarketed because it is still complex to demonstrate the precise nature of these ES 
and even more convoluted in economic sense (Myers, 1996). But there are some 
attempts as the study from Tsonkova et al. (2014). They analysed five regulating ES 
using a developed assessment tool in order to facilitate comparison of ES provision with 
respect to different land use practices. They state that quantifying ES is expected to 
enhance the implementation of sustainable land use systems, concluding that the 
developed tool can be considered a flourishing first assessment step toward valuation of 
non-market environmental services (Tsonkova et al., 2014). The environmental service 
concept was popularised by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a multi-stakeholder 
study carried out under the direction of the UN from 2001 to 2005. This same study 
grouped ES into four broad categories: i) provisioning, such as the production of food 
and water; ii) regulating, such as the control of climate and disease; iii) supporting, such 
as nutrient cycles and crop pollination and iv) cultural, such as spiritual and recreational 
benefits (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
Many ecosystems and their services, however, are currently under increasing 
pressure; explicitly, more than 60% of the world’s ecosystems are not being used in a 
                                                 
6 Warwick Manfrinato – Personal  communication  
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sustainable way (Cenamo et al., 2009; Lima, 2014; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005). The Earth Summit promoted the “triple bottom line” concept of sustainable 
development that included ecological, social and economic sustainability (Roe and Elliot, 
2005). Therefore, development organisations have been increasingly using schemes as 
Payment for Environmental Services (PES) as a tool to promote both goals of 
conservation and social development. The concept of PES assumes that in cooperation 
with existing resource management institutions, it could foster both better resource 
management and livelihood benefits. However, a critical debate is addressed on whether 
PES schemes really improve the livelihood of local stakeholders, a debate which is also 
critical to current discussions on REDD+ (Lima, 2014). Some authors argue about the 
ability of PES schemes to promote equitable outcomes (Corbera et al., 2007; Proctor et 
al., 2008). 
According to Wunder (2005), PES is a voluntary transaction where a well-defined 
ES is being bought by a minimum one buyer from a minimum one ES provider but only if 
the ES provider secures ES provision addressing conditionality. This definition has been 
widely accepted by the academic community although those who have analysed PES 
interventions in a practical way have found that most PES schemes implemented do not 
accomplish all of these criteria (Sommerville et al., 2009). Following Bond et al. (2009), 
REDD+ can be regarded as a multi-level PES scheme; in other words, a special 
modality of PES as it also aims to preserve environmental services, while offering a 
financial compensation to those avoiding deforestation. The transaction of allowances at 
the international level rewards the country ensuring the provision of the environmental 
service (e.g. carbon storage). On the other hand, at the national level, the transaction 
rewards may be granted according to pre-defined rules (Gil, 2010; Lima 2014).  
In Brazil, however, PES is repeatedly referred to as a smaller component of 
REDD+ projects, specifically as the share of resources given to land owners and/or 
users as direct payments for the benefit provided. This notion is based on the 
understanding that REDD+ generates broader benefits (such as social improvements or 
governance enhancement) and PES is the financial compensation for strictly well-
defined ES (Gil, 2010). But for Valberg (2011) nevertheless, there is no clear definition of 
what should be accepted as “ecosystem services” in Brazil, indicating that Brazil may not 
have a full overview over opportunities for reducing deforestation, in turn making it 
difficult to determine whether goals are actually reached by the planned/implemented 
environmental policies. For instance, there is no regulation at federal level establishing 
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PES frameworks in Brazil, even though the new Forest Code allows the implementation 
of such schemes as a financial instrument. With that in mind and for the purpose of this 
study, both concepts may be merged, which means that REDD+ might be generally 
understood as a multi-level PES scheme, but differentiation will be made when 
necessary.  
In developing countries, increasing populations, income levels and energy use 
are leading to a rapid increase in GHG emissions (Miller, 2012). Therefore, the pressure 
on these countries increased to adopt some kind of GHG emissions reduction targets. 
Developed nations argue that conditions have changed as developing countries have 
begun to industrialise and pollute more rapidly in recent years (IEA, 2015). For example, 
developing countries will be responsible for almost 90% of the projected world increases 
in carbon emissions for the period from 2013 to 2035 (Miller, 2012). In Brazil the main 
source of emissions since the 1990’s is the burning and decay of biomass resulting from 
deforestation (see further details in item 5.4.2) followed by emissions from the 
agricultural sector, especially the methane emitted by cattle (MCTI et al., 2013). 
Although Brazil is not one of the biggest emitters of GHG by fuel use, the country is 
among the top world emitters due to land use change (GHG Protocol, 2014). 
Although estimative of deforestation contribution to global emissions have been 
reduced from 20% in 2006 to around 11% in 2014 (IPCC, 2014), this is still a 
considerable amount of global emissions. Efforts towards enhancing carbon stocks and 
conserving and managing tropical forests sustainably will, therefore, be decisive in the 
next years in the fight to diminish the impacts of climate change. In this sense, since 
2005 it was expected that REDD would be a part of the COP (Conference of Parties) 
agenda. This in fact officially happened in 2009 when REDD was adopted by the 
Copenhagen Accord. A year later, the REDD scope was extended to REDD+ in order to 
include the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks. In the same year, 2010, a group of emerging economies, the 
“BASIC countries” (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), have joined together in order 
to become a major force in the negotiation of a climate change agreement (Dagicour, 
2010). Therefore, they have released a statement about their position on their voluntary 
emissions reductions targets in virtue of the Copenhagen Accord. Thenceforth, 
designated authorities have been working on the definition of rules for REDD+ actions 
for standardisation and integration into a Brazilian national strategy (see further details in 
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Chapter six). At the international level, the ultimate step in direction of REDD+ 
establishment was its adoption in the new international climate agreement in 2015. 
 
 
 1.1.1 Paris Agreement  
The Paris Agreement7 has been agreed to by representatives of 195 nations at 
the COP21 to the UNFCCC in Paris on 12 December 2015 and will start in the year 2020 
onwards. The Paris Agreement aims to keep the global average temperature rise to “well 
below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5°C. Although the target of 1.5°C is not binding, reference to it in the text of 
the agreement was considered a breakthrough as well as the acceptance of the 
demands of the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island states (SIS), highly 
vulnerable to negative impacts of climate change (Wąsiński, 2015). Regardless of this 
fact, some specialists argue that the Paris Agreement exposed these countries even 
more to the threat posed by ever-increasing GHG emissions for which they are not 
entirely responsible (Cleménçon, 2016). The agreement contains two modalities for 
trying to achieve the targets. First, it declares that the peak of global GHG emissions 
should be reached as soon as possible, thereafter envisioning reductions to achieve 
zero net emissions by 2050. The second is a so-called (Intended) Nationally Determined 
Contribution (INDC/NDC),8 which all the Parties (developing and developed nations) 
publicly outlined what post-2020 climate actions they would develop under the Paris 
Agreement. Parties can meet their NDC targets by transferring “mitigation outcomes” 
internationally, likewise, in the context of emission trading, or to allow results-based 
payments (Climate Focus, 2015). Moreover, Parties to the new agreement will be 
obliged every two years to submit a report on progress, which will be subject to technical 
expert review (Wąsiński, 2015).  
The Paris Agreement is a treaty under international law, which must be approved 
under Parties’ respective domestic ratification processes, including approval by 
executive and in some cases parliamentary processes (CDKN Global, 2016). However, 
although the Paris Agreement has many provisions that impose legally binding 
obligations, what “legally binding” means in this context is controversial as each country 
may use a different interpretation. For example, although the agreement requires 
                                                 
7 Full version online available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf  
8 To make a differentiation between INDC and NDC, the INDC will become the NCD when a country ratifies 
the Paris Agreement, unless they decide to submit a new INDC at the same time. 
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countries to submit new commitments every five years, with each successive NDC 
needing to have more pushy reduction targets, the overall goal of the agreement is not 
broken down into specific reduction obligations. Thus, a country can sign the Paris 
Agreement and present a climate plan that envisages no remarkable changes in its GHG 
emissions, thereby justifying this action by asserting that its national circumstances do 
not allow it to have more ambitious reduction targets. On the other hand, as long as that 
country fulfils all the reporting and administration requirements, it will still be in 
compliance with the Paris Agreement, as also there are no implemented sanctions for 
governments that do not comply with their obligations. Therefore, one of the major 
challenges in this context will be enforceability. Thus, making the Paris Agreement 
legally binding is presumably not enough to guarantee that its core goals will be 
achieved (Harvey, 2016). 
 Many provisions establish common commitments while allowing flexibility to 
accommodate different national capacities and circumstances (C2ES, 2015). For 
example, the Paris Agreement will be implemented further in accordance with the 
‘principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (article 
2 §2). Also, the article 4 §4 states that ‘Developing country Parties should continue 
enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards 
economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national 
circumstances’ (UNFCCC, 2015). Moreover, the issue of which provisions to make 
binding (expressed as “shall,” as opposed to “should”) was a central concern for many 
countries, in particular the USA, which wanted an agreement the president could accept 
without seeking congressional approval (C2ES, 2015). For instance, the USA could 
agree to certain “procedural requirements” (e.g., reporting and measurement) that would 
be legally binding under the 1992 UNFCCC, to which USA was already bound legally 
(Busby, 2016). In other words, this action would not require the Senate’s consent. 
However, new legally binding commitments to GHG emissions reductions would require 
Senate approval, for example.  
 The Paris Agreement was opened for signature on 22 April 2016 (and would 
remain open for signature for one year) and would enter into force if at least 55 countries 
that account for at least 55% of global GHG emissions ratify it. This happened on 5 
October 2016, when the threshold for entry into force of the Paris Agreement was 
achieved. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016. The first 
session of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
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(CMA1) had taken place in Marrakech in conjunction with COP 22/CMP12. Until the 
conclusion of this dissertation 156 countries of 197 Parties to the Convention have 
ratified the agreement (UNFCCC, 2017). Brazil has ratified the agreement on 12 
September 2016. On the one hand, the low emissions threshold means that, 
theoretically, the Paris Agreement could have entered  into  force  even  if  China  and  
the  USA have  not  ratified  it (Wąsiński, 2015). On the other hand, this did not happen 
since the USA joined China to formally ratify the agreement on 3 September 2016. 
However, this scenario may change due to the election of Donald Trump in November 
2016 (as the new president of USA), because Donald Trump vowed to the “American 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement”. Unequivocally this withdrawal would have serious 
consequences for the Paris Agreement. However, this is still an opened chapter in the 
climate change arena. 
 Nevertheless, as a matter of domestic law, in the USA, the Paris Agreement is an 
executive agreement, binding only on (ex) President Barack Obama’s administration 
(Slaughter, 2015). However, although an executive agreement made by one 
administration is not necessarily binding on its successor, it would have to be explicitly 
repudiated. Thus, differently from the Kyoto Protocol (which was recognised by the US 
Senate as a treaty), the INDC was accepted as a voluntary action, which has allowed 
the Obama’s administration to effectively argue that the Paris Agreement is not a “treaty” 
under article 2 of the US Constitution, even if it is a legally binding agreement or treaty 
within the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Busby, 2016). In 
this sense, the Paris Agreement is a legal obligation that the USA has assumed and its 
non-compliance means that the USA will be breaking an international law. Moreover, the 
USA can not formally withdraw for three years after the Paris Agreement has gone into 
force. This happens on account of article 28 of the Paris Agreement, which allows for 
any Party to voluntarily withdraw from the agreement, and this withdrawal becomes 
effective one year later (CRS, 2016). However, this instrument is not available until 4 
November 2019. As an alternative, USA could withdraw from the UNFCCC (which would 
take one year) since the article 28 also establishes that any Party that withdraws from 
the UNFCCC shall be considered to have also withdrawn from the Paris Agreement (and 
since the UNFCCC entered into force in 1994, the three-year withdrawal prohibition 
expired in 1997). On the other hand, since the UNFCCC was approved by the US 
Senate, the withdrawal procedure under domestic law would be less straightforward 
(CRS, 2016). 
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 Although the agreement was lauded by many, including the then UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon, criticism has also been declared. While this “bottom-up” approach 
– with countries undertaking national pledges for 2020 – has attracted much wider 
participation (C2ES, 2015), estimates based on the submitted INDCs show if fully 
implemented by 2030, GHG emissions will be reduced by about 9%, which would 
translate into an increase in the average global temperature at the end of this century of 
between 2.7°C and 3°C (Wąsiński, 2015). Moreover, in order to have a 50% of chance 
of reaching this 1.5°C target, global GHG emissions would have to fall from an expected 
56 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2020 to just eight by 2050 (Chivers and Worth, 
2015). Hence, limiting expected warming to no more than 2°C requires deeper, steeper, 
and earlier reductions in global GHG emissions than the current INDCs would achieve 
(Sterman et al., 2015). Furthermore, in order to reach 1.5°C it will be necessary to put 
much more effort into reducing dependence on fossil fuels and other GHGs such as 
methane, by tackling major drivers as the expansion of unsustainable practices of cattle 
ranching, for example. Although the lifetime of methane in the atmosphere is much 
shorter than carbon dioxide, methane is more efficient at trapping radiation than CO2. 
The comparative impact of methane on climate change is more than 25 times greater 
than carbon dioxide over a 100-year period (EPA, 2017). However, the Paris Agreement 
contains no mention of the word “fossil fuel” (Chivers and Worth, 2015). This implies no 
clear timescale of when fossil fuels must be phased out. Nevertheless, in Paris it was 
recognised that private sector, philanthropy, civil society, academia, and the society in 
general all have a role to play in addressing a major global challenge (Slaughter, 2015). 
 Finance was a contentious issue in Paris with developed countries pushing for 
wealthier developing countries to contribute financially and poorer developing countries 
seeking stronger assurances that financial support would be scaled up (C2ES, 2015). 
The agreement commits developed countries to provide finance for mitigation and 
adaptation measures in developing countries, in continuation of their existing obligations 
under the UNFCCC, a specification desired by the USA so the agreement would not 
create new binding financial commitments requiring congressional approval (C2ES, 
2015). Other major issues included whether to set a new finance mobilisation goal 
beyond the US$100 billion a year in public and private resources already promised by 
developed countries, and whether to establish a process to revisit the question every five 
years. The COP decision extends the US$100 billion-a-year goal through 2025, and 
beyond that, says only that by 2025 the COP will set a ‘new collective quantified goal 
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from a floor of US$100 billion a year’ (C2ES, 2015). Meanwhile, the world still spends 
close to US$500 billion in fossil fuel subsidies each year but only about US$70 billion a 
year for helping developing countries lower their GHG emissions (Clémençon, 2015). 
For Clémençon (2016), much of the claimed climate ﬁnancing mobilisation is relabeling 
or redirection of existing official development ﬂows, which means that financing issues 
will remain the most important dilemma influencing how rapidly developing countries will 
move on implementing their INDCs. 
 
 
1.2 Statement of problem and justification 
Similar to other strategies also aimed at tackling an issue as multi-dimensional 
and convoluted as deforestation, the REDD+ approach raises equally complex questions 
related to effectiveness (whether it really can achieve GHG emission reductions and 
decrease of deforestation rates), efficiency (whether these reductions are obtained at the 
lowest cost possible) and equity (whether benefits are fairly distributed). In this context, 
REDD+ issues involve stakeholders from the local, national and international levels and 
requires a combination of political, institutional, technical and economical conditions to 
succeed. 
Unsurprisingly, a deeper understanding about the risks and the opportunities 
involved are required due to the fact that some critical operational issues remain unclear 
for the development of a national REDD+ strategy. Regarding the establishment of a 
REDD+ system, some of the main concerns still are, for instance, related to which rules 
and targets should be addressed for emission reduction; how to design an adequate 
financing scheme and how to set a comprehensive accounting system. Since the 
adoption of REDD+ actions will affect the livelihood of forest-dependent groups, social 
aspects must also be observed, ensuring public participation as well as the interests and 
rights of indigenous people and traditional communities (Bonfante et al., 2010; Gebara, 
2013; Lima, 2014). Such involvement is a key issue for environmental policies to 
enhance the reduction of deforestation rates and the sustainable use of natural 
resources. 
Although negotiations on REDD+ advanced as the mechanism was included into 
the Paris Agreement (see further details in Chapter four), there is still a long way to go 
and many countries are still skeptical about relying on mechanisms that involve forest 
protection for different reasons. At the moment it should be the beginning of an important 
 13
legislative9 process to enforce institutional design of REDD+ frameworks in countries 
establishing such mechanism. This means, the main priority should be the preparation of 
countries from an institutional point of view, so that they could have the conditions to 
implement REDD+ policies at national level in an effective and efficient way. Thus, a 
coherent domestic legal framework is needed for countries preparing to implement 
REDD+ to ensure that national systems not only deliver permanent GHG emission 
reductions, but also prevent social and environmental constraints while also delivering 
non-carbon benefits (Denier et al., 2014). In this context, the legal framework will be the 
instrument through which many of the international requirements for REDD+ will be 
translated by countries into concrete and specific national requirements, according to 
their singular circumstances (Denier et al., 2014). Also, the voluntary market for REDD+ 
credits has been evolving more rapidly than regulations and this may have left room for 
projects of equivocal merit (Gil, 2010). It is important to keep in mind, therefore, that the 
design of a national strategy is needed prior to the establishment of an operational 
system, meaning that the REDD+ should be in accordance with national development 
interests. That requires, in the first place, the identification of measures that countries 
should take in order to lay down the conditions for benefiting from REDD+ initiatives.  
 At present, the question in Brazil still is how to design a legal framework that 
ensures the success of such strategy, albeit the country has released its REDD+ 
national strategy through Decree 8.576/201510 (see further detail in Chapter six). The 
regulation of REDD+ in the context of forest management and land use in Brazil is still 
under progress and, therefore generates many questions regarding its form of 
implementation. For example, Brazil faces several challenges especially regarding 
institutional weakness as lack of governance, weak property rights, land use conflicts 
                                                 
9 The definition and differentiation of some concepts are needed here:  
 Following Denier et al. (2014) a domestic legal framework comprises a country’s strategies, policies, 
plans, programmes, laws and regulations; 
 Strategy aims to achieve a long-term goal related to one or more policy areas. It will identify the 
challenges facing one or more sectors enabling the government to define a position. A strategy 
describes how the ends (goals) will be achieved by the means (resources); 
 Following the FAO definition, policy is a set of decisions which are oriented towards a long-term 
purpose or to a particular problem. It is more specific than a strategy and provides political direction 
for the adoption, implementation and interpretation of laws. However, policies do not ensure that 
the same will be successfully followed reaching that long-term goal; 
 Legislations are actual laws that are enforceable, which means they must happen and should be 
followed. Legislations also require a voting to ensure that they are passed, while policies can be 
decided by the government. Legislation can also mean the process of making the law; 
 Plans generally build on policies and provide more detailed quantitative targets and qualitative 
principles. Programmes are spatially, temporally and technically explicit about the actions or 
activities and resources needed to achieve a plan’s objectives (Denier et al., 2014). 
10 Online available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2015/Decreto/D8576.htm  
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and negligence with the environmental legislation that hinder appropriate policies’ 
implementation in the country (see Fatorelli et al., 2015; Gebara et al., 2014). Moreover, 
the country faces another clear problem: there is a high level of public sector corruption11 
and bureaucracy in the country. Such high level of bureaucracy creates a fertile 
environment for corruption that may contribute to the development of environmentally 
damaging policies and laws (Alves, 2014). Indeed, the current political system in Brazil 
creates difficulties in effectively exercising legislative and executive12 powers (Valberg, 
2011). In addition, although there has been progress in decreasing deforestation rates in 
Brazil, the country faces important development challenges in combining the benefits of 
agricultural growth, environmental protection and sustainable development (World Bank, 
2015).  
Furthermore, some federal states are taking independent and non-aligned steps 
towards devising and implementing their own REDD+ policies. The development of the 
REDD+ national strategy in Brazil is then characterised by inconsistency. This is directly 
related to a lack of dialogue with civil society, federal states and mainly indigenous and 
traditional communities (Cenamo and Lima, 2014). Moreover, it is also related to a lack 
of coordination among the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC), environmental 
policies and development goals (Cenamo et al., 2014). Especially in the legislative 
branch of government, there are characteristics that indicate weakness of the Brazilian 
position in the international sphere, as there is no internal ballast to support it (Reis et al., 
2015). While internationally the country stands as a leader on voluntary commitments 
and actions towards a climate-forest-related approach, internally it presents discrepancy 
in its conduct (the federal government does not always support such actions 
domestically), illustrating the challenges for the development of environmental policies in 
the country (Reis et al., 2015). 
In a wider view, despite all progress related to the sustainable use of natural 
resources, however, it seems not to be enough to deal with the critical situation that the 
planet is facing. Deforestation shows signs of decreasing in several countries but 
continues at a high rate in others. In addition, the humankind is facing other challenges 
                                                 
11 According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Brazil ranked 69th (43 points) 
among 175 countries in 2014. The Corruption Perception Index ranks countries and territories based on how 
corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of 
public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). For 2014, there was no country 
that got a perfect score and more than two-thirds scored below 50. For 2015 the situation has even 
worsened. Brazil scored only 38 points (76th). 
12 Typically the legislative power makes the laws, and the executive power executes and enforces the laws, 
although their exact roles can be determined according to a country's constitution. 
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as increasing poverty, water and energy, security, biodiversity loss, etc. Most of these 
problems and their solutions are inter-related and related to climate change (see IPCC, 
2002, 2014; OECD et al., 2002). A much broader perspective and brand new strategies 
are therefore needed to tackle inequity and to truly reach a sustainable socio-ecological 
transformation of global economies. Thus, an understanding of how sustainable forest 
management policies and practices are vulnerable to climate change, as well as how to 
incorporate uncertainty into decision making is required in order to address the 
challenges and capitalise new opportunities presented by climate change (Williamson et 
al., 2012).  
Moreover, a deeper understanding of different contexts is extremely important for 
such achievement. It is accurate affirm then that Brazil benefits from international 
discussions on REDD+ (as these discussions provide subsidies on how to apply the 
mechanism domestically) and, at the same time this relationship is beneficial to the 
design of the international REDD+ framework (because Brazil can serve as a very 
realistic example). Within this context, the establishment of national strategies is 
essential to convert international commitments based on the optimisation of collective 
interests and, therefore, REDD+ should be implemented within the national policy arena 
that promotes the sustainable forest management. However, REDD+ must go beyond 
tackling also the dependence on fossil fuels and market changes. For example, the 
indirect substitution that takes place when materials that require high volumes of fossil 
fuel to be produced (e.g. steel) are replaced with materials that do not, represents great 
potential in reducing GHG emissions (Galbert et al., 2013). Thus, REDD+ policies should 
create synergies that leads to fossil fuel replacement rather competition among non-
fossil options (Berndes et al., 2016). Galbert et al. (2013) also defend the idea that the 
REDD+ scope should be widened to a more comprehensive perspective that addresses 
the productive use and management of forest resources, including impacts that take 
effect outside of the forest sector. 
Hence, the goal is for the incorporation of the co-dependent relationship between 
good governance and forest-based emission reductions into REDD+ schemes, 
integrating multiple options and generating useful key-scenarios to formulating strategies 
for maintaining forests stand. In this sense, a more consolidated and cooperative 
landscape approach can better measure trade-offs13 between conflicting issues such as 
                                                 
13 The term trade-off involves losing one quality or aspect of something in return for gaining another quality 
or aspect. It is now more generally used for situations where a choice needs to be made between two or 
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food security, energy needs, and the preservation of natural resources (CGIAR, 2013). 
Significant opportunities exist to promote more integrated and multi-functional land uses 
that combine conservation and the production (e.g. timber and/or crop and livestock) and 
other forest products that support livelihoods and provide for both socio-economic and 
environmental functions (Galbert et al., 2013). Brazil could make a substantial 
contribution towards the mitigation of global climate change through the reduction of 
GHG emissions from deforestation and degradation and, simultaneously seek for 
progress on, or perhaps lead in establishing a model for economic development of a low 
carbon economy.  
The results of this study identified key constraints related to the ongoing 
negotiations on the formulation of a national strategy on REDD+ in Brazil. The findings 
guided a multi-disciplinary exercise and laid forthcoming challenges for the successful 
establishment of REDD+ into the policy arena. The study further propounded how 
REDD+ could be addressed as an opportunity to provide pathways for consistent forest 
governance in Brazil. This means, the dissertation identified the regulatory and 
organisational conditions that are most likely to ensure the effective implementation of 
the REDD+ in Brazil. This is necessary to establish the contextual groundwork of 
regulatory and institutional structures, which will be imperative for REDD+ to promote 
better governance practices. Moreover, until currently there have been also few attempts 
to analyse and understand the overall framework of REDD+ (DeShazo et al., 2016). 
Identifying effective approaches must therefore take a multi-disciplinary perspective that 
sheds light on the economic, social and organisational implications of discrete policy and 
regulatory choices (Fosci, 2014). 
 
 
1.3 Research aims  
With the research background in mind, the proposed study: 
 Investigates and understands the overall framework of REDD+ development as a 
national strategy in Brazil; 
 Identifies the major challenges and policy constraints, which undermine this 
development design process; 
                                                                                                                                                 
more things that cannot be had at the same time. It is also a very popular term in the ES literature, covering 
a broader array of occurrences, such as conflicting land-uses, ES incompatibilities, etc. Despite its popularity, 
the intuitive definition of “ES trade-offs” and its antonym “ES synergies” lack conceptual clarity (Turkelboom, 
2016). 
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 Identifies tools, mechanisms and policy areas to address the constraints 
associated with the findings to proffer an analytical reasoning for fundamental 
changes in order to REDD+ to be able to improve domestic forest governance 
within the Brazilian context. 
  
 
1.3.1 Research questions 
 The following research questions are designed to address and achieve the 
research aims: 
 What is the current status of REDD+ development as a national strategy in 
Brazil? 
 What is the Brazilian strategy on REDD+? 
 What are the main challenges related to this development process? 
 What are the weaknesses and strengths of this strategy? 
 What are the legal and political barriers for this implementation? 
 How can this strategy be used as a tool of forest governance in Brazil? 
 What area(s) of domestic policy, if any, should be followed to prioritise REDD+ in 
Brazil? 
 
 
1.4 Research approach and methodology 
 After setting out the context and the aims of this research, in this section the 
methodological approach is outlined.  
 
 
1.4.1 Research strategy 
The choice of research strategy should be based on the aim or research 
questions that are addressed in a study (Zobel, 2005). The case study is chosen as the 
central research strategy for this thesis. It has been largely used as research strategy in 
political science (Yin, 2009). Also, Yin describes the case study as the preferred 
research strategy when the research focus is on contemporary real-life scope and when 
the researcher has little control over the actual behavioural event. Answering the 
research questions developed in the previous section requires the exploration and 
description of the forest governance framework in Brazil. The focus of this work will 
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therefore be on exploratory and descriptive research, mapping the field and providing a 
structured approach to the issue. In other words, the goal of identifying how the REDD+ 
mechanism can be used as tool for the enhancement of governance in the Brazilian 
context has not been previously profoundly explored. Hence, a research that aims to 
cover this issue can be considered exploratory. Moreover, this research must also 
include a deep comprehensive description of different elements for assessing the current 
status of REDD+ development in Brazil. The study can therefore also be considered as 
descriptive in nature. 
A qualitative research methodology offers the opportunity of meeting the needs 
of an exploratory study, because it is possible to observe a process in detail; thus, this 
research is based on qualitative data. The qualitative research method investigates 
questions about the what, how or why of a phenomenon rather than how many or how 
much, which are normally answered by quantitative methods (Patton and Cochran, 
2002). Furthermore, it could enrich the quality and depth of the collected data. Having 
established the research strategy applied in the present study, it is necessary to 
comment on the specific research design of this dissertation. 
 
 
1.4.2 Research design and methods 
For this research, the respondents were selected through purposeful sampling. 
The objective was to compare the views and experiences of the actors. The selected 
respondents are actively involved in REDD+, climate change and forest initiatives at their 
jurisdiction. Personal dialogues (semi-structured interviews, open-ended questions) were 
conducted, but also some of the interviews were responded to electronically (using 
questionnaires). The respondents were divided in two different groups: i) governmental 
and ii) non-governmental stakeholders.14  Governmental stakeholders comprise of all 
actors that are part of the state administration and its institution, working at different 
levels of administrative units (local, regional, national and international) and non-
governmental stakeholders comprise of all actors that are interested in climate change 
and REDD+ at different levels of administrative units (non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), forest based enterprises, universities and research institutions, media and 
consultants). In total, 58 different stakeholders have participated in this research. Among 
                                                 
14 Stakeholders are considered those who have an interest and/or direct relevance in a particular decision, 
either as individuals or representatives of a group. This includes people who influence a decision, or can 
influence it, as well as thought affected by it. 
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governmental stakeholders, 15 different organisations (comprising federal and state 
level) have participated. Concerning non-governmental stakeholders, different sectors 
were reached as it was outlined. For example, respondents were representatives from:  
 Two independent consultants;  
 Six universities (four national and two international);  
 Four private companies; 
 18 Civil Society Organisations, Funds, Foundations (twelve national and 
six international; 
 13 Institutes, NGOs, Non-Profit Organisations (ten national and three 
international). 
 
The use of interview is the most suitable and coherent choice for certain 
evaluations due to their exploratory character, openness and flexibility, which stimulates 
interviewees to think freely and expose their perceptions spontaneously about 
controversial and often non-explicit topics (e.g. poor administration, difficulties in 
accessing finance and political power relationships). Interviews technique should be: i) 
reproducible, ii) systematic, iii) credible and iv) transparent (Patton and Cochran, 2002). 
This study therefore is based on primary and secondary data. Three main types of data 
collection methods were utilized to obtain the necessary information for answering the 
research questions. These included semi-structured interviews (utilizing a previously 
prepared interview guideline) and a questionnaire to collect primary data. Concerning 
secondary data, it was based on a detailed review of published works on topics such as 
climate change, the REDD+ mechanism, the role of tropical forests inside the climate 
debate, the international forest regime, forest governance and several other documents 
(strategic, legislative, policy studies, etc) were examined. 
 
 
1.4.3 Data analysis 
 The research questions were addressed based on the methodology of grounded 
theory, often used in social science within qualitative research (Bryman, 2008). Such 
methodology is systematic, which involves the construction of theory through data 
analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Unlike positivist research, a study using grounded 
theory has a major focus on the evaluation of primary data, repeated ideas, elements 
that are tagged with codes and then grouped into concepts or categories that become 
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clearly apparent with analysis. The writing of the dissertation started with an empirical 
question (how to use REDD+ to enhance domestic forest governance in Brazil?) and, 
subsequently, from this theory, the data collection was outlined. After the interviews with 
the governmental stakeholders were conducted in Brasília, the data was categorised 
and the outcome of these interviews determined the next step of data collection process. 
Each interviewee gave a unique answer and this was the fundament to understand a 
more complete picture of the research context and also being part of the process of 
finding new questions for the non-governmental stakeholders. After the complete data 
analysis, in order to corroborate with the discussion presented throughout this 
dissertation, the analysis returned to theory.   
 The choice of employing grounded theory methodology is built on two major 
considerations as in Fosci (2014): i) theoretical reasoning on regulatory instruments and 
governance must be considered in context and based on evidence if it is to be of any 
assistance to policy-making and ii) abstract treatment of these subjects is important in 
academic debate and increases analytical understanding, but it is not directly applicable 
to particular cases. Research based on observations, experimental evidences and 
interpretations rather than theoretical concepts often lack the comprehensiveness 
necessary to inform policy making, or in other words, they are insufficiently theoretical to 
be applicable across contexts. Grounded theory, on the other hand, provides a synthesis 
between these two approaches which makes the research also relevant for decision 
making. 
 A qualitative content analysis (using the software MAXQDA© version 12) was 
then carried out, which involves the use of derivatives, analytical codes, theories/existing 
and relevant explanations for the research focus (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Qualitative 
content analysis goes beyond purely counting words to examining language deeply for 
the purpose of classifying large amounts of text into an efficient number of categories 
that represent similar meanings (Weber, 1990), which means focusing also on the 
contextual meaning of the text. In the initial phase, a first reading of the interviews was 
conducted to get a first impression of the texts (conventional content analysis 
approach)15 and, based on previous studies and theories discussed in this dissertation 
(directed content analysis approach), a list of codes was created to label and classify the 
                                                 
15 In a conventional content analysis, categories are derived from data during data analysis. The researcher 
is usually able to gain a richer understanding of a phenomenon with this approach. With a directed content 
analysis, the researcher uses existing theory or prior research to develop the initial coding scheme prior to 
beginning to analyze the data. As analysis proceeds additional codes are developed, and the initial coding 
system is revised and refined (Kyngas and Vanhanen, 1999).  
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material from the interviews. The data were then coded according to the topics relevant 
to the research questions: 
 Governance constraints; 
 Institutional weaknesses;  
 Cross-sector interaction; 
 Distribution of benefits; 
 Rights of indigenous communities, forest dwelling and forest dependent 
communities 
 Policy linkages; 
 Participation on decision-making process; 
 Transparent safeguard system; 
 Finance structure; 
 Monitoring system; 
 Technical requirements (scope, leakage, permanence, baseline). 
 
 Furthermore, new codes were added based on the most common problems 
presented in the data (e.g, social inequality, land tenure conflict, corruption and 
bureaucracy, low institutional capacity, political will, conflict of interests, etc). At this 
stage, each encoded piece of text was assigned to a specific topic. Sometimes two or 
more subjects were coded to a text excerpt because of its relevance to both. This coding 
aimed to summarise, condense and organise text snippets of different interviews, in 
accordance with the main topic of this dissertation. All approaches to qualitative content 
analysis require a similar analytical process of seven regular steps, including: i) 
formulating the research questions to be answered; ii) selecting the sample to be 
analysed; iii) defining the categories to be applied; iv) outlining the coding process; v) 
implementing the coding process; vi) determining trustworthiness and vii) analysing the 
results of the coding process (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Kaid, 1989). 
 
 
1.5 Trustworthiness and limitations of the research 
 William Bruce Cameron wrote: ‘not everything that can be counted counts and, 
not everything that counts can be counted’ (Cameron, 1963). Although Flick et al. (2000) 
declares that qualitative research has become firmly established, concerns and criticism 
remain. Critiques towards qualitative research are mostly centered on the validity and 
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reliability of findings (Yin, 2009). While interpretations are an essential element of 
qualitative research, results achieved via inductive reasoning 16  can not be proved 
beyond doubt and, therefore they need to be well founded using reasoned arguments 
(Mayiring, 2002). Thus, this dissertation is based on communicative validation, which 
means, the discussion of the results is used to validate the findings (Mayiring, 2002). At 
this level of discussion empirical primary-data gathered first-hand is treated no differently 
from evidence derived from the literature. In order to complement and address concerns 
regarding the internal validity of the results, different methods of data collection were 
used to answer the research questions, as an instrument to ensure the quality of the 
gathered data. Although some specialists argue that the production of similar findings 
from different methods merely provides corroboration (Barbour, 2001), for Mays and 
Pope (2000), patterns of convergence can be seen as a way of ensuring 
comprehensiveness and encouraging a more reflexive analysis of the data. On the other 
hand, the exploration of elements in the data that contradict, or seem to contradict the 
emerging explanation of the phenomena under study, may also improve the quality of 
explanations in qualitative research (Mays and Pope, 2000). Reliability of this present 
research is ensured through the provision of the references utilized, description of 
stakeholders interviewed as well as explanation of research design and methodology. 
Also, the semi-structured guideline and questionnaire are presented in Annex I and II.  
In this research, as previously mentioned, face-to-face interviews and 
questionnaires are used for data collection. Both methods have strengths as well as 
weaknesses. Personal interviews are often conducted in an agile way, and researchers 
are able to gather data rapidly (Patton and Cochran, 2002). Also, face-to-face interviews 
enable the respondent to elaborate better on difficult questions (Jäckle et al., 2006). On 
the other hand, some criticisms are associated with the uncertainty that the researcher 
must deal, because it is controversial if the interviewee is constantly telling the truth or 
not. In other words, some interviewees could be willing to please the researcher. In order 
to not influence the interviewees’ answers, they were left uninformed about the 
theoretical ideas which led to the construction of the interview guidelines. Moreover, 
interviews are challenging to conduct. However, these arguments simply illustrate the 
limits to what could be inferred from such data. Questionnaires have the benefit of being 
the same for all respondents in the research. On the one hand, questionnaires do not 
                                                 
16 Inductive reasoning is the reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying strong evidence for 
the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the 
conclusion of an inductive argument is probable, based upon the evidence given. 
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vary from respondent to respondent, during the data collection. On the other hand, 
questionnaires require that each respondent has a fairly good understanding of the 
research being conducted (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992). That is the main reason why the 
respondents were selected through purposeful sampling. 
 
 
 1.6 Structure of dissertation 
This document is divided into seven independent chapters followed by the 
references and annexes. Chapter one introduces the research background and provides 
the information needed to understand the research context. Also, the research problems, 
the research objectives, the methodological approach and the research limitations are 
introduced. The next chapter, Chapter two, explores the sustainable forest landscape 
governance approach as the overarching concept for the effective implementation of 
REDD+ in Brazil. Chapter three focuses on the role of forest issues in international 
politics. It examines the forest development context in international agreements 
centering the focal point on the relationship between forest and climate change. In 
Chapter four, the REDD+ mechanism is introduced. The chapter explores several 
aspects of the mechanism in order to provide a substantial understanding of its role in 
the climate agreement umbrella. It also examines the high complexity of technical 
requirements, as well as social, political, economic and institutional issues related to the 
REDD+ framework. Chapter five focuses on the Brazilian context in the climate debate. 
It starts with an overview of Brazil. It describes the context of forest conservation in the 
country and explores the evolution of the Brazilian position concerning climate change 
and forest-related issues as well as the development of domestic forest-climate-related 
measures. It ends discussing and introducing the context of REDD+ in Brazil. Chapter 
six presents the findings related to the research questions that guide the study, meaning 
that, in this chapter, the findings of the research are presented, discussed and 
interpreted. Finally, Chapter seven concludes the thesis and exposes lessons learned. 
The references and annexes are presented at the end of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 Building a Conceptual Framework  
Chapter two explores the sustainable forest landscape governance approach as 
the overarching concept for the effective implementation of REDD+ in Brazil, introducing 
conceptualisation and ideas for further discussion on how Brazil could use REDD+ to 
enhance domestic forest governance. The main conception related to the development 
of the thesis is to identify policies’ areas, measures and tools to approach forest 
governance at landscape level as the groundwork approach to be adopted in the 
formulation of the Braziian REDD+ strategy. The chapter starts defining the concept of 
governance. 
 
 
2.1 Defining governance 
 The complexity of governance (as a theoretical concept) is difficult to capture in a 
simple definition. Rhodes (1996) states, for example, that the term governance is 
popular but imprecise. Literature shows several different conceptions about what is 
defined as governance. Interestingly, Graham et al. (2003) begin their paper defining 
what governance is not. They argue that governance is “not” synonymous with 
government. But governance is related to how governments and other social 
organisations interact, how they relate to people, and how decisions are taken among 
the actors involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or 
reproduction of social norms and institutions (Graham et al., 2003). Differently, Cabello 
and Gilbertsson (2012) state that governance seems to remove the ideas of direct 
authority and power from the government while altering it as an apolitical “practice”. For 
Bevir (2013), governance refers to all of processes of governing, whether undertaken by 
a government, market or network, whether over a community, family, tribe, formal or 
informal organisation or territory and whether through the laws, norms, power or 
language. For Pierre (2000), governance refers to sustaining coordination and 
coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives. In this 
context, governance does not need to be conceptualised in the meaning of “authorities 
having power over”, but rather, can be realised in the form of “government exercising 
power with", as the involved actors strive together to solve common problems or 
accomplish shared goals (Foucault, 1991). While this definition gives credence that 
governance is broader than government, Pierre and Peters (2000) perceives 
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governance as a more State-centric concept. They define governance as processes in 
which the State plays a leading role, making priorities and defining goals.  
 Hirst (2000) offers a more general definition of the concept, considering 
governance as the means by which an activity is controlled or directed in a way that it 
delivers an acceptable range of outcomes according to some established principles. The 
World Bank (1993) defines governance as the method through which power is exercised 
in the management of a country’s political, economic and social resources for 
development. The World Bank focus on governance reflects the worldwide thrust toward 
political and economic liberalisation. The UNDP in its policy paper from 1997 defined 
governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affairs at all levels, comprising the mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which the population articulate their interests, exercise their legal 
rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. In other words, the term 
governance enlarges and better illustrates what governments should be focusing on. 
This dissertation combines such definitions and fundaments itself on the conceptual 
framework of governance that leaders through a participatory process may be able to 
reconcile different political, social and economic perspectives with regard to the 
sustainable use of natural resources as a basis for sustainable development. 
Furthermore, some defend the idea that most of the crises in developing countries are of 
a governance nature. Thus, the contemporary adjustment package emphasises 
governance issues such as transparency, accountability17 and judicial reform. In this 
context, a new way of looking at governance (more as a policy concept) was introduced; 
which defines the term “good governance”. This concept often emerges as a model to 
compare ineffective economies with viable economies. 
 Defining the principles of good governance is difficult and controversial. 
According to the World Bank, good governance entails robust public sector management 
(efficiency, effectiveness and economy), accountability, exchange and free flow of 
information (transparency), and a legal framework for development (justice, respect for 
human rights and liberties). A more succinct definition of good governance is offered by 
Hirst (2000) who proposes that good governance means creating an effective political 
framework conducive to private economic action: i) stable regimes; ii) the rule of law; iii) 
efficient State administration adapted to the roles that governments can actually perform 
                                                 
17 Accountability is related to notions of responsibility, referring to the willingness to accept responsibility 
(Biermann and Gupta, 2011). 
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and iv) a strong civil society independent of the State. On the other hand, the UNDP 
(1997) enunciated a set of principles that have a claim to universal recognition (table 1), 
grouping those under five broad themes. However, it is recognised that these principles 
are complex and conflicting at some point, playing out in practice according to the actual 
social context (Graham et al., 2003). In the context of REDD+, the five good governance 
principles may be use to prepare an effective institutional framework integrating 
governance and regulatory systems to ensure the implementation of national strategies 
on REDD+. 
 
Table 1 The five good governance principles 
The Five Good 
Governance 
Principles 
Related UNDP text on which they are based 
 
1. Legitimacy and 
Voice 
Participation: anyone affected by or interested in a decision should 
have the opportunity to participate in the process for making that 
decision. This can happen in several ways such as, community 
members may be provided with information, asked for their opinion, 
given the opportunity to make recommendations or be part of the 
actual decision-making process. Such broad participation is built on 
freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to 
participate constructively 
 
Consensus orientation: good governance mediates differing 
interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest 
of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures 
2. Direction Strategic vision: leaders and the public have a broad and long-term 
perspective on good governance and human development, along 
with a sense of what is needed for such development.  There is also 
an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in 
which that perspective is grounded 
3. Performance Responsiveness: local government should always try to serve the 
needs of the entire community while balancing competing interests 
in a timely, appropriate and responsive manner 
 
Effectiveness and Efficiency: local government should implement 
decisions and follow processes that make the best use of the 
available people, resources and time to ensure the best possible 
results for their community 
4. Accountability  Accountability: accountability is a fundamental requirement of good 
governance. Local government has an obligation to report, explain 
and be answerable for the consequences of decisions it has made 
on behalf of the community it represents. This accountability differs 
depending on the organizsations and whether the decision is internal 
or external 
 
Transparency: transparency is built on the free flow of information.  
Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to 
those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to 
understand and monitor them 
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5. Fairness Equity: a community’s wellbeing results from all of its members 
feeling their interests have been considered by council in the 
decision-making process. This means that all groups, particularly the 
most vulnerable, should have opportunities to participate in the 
process 
 
Rule of Law: legal frameworks should be fair and enforced 
impartially, particularly the laws on human rights. This means that 
decisions are consistent with relevant legislation or common law and 
are within the powers of council 
Source: Adapted from Graham et al., 2003 
  
 The concept of governance has over the years gained momentum and a wider 
meaning. Apart from being an instrument of public affairs management, or a gauge of 
political development, governance has become a useful instrument to enhance the 
legitimacy of the public domain. It has also become an analytical framework or approach 
to comparative politics. But the actual meaning of the concept depends on the level of 
governance (global, international, national, sub-national, organisational, local) as well as 
it depends on the goals to be achieved and the approach being followed. Under the term 
governance, to a certain extent, the field of environmental policy has been paradigmatic 
of the search towards new manners of political guide (Görg, 2007). 
 
 
2.2 Sustainable forest landscape approach 
 On account of the complexity of sustainable forest management and the 
ineffectiveness of many sector-based activities that neglect the cross-sector linkages 
between forestry, agriculture, nature conservation and economic development, there is 
increased recognition of the importance of landscape approaches (van Oosten, 2013). 
Today, maintenance of ecosystem services, conservation of biodiversity, rural 
development and human well-being are new additional objectives to the previously goals 
of sustaining the yields of wood, food and energy (Axelsson et al., 2012). At the same 
time there are new risks and uncertainties linked to climate change, economic 
globalisation, energy security and water supply which should also be addressed. 
Consequently, adaptive governance and management are needed (Axelsson et al., 
2012).  
 In response to this, the concept of forest landscape governance is currently being 
developed to stimulate such integration, aiming to preserve and restore degraded forests 
in human landscapes (van Oosten, 2013). Land-use planning efforts are embracing the 
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more integrated, holistic approach of a landscape as a series of inter-dependent natural 
and human systems (CI, 2011). With the increasing importance of the concept of forest 
landscape governance, the topic becomes also relevant to the Brazilian context. 
Conflicting sectoral policies that prioritise agribusiness and decentralisation without 
adequate training characterise the institutional governance framework applied to forest 
landscapes in Brazil (Gebara, 2015a). Therefore, it is even more important to 
understand the obstacles present in the transition to a more integrated model of 
governance of forest landscapes and factors that may contribute to this process in the 
country. 
 At this point, it is useful to provide a definition of the concept of a landscape. 
There are several definitions of what constitutes a landscape with many variants of the 
definition depending on the research or management context. From an ecological 
perspective, a landscape can be defined as mosaic of interacting ecosystems (at any 
scale), spatially heterogeneous in at least one factor of interest (Forman and Godron, 
1986; Turner et al., 2001). On the other hand, landscapes can also be seen as stages of 
processes, resulting from socio-economic, cultural, institutional or natural factors and 
influences (Brascamp, 2013). Guilmour (2008) defines landscape as a unique mosaic 
(because of the structure and the arrangement of its different components) of different 
biophysical and social components, such as different land uses, land owners, 
vegetation, human areas, etc. The inter-related land-use mosaic explains the many 
different functions that a landscape can have, being called services, when these 
functions or benefits are valued by people (van den Dries, 2013). Moreover, landscape 
is a result from practices of society and nature relations, which is shaped by customs, 
rights and duties (Penker, 2009). In this dissertation as adopted in Brascamp (2013), the 
landscape is defined as an area in which humans interact with the environment for 
social, economic, cultural, and natural purposes, being seen as a continuous process of 
changes over time. 
 The disparity in definitions makes it difficult to establish consistent management 
policies. The essential beginning in any landscape-level management endeavour, 
nevertheless, is to define the landscape, which is not necessarily defined by its size, but 
rather it is defined by an interacting mosaic of patches relevant to the phenomenon 
under consideration (McGarigal, 2016). However, the landscape scale for governance 
processes is significant since it links multi-level politics to natural-spatial conditions (van 
den Dries, 2013). In this sense, landscape governance is regarded as a way of bringing 
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spatial decision-making closer to those directly affected by spatial decisions; it considers 
landscapes as the ideal space for multiple stakeholders to negotiate and dialogue on 
their needs and options on collective decisions about the organisation of their space 
(van Oosten, 2013). Landscape at the meso-level is increasingly seen as valuable to 
facilitate governance processes since it combines societal factors with natural factors 
and is able to connect different scales for finding solutions (Görg, 2007). However, 
frequently landscapes are not represented in planning and decision-making processes of 
governmental actions (Rietbergen-McCracken et al., 2007).  
 The term landscape approach to support sustainable development as a societal 
process in order to achieve sustainability on the ground is originated from the 
conservation discourse (Angelstam et al., 2013). It promoted as an understanding that 
sustainable responses to conservation often required the involvement of local people 
living in the area, describing this way the social learning process where stakeholders 
concrete participate in the development and implementation of sustainable management 
solutions (Angelstam et al., 2013). This understanding has grown to a paradigm shift in 
conservation realm (Singer, 2007). Sustainability of landscapes is often related to their 
multi-functionality, an important paradigm within sustainable development thinking 
(Selman, 2008; Southern et al., 2010). However, distinguishing between sustainable 
development and sustainability is relevant because in many cases the close association 
between the two concepts has caused “sustainable development” to be isolated as 
simply environmental, although the concept is intended to facilitate coordination between 
social, environmental and economic aspects.  
 Sustainability is the ability of a human system, natural or mixed, to resist or adapt 
to endogenous or exogenous change indefinitely (Dovers and Handmer, 1992). In 
contrast, sustainable development is a way of intentional change and improvement that 
keeps or increases this attribute of the system meeting the needs of the population 
(Sartori et al., 2014). Sustainable development can therefore be considered the path to 
achieving sustainability, that is, sustainability is the ultimate long-term goal. Apart from 
the ecological and physical appraisal of urban/rural/natural environments, the multi-
functionality of the landscape (its structure and functions) have been inserted within the 
context of the entire natural and cultural dynamics of any region to emphasise a 
consistent “asset-based local development” (Kaplan, 2014). It is precisely this hybrid 
character of landscape concept, which intrinsically links societal and natural services 
provision to one another that ensure that cultural, aesthetic, economic and social 
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dimensions are as much involved as ecological functioning (Janssen and Knippenberg, 
2012). The landscape approach is at the centre of sustainability and sustainable 
development rhetoric as a domain of this hybrid human-environmental interaction, 
inducing a shift in land use. 
 The global concern about biodiversity loss and climate change effects has been 
supporting the concept of sustainable forest landscape governance. This debate has 
stimulated policy makers to restore ecological connectivity by scaling up scattered local 
conservation initiatives to larger spatial units, strengthening their resilience and 
increasing carbon stocks (van Oosten, 2013). The global agenda on food security, social 
resilience and sustainable land use has been a second driver, highlighting the 
complexity of forests as elements of anthropogenic landscapes. It has also highlighted 
that productive land-use systems do not necessarily reduce the biodiversity of natural 
ecosystems, but rather increase the bio-cultural diversity of landscapes (Wiersum, 
2003). However, within the policy arena, use and management of landscapes are often 
unsustainable (Butchart et al., 2010), and multiple stakeholders act independently of 
each other (Young, 2013).  
 There are several gaps between policies for natural resource governance and 
what is practiced on the ground (Angelstam et al., 2013). Building multi-sector 
governance for sustainable development of landscapes is indeed not an easy task for 
authorities and institutions. This means that the participation of non-state stakeholders in 
decision-processes on the different levels of governance as well a stronger 
decentralisation in policy implementation is advocated (Newig and Fritsch, 2009). 
Although it is assumed that the nature of participation (or even its absence) in 
governance decisions affects outcomes, little is known about this relationship and how 
participation concrete influences over governance effectiveness (Newig and Fritsch, 
2009).  
 As such, multi-level governance18 raised new and important questions about the 
role, power and authority of governments, evolving over time and addressing a more 
network-like structure of policy-making (Conzelmann, 2008). A network can be seen as 
                                                 
18 Originally, multi-level governance (MLG) is an approach in political science and public administration 
theory that originated from studies on European integration, which discovered that authority was shifting not 
only from central states up to Europe, but also down to sub-national authorities (Hooghes and Marks, 1996). 
Within the European context, MLG emphasized both the increasingly frequent and complex interactions 
between governmental actors and the increasingly important dimension of non-state actors that are 
mobilised in cohesion policy-making and in the EU policy more generally (Hooghes and Marks, 2003). The 
concept was developed as a tool of pure research, but recently motivates policy makers as well. 
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the links between the public and private sector in the implementation of policies, dealing 
with problems or situations that occur on a regional level (van Waarden, 1992). 
Stakeholders involved in these network structures are state (policy makers) and private 
actors and interest groups, which are inter-dependent in terms of problem solving 
(Spaargaren, 1997). Through these networks, interaction processes between 
stakeholders emerge to delineate problems and to achieve consent (Spaargaren, 1997). 
The stand of stakeholders and political decision-making processes play a relevant role in 
how governance works (Görg, 2007). In this sense, governments should guide 
stakeholders and policy development into the direction that is desired at that moment, 
and should give the involved actors sufficient favourable circumstances to be involved in 
the policy-making process and implementation of activities (Brascamp, 2013). Therefore, 
form this perspective it has become increasingly evident that regional and local 
decisions are essential in the design of environmental strategies to respond. 
 Landscape governance will require a high degree of collaboration to connect 
contrasting sectors, to integrate complex institutional layers, and to engage multiple 
stakeholders in the sustainable development of cultural landscapes (Görg, 2007). Since 
multi-level cooperation and multi-sectoral coordination are essential to an inclusive and 
participatory approach to landscape conservation, the goal is to stimulate and integrate a 
mutual win-win scenario between sectoral interests by a “conservation through 
development” approach (Janssen and Knippenberg, 2012). However, considerable 
challenges, conflicts and opposition could emerge. First, there are complex trade-offs 
among goals, which does not guarantee that this win-win situation will be created. 
  Also, multiple sectors with management responsibility at different societal levels 
of governance are challenged with sharing power and improving collaboration among 
stakeholders in social-ecological systems (Adger and Jordan, 2009). Also, to consider 
risks and uncertainties related to continually evolving expectations from society is 
needed as well as from variable market demands and economic crises (Barnes, 2006) 
and, to climate change (Johnston and Williamson, 2007). Dealing with all of this 
complexity is the predominant challenge for civil, private, and public sectors (Komiyama 
et al., 2011). For Janssen and Knippenberg (2012), resistance lies mostly in the manner 
of consulting and involving local interests, rather than possible economic losses to local 
livelihoods arising from acceptance. By working cooperatively with local stakeholders, 
local, regional and national levels of government should aim to increase regional 
resources creation. This will give greater importance to rural areas, and conceive more 
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acceptances for landscape conservation among the local population and increasing 
awareness among people about forests and the natural environment. 
 
 
2.3 Governance in the REDD+ context 
 It is well recognised that the consequences of the pressure on the environment 
are becoming increasingly inter-linked and globalised, requiring a higher level of 
adaptive capacity of governance regimes in order to deal with such challenges. On the 
one hand, although it has been many years since the pressure had risen for a more 
authoritative response to global forest loss – even though the international community 
has failed to reach a commitment in a global forest convention – the REDD+ discourse is 
the most recent chapter in several decades of developments in international forest law 
and governance (Asselt and McDermott, 2016). On the other hand, given the global 
nature of the problems associated with climate change and its relationship with forests, 
an international response to this concern has been required. Within this context, REDD+ 
has become likewise a critical focus of global climate change efforts. The REDD+ 
structure will affect or be affected by forest governance, it can influence forest 
governance or be undermined by its failures even though it is not primarily focused to be 
a governance reform. Therefore, the REDD+ framework will depend on good forest 
governance to become an efficient, effective and equitable regime.  
 The broadened definition of REDD+ has incited the creation of new bi- and multi-
lateral agreements, prompting a shift in which sustainable measures (e.g. agriculture) 
and low-emissions development are prioritised alongside forest conservation, affecting 
domestic structures of governance in tropical countries (CI, 2011). In this sense, it is 
because of its multi-faceted nature that REDD+ offers the opportunity to deal with 
deforestation drivers, emissions reduction, actors and different sources of complexity 
concomitantly, in a more integrated manner. On the other hand, the multi-dimensional 
indirect and unintended effects originated from such schemes should explicitly be 
addressed in policy design and implementation to deal with possible trade-offs between 
different aspects of such scope, for example, the bias favouring certain ecosystem 
services (Makkonen et al., 2015).  
 In order to establish REDD+, nevertheless, boosting accountability, capacity 
building, participation of all stakeholders and improved coordination and transparency 
are needed (Ozinga, 2012). However, most countries developing a REDD+ framework 
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have vulnerable governance structures, constituting one of the main challenges for its 
implementation (Fosci, 2013). Regardless of the constitutional form of government, 
environmental governance calls for a narrowing of the policy “gaps” among levels of 
government via the adoption of tools for vertical and horizontal cooperation. The vertical 
dimension recognises that national governments cannot effectively implement policies 
and strategies without working closely with regional and local governments as agents of 
change. Here, local capacity building and incentives for effectiveness of sub-national 
levels of government are crucial issues for improving the quality and coherence of public 
policy. On the other hand, to take action, federal states and municipalities cannot be 
effective and do not operate in isolation from other parts of government, this means the 
horizontal dimension of governance refers to co-operation arrangements between 
regions or between municipalities (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). 
 The opportunity presented by REDD+ is unprecedented but there are also risks 
which should be considered within this context (Cadman and Maraseni, 2011). Failing to 
tackle problems of deficient institutional capacity and coordination as those 
aforementioned obstacles may intensify current conflicts over the use of natural 
resources and risk creating perverse outcomes for forest-dependent people, forest 
ecosystems and the global climate (Vatn and Angelsen, 2009). Looking at several 
national REDD+ plans, however, it is noticed that mostly countries focus on 
measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) on carbon emissions, rather than on 
MRV on governance and safeguards, making it complicated to lead to better governance. 
Monitoring social and environmental impacts is needed to truly promote co-benefits. 
According to Vatn and Angelsen (2009), tasks to be performed by national REDD+ 
architectures should mainly be related to coordination, channeling international funding, 
monitoring, safeguards and governance. This means that governance structures should 
also focus on how suitable the actions are for national authorities, civil society, local 
communities, donors and other international organisations engaged in REDD+ activities. 
 Rather than solely to constrain or modify the behaviour of countries in order to 
address global dilemmas, the ultimate goal of many international and transnational 
endeavours is to influence domestic policymaking processes (Eba’a Atyi et al., 2010). 
This is reflected in the context of forest governance because, while forest resources lie 
within state borders, the consequences of their misuses or conservation may have 
global implications (Eba’a Atyi et al., 2010). The success of REDD+ as an international 
mechanism will therefore further depend on the existence of governance arrangements 
 34
that are also able to deliver both GHG emission reductions at significant scale (i.e. solve 
the problem), as well as being transparent and involving the participation of multiple 
stakeholders (Cadman and Maraseni, 2011).  
 While forest governance arrangements determine how the main questions 
regarding forests, livelihoods and sustainability will be answered under REDD+ schemes 
(Larson and Petkova, 2011), the climate governance discourse reflects the growing 
preference for social-political forms of multi-stakeholder interaction, functioning at multi-
levels and including NGOs and the private sector with decentralised networks (Haas, 
2002; Juhola and Westerhoff, 2011). Many decades of international environmental 
conservation efforts have shown that usually governments alone cannot ensure forest 
conservation even if they were indeed committed to it (Kashwan and Holahan, 2014; 
Ostrom, 2010). Thus, in order to establish REDD+ frameworks to include methods that 
engage representatives of a range of non-state interests, including forest dependent, 
civil society organisations, and the private sector will be demanded. However, often the 
final decision continues to be in the hands of the government (Peterson, 2003). That 
said, forest governance in context of REDD+ is a complex and fragmented issue as it 
also holds diversified interests of individuals and communities, which are now taking part 
in formulating, negotiating and implementing policies across different scales and 
productive sectors (Sharma and Kohli, 2012). Nonetheless, Cabello and Gilbertson 
(2012) argue that governance results in a political process which determines whose 
authority and power establishes and plays with the “rules of the game” and, as a 
consequence, who will gain and lose. 
 Although nationally-owned policy frameworks usually follow international 
directives and benefit from international guidance, it is clear that the success of REDD+ 
will depend on effective implementation at domestic level. The national REDD+ 
architecture should target on decisions about what are legitimate 19  governance 
principles (including functioning legal enforcement) and distribution of responsibilities, 
and how the trade-offs involved should be dealt with (Ozinga, 2012). For example, an 
institutional structure delivering cost-efficient results in terms of GHG emissions 
reductions may not deliver satisfactorily on other important goals, such as poverty 
reduction. The way the system is set up will strongly influence the handling of such 
                                                 
19 Legitimacy is a core analytical issue for governance, and commonly describes the state or quality of being 
legitimate, this means, to be in accord with established legal norms or requirements or; principles, accepted 
rules and standards of behaviour (Biermann and Gupta, 2011). 
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trade-offs, the costs of coordination (transaction costs), 20  the motivations of those 
involved and hence the overall outcomes. Upfront transaction costs may be raised in 
nested and less centralised approaches for REDD+ institutional frameworks. Although in 
this case the federal government may bare the largest share of costs, to be efficient, the 
government should be protective in defending the maintenance of natural resources for 
present and future generations from rash and reckless spoliation (Micheletti et al., 2015; 
Pigou, 1932).  
 In this sense, tropical countries that clarify tenure arrangements (improving land-
use planning and zoning) and address illegality are expected to benefit more from 
REDD+ investments than those that do not address such difficulties (Saunders et al., 
2008). This means, certainly without such fundamental changes, REDD+ may not be 
able to improve forest governance in REDD+ countries. However, there is still little 
evidence showing that existing REDD+ schemes are improving forest governance and 
strengthening local peoples’ tenure rights (Ozinga, 2012). Past efforts have failed to 
achieve transformational21  change, often because they did not adequately take into 
account the inherent complexity and inter-connected nature of the diverse actors, rules 
and practices that comprise governance of landscapes (Vatn and Angelsen, 2009). 
Therefore, it is required for countries to establish a proper understanding of how existing 
regimes interact with REDD+ in addition to how new rules or mechanisms will operate. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20Transaction cost includes learning costs, legal costs, bargaining costs, and other costs incurred when two 
parties trade with each other (game rules and refereeing). For example, these are costs related to the 
monitoring of carbon benefits and benefit-sharing agreements. 
21 High ambition is needed to combat climate change and its effects. This conviction drove the decision to 
implement the Green Climate Fund (GCF) of the UNFCCC and other climate finance instruments. Despite 
the increasing use of the term in the climate context, there is no generally acknowledged definition of 
transformational change. The GCF has to date not defined what a paradigm shift might mean in concrete 
terms. Likewise, the NAMA Facility another promoter of the transformational change concept, currently 
foregoes an explicit definition of what is meant by transformational change in its funding context (Mersmann 
et al., 2014). However, initiatives submitted to the NAMA Facility do have to argue how they will contribute to 
a transformation within a sector or on a national level. For Mersmann et al. (2014), given the complexity of 
the topic, it is understandable that such institutions choose to describe aspects that might contribute to 
“transformational change” instead of a definition that may raise a political debate. Although the definition 
used is not precise enough to clearly determine whether a specific process can be considered 
transformational or not, there is a shared belief that an elemental change is demanded to prevent climate 
change dangerous effects and to ensure a globally sustainable development. Such a change cannot merely 
arise from changing technologies or simple structures. It must entail a holistic approach as an integrated 
system (Mersmann et al., 2014). 
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CHAPTER 3 Forests and International Relations 
 In order to understand what caused the climate regime to become the main locus 
of political discussions on forests, first we need to understand the international context 
on this topic. Therefore, chapter three begins with one question: Is there an international 
forest regime? Further, the chapter discusses the role of forests in the climate change 
framework. It also examines how this topic evolved from the policy domain to the 
development of a market mechanism under the climate agreement umbrella.  
  
 
3.1 International forest policies: institutional context 
Although, it is recognised worldwide that forestlands should be conserved and 
protected, no single international regime (or convention) exists for the political issue 
primarily focused on forests in which the entire socio-economic and environmental 
aspects of forest ecosystems are included (Carvalho, 2010). The substantive focus of 
forest-related instruments ranges from the protection of biodiversity, to climate change 
mitigation, to the expansion of global trade (McDermott et al., 2007). However, the 
current literature provides several answers as to whether a forest regime exists, ranging 
from no regime (see Rayner et al. 2010) to the existence of a non-regime (see Dimitrov, 
2005) to a forest regime (see Tarasofsky, 1999; Humphreys, 2006) to an international 
forest regime-complex (see Howlett and Rayner, 2010). The basic advancement of the 
interpretation of a non-regime, however, lies in its ability to grasp a particular stage of 
international cooperation between cooperation within a regime and no international 
cooperation at all (Giessen, 2013).  
But first, as far back as 1983 Krasner developed his still valid definition of 
international regimes as the sum of explicit and implicit ‘norms, rules, principles and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
issue area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1983). ‘Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation, and rectitude; norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations; rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action and decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
action’ (Krasner, 1983). In addition, this dissertation proposes as in Carvalho (2010) that 
beyond what Krasner defines, following Dimitrov (2005) as well as Sprinz (2005) and 
Young (2001) an essential characteristic that defines a regime is its effectiveness. 
 37
But Humphreys (2006) suggests the existence of a forest regime based on 
Krasner’s regime definition, even though he characterises the current situation related to 
the forest regime as disconnected, fragmented and multi-centric in order to set up 
management regimes for ensuring their protection and sustainable use, since forests are 
true commons natural resources. Moreover, Humphreys identifies key elements in an 
evolving international forest regime (Giessen, 2013):  
 Hard laws (binding legal instruments), for example, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES);  
 Soft laws (non-legally binding instruments), for example, UNCED Forest 
Principles, Agenda 21 Chapter 11, the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and 
the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests Proposals for Action, and the United 
Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) and also resolutions such as the 2007 “Non-
legally binding instrument on all types of forests”. Although soft law instruments 
are non-legally binding instruments, they are often negotiated in good faith by the 
negotiating parties who expect that the non-binding commitments will be 
performed and achieved (Egute, 2011);  
 Private international law (deals with cases having a foreign element), such as the 
legal chain of custody of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the FSC 
forest management principles. 
 
On the other hand, for Carvalho (2010) all these instruments are at a lower stage 
of existence of an international regime. It seems clear that these several institutional 
arrangements are insufficient to efficiently deal with a complicated issue as natural 
resources use and degradation added the complex economic aspect that should also be 
addressed in these instruments, which brings a bias to the point in question (Carvalho, 
2010). Surely, such “failure” has many causes; however, the political and economic 
importance of forest exploitation was certainly decisive (Fosci, 2014).  
 
 
3.1.1 International forest-related policy initiatives 
Forests can be said to have become a global political concern since the 
establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and 
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its forestry department in 1945 (SIFI, 2010). Likewise, the Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) included environmental issues into their original 
mandates (McDermott, et al., 2007). However, it was not until the 1980s, when tropical 
deforestation became a widely recognised problem, that forests became a global 
politically controversial issue (SIFI, 2010). The first Global Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) was ratified in 1948 promoting the elimination of national import and 
export restrictions in favour of expanded global trade in goods and services (McDermott, 
2007), but environmental issues received relatively little attention in these early multi-
lateral processes.  
Nevertheless, in 1972 the United Nations organised the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm. Moreover, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) was established that same year, as a UN programme primarily 
focused on environmental protection (McDermott et al., 2007). The conference in 1972 
resulted in a non-binding instrument, commonly known as the Stockholm Declaration. 
The Stockholm Declaration established 26 principles to inspire the global community in 
the preservation and enhancement of the human environment (Egute, 2011). The 
Stockholm Conference was characterised by ideological controversy between developed 
and developing countries. The developed countries held the position that the biggest 
threat facing the planet is environmental degradation, while poorer developing countries 
articulated that poverty and consequently greater development would be the main 
reasons for pollution and biodegradation (Nukpezah, 2010). Moreover, the Stockholm 
Declaration formed the basis for environmental reforms and implementation at the 
national level of most developing countries which had no concrete environmental policy 
(Nukpezah, 2010). 
During the 1970’s other key agreements have been ratified including: i) the 
RAMSAR Convention on Wetlands of International Importance – adopted in 1971 and 
entered in to force in 1975; ii) the World Heritage Convention (WHC) – adopted in 1972 
and entered into force in 1975; iii) the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) – 
adopted in 1979 and iv) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) – adopted in 1973 and entered into force in 1975, which focused on governing 
international trade in endangered species or their specimen, whether alive or dead, by 
creating a system of import and export permits (Egute, 2011). 
The World Bank between the years from 1980 and 1995 carried out a review and 
reformed its forest and environmental policy. They have recognised the need to invest in 
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biodiversity conservation and the integration of environmental protection into the goals of 
poverty reduction and economic growth (Egute, 2011). In 1985, the FAO in cooperation 
with the UNEP, the World Bank and the World Resources Institute (WRI), launched the 
Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP). In 1986, the first International Tropical Timber 
Agreement was adopted, along with the establishment of the International Tropical 
Timber Organisation (ITTO). The Brundtland Commission’s report “Our Common Future” 
from 1987 – which came to have a major impact on the agenda of the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (also known as 
the Rio Conference, Rio Summit or Earth Summit) – also established a link between 
economic growth and sustainable development, emphasising the need to curtail the 
destructive impact of development on the environment (Egute, 2011).  
It was at the Rio Conference that a globally coordinated strategy for forests first 
emerged. A number of governmental and non-governmental participants at the UNCED 
pushed for the creation of a legally-binding convention on forests. However, such an 
agreement was not reached (McDermott et al, 2007). Instead, five instruments that 
addressed forest management were produced, including: i) the Chapter 11 (Combating 
Deforestation) of Agenda 2122 focused on human impacts on the environment; ii) the 
Chapter 15 of Agenda 21 focused on the conservation of biological diversity and iii) the 
Forest Principles (formally named as Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of 
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable 
Development of All Types of Forests), a weakened document that makes several 
recommendations for conservation and sustainable development. On the other hand, it 
was the first global agreement concerning sustainability of forest management 
(Kubiszewski and Cleveland, 2012). 
Three major global environmental conventions, known as the “Rio Conventions”, 
were also created as a result from the UNCED. All of these conventions contained 
mandates of direct relevance to forests (McDermott et al., 2007). These agreements, 
which are all housed within the UN, are: i) the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
– adopted in 1992 and entered in force in 1993; ii) the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) – adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994 and iii) the 
                                                 
22 The Agenda 21 is the international plan of action to sustainable development, outlines key policies for 
achieving sustainable development that meets the needs of the poor and recognises the limits of 
development to meet global needs. Agenda 21 has become the blueprint for sustainability and forms the 
basis for sustainable development strategies (adapted from Kubiszewski and Cleveland, 2012). 
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Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) – adopted in 1994 and entered into 
force in 1996.  
The CBD is concerned with forests as habitat for a large number of the world’s 
plant and animal species (McDermott et al., 2007). Moreover, the CBD is based on three 
pillars, which are: i) conservation of biological diversity, ii) sustainable use of its 
components and iii) fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources. 
In other words, its objective is to promote the development of national strategies for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, including appropriate financing 
(Carvalho, 2010). In Brazil, based on the CBD principles, the Decree 4.339/2002 defines 
the rules for the implementation of the national biodiversity policies. Nevertheless, 
Gulbrandsen (2004) and Carvalho (2010) state that the CDB – regarding forest issues – 
promotes much more research and exchange of information than the cooperation for the 
development of political agreement and commitments. 
The UNFCCC recognises forests as carbon “sinks” capable of mitigating the 
effects of the human pollutants contributing to climate change. As it is the focus of this 
dissertation, the UNFCCC area issue is further discussed throughout the subsequent 
chapters. Finally, the UNCCD recognises the role of forests in preventing desertification 
and drought. The UNCCD is worthy of special note as the first multi-lateral 
environmental agreement primarily driven by developing countries (McDermott et al., 
2007). 
Three years after the Rio Summit, in 1995, governments decided to establish the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) and subsequently succeeded in 1997 by way 
of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) – in order to implement the Forest 
Principles and Chapter 11 of Agenda 21 – as subsidiary bodies of the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) under the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) of the UN (Schneider, 2006). The IPF/IFF processes examined a wide range 
of forest-related topics, such issues as the underlying causes of deforestation, traditional 
forest-related knowledge, international co-operation in financial assistance and 
technology transfer, the development of criteria and indicators for sustainable forest 
management, and trade and environment, etc. It has presented its outcome in the form 
of more than 270 proposals for action towards sustainable forest management and 
which are considered collectively as the IPF/IFF Proposals for Action (PfA). Although the 
IPF/IFF PfAs are not legally binding, participants of these processes are under a political 
obligation to implement the agreed proposals for action (Schneider, 2006). 
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In October 2000, ECOSOC created the United Nations Forum on Forests 
(UNFF), thereby providing a more permanent home for the international dialogue on 
forests with a substantially higher level of political authority, which had as its main 
objective to promote ‘the management, conservation and sustainable development of all 
types of forests and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end’ (UN 
ECOSOC, 2000). 23  Also, it aimed to facilitate the implementation of forest-related 
agreements, and to foster a common understanding regarding sustainable forest 
management (McDermott et al., 2007). Through this process, the Collaborative 
Partnership on Forests (CPF) was established to support the work of the UNFF and to 
foster increased cooperation and coordination on forests. Since the UNCED, 
intergovernmental deliberations (IPF, IFF and UNFF) have made evident progress 
towards international forest policy development and policy coordination at the 
international level (Schneider, 2006). However, despite the achievements, deforestation 
and forest degradation continue at threatening rates worldwide.  
The currents of global governance have been shifting again since the UNCED. 
Considering the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in 2002 in 
Johannesburg, until the Rio+2024 (a 20-year follow-up to the 1992 Earth Summit that 
also took place in Rio de Janeiro on 20-22 June 2012)  an increased emphasis is given 
on the social issue of global poverty reduction (McDermott et al., 2007). An 
environmental action may solve an environmental problem, but in the process it may 
simultaneously create a social or economic problem (Hobbs, 2004). Furthermore, it is 
not simply necessary to understand the interplay between environment and poverty but 
to be aware that environmental degradation contributes to poverty and to understand 
that a cause of environmental problems is not only poverty (Hobbs, 2004). Although 
                                                 
23 More detail at: http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/dec/2000/edec2000-inf2-add2.pdf  
24 The Rio+20 resulted in over 700 voluntary commitments:  
 Member States decided to launch a process to develop a set of Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), which will build upon the Millennium Development Goals and converge with the post 2015 
development agenda; 
 The Conference also adopted ground-breaking guidelines on green economy policies; 
 Governments also decided to establish an intergovernmental process under the General Assembly 
to prepare options on a strategy for sustainable development financing; 
 Governments also agreed to strengthen the UNEP on several fronts with action to be taken during 
the 67th session of the General Assembly; 
 They also agreed to establish a high-level political forum for sustainable development;t 
 Governments also requested the United Nations Statistical Commission, in consultation with 
relevant United Nations system entities and other relevant organizations, to launch a programme of 
work in the area of measures of progress to complement gross domestic product in order to better 
inform policy decisions, etc.  
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changes in environmental protection policies framework are required in order to deal 
with global pressures which the world is facing, changes in the nature of environmental 
governance may affect the welfare of households, mainly in those cases where natural 
resources (e.g. forests) play an important role for survival. Therefore, the necessity of 
multi-level, multi-stakeholder governance models, linking the aims of creating a green 
economy and effective global environmental governance is increasing (EEA, 2011). 
 
 
3.2 Forests and climate change 
Forests have the potential to absorb nearly one-tenth of global carbon emissions 
projected for the next 50 years storing this carbon into their biomass, soils and products 
(FAO, 2012). Forests contain approximately 60% of all the carbon stored in terrestrial 
ecosystems (IPCC, 2000). The world’s forest ecosystems are estimated to store around 
638 billion tonnes of carbon (Green Facts, 2015). Due to large data gaps for soil carbon 
in major boreal forests, this figure probably underestimates the total amount of carbon 
stored in forest ecosystems (Green Facts, 2015). 
Unless disturbances occur, forests over time accumulate carbon through the 
growth of trees and the increase of soil organic carbon (Zhou et al., 2006). It is widely 
recognised that juvenile forests sequester carbon at high rates, while in mature forests 
the ecosystem reaches a stable state since carbon sequestration is eventually equals to 
decomposition (Luyssaert et al., 2008). However, Stephenson et al. (2014) argue that 
most of the studies – that support the idea that very old trees absorb less carbon as they 
age – are not based on measurements of individual tree mass growth. They reviewed 
records from forest studies on six continents, involving 673,046 individual trees 
belonging to 403 tropical, sub-tropical and temperate tree species, going back as far as 
80 years ago. They found out that for most species mass growth rate increases 
continuously with tree size (Stephenson et al., 2014). Hence, large old trees do not act 
simply as senescent carbon reservoirs but actively sequester large amounts of carbon 
compared to smaller trees. Nevertheless, it should also be considered that on a forest by 
forest as opposed to tree by tree basis, still, younger stands of trees sequester more 
carbon overall than very old ones (Walsh, 2014). Thus, whether forests act as 
reservoirs, carbon sinks or sources of GHG depends on some factors such as the age of 
the forest, the management regime and human-induced deforestation (Streck and 
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Scholz, 2006). For policymaking, such implications confirm that all kind of natural 
resources should be conserved, protected or at least sustainable managed.   
Deforestation – mainly for the establishment of pasture and agricultural crop or 
other land uses – has the largest land-use change impact on the carbon cycle, both 
through the loss of photosynthetic capacity in forest vegetation and the simultaneous 
release of large carbon stocks25 accumulated in forest ecosystems over long periods of 
time (Apps, 2003). Thus, forests play a vital role in the global carbon cycle, for example, 
forests release carbon through processes of respiration and through the decay of 
organic matter or burning of biomass. Also, forests affect rainfall interception, 
evapotranspiration (ET), water inﬁltration, and groundwater recharge (Pramova et al., 
2012). Moreover, forests also stabilise soil and prevent erosion and landslides, reducing 
further negative impacts of these hazards (partially climate-related) on infrastructure, 
settlements, and water users (Pramova et al., 2012). 
Although forests typically recover from natural disturbance, continued 
disturbance can keep forests from recovering, which means that it is not necessary to 
increase the ability of existing sinks, but it is essential to prevent forests from continuing 
to be massive sources of GHG emissions (Junior et al., 2008). Aside from the key role 
that forests play in the carbon cycle, they also provide many goods and services that 
humanity values highly (Streck and Scholz, 2006). Societies in general rely on these 
services and goods, for raw material inputs, production processes, and climate stability. 
Moreover, another important aspect is related to those livelihoods (principally poorer) 
that depend on natural resources for their subsistence. As a consequence of the human-
induced action, climate change effects will affect most of these goods and services, thus 
causing significant impacts on socio-economic systems and livelihood flows (IPCC, 
2014). Tropical forests are then an important component of mitigation 26  measures, 
however, their role in adaptation is rapidly gaining significance, since forests are 
vulnerable to climate change, those managing or conserving them will have to adapt 
                                                 
25 Carbon stock refers to the amount of carbon stored in the world’s forest ecosystem, mainly in living 
biomass (44%) and soil (46%), but to a lesser extent also in dead wood (6%) and litter (4%) (Green Facts, 
2015). 
26 Mitigation and adaptation are the two main responses to climate change, mitigation seeking to address its 
causes and adaptation aiming to reduce its impacts. In the forest sector: 
 mitigation strategies comprise reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from 
forest degradation; increasing the role of forests as carbon sinks; and product substitution, such as 
using wood instead of fossil fuels for energy and forest products in place of materials whose 
manufacture involves high GHG emissions;  
 adaptation encompasses interventions to decrease the vulnerability of forests and forest-dependent 
people to climate change (FAO, 2015). 
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their management to future conditions (Locatelli et al., 2008). Future actions must focus 
on the sustainable use of natural resources likewise on the contribution of forests on the 
development of livelihood strategies to ensure the continuous provision of these goods 
and services (van Bodegom et al., 2009). In this sense, coping with altered ecological 
conditions while eliminating uncertainties and gaps in knowledge and likewise 
strengthening the international and human dimensions of sustainable forest 
management and conservation constitute realms for major changes (Schoene and 
Bernier, 2011).  
As mentioned, forests and trees can also support climate adaptation strategies, 
for example, family farming and agriculture are threatened by rainfall and temperature 
variability. Hence, the presence of trees in agricultural lands can help maintain 
production under a variable climate and also protect crops against climate extreme 
occurrences (Pramova et al., 2012). The agroforestry system – which combines trees 
and shrubs with crops and/or livestock – is therefore, being increasingly recognised as 
an effective approach for minimising production risks under climate variability and 
change (Verchot et al., 2008). With their deep root systems, trees are able to explore 
deeper soil depths for water and nutrients, which will be advantageous to crops in times 
of drought. Their contribution to increased soil porosity, reduced runoff, and increased 
soil cover leads to increased water inﬁltration and retention, and reduction of moisture-
stress during low rainfall. On the other hand, excess water is pumped out of the soil 
more rapidly in agroforestry plots due to their higher evapotranspiration rates (Pramova 
et al., 2012; Verchot et al., 2008).  
For instance, in the temperate regions, a sustainable land use option receiving 
an increasing amount of interest is an agroforestry model called alley cropping, in which 
woody biomass is produced by integrating parallel strips of fast growing trees into 
conventional agricultural sites, thus simultaneously yielding conventional agricultural 
crops and woody biomass (Grünewald et al., 2007; Tsonkova et al., 2014). In Brazil, 
agroforestry systems such as the integrated crop-livestock-forest system (iCLF) are still 
not broadly adopted, mainly because of their level of complexity compared with 
traditional systems. Also, because the lack of understanding by farmers regarding their 
benefits (de Almeida et al., 2013). Although the government has allocated financial 
resources in terms of credit for development and for technology transfer addressing iCLF 
systems (de Almeida et al, 2013), farmers continue to have difficulties mainly related to 
rural extension contacts, technical assistance and access to financial credit.  
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Furthermore, coastal forests such as mangroves can protect coastal zones from 
tropical storms, sea-level rise, ﬂoods, and erosion due to their ability to absorb and 
dissipate wave energy and stabilise coastal land (Pramova et al., 2012). However, 
controversies exist with regards to the protective role of mangroves during extreme 
storms. Nevertheless, mangrove forests can be very effective in buffering coastal 
settlements from the impacts of lower-grade cyclones, typhoons, coastal ﬂooding, 
erosion, and sea-level rise (Pramova et al., 2012). Uncertainties remain about the 
characteristics of ecosystems in determining their protective role from different types of 
hazards.   
Urban forests and trees can provide shading, evaporative cooling, and rainwater 
interception, storage, and inﬁltration services in cities. They can play a notable role in 
urban adaptation to climate variability and change (Pramova et al., 2012). Trees are 
generally a better option than grasslands for cooling and reducing runoff because they 
are less sensitive to drought. Urban development significantly increases the amount of 
storm water. The increased runoff causes more intense local flooding, while droughts 
during dry weather are deeper and longer (EPA, 2015). Precipitation flows over 
impervious surfaces transporting pollutants, such as oil, heavy metals, and fine 
particulates. This has altered hydrology27 in urban areas and can generate five times as 
much surface runoff as an equivalent area in a forested condition (EPA, 2015). However, 
trees cannot act as a stand-alone solution against flood impacts, and other measures 
might be needed such as green roofs (Gill et al., 2007). The green roofs are based on 
the concept of conversion of impervious surfaces in urban areas into a multi-functional 
land cover that serves both human demands, such as transportation and housing, as 
well as ecological functions, such as storm water retention, energy conversion resulting 
in primary production and habitat creation (Carter and Butler, 2008). 
On the other hand, not only forests can affect climate change, but the global 
changing of climate also does affect the vegetation, significantly impacting ecosystems 
in different latitudinal zones. For example, such impacts could result in changes of tree 
species dominance and diversity, the seasonality of biotic and abiotic processes and 
                                                 
27 Combined effects of urbanisation, industrialisation, and population growth greatly modify landscapes and 
thus the hydrological cycle. Removing vegetation and soil, grading the land surface, and constructing 
drainage networks increase runoff to streams from rainfall and snowmelt. As a result, the peak discharge, 
volume, and frequency of floods increase in nearby streams. Changes to stream channels during urban 
development can limit their capacity to convey floodwaters. Roads and buildings constructed in flood-prone 
areas are exposed to increased flood hazards, including inundation and erosion, as new development 
continues (Konrad, 2003). 
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events, the structure of plant communities, net primary (NPP) and net ecosystem 
productivities (NEP), carbon and nutrient cycling, evapotranspiration and water-use 
efficiency (Olchev et al., 2009). Also, it is likely that changing temperature and 
precipitation patterns will produce a strong direct impact on both natural and planted 
forests (Kirilenko and Sedjo, 2007). Warmer and wetter climates will enhance forest 
growth, while warmer and drier climates will likely be detrimental to growth. Grasses will 
often replace forests in a dry natural system, which means a limitation on moisture 
availability (Bowes and Sedjo, 1993). In addition, mortality may increase in older forests 
stressed by low soil moisture, and regeneration may decrease for species affected by 
low soil moisture and competition with other species during the seedling stage (Vose et 
al., 2012).  
In general, climate change is likely to shift natural forests toward the poles 
(Sedjo, 2010). Rising temperatures drive many living organisms to migrate to cooler 
areas. Such movements involve all species, including plants. Some species will seek 
higher altitudes, others will move further polewards. Most climate models indicate that 
temperature changes will be least at the Equator and increase as the poles are 
approached (Sedjo, 2010). For forests, therefore, the changes should be immense in the 
boreal and temperate countries as boreal forests migrate into areas formerly absent of 
trees, such as parts of the tundra, and temperate forests move into former boreal forest 
areas where soils, photoperiod, and other growing conditions are appropriate (Sedjo, 
2010). Tropical forests may be affected differently, since the anticipated amount of 
temperature warming is lower at those latitudes, even though this issue is not often 
discussed. On the other hand, these same forests may have less tolerance for 
adaptation (Sedjo, 2010).  
Interacting disturbances (such as fire, drought, landslides, species invasions, 
insect and disease outbreaks, hurricanes, windstorms and ice storms) will have the 
biggest effects on ecosystem responses, simultaneously altering species composition, 
structure, and function (Dale et al., 2001; Moore and Allard, 2008; Vose et al., 2012). 
Climate change is expected to impact the susceptibility of forests to disturbances and 
also affect the frequency, intensity, duration, and timing of such disturbances (Moore 
and Allard, 2008). The type and magnitude of disturbances will differ regionally and will 
pose significant challenges for resource managers to mitigate and reduce damage to 
resource values (Vose et al., 2012). For example, increased drought will exacerbate 
stress complexes that include insects, fire, and invasive species, leading to higher tree 
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mortality, slow regeneration in some species, and altered species agglomeration. In this 
sense, as a consequence of a changing climate the disturbance dynamics of native 
forest insect pests and pathogens should be altered (Moore and Allard, 2008; Mortsch, 
2006). Moreover, invasive species will likely become more widespread, especially in 
areas subject to increased disturbance and in dry forest ecosystems (Vose et al., 2012).  
The change in frequency of extreme events can result in substantial economic 
damage to forest sector (Kirilenko and Sedjo, 2007). These effects of climate extremes 
on commercial forestry are region-specific and include reduced access to forestland, 
increased costs for roads and facility maintenance, direct damage to trees by wind, 
snow, frosts, or ice, effects of wetter winters and early thaws on logging, etc. High wind 
events can damage trees through branch breaking, crown loss, trunk breakage, or 
complete stand destruction, especially caused by faster build-up of growing stocks in a 
warmer climate (Kirilenko and Sedjo, 2007). Production patterns and trade in forestry 
commodities will be also altered as species are grown more competitively in higher 
latitudes and altitudes. On the contrary, markets may be saturated due to increased 
mortality of trees following pest infestations (Moore and Allard, 2008). Furthermore, 
forests with low productivity due to drought will likely face further decreases in 
productivity, while areas where temperature limits productivity may benefit from rising 
temperatures (Moore and Allard, 2008). 
Decreased environmental services will be experienced due to climate change 
effects in forests (e.g. timber production, water supply, recreational uses). On the other 
hand, according to Vose et al. (2012), a changing climate may improve and expand 
ecosystem services in others (e.g. increased growth of high-elevation trees, longer 
duration of trail access in high-snow regions). Some areas may be particularly 
vulnerable because current infrastructure and resource production are based on past 
climate and the assumption of steady-state natural resource conditions. Therefore, 
climate change implies increased social and environmental vulnerability, because both 
the supply and demand for forests products will be affected by climate change related 
events (Vose et al., 2012). 
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3.3 Forests in the international climate regime 
 
 
3.3.1 The UNFCCC background 
During the First World Conference on Climate in February 1979 held in Geneva, 
Switzerland, climate change was recognised as a serious problem to be faced by the 
international community. During the conference the conclusion that anthropogenic CO2 
emissions can cause long-term effects on the climate balance came up. The World 
Climate Programme (WCP) was established in the following year, providing a framework 
for international cooperation in research and the basis for the identification of important 
climate issues such as the destruction of the ozone layer and global warming (Gebara, 
2005). In this sense, recognising the need for reliable and updated scientific information 
especially for policy makers, the IPCC was established in 1988. That same year, 
following a proposal by the Maltese government, the UN General Assembly addressed 
the issue of climate change for the first time and adopted resolution 43/53 on the 
‘protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind’.  In 1990, the 
IPCC released its First Assessment Report, confirming that climate change is indeed a 
threat and urging the negotiation of a global agreement to address the problem (Gebara, 
2005). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an 
international environmental treaty negotiated at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and 
was adopted on 9 May 1992, opened for signature on 4 June 1992 and entered into force 
on 21 March 1994; 90 days after the 50th country’s ratification had been received. The 
climate convention enjoys broad legitimacy, largely due to its near-universal 
membership. Currently, there are 197 Parties, including all United Nations member 
states, United Nations General Assembly Observer State of Palestine, UN non-member 
states Niue and the Cook Islands and the Supranational Union European Union. As a 
framework agreement, the UNFCCC has only limited specific obligations to reduce GHG 
emissions, but it formulates principles, general goals, and general actions that countries 
are supposed to take (Metz, 2009). Also, it outlines how specific international treaties 
(e.g. protocols) should be negotiated to set binding limits. It has also established 
institutions and a reporting mechanism, as well as a system for review of the need for 
further action (Metz, 2009). Table 2 summarises some key elements of the UNFCCC: 
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Table 2 UNFCCC’s key elements 
 
Principles (article 3) 
 ‘Common but differentiated responsibility’ (article 3.1)   
 special consideration for vulnerable developing countries 
(article 3.2)   
 ‘Precautionary principle’ (article 3.3) 
 Promote sustainable development (article 3.4) 
 Measures taken to combat climate change should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on international trade (article 3.5) 
 
Goals (article 2) 
‘Stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner’ 
 
Actions Required 
 Minimise emissions and protect and enhance biological 
carbon reservoirs, so-called ‘sinks’ (all countries); take action 
with the aim to stop growth of emissions before 2000 (Annex I 
c ountries)   
 Promote development, application, and transfer of low carbon 
technologies; Annex I countries to assist developing countries  
 cooperate in preparing for adaptation  
 Promote and cooperate in R&D 
 Report on emissions and other actions (so-called ‘national 
communications’, annually for Annex I countries and less 
frequently for others)  
 Assist developing countries financially in their actions (Annex 
II countries) 
 
Compliance 
Review of reports by the secretariat and by visiting expert review 
teams 
 
Institutions 
 Conference of the Parties (COP), the supreme decision 
making body; voting rules for decisions never agreed so de 
facto decisions only by consensus   
 Bureau (officials, elected by the COP, responsible for overall 
management of the process)   
 Two Subsidiary Bodies (for implementation and for scientific 
and Technological Advice) to prepare decisions by the COP  
 Financial mechanism, operated by the Global Environment 
Facility of World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, filled by Annex II 
countries on voluntary basis; two special funds: a Least 
Developed Country Fund and Special Climate Change Fund, 
mainly to finance adaptation plans and capacity building, but 
also technology transfer and economic diversification  
 Expert groups on Technology Transfer, Developing Country 
National Communications, Least Developed Country National 
A daptation Plans   
 Secretariat (located in Bonn, Germany) 
Source: Adapted from Metz, 2009 
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3.3.2 Kyoto Protocol 
 After the signing of the UNFCCC treaty, Parties to the UNFCCC meet at 
conferences (Conferences of the Parties or COP) 28  to discuss how to achieve the 
treaty's goals. At the COP1 Parties had decided that the aim of Annex I Parties 
stabilising their emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 was "not adequate" and, 
further discussions at later conferences led to the Kyoto Protocol29 (Gebara, 2005). The 
Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into 
force on 16 February 2005. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol 
were adopted at COP7 in Marrakesh and are referred to as the "Marrakesh Accords". Its 
first commitment period started in 2008 and ended at the end of 2012. The Kyoto 
Protocol obliged Annex B Parties to cut their emissions of GHG to levels ranging from 
4.6% to 5.5% below the levels observed in 1990. However, under the terms agreed in 
Kyoto, the agreement would only enter into force following ratification by 55 Parties to 
the UNFCCC, and if these 55 countries included a sufficient number of Annex I Parties 
that at least 55% of that group’s total CO2 emissions for 1990 were represented (IISD, 
2015).  
 Although the USA did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the majority of other Annex I 
Parties, including Canada, Japan, and the EU ratified it. Nevertheless, in November 
2004, the Russian Federation also ratified the Kyoto Protocol, thus overcoming the 55% 
threshold reaching more than 60% (IISD, 2015). On 16 March 1998, in New York, the 
Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature and in November the same year the COP4 was 
held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In order to regulate certain aspects of the Kyoto 
Protocol and establish priorities for action was approved the Buenos Aires Action Plan.30 
The Buenos Aires Action Plan discussed about funding mechanisms, development and 
technology transfer, the implementation of articles 4 §8 and 4 §931 of the Convention and 
activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase (Gebara, 2005). Continuing the work, 
the COP5 was held a year later in Bonn, Germany. In 2000, the COP6 was held in The 
                                                 
28 The COP serves as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP). However, the first formal 
MOP just happened in 2005, after the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. 
29 The full version of the Kyoto Protocol can be found at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf  
30 The full version of the Buenos Aires Action Plan can be found at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop4/16a01.pdf  
31 Article 4.8 of the Convention calls on Parties to consider actions to meet the specific needs and concerns 
of developing countries in this regard, listing categories of countries (e.g. small island countries and 
countries whose economies are highly dependent on fossil fuel) that may be particularly affected. 
Article 4.9 refers specifically to the needs and special situation of the least developed countries (LDCs) 
concerning funding and the transfer of technology.  
Online available at: http://unfccc.int/cop7/issues/art4849.html  
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Hague, Netherlands. At that COP the discussions were suspended because the 
negotiations between the EU and the USA in relation to sinks32 and activities regarding 
Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)33 were not successful (Gebara, 
2005). Negotiations were then reconvened on 27 June 2001, again in Bonn. This 
conference is known as COP6 BIS and after further talks, Parties adopted during the 
conference the Bonn Agreement,34 a decision that provided high-level political direction 
on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (IISD, 2015) and also made some 
concessions to satisfy countries in conflict. These concessions were accepted in 
particular to ensure the permanence of countries such as Japan and the Russian 
Federation; considering the interests of the EU and the developing countries (Gebara, 
2005). 
 
 
3.3.3 Marrakesh Accords – the regulation of the flexible mechanisms 
It was in Marrakech, during the COP7 in 2001, where the Bonn Agreement 
translated into formal decisions, setting off operational rules for the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Marrakesh Accords35 consisted of a package of draft decisions on many of the details of 
the KP, including the flexible mechanisms, reporting and methodologies, LULUCF and 
compliance. The Marrakesh Accords also addressed issues such as capacity building, 
technology transfer, responding to the adverse effects of climate change, and the 
establishment of three funds: the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund, Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and Adaptation Fund (IISD, 2015). Regarding LULUCF 
(Decision 11/CP7), the principles in the Marrakesh Accords responded to concerns that 
the use of LULUCF activities should not undermine the environmental integrity of the 
Kyoto Protocol. These principles emphasised, for instance, the need for consistent 
methodologies, as well as the importance of conserving biodiversity. They also specified 
that naturally-occurring removals, including removals as a consequence of indirect 
anthropogenic effects, should be excluded from the system and that any re-release of 
                                                 
32 A carbon sink is anything that absorbs more carbon that it releases, whilst a carbon source is anything 
that releases more carbon than is absorbed. Forests, soils, oceans and the atmosphere all store carbon and 
this carbon moves between them in a continuous cycle. 
33 Article 3 §3 of the Kyoto Protocol describes the "Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry"  sector that 
can provide a relatively cost-effective way of offsetting emissions, either by increasing the removals of GHG 
from the atmosphere (e.g. by planting trees or managing forests), or by reducing emissions (e.g. by curbing 
deforestation). The matter had already been discussed in Buenos Aires, but had not reached any conclusion. 
34 The full version of the Bonn Agreement can be found at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/05.pdf  
35 The full version of the Marrakesh Accords can be found at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf  
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GHG (e.g. through forest fires) must be instantly accounted for (UNFCCC, 2002). Also, a 
common proposition to define the term "forest” 36  (in order to ensure firmness and 
comparability among Parties) was agreed. Some flexibility, however, was allowed to take 
account of national circumstances, so that a country could choose, for instance, to select 
a minimum tree height of between 2 to 5 meters for its definition of a forest. Once the 
values were chosen, they would remain fixed. This flexibility approach was adopted 
because when designing a monitoring plan, the analysis of remote sensing data could 
adapt to different minimum tree crown cover and minimum forest area thresholds, for 
example (GOFC-GOLD, 2009). 
Delegates built on the Marrakesh Accords also at COP8 and COP9, elaborating 
on various technical rules and procedures (IISD, 2015). During COP8 topics such as 
forests, permanence, additionality, baseline, leakage, crediting period, etc., were 
discussed. However, no substantial results were obtained and it was then agreed that 
such issues would be discussed during COP9. On the other hand, during COP8 the 
efforts of the private sector and non-governmental organisations to ratify the KP and the 
adoption of the flexibility mechanisms were noteworthy (Gebara, 2005). During COP9 
some of the main issues that had been previously discussed, were then standardised. 
Also, this COP was mostly focused on discussions about potential buyers and sellers of 
carbon credits. On the one hand, the buyers, including EU, Norway and Switzerland 
were concerned about the “quality” of these carbon credits and they attempted to 
establish conditions in order to protect their investments and preserve credibility with 
NGOs (Carvalho, 2010). On the other hand, the sellers defended better market 
conditions, in order to minimise the transaction costs of such measures (Carvalho, 
2010). In 2005 the COP 11 took place in Montreal. Since the Kyoto Protocol entered into 
force in February this COP was also the 1st Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(COP11/MOP1). Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are 
                                                 
36 By  the  Decision  11/CP.7  of  the  Marrakesh  Accords  the definitions  of  forests,  afforestation  and  
reforestation were adopted. “Forest” is a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectares with tree crown cover 
(or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30% with trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 
2-5 meters at maturity in situ. A forest may consist either of closed forest formations where trees cover a 
high proportion of the ground or open forest. Young natural stands and all plantations which have yet to 
reach a crown density of 10-30% or tree height of 2-5 m are included under forest, as are areas normally 
forming part of the forest area which are temporarily un-stocked as a result of human intervention such as 
harvesting or natural causes but which are expected to revert to forest. This forest definition is very similar to 
the definition adopted by FAO. The difference is, however, that the FAO definition is essentially a land-use 
based definition while the UNFCCC did not consider land use in this usage. But the definition of forest also 
varies country to country. How a country defines “forest” can have a significant impact on how carbon 
emissions from deforestation and degradation are measured and reported, and how the drivers of 
deforestation are assessed (further discussion in Chapter four). 
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able to participate in the MOP as observers, but without the right to take decisions. At 
this meeting the Marrakesh Accords was formally adopted. The COP11/MOP1 through 
Decision 1/CMP.1 also established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments 
for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). The AWG-KP would work in 
parallel focusing on negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol and should complete their 
work and present the outcome in Copenhagen (but the draft conclusions presented in 
2009 contained many unresolved issues). In 2012 it was decided that the AWG-KP had 
fulfilled the mandate set out in decision 1/CMP.1 and that its work was concluded 
(UNFCCC, 2017a). 
 
 
3.3.4 Flexible mechanisms 
These mechanisms (Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean 
Development Mechanism) are defined under the Kyoto Protocol and enable Parties to 
achieve emission reductions or to remove carbon from the atmosphere cost-effectively in 
other countries. Under carbon emissions trading (ET), a country having more emissions 
of carbon is able to purchase the right to emit more and the country having less emission 
trades the right to emit carbon to other countries. Usually, the carbon market trades 
emissions under cap-and-trade schemes or with credits that pay for or offset GHG 
reductions (Dowdey, 2015). In a cap-and-trade scheme, the government determines 
which emissions are covered by the system and sets an overall emission target, or 
“cap,” for covered entities (C2ES, 2011). This cap is the sum of all allowed emissions 
from all included facilities. Once the cap has been set and covered entities specified, 
tradable emissions allowances (rights to emit) are distributed (either auctioned or freely 
allocated, or some combination of these). Each allowance authorises the release of a 
specific amount of GHG emissions. The total number of allowances is equivalent to the 
overall emissions cap. For example, if a cap of one million tons of emissions is set, one 
million one-tonne allowances will be issued. Covered entities must submit allowances 
equivalent to the level of emissions for which they are responsible at the end of each of 
the programme’s compliance periods (C2ES, 2011). Market-based schemes will be 
further detailed in the next topic discussed in this chapter. 
The mechanism Joint Implementation (JI), defined in article 6 of the KP allows an 
Annex B Party with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the protocol to 
earn emission reduction units (ERU) from an emission-reduction or emission removal 
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project in another Annex B Party. A JI intervention must provide a reduction in emissions 
by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks that is additional to what would 
otherwise have occurred. For example, a JI project might involve replacing a coal-fired 
power plant with a more efficient combined heat and power plant. Projects must have 
approval of the host Party and participants have to be authorised to participate by a 
Party involved in the project. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in 
article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows an Annex B country to implement an emission-
reduction project in a non-annex B country. Such projects can earn saleable certified 
emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be 
counted towards meeting the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM issue area will be further 
explored in the subsequent section due to its importance in the context of developing 
countries. 
 
 
 3.3.5 Clean Development Mechanism  
The CDM is one of the Protocol's ‘project-based’ mechanisms, in that it is 
designed to promote projects that reduce GHG emissions. The purpose of the CDM is to 
promote clean development in developing countries, in account of for example, that in 
developing countries, enforcement and execution of environmental regulation are 
generally weaker than it is in developed nations (Sathaye et al., 2001). For instance, 
capacity building and changes in policy thinking resulting from CDM-implemented 
interventions has led to the introduction of domestic emission reduction policies in some 
developing countries (Scotney et al., 2012). Moreover, the economic basis for including 
developing countries in efforts to reduce GHG emissions is that emission diminutions are 
thought to be more inexpensive in developing countries than in developed nations 
(Goldemberg et al., 1996).  
Although forestry may be considered unproductive under the CDM umbrella, the 
CDM scope provided valuable lessons for REDD+ as a policy instrument which 
proposed new solutions of some functional, regulatory and technological (e.g. forest 
monitoring and baseline establishment) aspects of environmental governance at global 
scale (Lederer, 2011). Within this context, this is the reason why the CDM has been 
detailed at this part of the dissertation. Under the CDM umbrella few forestry projects 
were approved by 2014, only 55 CDM A/R projects out of more than 7,665 projects have 
been registered by the Executive Board (UNFCCC, 2017b). Forestry projects commonly 
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are challenging to implement, thus, some factors that could explain the low number of 
registered projects could be related to the reduced international demand for forest 
credits and the high complexity of technical requirements. For instance, because of 
permanence, carbon credits from forestry projects were not accepted in the EU-ETS 
(Carbon Market Watch, 2015). In addition, there are high transaction costs with low 
profits, among others issues. The CDM allows Annex B countries to partially37 meet their 
emission reduction commitments under the KP by buying CER units from CDM projects 
in developing countries (e.g. countries like Brazil, which in turn do not have reduction 
commitments). The projects and the issue of CERs are subject to approval to ensure 
that these emission reductions are real and “additional”. The CDM is supervised by the 
CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) and is under the guidance of the COP/MOP of 
UNFCCC. In general, CDM projects can be divided into two categories: i) "emission 
reduction projects," primarily associated with emissions displacement resulting from the 
burning of fossil fuels and/or capture and burning of methane and ii) "carbon 
sequestration projects" related to carbon capture and storage in forests. 
The CDM project will be represented by the Project Design Document (PDD). In 
preparing the PDD, one of the first steps is the assessment of eligibility. The project is 
considered eligible when it fully complies with the propositions of each criterion. An 
unanswered criterion is enough to make it ineligible. Moreover, a local stakeholder 
consultation as well as an environmental risk assessment should be included in the PDD 
development. In order to calculate the amount of CERs that will be generated by such 
initiatives, it is necessary to compare emissions with those in a baseline scenario 
representing the situation that would have occurred in absence of the project activity. 
The CERs would then be calculated as the difference in emissions between the baseline 
and the project outcomes. The baseline may be estimated through reference to 
emissions from similar activities and technologies in the same country or other countries, 
or to actual emissions prior to project implementation. Any proposed CDM project has to 
use an approved baseline and monitoring methodologies.38 It must also to be validated, 
approved and registered. Baseline methodology will set steps to determine the baseline 
within certain applicability conditions whilst monitoring methodology will set specific 
steps to determine monitoring parameters, quality assurance and equipment to be used, 
                                                 
37 To prevent industrialised countries from making unlimited use of CDM, the framework requires that the 
use of CDM must be “supplemental” to domestic actions to reduce GHG emissions. 
38 A project developer can also propose a new methodology; however, the PDD approval is conditional to 
the approval of the proposed methodology. 
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in order to obtain data to calculate the emission reductions. The first methodology for 
Afforestation/Reforestation (CDM A/R) 39  projects was approved in December 2005. 
Under CDM A/R, the approved methodologies give project developers options to 
manage and harvest forests for agro-forestry, bio-energy, timber production or urban 
forestry (FAO, 2006a). 
The criteria of additionality must also be accomplished in every CDM project. 
Additionality requires ‘that the activity goes beyond institutional and regulatory 
requirements in the region’. It corresponds also to the change in the reference scenario, 
which occurs as a result of the modifying action. Moreover, a forestry project becomes 
eligible when the reforestation of cleared areas before 1990 was made after 2000. Thus 
the projects implemented after the year 2000 (e.g. 2011) are eligible if these areas have 
been cleared until 31 December 1989. This measure was adopted to prevent eventual 
perverse actions of deliberate deforestation and subsequent reforestation that had been 
implemented and could be benefited (or encouraged) by the CDM mechanism. The 
crediting period for CDM A/R projects may be fixed for 30 years or 20 years renewable 
twice (for 60 years total). Despite the similarity in many aspects, key differences exist 
among CDM modalities which, in practice, have much importance. One of the main 
differences between CDM A/R modality to the others is the temporality of the CER 
system (Gebara, 2005). An alternative way proposed by Colombia of accounting for 
credits was established: temporary CERs (tCER) and long-term CERs (lCER). The first 
model expires at the end of the subsequent commitment period to that in which it was 
issued. The second expires at the end of the crediting period of the CDM A/R project 
activity for which it was issued. In addition, standards have been established for the 
accreditation of operational entities in relation to CDM A/R projects, as well as standards 
for the PDD preparation for such activities and additional requirements for the CDM 
Registry (Gebara, 2005).  
 
 
 3.3.5.1 CDM process 
 In order to be considered for registration, a project must first be approved by 
the Designated National Authorities (DNA). In Brazil, the DNA is the Inter-ministerial 
Commission on Global Climate Change (CIMGC), established by Presidential Decree of 
                                                 
39 Afforestation means planting of new forests on lands that historically have not contained forests, and 
Reforestation means planting of forests on lands that have previously contained forests but that have been 
converted to some other use. 
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7 July 1999.  The main function of the DNA is to elaborate a LoA (Letter of Approval) 
designed to enable the implementation of the CDM project in the designated country. 
The case is then validated by a third party agency (e.g. independent private 
organisations accredited to act as external controllers), called a Designated Operational 
Entity (DOE) to ensure that the project results are real, measurable, and contains long-
term GHG emission reductions. The CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) then decides on 
the approval of the project. If a project is registered and implemented, the CDM EB 
issues CER credits to project proponents based on the monitored40 difference between 
the baseline and the actual emissions, verified by the DOE. Figure 1 shows a schematic 
of the CDM project process:  
 
             Activity                                                Responsible 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Clean Development Mechanism project process scheme (Source: Own creation) 
                                                 
40 The monitoring report must be in accordance with the parameters and procedures laid out in the original 
PDD that was validated by the DOE and registered by the CDM EB. 
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After the issuance of CERs, the project proponent sells the generated carbon 
credits from the project to a buyer. The CERs can either be sold directly to a company 
that uses them to meet its legally binding or voluntary emission reduction obligations, or 
they can be sold to a trading company that facilitates the transaction between the seller 
and the end user of the carbon credits (Carbon Market Watch, 2015). 
 
  
 3.3.6 CDM and Brazil 
Brazil played an influential role in the development of the CDM schemes. In 
previous discussions before the COP3 the Brazilian government proposed that, if a 
developed country exceeded its GHG emissions targets, an economic punishment would 
be assessed, and this capital would be collected in a Clean Development Fund. The 
financial assets from this fund would be directed to developing countries, which then, 
would use these funds for developing GHG mitigation projects designed to prevent or 
mitigate global climate change. The COP3 discussions about this proposal evolved into 
the CDM scheme (UNIDO, 2003). 
Although the CDM context is controversial in Brazil, the country hosted 4.4% of 
total CDM projects between 2004 and 2015, only behind China with 49% and India with 
20.6% (Climate Policy Observer, 2015). Various reasons could be identified for the 
Chinese dominance of CDM market, including for example its favourable political and 
economic environment for foreign investment (Jung, 2006; Shen, 2011). As of 1 March 
2015, Brazil was host to a total of 455 CDM projects in a wide range of sectors (EDF, 
2015). The majority of projects address methane avoidance (27%), hydroelectric 
projects (25%), and landfill gas (13%). Regarding CDM A/R activities, Brazil has 
registered only three projects up to date under the CDM umbrella (UNFCCC, 2017b). 
They are: i) Reforestation as Renewable Source of Wood Supplies for Industrial Use in 
Brazil (registered on 21 July 2010); ii) AES Tietê Afforestation/Reforestation Project in 
the State of São Paulo, Brazil (registered on 7 January 2011) and iii) Vale Florestar – 
Reforestation of Degraded Tropical Land in Brazilian Amazon (registered on 12 
September 2012). In March 2015, Brazil was issued a share of 6.5% the total number of 
CERs issued (EDF, 2015). To date, the CDM is the main component of Brazil’s activity 
in the carbon market. 
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3.4 International economy on forest carbon  
The carbon market is still an area in expansion. Aside from the environmental 
benefits, this market flow promotes a quite lucrative commercial asset. The creation of 
this new financial asset leads to the establishment of a new commercial market in which 
interested institutions have built an organised structure for carbon credits transactions. In 
2015 in Paris, 65 governments stated in their INDCs that they will make use of 
international market-based systems (and another 24 will consider using them in the 
future) to implement anti-climate change actions. Moreover, several groups such as the 
Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC) claimed for support for the use of market 
mechanisms and a Ministerial Declaration on Carbon Markets 41  issued by 18 
governments at the close of the conference in Paris was designed to send ‘a clear signal 
to enhance the importance of the global carbon market’ (Mansell, 2016). The Paris 
Agreement includes provisions that can advance carbon markets in two ways for the 
post-2020 period: i) by ensuring there is no double counting when countries engage in 
emissions trading, and ii) by establishing a new mechanism to facilitate trading (Mansell, 
2016). In both areas, however, important details remain to be decided. 
 Concerning trading of carbon credits, the two main groups are the legally binding 
carbon market (which involves mandatory emission reduction targets placed on 
countries under international agreements and/or policies) and the voluntary markets 
(which operate independently). The establishment of the Kyoto Protocol and the cap-
and-trade system represented the outset of carbon markets; since then, they have 
grown considerably and become more organised, as financial and regulatory 
instruments were implemented. In fact, most of these instruments are expected to serve 
also the REDD+ system (Gil, 2010).  
The main binding markets (or compliance markets) under operation include the 
one created with the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol and regional initiatives such as 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the New South Wales 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS) in Australia and the US Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Voluntary transactions involving trading “over-the-
counter” (OTC), on the other hand, occur either directly or indirectly (between credit 
buyers and sellers or through organised markets as the Chicago Climate Exchange – 
CCX).  
                                                 
41 Online available at: http://www.mfe.govt.nz/sites/default/files/media/Ministerial-Declaration-on-Carbon-
Markets.pdf  
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Like other cap-and-trade programmes, the CCX sets a limit on total allowable 
emissions and issues allowances that equal the cap (Dowdey, 2015). Member firms then 
trade the allowances – carbon financial instruments (CFIs) – amongst themselves. Each 
CFI equals 100 metric tonnes of CO2eq. Members that meet their targets can sell or 
bank their allowances. Firms can also generate CFIs, specifically exchange offsets, by 
funding approved GHG reduction projects outside of the KP umbrella (Dowdey, 2015). It 
is worth mentioning that projects that fall outside the KP framework, or are ineligible, but 
are additional or are developed in non-signatory countries of the KP could be inserted 
into other types of market mechanisms, or even in governance actions, which may 
attract multi-directional interests of different economic groups. The organisation of the 
carbon market as a whole can be summarised as follows (figure 2): 
 
 
Figure 2. Organisation of the carbon market (Source: Green Rhino Energy, 2015)42 
 
Depending on the origin of the emission reduction, there are a number of 
different emission certificates (AAU, 43  CER, ERU, VER 44 ), as previously described. 
Standards are usually more flexible for VERs than for CERs and ERUs, since the last 
two can be used by developed countries to achieve their emission reduction targets but 
the first one is restricted to organisations voluntarily interested in offsetting their carbon 
emissions (Gil, 2010). Several standards and certificates have been created in order to 
                                                 
42 Online available at: http://www.greenrhinoenergy.com/climatechange/carbon_markets/  
43 The Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) is the allowance (set out in Annex-B) a country is permitted to emit. 
44 VER means Verified Emissions Reduction. 
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differentiate credits and many have become important tools for assuring quality and 
transparency. These set out rules defining how emission reductions are measured. 
Standards provide assurance for buyers of VERs. At a minimum, all VERs should be 
verified by an independent third party. Besides the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), 
other important certificates include the Voluntary Gold Standard (VGS), Climate Action 
Registry (CAR), Climate Community and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS), Plan Vivo, 
Carbon Fix Standard (CFS) and CCX. The third one (CCBS) deserves to be highlighted 
as a stringent standard, customised for forestry projects and focused on the contribution 
to local economies and integration with local communities (Gil, 2010). The first certified 
REDD project in Brazil (in 2008), the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve Project 
has the CCBS standard.  
 
 
3.4.1 Current developments 
Globally, 39 national and 23 sub-national jurisdictions have implemented or are 
scheduled to implement carbon pricing instruments (figure 3), including emissions 
trading systems and taxes (The World Bank, 2014). From 2016, China should house the 
largest carbon market in the world. China is already experimenting with seven regional 
carbon market pilots (The Climate Group, 2014). Each pilot covers a large city – Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai and Shenzhen – or a province – Chongqing, Guangdong, and Hubei. 
However, the system can also present some critical issues. For example, as the central 
one, should authority overestimate the emission cap, then the market price of the carbon 
credits becomes too low (The Climate Group, 2014). Hope (2014) affirms that many 
politicians and policy analysts consider carbon pricing as a core part of global efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions. However, Hope argues that existing markets have structural 
frailties and these difficulties often maintain prices low and limit their ability to reduce 
GHG emissions (Hope, 2014). 
 
 
 62
 
Figure 3. Summary of existing, emerging and potential national and sub-national ETS and 
Tax instruments (Source: The World Bank, 2014) 
 
Carbon taxation is also gaining ground. New carbon taxes were introduced in 
Mexico and France in 2013. Sweden also has its own carbon tax. In the USA, the states 
of Oregon and Washington are exploring carbon pricing options to join California, 
Québec, and British Columbia in concerted efforts to tackle climate change (The World 
Bank, 2014). The Portugal carbon tax entered into force on January 2015, covering all 
energy products used in non-EU ETS sectors. 
Initiated in 2012 and tasked by the Executive Group of the Inter-ministerial 
Commission on Global Climate Change (CIMGC), the Ministry of Finance (MF) started a 
multi-institutional working group to assess the convenience and feasibility of carbon 
pricing instruments and to determine the impact of an ETS on the Brazilian economy. 
Article 6, Section XI of NPCC (Brazil’s National Policy on Climate Change) explicitly 
mentions ‘financial and economic mechanisms that are national in scope and referring to 
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mitigation and adaptation to climate change’ as instruments to achieve the country’s 
GHG mitigation targets. This article then outlines regulatory elements that could support 
Brazilian ETS activity, and authorises the creation of a Brazilian Carbon Market (MBRE) 
– Mercado Brasileiro de Redução de Emissões (EDF, 2015). 
While the MBRE, as defined by the NPCC, has yet to be implemented, the 
development of such a market is contemplated in the law. In the meantime, an exchange 
for environmental assets in Brazil, through BM&F/Bovespa operates as a stock 
exchange for voluntary reduction permits, and it holds auctions for CERs and for 
voluntary carbon units (EDF, 2015). The major Brazilian environmental assets 
exchanges are Bolsa Verde do Rio de Janeiro (BVRio) and the BM&F/Bovespa 
environmental assets exchange. This market operation resulted from a joint initiative by 
the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), and the BM&F. The 
market was launched in São Paulo in December 2004, and it was the first market of its 
kind in a developing country. It became operational in September 2005 with the Project 
Bank, which aimed to improve visibility and facilitate the commercialisation of CDM 
projects (EDF, 2015). 
 
 
3.5 Discussion: from the legal to economic sphere    
 In this chapter the scene of forest subject in the context of international relations 
was studied. In summary, the international politics over forests issues is complex mainly 
due to the existence of distinct perceptions and the difficulty of achieving a minimum 
consensus on controversial issues, often related to the sovereignty of a country over its 
natural resources and their right to use these resources to their development goals 
(Carvalho, 2010). In this sense, no single international regime exists for the political 
issue primarily focused on forests. However, forest global governance has been shifting 
since the UNCED, giving more emphasis to the connection between poverty, wealth and 
environmental devastation. Nevertheless, the tendency of a global convention on forests 
seems remote; therefore, attention is focused on existing global conventions to find 
synergies among them that could be applied to the forestry scope (Ruis, 2001). 
 Following the IPCC and its analyses, in virtue of climate change, several 
damages affecting environmental, social and economic aspects will happen on a global 
scale. In consequence, the international community has signed the Kyoto Protocol to 
develop actions to mitigate impacts of changes in the global environment. As carbon 
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emissions have traditionally been a fairly good benchmark of economic development, 
few countries were/are willing to take unilateral restrictive actions that could hamper their 
future economic competitiveness (Stuart and Costa, 1998). Thus, in order to assist 
developed nations to achieve their reduction targets, the Kyoto Protocol adopted Flexible 
Mechanisms. As a cap-and-trade system, the Kyoto Protocol established a cap and the 
Parties had specific emission reductions targets to achieve through a mix of alternatives, 
including trading or investing in projects in developing countries, which means that the 
protocol framework created a carbon market with a supplementary role to domestic 
measures (Carvalho, 2012).  
 Developing countries could then participate by providing ways to reduce GHG 
global emissions by means of additional and certified operations which were part of a 
global market scheme known as CDM. In the intergovernmental context of UNFCCC, 
forest issues were primarily negotiated under the headings of LULUCF developing A/R 
CDM projects, targeting developed (more industrialised) nations; and currently under 
REDD+, targeting developing countries (Holmgren, 2015). Therefore, the international 
discussion on forests have shifted; from a legal perspective, connected with territorial 
and sovereignty issues, to an economic perspective, related to the environmental 
service of carbon sequestration provided by forests (Carvalho, 2012). In the climate 
regime per se this change can also be observed. After the Kyoto Protocol adoption 
issues as economic measures, new technologies and financial instruments were more 
dominant on negotiations than previous discussions on per capita emissions, historical 
responsibility for climate change and the need of transferring substantial funds from 
developed to developing countries (Brunnengräber, 2006). 
 Looking onwards the relationship between forests and the carbon market, the 
complex relationship between forests and markets is surely growing (Carvalho, 2010). 
On the one hand, for instance, tropical timber is an internationally demanded product. 
Moreover, the growing demands for forest products, added the demands for food – due 
to human population growth and consumption – contribute to the increased pressure on 
forest ecosystems for more available arable land. Certainly, it is not a coincidence that 
the main cause of tropical deforestation is the expansion of agricultural activities, while 
(illegal) logging is the biggest single driver of forest degradation (Kissinger et al., 2012). 
A tangled challenge concerning forests and climate change mitigation agenda is to strike 
an effective and workable balance between forest carbon conservation and the 
production of forest products (Galbert et al., 2013). Although REDD+ should address the 
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role of production forests, because forests can play a significant role as an economic 
asset if they are managed sustainably, a major problem that will limit the success of the 
REDD+ domain (and which has not been discussed as it should) is the overall increase 
of goods consumption and the global demand for forest products. Current policies are 
designed with little attention to the residuals of production and consumption. Among the 
most evident unintended byproducts of the ongoing economic system are environmental 
problems like air and water pollution and landscape degradation. Moreover, it should 
also never be forgotten that a situation has two different sides. For example, the decision 
to shut down all nuclear energy plants by 2022 in Germany is accelerating coal and oil 
price increases, indirectly helping to drive up the demand for wood energy (UNECE, 
2011).  
 On the other hand, the concern that forest goods and services be produced and 
managed sustainably exists. However, such conception is more based on sustainable 
production measures than on sustainable consumption pattern. This means, if the levels 
of consumption that the society craves nowadays were replicated across of the roughly 
nine billion people projected to be on the planet in 2050, the impact on water supply, air 
quality, forests resources, climate, biological diversity, and human health would be 
extremely severe. Nevertheless, these concerns have begun to be internalised in 
markets through voluntary forest management and chain of custody certification45 for 
forest products such as the Forest Stewardship Council – FSC (one of the earliest and 
largest forest certification schemes). Forest certification is widely seen as one of the 
most important initiatives to promote better forest management. Challenges faced by the 
Brazilian forest industry dealing with the natural forests and plantations have provided 
favourable ground for the establishment of forest certification (Araújo, 2008). However, 
efforts focused on the timber supply chain, including certification and legal verification of 
traded timber, have been limited in Brazil, especially in the fragmented nature of 
Amazonian wood production (McDermott et al., 2015).  
 Although it is argued that forest certification provides forest owners – families, 
communities and companies – with access to the global marketplace for certified 
products, a study from McDermott et al. (2015) suggest the opposite. They assert that in 
Brazil, both activities (certification and legality verification) favour large producers as well 
as concentrated supply chains destined for international markets (e.g. pulp and paper 
                                                 
45 Forest certification is a non-state, voluntary market-based instrument with the purpose of incentivising 
change in the forest sector (Pinto and MacDermott, 2013).  
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and high-value tropical sawnwood), while extensive legal requirements inhibit local 
benefit capture. On the other hand, since most of the pressure on forests that leads to 
deforestation in Brazil is due to clearing of land for agriculture or cattle ranching 
expansion – and not due to logging activities – certification is not necessarily an 
instrument that will highly contribute to decrease deforestation rates, especially in the 
Amazonian scenario. On the other hand, it can positively affect against forest 
degradation. Thus, it is noteworthy that although the forest issue has acquired an 
economic perspective in global governance, the achievement of establishing viable and 
sustainable economic instruments for the conservation of forests it is not currently 
entirely successful (particularly in the Amazonian scenario). For authors as Fosci (2014) 
this happens because in his view, environmental disturbance is much a failure of the 
market as it is a failure of the State, on account of forest loss being driven by market 
demand and the contextual failure of recognising the value of environmental services. 
Notwithstanding, usually in developing countries, poor public sector governance has led 
to an inefficient and disorderly management of economic activities and increased 
environmental damage. Nevertheless, the failures to achieve prescriptive regulations in 
international forestry left space for the emergence of alternative approaches (Fosci, 
2014).  
 These developments are part of the shift of forest policy away from prescriptive 
regulations and towards a neoliberal46 model of environmental governance. This means 
that payment for ecosystem services (PES) as a way to conserve natural resources is 
becoming more commonplace, using the market demand, rather than the government 
force to drive this change (DeShazo et al., 2016). However, it should be not forgotten 
that economic incentives (so called indirect means) also need quite often regulations to 
be established. Consequently, this shift is also noticeable in the Brazilian context. Since 
the years 2000’s, deforestation in the Amazon forestlands began to be recognised also 
as an economic (rather than merely legal) problem, which induced the advocacy of 
economic incentives for the preservation of forests (van der Hoff et al., 2015). It was 
within this broader context that the REDD+ mechanism started to be viewed by different 
actors in Brazil as a way to channel financial resources and provide economic benefits 
for the conservation of the Amazon rainforest (van der Hoff et al., 2015).  
                                                 
46 Neoliberalism applied to international environmental law has three fundamental principles: i) voluntary 
compliance as opposed to binding obligations, ii) property rights over nature as opposed to public goods, 
and ii) the use of market incentives as opposed to top-down regulation (Humphreys, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 4 REDD+ and the Climate Change Negotiations 
In Chapter four the REDD+ mechanism is presented. The chapter explores 
several aspects of the mechanism in order to provide a substantial understanding of its 
context into the climate agreement umbrella. It examines the high complexity of technical 
requirements, as well as social, political, economic and institutional issues related to the 
REDD+ framework. The chapter starts defining what REDD is and ends with a 
discussion on the decisive role of the REDD+ mechanism within the UNFCCC 
framework. 
 
 
4.1 The Mechanism 
Precisely, the acronym REDD stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation and refers to reduced GHG emissions by preserving existing 
threatened forests (avoiding their deforestation and degradation). On the other hand, this 
mechanism can be a valuable action to curb deforestation in tropical forested lands, 
because it opens up the possibility to maintain standing forests, while recognising the 
real value of the natural capital of forests. While deforestation refers to long-term human-
induced conversion of forested areas to other forms of land use, degradation refers to 
gradual, human-induced loss of forest carbon stocks, for instance caused by logging, 
grazing, fire or fuel wood collection (Forest Trends et al., 2008).  
The concept behind REDD is simple: ‘an effort to create a financial value for the 
carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions 
from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development’ (UN-
REDD, 2016). In other words, it involves payments to developing countries in pursuance 
of establishing strategies that will prevent deforestation and/or degradation that would 
otherwise have taken place in forested areas, enabling these countries to conserve and 
use their natural resources sustainably.  
 The REDD concept also evolved over time. First, RED (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation) was introduced as a proposal to compensate emission reductions from 
avoided deforestation. Afterwards, considering that degraded forests have their ability to 
store carbon compromised, it was decided that compensations should also be 
incorporated to avoided degradation. Thus, RED became REDD. In association with the 
Principles of the Bali Action Plan, as a way of comprising also sustainable forest 
management that could lead to the enhancement of carbon stocks the REDD+ 
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mechanism has been established (Gil, 2010). Today, aside from some level of confusion 
of the above described evolution, the REDD/REDD+ concept became a general way of 
discussing activities that result in avoiding deforestation and the reversal of forest 
degradation processes. In this context many types of strategies may be proposed such 
as full protection, management, restoration and enrichment of forest areas, including 
deforested areas that should function as forests and need such anthropogenic action in 
restoring an area into a functional forest.  
 Once the principle of "carbon storage" was introduced by REDD, it was also 
argued that the REDD concept could be extended to every form of land use. This 
scheme would be called REDD++, with the second plus signaling the inclusion of 
agriculture. However, the term REDD++ was not adopted, but it is also sometimes 
referred to as Reducing Emissions from All Land Uses (REALU). On the other hand, two 
previously distinct sectors, the LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) and 
Agriculture, were both recently integrated in the IPCC Guidelines into one sector called 
Agriculture Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) – which in the context of climate 
policy refers to all forms of "terrestrial carbon” – in order to improve the general 
consistency and completeness of national GHG inventories. Also, it is important to clarify 
that the term REDD+ is used throughout this dissertation to denote all categories, and 
differentiations is specified whenever needed. Moreover, it is interesting to state that the 
land-use sector is peculiar in climate debate as it is the only sector where both 
emissions and removals of GHG occur (including depletion of carbon sinks).  
 
 
4.2 The politics of REDD+ 
 
 
 4.2.1 Background  
 The concept of a simple performance-based compensation mechanism for 
developing countries based on the discourse on environmental services for the human 
well-being and on economic approaches to overcome unsustainable exploitation of 
natural resources rapidly gained momentum when was first presented at a scientific side 
event at COP9 in 2003 (Pistorius and Kiff, 2014). Thenceforth, since 2005 several 
countries had been willing to include REDD in the official COP agenda through a 
proposal led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica and on behalf of the Coalition for 
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Rainforest Nations47  (when they submitted the document "Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action"). However, 
REDD became an integral part of the so-called Bali Action Plan in 2007 during COP13. 
The idea was that the countries should submit their initial visions about REDD and the 
Convention would technically deepen its knowledge to address political and technical 
implications that originated from this mechanism (Pavan, 2014).  
 While the Bali Action Plan did not specifically mention that REDD would be a part 
of a future global emissions trading scheme, it happened in 2009, when REDD was 
adopted by the Copenhagen Accord. In order to prevent performance-based payments 
from creating perverse incentives, at COP16 in Cancun in 2010, the Parties agreed on 
rather unspecific social and environmental safeguards.48 Also, the REDD scope was 
extended to REDD+ in order to include the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. One year later, at 
COP17 in Durban the Safeguard Information System (SIS) was officially adopted. 
Developing countries should provide information regarding how they would address and 
respect these safeguards in order to receive performance-based payments (Pistorius 
and Kiff, 2014).  
 At the following rounds of negotiations, several elements regarding for example, 
reference levels, monitoring and other significant aspects related to REDD+ were 
decided and therefore, with the adoption of the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ at 
COP19 in 2013, the REDD+ mechanism was supposed to be ready for its 
implementation (Pistorius and Kiff, 2014). This framework is composed of seven 
decisions49 concerning the financial, methodological and institutional aspects of REDD+ 
under the terms of the UNFCCC at the international level.  
                                                 
47 The Rainforest Coalition provides Diplomatic Leadership through efforts across government, academia 
and industry to address the complex issues surrounding environmental sustainability specific to tropical 
rainforests. Currently, participating countries in the activities of the Rainforest Coalition include: Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Belize, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, DR Congo, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Thailand, 
Uruguay, Uganda, Vanuatu and Vietnam. 
More details online available at: http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/  
48 Safeguards encompass environmental standards (e.g., improved ecosystem services and biodiversity 
conservation), social standards (e.g., opportunities for wealth creation and well-being), governance-related 
standards (e.g., increased levels of local participation and transparency in environmental policies that affect 
the management of forest resources) – also referred as non-carbon benefits – and carbon standards to be 
applied as the core minimum performance requirements for REDD+ initiatives. 
49 The seven decisions are:  
i) Decision 9/CP.19: Work programme on results-based finance to progress the full 
implementation of the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70; 
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 4.2.1.1 Bali Action Plan 
 In 2007 during the COP13 held in Indonesia, the Parties adopted the Bali Road 
Map by which a binding international agreement could eventually be adopted at the 
Copenhagen Summit in December 2009 (Dagicour, 2010). The Bali Road Map included 
the Bali Action Plan50 that was adopted by Decision 1/CP13. It also included the launch 
of the Adaptation Fund, the scope and content of the article 9 review of the Kyoto 
Protocol, as well as decisions on technology transfer and on REDD issues. The COP 
decided to establish a subsidiary body under the UNFCCC to conduct the process, the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). The Bali Action 
Plan was divided into five main categories: i) shared vision, ii) mitigation, iii) adaptation, 
iv) technology and v) financing. The shared vision referred to a long-term vision for 
action on climate change, including a long-term goal for emission reductions. The AWG-
LCA subsequently divided the work streams into components under those five parts 
(UNFCCC, 2017c).  
 There are significant achievements that have resulted from the work of the AWG-
LCA, which include for example: i) Decision 1/CP.16 (Cancun Agreements), ii) Decision 
2/CP.17 (outcome of the AWG-LCA) and subsequent implementing decisions related to 
the many institutional arrangements created – including the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework, the Technology Mechanism, Institutions on Finance, iii) Forum on Response 
Measures and the Durban Forum on Capacity-Building, etc (UNFCCC, 2017d). The 
AWG-LCA, however, was replaced by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform with Enhanced Action (ADP) due to Decision 1/CP17 in 2011. The ADP was a 
subsidiary body established ‘to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force applicable to all Parties’. The ADP was aimed to 
conclude its work prior to 2015 for the new instrument to be adopted in the same year 
and implemented from 2020. 
                                                                                                                                                 
ii) Decision 10/CP.19: Coordination of support for the implementation of activities in relation to 
mitigation actions in the forest sector by developing countries, including institutional 
arrangements; 
iii) Decision 11/CP.19: Modalities for national forest monitoring systems;  
iv) Decision 12/CP.19: The timing and the frequency of presentations of the summary of 
information on how all the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, are being 
addressed and respected; 
v) Decision 13/CP.19: Guidelines and procedures for the technical assessment of submissions 
from Parties on proposed forest reference emission levels and/or forest reference levels; 
vi) Decision 14/CP.19: Modalities for measuring, reporting and verifying; 
vii) Decision 15/CP.19: Addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.  
More details at: http://unfccc.int/land_use_and_climate_change/redd/items/8180.php  
50 The full version of the Bali Action Plan can be found at:  
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf  
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 4.2.1.2 Copenhagen Accord 
 The Copenhagen Accord51 adopted at the COP 15 in 2009 does not commit 
countries to agree on a binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, certain 
specific elements contained in the agreement could have helped to pave a path for the 
new climate agreement. For example, the Copenhagen Accord set the target for a 
maximum of a 2°C limit on temperature increases. It also included a reference to 
consider limiting the temperature increase to below 1.5°C (a key demand made by 
vulnerable developing countries). On the other hand, there was no agreement on how to 
do this in practical terms. The Copenhagen Accord also established the Copenhagen 
Green Climate Fund (GCF),52 as part of a joint effort to mobilise US$100 billion per year 
by 2020 in public and private investments to address the adaptation and mitigation 
needs of developing countries (Dagicour, 2010). Other central elements included 
(UNFCCC, 2017e): 
 Developed countries promised to fund actions to reduce GHG emissions and to 
adapt to the inevitable effects of climate change in developing countries; 
 Developed countries promised to provide US$30 billion for the period 2010 to 
2012, and to mobilise long-term financing of a further US$100 billion a year by 
2020 from a variety of sources;  
 Agreement on the measurement, reporting and verification of developing country 
actions, including a reference to "international consultation and analysis".    
  
 Also, for the first time in an international agreement, the Copenhagen Accord 
established a new body on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD). Also, the concept of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMAs) was formally adopted whereby developed countries would inscribe emissions 
targets for 2020, and developing countries would inscribe NAMAs, recognising that 
different countries may take different nationally appropriate action on the basis of equity 
                                                 
51 The full version of the Copenhagen Accord can be found at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf  
52  The Green Climate Fund was designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the 
UNFCCC, in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention. The GCF is based in the new Songdo district of 
Incheon, South Korea. The Green Climate Fund is intended to be the centerpiece of Long Term Financing 
under the UNFCCC. Uncertainty over where this money would come from led to the creation of a High Level 
Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) which was founded by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon in 2010. There is no formal connection between this Panel and the GCF, although its report is one 
source for debates on "resource mobilisation" for the GCF. The lack of pledged funds and potential reliance 
on the private sector is controversial and has been criticized by developing countries. Pledges to the fund 
reached US$10.2 billion on 28th May 2015 (Green Climate Fund, 2015). More details online available at: 
http://news.gcfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/GCF_contributions_2015_may_28.pdf  
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and in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (Dagicour, 2010; Gil, 2010). A year later, in 2010 at COP16, REDD formed 
part of the Cancun Agreements, described in paragraph 70 of the AWG-LCA outcome: 
 
“Encourages developing country Parties to 
contribute to mitigation actions in the forest 
sector by undertaking the following activities, as 
deemed appropriate by each Party and in 
accordance with their respective capabilities and 
national circumstances: 
 Reducing emissions from deforestation; 
 Reducing emissions from forest degradation 
 Conservation of forest carbon stocks; 
 Sustainable management of forest; 
 Enhancement of forest carbon stocks” 
  
 The text defines the REDD+ mechanism, although it is not referred to as such in 
the AWG-LCA text. Moreover, the term “forest carbon stocks” were added to the Cancun 
Agreements, in account of the concern that forests could be viewed simply as stores of 
carbon rather than ecosystems (Lang, 2011). 
 
 
 4.2.1.3 Doha Climate Gateway 
 Negotiations in Doha focused on ensuring the implementation of agreements 
reached at previous conferences. The package of Doha Climate Gateway decisions 
adopted amendments to move towards a new global agreement that applies to all 
Parties by 2020. Key elements of the outcome also included agreement to consider loss 
and damage, which means, compensations would be provided to vulnerable 
communities for the loss and damage caused by climate change. However, an 
international mechanism on loss and damage in Doha was not adopted (IISD, 2012). 
Furthermore, the Parties re-affirmed continued efforts to scale up climate finance (GCF) 
to help developing countries to respond to climate change and consequently to enforce 
the establishment of the REDD+ mechanism. The Conference in Doha was notably 
about the cost of addressing climate change and, in particular, making progress on long-
term funding to support action in developing countries. In Copenhagen it was agreed 
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that US$100 billion annually from 2020 would be provided to developing countries, but 
nothing in between (IISD, 2012). However, only few countries, like the UK and the EU, 
stepped forward with some numbers (Fuhr and Schalatek, 2012). 
 Also in Doha, a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was decided, 
which would  start on 1 January 2013 lasting until 2020, encompassing commitments for 
a total of 14% in emissions reductions compared to 1990 levels. Specifically (UNFCCC, 
2017f): 
 The legal requirements that would allow a smooth continuation of the Kyoto 
Protocol were agreed, and the valuable accounting rules of the agreement were 
preserved;  
 Countries that are taking on further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
agreed to review their emission reduction commitments at the latest by 2014, 
with a view to increasing their respective levels of ambition;  
 The Kyoto Protocol's Market Mechanisms – the CDM, JI and ET – would 
continue; access to the mechanisms remains uninterrupted for all developed 
countries that have accepted targets for the second commitment period; 
 A key element was added to the monitoring framework for developed countries 
with the adoption of the tables for the biennial reports known as common tabular 
format, thereby strengthening transparency and the accountability regime;   
 Surplus assigned amount units can be carried over without limit from the first to 
the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol by Parties included in 
Annex I that have a target for the second commitment period, but with 
restrictions on the use of these carried-over AAUs53 for the second commitment 
period and quantitative limits on how many of these units may be acquired from 
other Parties. 
 
 Nevertheless, only the EU, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Monaco, 
Liechtenstein, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan would have targets. The USA, Canada, 
Russia and Japan54 would not take part in the second period. They would also no longer 
have access to the CDM mechanism (Fuhr and Schalatek, 2012). As of 29 December 
                                                 
53 AAUs are units of GHG emissions as defined by the Kyoto Protocol. An AAU is equivalent to one metric 
tonne of carbon dioxide equivalence. 
54 Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, while Japan and Russia declared they would not join a 
second commitment period. 
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2016, 75 countries had ratified the amendment, which will enter into force once 144 
parties have ratified it (UNFCCC, 2017g).  
  
 
 4.2.2 REDD+ Developments 
 Given the considerations that the capacities of countries vary greatly, the Cancun 
decision established that countries would proceed in their efforts to get ready for REDD+ 
at different paces (Pistorius and Kiff, 2014). It was agreed that REDD+ implementation in 
each country should follow three consecutive phases (figure 4): i) readiness and 
capacity building, ii) implementation of national strategies, and when all requirements 
are fulfilled the transition to iii) performance-based payments.  
 
 
Figure 4. REDD+ implementation phased-approach (Source: WWF, 2017)55 
 
 REDD+ has been fully recognised in many sub-national levels of dialogue and 
official engagements, such as State to State negotiations. An example of that is the 
dialogue started by California State in the USA, enrolling many other states in different 
countries (as Acre in Brazil). This type of agreement has been useful in strengthening 
                                                 
55 Online available at: https://www.slideshare.net/samyakjainshah/redd-feasibility-report-updated-march-05  
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non-compliance markets at a voluntary level, which significantly helps to indicate the 
way to some diplomatic negotiations. Another via of funding concerns countries being 
financially supported by grants. This REDD-Readiness funding is administered through 
both the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emission from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD Programme, 
a partnership of UNDP, UNEP, and FAO) and the World Bank, with their Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Forest Investment Programme (FIP). 
 In the Phase 1, governments receive funding basically to build capacity, creating 
or strengthening the institutions, policies, and legal frameworks. Phase 2 consists of 
initiating pilot/demonstration projects, along with further financing for capacity-building 
activities. Phase 3 will be the mature state of REDD+, with formal payments transferred 
in exchange for verified emissions reductions (Angelsen, et al., 2009).   
 
 
 4.2.2.1 UN-REDD Programme 
 The UN-REDD Programme was launched in 2008 and is a collaborative initiative 
between FAO, UNEP and UN Development Programme (UNDP). These agencies are 
combining forces to support developing countries in their efforts to mitigate climate 
change through the implementation of REDD+ activities agreed under the UNFCCC 
umbrella (UN-REDD, 2015). The overall development goal of the UN-REDD Programme 
is to reduce forest emissions and enhance carbon stocks in forests while contributing to 
national sustainable development in developing countries (UN-REDD, 2015).  
 The programme has also a role to play in both, supporting the incorporation of an 
effective REDD+ mechanism under the climate agreement, as well as supporting the 
emerging arrangements for REDD+ financing and coordination. During its first phase 
(2008-2015), in 23 countries full-scale national programmes designed for REDD+ 
readiness have been funded. Smaller targeted support and policy/technical advice has 
been provided to over 35 countries and a global programme has allowed the UN-REDD 
Programme to move the REDD+ discussion forward through the development of 
guidance, tools and briefs. Moreover, the Programme has operated in tandem with the 
Readiness Fund of the FCPF (UN-REDD, 2015).  
 An external evaluation made in 2014 resulted in a series of recommendations 
that have shaped the design of the new phase of the programme strategy, which will last 
from 2016 to 2020. One of the envisaged goals is to strengthen the collaboration with 
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the FCPF as well as closer collaboration between the UN agencies and both the 
established GCF and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 56 will be explored. 
Interaction with these strategic partners at global level, as well as with the FIP will be 
complemented with enhanced dialogue on cooperation at country level (UN-REDD, 
2015). 
 
 
 4.2.2.2 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
 The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) was launched in 2008 as a global 
partnership that complements the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ initiatives. The 
FCPF has created a framework and processes for REDD+ readiness, which 
demonstrates how REDD+ could be applied at the country level. The FCPF has two 
separate but complementary funding mechanisms, the Readiness Fund and the Carbon 
Fund in order to achieve its strategic objectives (FCPF, 2014): 
 FCPF Readiness Fund supports participating countries in the development of 
REDD+ strategies and policies, reference emission levels; measurement, 
reporting, and verification systems; an institutional capacity to a manage REDD+, 
including environmental and social safeguards; 
 FCPF Carbon Fund is designed to pilot performance-based payments for 
emission reductions from REDD+ programmes in FCPF countries. Countries that 
have made significant progress in their REDD+ readiness endeavors may be 
selected to participate in the Carbon Fund, through which the FCPF will pilot 
incentive payments for REDD+ policies and measures in approximately five 
developing countries. The Carbon Fund will remunerate the selected countries in 
                                                 
56 The Global Environment Facility was established in 1991 as a $1 billion pilot program in the World Bank to 
assist in the protection of the global environment and to promote environmental sustainable development. 
Since then, the GEF has provided over $14 billion in grants and mobilized in excess of $70 billion in 
additional financing for more than 4,000 projects. The GEF has become an international partnership of 183 
countries, international institutions, civil society organizations, and private sector to address global 
environmental issues. The GEF serves as financial mechanism for the following conventions: 
 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); 
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); 
 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs); 
 UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) ; 
 Minamata Convention on Mercury;  
 The GEF, although not linked formally to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the 
ozone layer (MP), supports implementation of the Protocol in countries with economies in transition. 
More details online available at: https://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef  
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accordance with negotiated contracts for verifiably reducing emissions more than 
in the reference scenario. 
 
 The FCPF offers financial support to 36 forest developing countries (13 in Africa, 
15 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and eight in the Asia-pacific region). From these 
countries, 33 have prepared Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs), nine have 
signed Readiness Preparation Grant Agreements, and one – the Democratic Republic of 
Congo – has advanced to the mid-point of their readiness preparations (FCPF, 2014). In 
June 2013, the Facility Management Team prepared the Monitoring and Evaluation 
framework. It builds on country level monitoring and evaluation efforts to be developed 
as part of readiness implementation. It includes the two following main constituents 
(FCPF, 2014): 
 Result Chain and Logical Framework, which together provide a strategic 
overview of the FCPF and support decision-making by illustrating the main 
results to be achieved by the Facility at various levels, and their associated 
performance indicators. They provide a frame to focus both the monitoring and 
evaluation efforts at the Facility level. 
 Performance Measurement Framework (PMF), which is based on the Logical 
Framework, is the key internal management tool to be used by the Facility 
Management Team (FMT) to manage the collection, analysis and reporting on 
the performance data that must nourish the monitoring and evaluation functions. 
It captures key elements of expected results of the FCPF at the Facility level, by 
outlining proposed programme indicators for each result level, targets, baselines, 
frequency of data collection, data sources and methods, as well as 
responsibilities for this data collection and consolidation. 
 
 
 4.2.2.3 Forest Investment Programme  
 Approved in 2009 the US$785 million Forest Investment Programme (FIP) is a 
funding window within the framework of the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). The FIP 
supports developing countries to reduce GHG emissions and deforestation leading to 
protection of carbon reservoirs. In practice, the goal of FIP is to support the 
establishment of REDD+ strategies by developing countries, and consequently to 
identify opportunities to help these countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change 
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and to contribute to several others benefits such as biodiversity conservation and rural 
livelihood improvement. FIP primarily focuses on REDD+ implementation activities 
(Phase 2), providing a crucial pull to incentivise REDD+ readiness activities (Phase 1) 
and exerting a push to develop needed capacity and experience for countries to 
progress to results-based payments (Phase 3). The FIP is active in eight pilot countries, 
including Brazil (FIP, 2014). For a better understanding, the REDD+ financing packages 
are divided into (FIP, 2014): i) FIP US$501 million is allocated to 38 projects and 
programmes, expecting co-financing of US$1 billion from other sources, ii) FIP US$208 
million (42% of the FIP allocations) is approved and under implementation for twelve 
projects with expected co-financing of US$742 million, iii) FIP US$50 million is the 
Dedicated Grant Mechanism for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (DGM). 
 
 
4.3 The economics of REDD+  
 Several works in economic domain have attempted to estimate the needs of 
REDD+ finance, showing that one of the least expensive GHG abatement strategies 
would be the preservation of rainforests (Anderson, 2009; Boucher, 2008). Thus, carbon 
sequestration may effectively compete with other climate investments as part of a cost-
effective climate policy (Bluffstone et al., 2012; Kindermann et al., 2008). According to 
the UN-REDD (2015), the REDD+ mechanism could yield meaningful sustainable 
development benefits and may generate a financing stream for sustainable forest 
management in developing countries, assuring the necessary time for countries to seek 
for paths to reach an economic model based on low GHG emissions. 
  For example, the Eliasch Review (Eliasch, 2008) suggested that around US$17 
to US$33 billion per year should be invested to halve GHG emissions from the forest 
sector by 2030 considering the scenario of inclusion of a global carbon trading. 
Moreover, Kindermann et al. (2008) and Strassburg et al. (2009) use simulations 
techniques and estimate that 80% of avoided deforestation costs less than US$5 per 
tonne of CO2 (Bluffstone, 2013). Zarin et al. (2009) estimates that REDD readiness and 
implementation costs for a 50% global reduction in forest emissions would range from 
US$15 to US$35 billion per year. The Stern Review (Stern, 2007) estimates even less, 
ranging from US$5 to 15 billion per year. Some specialists, however, argue that such 
studies underestimate the costs of REDD+ mechanism (Fosci, 2013; Lohmann, 2011). 
For example, Persson and Azar, (2010) suggest that a climate policy framework will 
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raise the value of land by increasing the demand for bioenergy (making deforestation for 
biomass cultivation increasingly profitable) and, therefore, this could imply that REDD+ 
activities would not offer enough economic incentive to preserve tropical forests. For 
Sunderlin et al. (2013), in order to be a cost-effective measure, the REDD+ financial flow 
should provide a large stream of benefits, however, recent developments in Brazil and 
Indonesia have shown that funding stream must be substantially raised to assure that 
forests are not converted to other land uses.  
 Reports such as the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) focused on opportunity costs,57 
and the importance of creating financial incentives to encourage governments and 
landowners to keep forests standing instead of cutting them down for alternative land 
uses. On the other hand controversy remains, nevertheless, regarding whether all local 
opportunity costs of carbon sequestration have been effectively included in such studies 
(Dyer and Counsel 2010; Gregersen et al., 2010). Also in Brazil, the majority of the most 
relevant studies (se for example, Börner et al., 2010 and Strassburg et al., 2009) about 
REDD+ costs focused primarily on opportunity costs in the Amazon region (Cunha et al., 
2016). Moreover, there also is the question of how opportunity costs are estimated 
because opportunity cost estimates vary widely, depending on which method is used. 
Furthermore, it changes as market forces change, as technology improves, and as new 
technologies emerge (Gregersen et al., 2010). It may also be difficult to estimate 
opportunity costs correctly because sometimes the “perceived” opportunity cost by the 
targeted recipients may differ from a calculated one. For example, Börner et al. (2013) 
estimate that the opportunity cost for the participants of a PES programme (in this case 
the Bolsa Floresta Programme (BFP) in the Uatumã Sustainable Reserve, Brazil) to 
comply with the land use related rules tend to be null – the communities carry out rustic 
activities, they do not use fertilizers (or other chemicals) and to plant they use part of the 
cassava plant, thus this cost tends to zero (Lima, 2014).  
 On the other hand, Lima (2014) indicates in her research that under the same 
conditions (this means observing the same scheme at the same reserve) the “perceived” 
opportunity cost of participation is not fully compensated by the provided direct payment. 
This may happen according to Agustsson et al. (2010) for the reason that when a 
monetary incentive is given to beneficiaries, they assume the payment as their 
                                                 
57 Opportunity costs are equivalent to benefits foregone by government, farmers and local communities in 
conserving forests, rather than adopting potentially more profitable alternative land uses, such as agriculture, 
or harvesting for timber and charcoal. REDD+ opportunity costs are the difference in net earnings from 
conserving or enhancing forests versus earnings from converting them to alternative land uses. 
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motivation even though non-carbon benefits are also outlined, as the case of the BFP 
(complementing a higher value of total benefits added to the direct payment). In addition, 
even in scenarios where opportunity costs are relevant, the costs of establishing, 
implementing, and monitoring may make an important contribution to total costs, thus 
influencing the likely success of the REDD+ intervention and its ability to invest 
significantly in biodiversity and social co-benefits (Thompson et al., 2011). For Fosci 
(2014), for the positive incentive approach to work under REDD+ according to 
opportunity cost logics, the same incentives must make activities driving deforestation 
“uneconomic”. However, this prospect is highly unlikely as countries are already 
struggling to meet their modest financial commitments (Fosci, 2014).  
 Ultimately, there are more prospective issues that need to be addressed in 
developing realistic estimates payments and costs required for a successful REDD+ 
implementation (Gregersen et al., 2010). For instance, further with Gregersen et al. 
(2010), in a situation where perverse incentives that encourage deforestation exist, the 
same must be considered into the costs that need to be covered. For example, 
Binswanger (1991) firmly argued that some tax incentives, rules of land allocation and 
an agricultural credit system have accelerated deforestation in the Amazon. Hence, 
while the country has addressed many of these distorting policies, some remain until 
nowadays and need to be factored into calculations of what the realistic cost of reducing 
deforestation will be in Brazil (Gregersen et al., 2010).  
 Furthermore, developing countries will need to build measuring, monitoring, 
reporting and verification systems and create new agencies and institutions for the 
management of REDD+ in order to be prepared for the later phases of REDD+ 
mechanism implementation and to have access to longer-term financing based on 
results (Norman and Nakhooda, 2014). In this sense, global cost estimates for reducing 
deforestation do not often factor in these costs (Morris and Stevenson, 2011). Hence, 
the sum of opportunity costs, implementation costs (except those directly compensating 
opportunity costs), and transaction costs are therefore an estimate of the total costs of 
REDD+ actions (Angelsen, 2011). Merger et al. (2012) go even further. They propose 
that in order to estimate the full range of REDD+ costs, apart from opportunity costs, 
implementation costs, transaction and institutional costs, development and estimation of 
potential revenues (based on regional variations) to assess the potential effectiveness of 
REDD+ investments should be included. They argue that this bottom-up approach would 
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provide data for the design of marginal abatement cost curves as a vigorous economic 
decision-making instrument (Merger et al., 2012).  
 Numbers concerning the amount of resources that may be supplied or needed by 
REDD+ mechanism are still uncertain on account of several aspects. It may vary 
according to the stringency of the emissions reduction targets, the actual emissions, the 
percentage of emissions reductions that can be achieved through the mechanism and 
the price of carbon in offset markets, for example (Gil, 2010). Moreover, the amount of 
resources may also vary considerably among regions, mainly as a function of alternative 
land-use opportunities (Gil, 2010) and the ability of developing countries to implement 
required safeguards (Morris and Stevenson, 2011). However, since fairness and poverty 
alleviation also are at stake in REDD+, it appears that the debate on cost estimates to is 
not only a technical economic one, but also about how the international community and 
national governments will commit to reduce deforestation and to improve livelihoods. 
Although the overall expected costs of REDD+ would most likely increase (beyond initial 
opportunity cost estimates) with efforts to integrate equity and poverty concerns, these 
increased costs need to be met in order to ensure the delivery of outlined REDD+ 
outputs, which means favouring the “lowest cost” efficient carbon sequestration option or 
the one that also considers poverty reduction (Gregersen et al., 2010). 
 In order to understand the size and composition of finances for REDD+ 
initiatives, over 23,000 pledges (or individual projects) of support of REDD+ activities 
between 2006 and 2014 were reviewed by Norman and Nakhooda (2014) in a joint 
paper. They state that aggregate pledges of both public and private finance are 
significant, at more than US$9.8 billion for the period between 2006 and December 
2014, but the pace of new pledges slowed after 2010. Since 2010, global pledges for 
dedicated REDD+ initiatives average US$796 million per year, partially because of the 
global economic crisis (Norman and Nakhooda 2014). In addition, the lack of a global 
compliance market for carbon offsets from REDD+ has depressed price expectations in 
the voluntary market (Peters-Stanley et al., 2013; Sunderlin et al., 2014). Although there 
are more than 20 REDD+ donors and 80 recipient countries, activity is relatively 
concentrated. Norway, USA, Germany, Japan and the UK provide approximately 77% of 
identified funding with ten countries receiving the majority of this resource. Indonesia 
and Brazil collectively receive 35% of allocated funding, 20% of funding is directed to 
global programmes or international research and just 17% of allocated funding is 
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supporting REDD+ activities and programmes across the remaining 75 recipient 
countries (Norman and Nakhooda 2014).  
 
 
4.4 The challenges of REDD+  
 After its adoption and much debate among scientists, technical experts and 
policymakers many aspects inherent to the REDD+ mechanism and/or related to its 
operationalisation still remain unsettled. This part of the dissertation explores most of the 
usual challenges related to the REDD+ concept discussed in the literature. Although it 
focuses on issues such as leakage, reference level and permanence, some fundamental 
concerns with respect to the establishment of REDD+ are: how to link the REDD+ 
framework with existing national development strategies; how to improve institutional 
capacity and enhance local governance; how forest communities and indigenous 
peoples will participate in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
national REDD+ programmes and how the amounts of reduced emissions and 
enhanced removals as a result of REDD+ will be monitored, etc (which will be assessed 
in the subsequent chapters). 
   
 
 4.4.1 Definition of forest 
 One of the most important aspects concerning REDD+ but not so discussed as it 
should be is the definition of what is considered to be a forest. Why is it so important to 
have a coherent definition of what a forest is? Research shows that the choice of a 
forest definition can have a considerable impact on estimates of deforestation and forest 
degradation areas, on assessment of drivers of deforestation as well as on the 
development of a reference level (Romijin et al., 2015). There are hundreds of definitions 
of forest that are used throughout the world, incorporating factors such as tree density, 
tree height, land use, legal standing and ecological function (Schuck et al., 2002). 
  Differences in definitions among countries are questionable when determining 
the extent of leakage internationally and measuring whether global emissions reductions 
are being achieved or not (DeShazo et al., 2016). However, the definition of a forest 
becomes an issue within a country when one seeks to determine the drivers of 
deforestation and measure future deforestation and forest degradation (DeShazo et al., 
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2016). Should the definition leave out a significant portion of deforestation, policies to 
curb deforestation may be ineffective in reaching relevant results.  
 According to Sasaki and Putz (2009) should global policies intended to promote 
forest conservation continue to use the definition of forest adopted by the UNFCCC 
great quantities of carbon and other environmental values would be lost when natural 
forests are severely degraded or replaced by plantations but technically remain “forests.” 
Although forest plantations do store carbon, they contribute to emission reductions only 
when planted on degraded land with initially lower carbon densities (Moss, 2013). It is 
important therefore for the integrity of REDD+ framework to differentiate between natural 
forests and forest plantations. The definition of “forest” as an area of 0.05-1 hectares in 
size with 10 to 30% covered by a canopy consisting of trees that reach a height of at 
least 2 to 5 meters at maturity was adopted in the Marrakesh Accords through Decision 
11/CP.7. However, this definition also implies that an old-growth rainforest can be 
heavily logged, with substantial amounts of timber (biomass) removed, without 
recognition of the loss of carbon (Butler, 2009).  
 Sasaki and Putz (2009) recommend that natural forest be differentiated from 
plantations and that for defining “forest” the lower height limit defining “trees” be set at 
more than five meters tall with the minimum cover of trees be set at more than 40%. 
These changes, they argue, would help to reduce GHG emissions from what is now 
termed forest “degradation” without increasing monitoring costs. Furthermore, these 
changes in the definition of forest would promote the switch from degradation to more 
reliable forest management, fostering mitigation actions while protecting biodiversity and 
contributing to sustainable development.  
 Although the IPCC recommends that countries report forest cover loss and GHG 
emissions using an internationally recognised definition, international definitions do not 
include national circumstances and can leave out a significant amount of deforestation. 
For example, Romijin et al. (2015) found that between 2000 and 2009, the total 
cumulative deforestation rates in Indonesia were 49.000 km2 when using the FAO 
definition,58 58.000 km2 when using a “natural forest” definition (18% higher) and 68.000 
km2  when using a national definition (28% higher). Moreover, the stricter definition from 
Sasaki and Putz (2009) could reduce incentives to conserve habitats with sparse 
                                                 
58 FAO defines forest as land of at least 0.5 ha covered by trees higher than 5 m and with a canopy cover of 
more than 10%, or by trees able to reach these thresholds. This definition is fairly similar to the definition 
adopted by the Kyoto Protocol; however, the FAO definition is essentially a land-use based definition.  
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vegetation or a low canopy, like the Cerrado biome in Brazil,59 which would no longer be 
qualified for carbon payments.  
 
 
  4.4.2 Reference Level  
 The additionality assessment of results-based payments from REDD+ activities 
implies that the establishment of forest reference levels and/or forest reference 
emissions levels (FRL/FREL) 60  provides a hypothetical “business as usual” (BAU) 
scenario against which carbon stock changes can be measured (Gil, 2010). FRL/FREL 
set, therefore, a performance benchmark 61  – that reduce transaction costs – for 
mitigation activities by providing a reference point to which current and actual efforts can 
be compared throughout a predetermined timeframe. Consequently, FRL/FREL is 
strongly linked to monitoring of mitigation efforts (Chagas et al., 2013). The BAU 
baselines refer to the projected quantity of GHG emissions, or the net amount of 
emissions after subtracting removals, without any mitigation action.  
                                                 
59 The Brazilian Forest Service (SFB), when developing its actions and elaborating national and international 
reports on forest resources in Brazil, defines its forests types according to the Classification System (based 
on FAO’s definitions). This classification includes forests and other wooded lands classified by the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE):  
 Dense humid forest 
 Open humid forest 
 Mixed humid forest 
 Semi-deciduous seasonal forest 
 Deciduous seasonal forest 
 Campinarana (forested and wooded) 
 Savannah (forested and wooded), in portuguese Cerradão and Cerrado 
 Steppe savannah (forested steppe and wooded steppe)  
 Steppe (tree steppe) 
 Forest vegetation under marine influence, forest vegetation under fluvial-marine influence (wooded) 
 Transitional zones with at least one forest formation  
 Secondary vegetation in forest areas and, 
 Reforestation. 
The estimate of forest areas is calculated by the SFB based on maps of remnant vegetation in the Brazilian 
biomes, produced by the Ministry of Environment (MMA) from Landsat images. 
60 The UNFCCC does not explicitly specify the difference between a FREL and a FRL, the most common 
understanding is that a FREL commonly refers to emissions from gross deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD) in a given time period while FRL refers to net emissions and removals, in the case that the other 
REDD+ activities (comprising the “+”) have also been included in the scope. Also, the terms reference level 
and baseline are often used interchangeably when additionality is discussed. From a strict conceptual 
perspective though, Angelsen (2008a) differentiates between historical baseline (the rate of deforestation 
and degradation and the resulting CO2 emissions over the years); business as usual baseline (how 
emissions would evolve without the REDD activity); and finally crediting baseline (the benchmark for 
rewarding the country/project, such as an emissions quota). Here, reference level refers to the crediting 
baseline and other concepts are specified, whenever they are utilized. 
61 Such as carbon stocks determined in a fixed year or range of years. 
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 There are several key technical elements, decision points or design features that 
need to be considered when establishing a FREL/FRL for REDD+. These are: i) forest  
definition; ii) scale (national or sub-national); iii) scope of activities; iv) carbon pools 
included; 62  v) data and methodologies used; 63  vi) time period 64  and vii) use of 
adjustments.65 The scale of REDD+ initiatives determines whether FRL/FREL is set for 
the territory of a jurisdiction (country, federal, state or administrative region), or whether 
it applies to an area defined by the boundaries of a particular intervention, such as a 
project or a programme (Chagas et al., 2013). Project-scale standards differ in their 
objectives and concerns from jurisdictional and/or national efforts, resulting in divergent 
approaches to each FRL/FREL. Project-scale standards as the CDM are mostly 
concerned with the creation of tradable offsets. On the other hand, incentives at larger 
scales (jurisdictional or national) are created through government initiatives and/or 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations and tend to involve a more convoluted set of 
objectives including those set under the UNFCCC (Chagas et al., 2013).  
 The scope refers to the activities that are covered in the FRL/FREL such as 
avoided deforestation, forest management, afforestation or conservation, for example. 
Most project-scale standards outline specific methodologies on how to establish 
baselines for each activity. The scope of jurisdictional REDD+ consists of various 
activities, adding significant complexity to developing FRL/FREL. Hence, the responsible 
entities in developing jurisdictional REDD+ FRL/FREL usually have flexibility to start 
accounting for avoided deforestation, and afterwards as capacities, systems and 
                                                 
62 There are 5 IPCC forest C pools: aboveground biomass, belowground biomass, deadwood, litter and soil. 
According to the UNFCCC Durban decision on FREL/FRL, significant pools and gases should not be 
excluded from the construction of a FRL and parties should give reasons for omitting any pool or gas. 
63 The Durban guidelines for REDD+ FREL/FRL submissions make it clear that the data, methodologies and 
procedures used in the construction of the FREL/FRL should be guided by the most recent IPCC guidance 
and guidelines, as adopted or encouraged by the COP. Given IPCC methods, both activity data as well as 
emission factors will be needed to estimate the forest-related emissions by sources and/or removals by 
sinks. All data and information used to estimate CO2 equivalents per year over the selected time period will 
need to be consistent with that used to estimate the forest-related emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks, for the purpose of MRV. 
64 A historical reference period will need to be chosen. This is the span of time during which emissions 
taking place in the past will be estimated. This time period will likely be based on a combination of factors 
including data availability and the relevance of the past as a predictor of the future.   
65 While for some national contexts, it may be most appropriate to set the FRL/FREL based on historic 
deforestation rate, for other REDD+ countries it may likely require an adjustment from the historic rate to 
more accurately reflect the BAU case. The scope of eligible adjustments is not defined in the UNFCCC 
decisions. There are no specific guidelines for countries to follow in order to account for national 
circumstances, if they opt to do so. Generally, the UNFCCC guidance only makes it clear that adjustments 
should be justifiable and transparent. Though the definition or types of sufficient justification are not specified, 
it can be assumed that this will require reasonable proof, particularly third party assessment of likely forest 
impacts. 
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available data improve, they can incorporate additional activities or categories (Chagas, 
et al., 2013). 
 The discussion on how to determine a FRL/FREL has been focused on two 
approaches: the past approach – according to which it would be calculated as an 
average of past deforestation rates and the future approach – which it would be 
calculated as a function of estimated future deforestation rates based, for example, on 
population density and growth, forest area, economic growth, commodity prices, 
governance variables, future disturbance of forests due to infrastructure investments 
(Gil, 2010). Standards focused on offset credits frequently define as BAU baselines that 
take into account historic data and extrapolate these into the future. Wherever necessary 
and justified, these extrapolations may be adjusted for projected events that, at the 
jurisdictional level, are often referred to as “national circumstances”66 (Chagas et al., 
2013). 
 Approaches based on historical deforestation rates have been criticised by 
specialists, although both approaches have some limitations (Köthke et al., 2014). It is 
argued that countries with high forest cover and low historical deforestation rates could 
be underprivileged, because the past approach does not reflect national circumstances 
and it is not a precise predictor of future deforestation either (Gil, 2010; Köthke et al., 
2014). On the other hand, countries with high deforestation rates in the past could be 
advantaged by less demanding reference levels, which may induce countries to inflate 
their crediting baselines in order to maximise REDD+ transfers (the so-called “hot air”)67 
because it allows high deforestation rates even in the future (Köthke et al., 2014). Also, 
the past approach depends on reliable deforestation data, which most developing 
countries lack (Gil, 2010).  
 The future approach is very uncertain because deforestation is a complex 
phenomenon and can be highly variable from year to year. However, at the same time, 
‘it shows systematic trends over longer periods (5-10 years) which depart from past 
deforestation rates’ (Angelsen et al., 2008). A systematic bias of the forest cover 
development by simple linear extrapolation is expected and must be avoided; becoming 
evident when simple historical reference levels are related to the forest transition 
                                                 
66  National circumstances is recognised in Decision 4/CP.15, which states that the establishment of 
FRL/FREL should be transparent taking into account historic data, and adjusting for national circumstances. 
On the other hand, despite the lack of specific guidance, countries can look to the scope of national 
circumstances considered in National Communications reporting as one input into determination of which 
circumstances maybe relevant in the context of setting a REDD+ FREL/FRL. 
67  REDD+ credits that do not reflect any additional efforts being put on the market. 
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hypothesis (Köthke et al., 2014). This hypothesis will be further explored in item 6.9.4.4. 
Brazil has in theory adopted a sub-national framework by biome, transitioning afterwards 
to the national scale using the historic approach; agreeing that projections tend to work 
better for countries with low historic rates of deforestation and degradation (MCTI, 2014, 
personal communication).68 
 
 
 4.4.3 Permanence 
 Permanence is frequently mentioned as a risk for REDD+ implementation, which 
refers to whether the net benefit of an action, such as carbon removed from the 
atmosphere, will remain fixed for a long period or whether the process may soon be 
reversed. In other words, in the case of REDD+, it is questionable its inefficacy to 
confirm how long the reduced (or zero) rate of deforestation can be ensured (McFarland, 
2010). Moreover, in the circumstance of GHG standards for land use, permanence 
refers to the longevity of a carbon pool and the stability of its stocks, given the 
management and disturbance of the environment in which it occurs. The risk of non-
permanence (also referred to as “reversals”) describes the possibility of reversing 
climate benefits through the loss of forest carbon biomass, for example through a fire or 
pest outbreak that releases carbon back into the atmosphere. Reversals are sometimes 
categorised as “intentional vs. unintentional” referring to whether it was anthropogenic 
(i.e. induced by human activity, such as harvesting) or a natural disturbance (e.g. a 
hurricane).  
 The risk of reversals should be addressed through two groups of risk 
management measures: the first refers to the possibility of GHGs re-emissions; and the 
second refers to the need to establish a liability system in case REDD+ is to be credited 
and traded in carbon markets. If the forest underlying the offset is destroyed, the offset 
will also be compromised unless the loss of forest is taken into account (Dutschke and 
Angelsen, 2008). The table 3 below explains the first group in detail and summarises 
strategies to deal with it:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 MCTI – Ministry of Technology, Science and Innovation – Personal communication  
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Table 3 Re-emissions risks and coping measures 
 
Specifics Risks 
 
 
Coping Measures 
Natural/Ecological Risks:  
Storms, pests, fire, droughts 
Traditional forest insurance. Contracts are 
usually renewed on an annual basis, in order 
to reflect the actual risk profile 
Climate Change-related Risks: 
Although is related to natural risks (above), 
climate change may lead to carbon losses in 
certain regions  
Projects should attempt to factor out human 
intervention, so that eventual carbon 
variations are not attributed to individual 
actions 
Demand-side Risk: 
When the demand for particular crops is the 
one of the main driver of deforestation and 
their prices ascend, forest conversion might 
become profitable 
Changes in commodity prices can be divided 
between funding agency and landowner by 
including an indexing clause in the contract 
that foresees additional payments when 
prices differ from what had been agreed on 
Failure of Project Partners: 
Ineffective project management, insecure land 
tenure or bankruptcy of project partners 
 
When project proponents fail to comply with 
contractual commitments, the ultimate liability 
falls back to the selling country’s government. 
The national REDD+ focal point should ask 
for an in-kind risk premium before approving a 
sub-national activity    
Political Risk:  
Political changes may modify prior 
approvals/commitments and impacts projects, 
programmes or policies 
It can be minimized by broad participation in 
the climate regime and by international 
cooperation 
Source: Adapted from Dutschke and Angelsen, 2008 and Gil, 2010 
  
 Security measures against commercial risks must also be adopted (Gil, 2010). 
The issue of permanence can be addressed primarily by the proper design of REDD+ 
measures (GTZ, 2009) and likewise through a range of alternative approaches. For 
example, under the tonne year accounting credits are issued for the increments of 
carbon sequestered corresponding to a defined permanence period and their quantity 
depends on the carbon stored in biomass each year of the permanence period. On the 
other hand, this approach has not been implemented by any standard. The buffer 
approach, setting aside credits to cover reversals has been adopted in compliance and 
voluntary carbon markets and in the CDM for carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects 
along with host country guarantees. Commercial insurance could serve in place of or as 
a supplement to other approaches such as buffers, but is not extensively available. 
Under country guarantees, countries can take responsibility for addressing reversal risk 
through policy, legal, and financial measures (BioCarbon Fund, 2013). These 
approaches are not mutually limited but could be used in tandem with each other. To 
date the CDM framework has addressed reversal risks in A/R CDM projects adopting 
temporary crediting (tCERs or lCERs), which must be replaced upon expiration. This has 
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resulted in lowering the value of such credits in comparison to permanent CER from 
other sectors. 
 Under a national approach, the concern is no longer the permanence of 
particular forest areas, but whether the country as a whole continues to maintain 
reductions below those established by the FREL/FRL regardless of where the singular 
reductions are coming from (Dutschke and Angelsen, 2008). A crucial question then 
emerges: What happens if the country exceeds its reference level? In the case of Brazil 
for example, the Amazon Fund (further details in Chapter five) states that if GHG 
emissions exceed the reference level, no payments would be made in that year and 
equivalent emissions would be deducted from positive results in subsequent years. 
 Much of the focus of the discussion about forest carbon has been about ensuring 
and insuring permanence, which are usually mistaken, as they are different concepts 
(Skutsch and Trines, 2010). Ensuring permanence relates to creating conditions under 
which forest remains forest, for instance by accurate enforcement of forest protection 
law, or by continued payment of incentives to the local communities to not deforest, or 
by diminishing conditions, such as land tenure insecurity, that are regularly related to 
deforestation actions (Palmer et al., 2009; Skutsch and Trines, 2010). On the other 
hand, insuring permanence relates to the guarantee that any carbon lost is not credited, 
or that the credits are replaced by others when any loss occurs. Often this involves 
consideration of who is liable, morally and financially, for replacing the losses (Skutsch 
and Trines, 2010). 
 
 
 4.4.4 Leakage 
 Within the REDD+ context, leakage refers to changes in removals of GHGs 
outside the accounting system that result from activities that cause changes within the 
boundary of the accounting system. If a conservation activity is implemented in a given 
area, how could it be assured that unanticipated emissions would not occur outside this 
protected area? (McFarland, 2010). In other words, leakage is in some ways just another 
kind of non-additionality. For example, if interventions do not reduce GHG global 
emissions because deforestation moves elsewhere (even though they protect a 
threatened forest), then they make no additional contribution to diminish global warming. 
This is why the international REDD+ architecture has argued for national rather than 
project-level accounting and compensation. This means that leakage would not be 
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considered or would be assumed to be captured in the national monitoring and 
accounting system, even if a risk of international leakage would still remain (Wunder, 
2008; Angelsen et al., 2008; Eliasch, 2008).  
 Although Appendix I of Decision 1/CP.16 states that when undertaking REDD+ 
activities, actions to reduce displacement of emissions should be promoted and 
supported, there is no international leakage requirement. But instead the use of national 
reference levels captures in-country leakage. This is exactly what happens in Brazil, 
under the REDD+ national strategy approaching the Amazon Fund, the issue of leakage 
is not addressed, using on the other hand, a national baseline rather than sub-national 
or project baselines to calculate the emissions reductions achieved. For DeShazo et al. 
(2016), there is still no realistic way to address leakage. 
 Leakage can be further categorised as “market leakage”, in which alterations to 
the supply, demand or equilibrium of a forest product may lead to an increase in its value 
and subsequent pressure to convert less well protected forests elsewhere and “activity 
shifting”, in which destructive activities are displaced from inside to outside a REDD+ 
design’s boundaries (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2009). Market leakage simply refers to 
changes in market, for instance, if the supply of timber in one region decreases, it could 
be expected that markets would act to make up the shortfalls in others regions 
(DeShazo et al., 2016). An example of activity-shifting leakage occurred in Ecuador. The 
President Rafael Correa drew international attention when he offered to call off oil drilling 
projects in the Yasuni National Park if international organisations would compensate 
Ecuador US$3.6 billion (DeShazo et al., 2016). Many people argued then that protecting 
the park (through a REDD+ project) would only cause oil drilling to be moved to another 
part of Ecuador – on account of its inelastic demand the oil would be extracted either 
within or outside the park – even though this action would mitigate around 410 millions 
tonnes of carbon emissions (DeShazo et al., 2016). 
 Concerns have also been voiced over the possibility of temporal leakage from 
one period to another, negating this way past climate change mitigation efforts. The 
question lies on whether and how the mechanism can adequately ensure that reduced 
deforestation at one point in time does not simply mean delayed deforestation to another 
point in time. All REDD+ design has to consider and manage the risk that deforestation 
pressures will happen again due to policy shifts or market feedbacks, or that avoided 
deforestation is offset by natural disasters, such as pests or forest fires (Dutschke and 
Angelsen, 2008b; Angelsen et al., 2008; Eliasch, 2008). 
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 4.4.5 Measurement, Reporting, Verification (MRV) 
 MRV raises two main questions: How do we measure, report and verify emission 
reductions from forests? and What mechanisms are needed – and who will operate them 
– to measure changes in rates of deforestation, leakage, permanence, the 
implementation of safeguards and the impacts on governance?  
 Therefore, MRV for REDD+ specifically refers to the measurement, reporting and 
verification of a country’s forest, and associated GHG emissions and removals, including 
their changes over time (Hewson et al., 2014). A REDD+ design of any scale depends 
on the establishment of criteria defining which activities are eligible under REDD+, as 
well as on robust methodologies for the measurement of carbon pools (i.e. aboveground 
biomass, belowground biomass, litter, dead wood and soil organic carbon) and flows 
(variations in the carbon content of each pool) (Gil, 2010). The reliability of the generated 
information depends on whether data comply with defined quality criteria: transparency, 
comparability, consistency, completeness, and accuracy. 
 
 According to the UN-REDD Programme: 
 Measurement refers to the direct or indirect measurement of emissions or 
removals per unit activity (emission factors – EF) from forest areas 
(activity data – AD) as a result of human activities. For REDD+ this 
translates into measurements of forest area and area change (AD) and 
forest carbon stock and carbon stock changes (EF). Direct measurement 
can include both field measurements and remote sensing, and can be 
supplemented with modeling. Indirect measurement involves estimation 
of emissions reductions using equations based on data on land areas and 
specific emission factors or the use of complex models that take into 
account a number of different parameters that affect the release or 
sequestration of carbon and other GHGs (Hewson et al., 2014).   
 Reporting refers to the presentation of measured information in a 
transparent and (often) standardised manner. Reported information 
encompasses forest-related data and estimates of GHGs and the 
methodologies used to derive them, as well as other related issues, such 
as quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) activities and 
uncertainty estimation, among others. Reporting requirements to the 
UNFCCC (National Communications) may cover issues other than just 
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those subject to measurement. For example, under the UNFCCC 
reporting agreements, developing countries can report their GHG 
inventory data as part of their national communication to the UNFCCC 
and in the context of biennial update reports.  
 Verification refers to the assessment (through internal and external 
checks) of the completeness, consistency, and reliability of the reported 
information through an independent process. Verification provides inputs 
to improve data (including GHG emissions and removals as well as all 
measured data or derived parameters) and helps to build confidence in, 
and improve scientific understanding of, estimates and trends. The 
UNFCCC Secretariat through its experts will verify the data reported. The 
verification of countries’ actions depends on three factors: i) the degree to 
which reported data is capable of being verified; ii) the actors conducting 
the verification; and iii) the way in which verification is performed.  
 
 In REDD+ framework there are five components which may be compensated for 
at the national level, and whose performance would need to be measured for this level: i) 
reducing emissions from deforestation; ii) reducing emissions from degradation; iii) 
conservation for forest carbon stocks; iv) enhanced forest carbon stocks; and, v) 
sustainable management of forests (McCall et al., 2016). At the national level, 
measurement of change in forest area (to detect changing rates of deforestation) can be 
carried out reasonably efficiently and inexpensively through remote sensing, but this will 
not be sufficient for REDD+ (Knowles et al., 2010). Quantifying the density of biomass 
(i.e. the level of the carbon stock) in different categories of forests is much more 
complex. On the other hand, it is essential firstly for estimating the stock in the forests, 
both remaining and lost, and secondly, also for claiming reduced degradation, forest 
enhancement and sustainable forest management, for which the changes in biomass 
density must be precisely measured (Knowles et al., 2010).  
 The MRV system should therefore be integrated with a country’s overall goals for 
sustainable development. It should be designed to capture sufficient detail for an 
assessment of the GHG impacts of policies and measures that are planned or 
implemented, added the impacts on other interventions. Monitoring systems – another 
activity of particular importance for REDD+ activities – must include all lands that are 
impacted by human activity and are defined as managed lands (Hewson et al., 2014). 
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While developing a MRV system for REDD+, a country has the opportunity to identify its 
national and regional development objectives and actions associated with its REDD+ 
strategy (Hewson et al., 2014). Without a clear linkage between MRV and policy 
development from the beginning, results-based compensation for REDD+ actions will be 
ineffective. 
 In countries with “nested-based” REDD+ programmes under development, where 
REDD+ activities exist at multiple levels, MRV must be coordinated to ensure that sub-
national systems do not discord with the national system. In addition, a MRV system 
should be linked to a decision-making process and enforcement for better adaptive 
management and policy implementation at the national level. For example, for Pratihast 
et al. (2014), ongoing  nested  MRV  structures  are  expected  to  narrow  the  gaps  of  
different  levels  (local, sub-national and national) monitoring data. During UNFCCC 
negotiations, Parties ultimately agreed that local communities should be involved in the 
MRV development (Hewson et al., 2014). But although this issue was addressed in the 
Cancun Agreement, there is no specific formal guidance on how this local engagement 
should be achieved and countries have the flexibility to decide the extent and modalities 
of such involvement (Hewson et al., 2014). Nevertheless, several authors suggest that 
such participatory MRV promotes several benefits such as empowerment of local people 
(Constantino et al., 2012), conservation of biodiversity (Porter-Bolland et al., 2012), 
reduction of forest degradation (Lawrence et al., 2006) and consequently promotes 
monitoring at lower costs. 
 During the COP19 the Warsaw Framework on REDD+ was adopted and among 
other things, these decisions provide guidance to countries on MRV-related matters, 
including:   
 Coordination of support for the implementation of activities in relation to 
mitigation actions in the forest sector by developing countries, including 
institutional arrangements; 
 Modalities for national forest monitoring systems; 
 The timing and the frequency of presentations of the summary of information on 
how all the safeguards are being addressed and respected; 
 Guidelines and procedures for the technical assessment of submissions from 
Parties on proposed FREL/FRLs; 
 Modalities for measuring, reporting and verifying. 
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 4.4.6 Additionality and the 3E’s 
 REDD+ must promote additional improvements beyond a reference scenario, in 
terms of reduced deforestation and degradation. Thus, the underlying rationale is to 
distinguish activities which further contribute to mitigation measures from those which, 
although they may be associated with carbon savings, offer no benefits above those 
expected anyway (Valatin, 2011). Distinguishing activities which are additional implies 
the establishment of a reference level that provides a hypothetical business as usual 
scenario against which carbon stock changes can be measured. This requires 
determining a counterfactual scenario for what would have happened if the project or 
activity had not gone ahead, and identifying the carbon pools and other GHG emissions 
sources and savings covered by the assessment (Valatin, 2011). One way to avoid 
additionality problems regarding REDD+ initiatives would be to target areas – usually 
those adjacent to land that had recently been deforested – for protection that are most 
likely to be deforested, because REDD+ should not pay for protection of a forest that 
would be protected anyway (DeShazo et al., 2016).  
 Wunder et al. (2008) also argue that potential areas for REDD+ schemes can be 
those areas where the ecosystem services are threatened by deforestation or already 
deforested land (in which services could be generated with additional environmental 
positive externalities) under the control of potential providers, and not only the areas 
which show a high level of carbon stocks, biodiversity indicators, or areas with potential 
for carbon capture. This can be observed in Africa, where several REDD+ initiatives are 
placed where pressure on forests is high, people are most receptive, and where there 
are fewer political obstacles (Rayden et al., 2010; van Oosterzee et al., 2012). On the 
other hand, targeting high risk forests could create perverse incentives (DeShazo et al., 
2016). Risk may introduce uncertainty that also may reduce the attractiveness of the 
investment, demand, and hence the price of carbon, implying that the opportunity cost of 
not harvesting a forest increases, thus perversely incentivising accelerated deforestation 
(van Oosterzee et al., 2012). 
 Additionality is also very controversial in Brazil. Some critics claim that since 
deforestation rates have been decreasing prior to the establishment of a national 
REDD+ framework, such actions should not be recognised under the climate convention 
umbrella. Moreover, in Brazil the suppression of forests by users is already restricted by 
the current legislation (Forest Code). Therefore, it is argued that establishing REDD+ 
interventions in these areas and paying beneficiaries for preserving forests would be the 
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same as rewarding them for complying with their legal obligations (Gil, 2010). However, 
it also argued that the level of law compliance is unquestionably low in Brazil and that 
deforestation will continue to increase unless a financing scheme such as REDD+ is 
adopted. For example, estimates from Soares-Filho et al. (2006) determine that between 
2007 and 2050, an area of approximately 1.5 million km2 across the Amazon (more than 
60% of that in the states of Amazonas and Pará) will be cleared. Under this scenario, 
deforestation would be extended to other regions than those around recently deforested 
areas. It is then discussed by Gil (2010), that the selection of sites for the 
implementation of REDD+ initiatives should not be based on the additionality de jure (i.e. 
defined by legal parameters) but rather on the additionality de facto (i.e. defined by what 
happens in practice, which not necessarily is authorised by the law).  
 In parallel with the development of different formal criteria for assessing REDD+ 
performance, there are also the development of informal criteria for assessing the wider 
success of REDD+ frameworks. The criteria that has achieved the most resonance is the 
‘3E’ criteria first proposed by Stern (2007) and promoted through a set of Centre for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR) publications (Angelsen, 2008b; Angelsen et al., 
2009; McDermott, 2013). The objective is to support informed decision-making that will 
help deliver REDD+ initiatives that are effective, efficient and equitable (Babon et al., 
2012). These are known as the ‘3E criteria’ (Angelsen et al., 2009; McDermott et al., 
2013):  
 Effectiveness: refers to the extent of carbon and non-carbon benefits achieved by 
REDD+ (i.e. can the mechanism bring significant emission reductions?); 
  Efficiency: refers to the costs of these emissions reductions or removal 
increases (i.e. are these reductions achieved at the minimum cost?);  
 Equity: refers to the distributional aspects of the associated costs and benefits, 
but also to procedural aspects of participatory decision-making and the specific 
contexts that shape stakeholders’ perceptions of equity (i.e. are benefits and 
costs distributed fairly among and within countries/stakeholders?).  
 
 These criteria have been widely adopted in the literature as the key determinants 
for assessing REDD+ frameworks. They provide the key indicators in order to develop 
recommendations on how REDD+ should be designed, providing also a framework for 
assessment of REDD+ policy. Early assessments of REDD+ policy using such criteria 
are essential as the full emission impacts of REDD+ policy may not be known for years 
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after initial policy interventions due to lags in data availability, and slow changes in 
behavioural patterns. Providing initial assessments of the impact of REDD+ policy on 
proxies for deforestation can help to provide early lessons for the wider implementation 
of REDD+ interventions (Laing, 2014). 
 
 
4.5 Discussion: the role of REDD+ in the new climate agreement 
 The relatively high opportunity costs of conservation compared to more profitable 
land-use options and the lack of viable alternatives to generate income in forested areas 
mostly result in high deforestation rates. A key question is to find avenues for extracting 
value from forests other than from timber. Moreover, even though extensive monitoring 
and strict legislation are the fundamental basis to any policy that seeks to extinguish 
deforestation, they have not been sufficient to reach this goal, as observed in the 
Amazon region (IPAM, 2011). Thus, by attributing a financial value to the carbon stored 
in forests and offering tropical countries economic incentives to fight deforestation, 
REDD+ started gaining support as an adequate alternative tool to halt forest destruction 
while reducing GHG emissions. In this sense, although the value of forests can be hardly 
calculated, REDD+ payments may outline the economic balance away from loss of 
forests and in favour of sustainable forest management (Bluffstone et al., 2012). 
 The real challenge, however, is the implementation of such idea, considering 
methodological constraints and complex relationship observed between deforestation 
drivers in different regions as previously presented. REDD+ is strongly linked to issues 
of human rights and participatory governance and, therefore, it is expected that the 
REDD+ initiatives could also contribute to the promotion of non-carbon advantages, 
benefiting local stakeholders. On the other hand, questions of whether and how social 
co-benefits should be included into REDD+ design are raised. For specialists as 
DeShazo et al. (2016), if REDD+ programmes are not cautiously institutionalised and 
designed, those livelihoods with informal land use-rights could be marginalised (also into 
the decision-making processes, which are usually driven by the elites). 
 The role of forests to mitigate climate change has been also recognised in the 
Paris Agreement, with a specific article devoted to REDD+, but what does such item 
state? 
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 4.5.1 REDD+ in the Paris Agreement 
 The article 5 specifically devoted to REDD+ outlines: 
 
“1. Parties should take action to conserve and 
enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gas as referred to in Article 4, 
paragraph 1(d), of the Convention (Article 5.1) 
2. Parties are encouraged to take action to 
implement and support, including through 
results-based payments, the existing framework 
as set out in related guidance and decisions 
already agreed under the Convention for: policy 
approaches and positive incentives for activities 
relating to reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation, and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries; and alternative 
policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and 
adaptation approaches for the integral and 
sustainable management of forests, while 
reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as 
appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with 
such approaches (Article 5.2)” 
 
 This provision also calls on Parties to adhere to previous REDD+ related COP 
decisions, which includes the Warsaw Framework for REDD+. The article 5 §1 clearly 
references the 1992 UN Convention. On the other hand, the Paris Agreement uses the 
word “should”, whereas the Convention text from 1992 used “shall” – in UN-speak, shall 
means must and should means encouraged to. While in the text from 1992 Parties had 
to ‘promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement’ of sinks and 
reservoirs, under the new Paris Agreement, Parties ‘should take action to conserve and 
enhance’ sinks and reservoirs. Article 5 §2 provides international support of both REDD+ 
and of a joint mitigation and adaptation approach to the sustainable management of 
forests. It also reaffirms the significance of non-carbon benefits (NCBs) and, in doing so 
endorses the broader scope of REDD+ to be a market- and a non-market-based 
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mechanism that is as much applicable to adaptation actions as it is to mitigation 
(Leonard, 2015). As a result, the Paris Agreement operationalises the REDD+ 
framework and sets the stage for forests to play a major role in the fight against climate 
change. The paragraph 55 of the text is about financing REDD+: 
 
“Recognizes the importance of adequate and 
predictable financial resources, including for 
results-based payments, as appropriate, for the 
implementation of policy approaches and 
positive incentives for reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation, and the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks; as well as alternative policy approaches, 
such as joint mitigation and adaptation 
approaches for the integral and sustainable 
management of forests; while reaffirming the 
importance of non-carbon benefits associated 
with such approaches; encouraging the 
coordination of support from, inter alia, public 
and private, bilateral and multilateral sources, 
such as the Green Climate Fund, and alternative 
sources in accordance with relevant decisions 
by the Conference of the Parties (Paragraph 
55)” 
 
 Nevertheless, Parties ‘recognise the importance of adequate and predictable 
financial resources’ for REDD+ initiatives. The financial support may come from public, 
private, bilateral, or multilateral sources. However, the text does not involve anyone 
making any commitments to finance REDD+ developments (Lang, 2015). For Fosci 
(2014), REDD+ does qualify for a share of the US$100 billion. On the other hand, even 
assuming that developed countries will be able to reach their reduction targets, this sum 
will cover several activities such as mitigation from all sectors, adaptation, technology 
development and transfer, capacity building, measurement and reporting obligations, 
etc. Thus, despite the important contribution of forests to climate change (although 
moderated when compared to fossil fuels), the rapid increase in industrial emissions in 
 99
developing countries, and the increased needs for adaptation in a warming planet, 
REDD+ would only be entitled to receive a small fraction of that amount (Fosci, 2014). 
Nevertheless, specifically for REDD+, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom 
announced a collective aim of providing US$1 billion/year from 2015 and beyond 2020 in 
order to support countries that are involved in REDD+ initiatives.  
 Eventually, the text implies REDD and the “plus” part of REDD (the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries). This is claimed to be a clear call to action for countries 
to endorse policies that conserve standing forests. Indeed, the Paris Agreement 
indicates that tropical and sub-tropical countries can receive both public and private 
funding if they succeed in reducing their GHG emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation. On the other hand, how exactly REDD+ is to be inserted into national 
development and climate strategies remains as the major questions (Angelsen and 
Verchot, 2015).  
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CHAPTER 5 Brazil and Forest-Climate Debate 
 Chapter five focuses on the Brazilian context in the climate debate. It starts with 
an overview of Brazil. It reveals natural characteristics as well as history, politic and 
economy background, focusing on enumerating aspects relevant to this study. Exposing 
pressing environmental problems, the big picture is built in order to provide a 
comprehensive understanding into the contemporary forest conservation and 
management context and models adopted in Brazil. Furthermore, it presents a 
description of the context of forest conservation in the country. It explores the evolution 
of the Brazilian position concerning climate change and forest-related issues as well as 
the development of domestic forest-climate-related measures to diminish GHG 
emissions in the country. It ends discussing and introducing the context of REDD+ in 
Brazil.  
 
 
5.1 Location, geographic regions and demography 
 Brazil with 8,547,403.5 km2 is a country of continental dimensions (the largest in 
South America; occupying 66% of the South-American territorial area (Carvalho, 2006)). 
The land area corresponds to 8,491,194 km and internal waters 55,547 km. Among all 
countries of continental dimensions, it is the only one whose territory is completely 
habitable. This does not occur, for example, in the cold areas of Canada, in the desert 
regions of China and Australia, the regions of the Rocky Mountains and in the deserts of 
the USA (Schneeberger and Farago, 2003). The country is located in the Western 
hemisphere, between the meridians 34o47'30" and 73o59'32" to West of Greenwich. 
Located between the parallel of 5o16'20" of North latitude and 33o44'42" of South, it is 
cut to the North by the Equator and, to the Southeast, by the Tropic of Capricorn; 
therefore, with 93% of its territory in the Southern hemisphere (Carvalho, 2006). With 
exception of Ecuador and Chile, Brazil has a border with all other countries that 
compose the South-American continent (figure 5). Its perimeter embraces 23,086 km, 
being bounded over 7,367 km by the Atlantic Ocean, that is to say 31.9% of its borders.  
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Figure 5. Brazil’s location and its political borders (Source: National Geographic, 2017)69 
  
 
 Brazil has 26 federal states aside from Brasília (called Federal District) and is 
divided into five regions: North, Northeast, Southeast, South and Center-West (figure 6). 
Although the administrative boundaries do not necessarily coincide with ecological 
boundaries, each of the five regions predominantly has a distinct ecosystem. 
 
                                                 
69 Online available at: http://kids.nationalgeographic.com/explore/countries/brazil/#brazil-soccer.jpg  
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Figure 6. The regions of Brazil (Source: GCR, 2013) 
 
 
5.2 History, politics and economy 
For a better understanding about the institutional and political system adopted in 
Brazil, it is necessary to have a peprspective about its historical development. Thus, 
Brazil was discovered in 1500 by the Portuguese navigator Pedro Álvares Cabral and 
was a Portuguese colony until 1822, when it became independent. When gold was 
found in Brazil in the 1690’s, the country was recognised for its mineral and trading 
potential. Approximately one century later though, it was understandable that the gold 
sources were limited and that the agricultural value of Brazil would remain its main asset. 
In 1807, during the invasion of Portugal, the Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil, 
establishing Rio de Janeiro as the de facto (by the facts) capital of Portugal. After 
Napoleon's army was finally defeated in 1815, in order to maintain the capital in Brazil 
and alleviate Brazilian fears of being returned to colonial status, the King Dom João VI of 
Portugal raised the de jure (of the law) status of Brazil to an equal, integral part of a 
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United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves. In 1820 the Constitutionalist 
Revolution started in Portugal. The movement demanded the return of King Dom João 
VI, who had been living in Brazil since 1808. When returned to Portugal in 1821, he left 
Brazil in the hands of his son, Prince Dom Pedro. However, Dom Pedro rebelled, 
declaring Brazil independent from Portugal in 7 September 1822. The prince was 
acclaimed Emperor Dom Pedro I on his birthday (12 October), which coincided with the 
inauguration of the Empire of Brazil. Nevertheless, formal recognition came with a treaty 
signed by both Brazil and Portugal in late 1825. Dom Pedro II was the second and last 
ruler of the Empire of Brazil, reigning for over 58 years (from 1831 to 1889). Abolition of 
slavery came in 1888, and the first Republic was established two years later (1890). 
Coffee and sugar became major products of Brazil, giving the locals work and 
establishing the country within the world’s economy. The 19 century coffee magnates 
cooperated with a military coup, removing imperialism from Brazil, and making these 
coffee planters the major Brazilian powers of the time. The economic abundance 
stopped, however, when the world experienced a major depression in 1929. In 1930, this 
existing political era came to a grinding halt when a new military coup placed Getúlio 
Vargas in the presidency. Although a civilian, Vargas was the dictator, elected president, 
dictator again, senator and then democratically elected president. He governed from 
1930-1945, then he resigned in 1945 and returned as elected president in 1950 until he 
took his own life in 1954. A democratic government prevailed from 1945 to 1964. In the 
late 1950s after Vargas' second period the country experienced an economic boom 
(using export goods regardless of what they had to charge for those goods to do so) 
during Juscelino Kubitschek's mandate, period in which the capital was moved from Rio 
de Janeiro to Brasília.  
In Brazil, the military government began with the 1964 coup led by the Armed 
Forces against the administration of the President João Goulart. The military dictatorship 
lasted 25 years, from 1964 to 1989 (when the country returned to a democratic model of 
government). The military government adopted nationalism, economic development, and 
anti-communism as its guidelines. Nowadays, Brazil has three levels of government: a 
federal government, 26 states and a federal district (Brasilia), and approximately 5,570 
municipalities (Nogueira et al., 2016). Brazil may be considered as one of the most 
decentralised federations in the world (Afonso, 2004; Gupta et al., 1994). After the 
totalitarian regime, decentralisation to the local level was argued for in the name of 
democracy as much as in the name of governmental efficiency and efficacy (Almeida, 
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2006). There are two main reasons for Brazil’s level of decentralisation: i) the response 
by the military government to domestic and international politics (as a means to maintain 
its support, the government devolved powers to locally-elected municipalities), and ii) the 
transition to democracy and its subsequent constitution.  
The 1988 constitution enshrined decentralisation into its charter. For example, 
the constitution mandates that a percentage of the revenue collected at the national and 
state level be redistributed downwards to the municipalities and delegates administrative 
authority to the states. However, this has not been enough to address Brazil’s many 
problems. In fact, decentralisation exacerbated the financial and economic problems in 
the country. Inflation and debt increased after the implementation of decentralisation in 
Brazil in the late 1980. Re-centralisation was considered the solution to that problem 
then. On the other hand, there are not enough evidences to merit the claim that a re-
centralisation process is in course in Brazil (Almeida, 2006). But tensions over re-
centralisation has resulted in deficits at the national and state level and little 
improvement in conditions at the municipal and local level, producing different results 
(e.g. lack of control over resources) according to the specific issues that are at stake 
(Almeida, 2006). 
From 2000 up to 2012, Brazil was one of the fastest-growing major economies in 
the world, with an average annual GDP growth rate of over 5%, with its economy in 2012 
surpassing that of the United Kingdom, making Brazil the world's sixth largest economy 
(Soto, 2015). However, Brazil's economic growth has decelerated in 2013 and it had 
almost no liquid growth during 2014 and 2015 (Soto, 2015). Brazil’s medium-term 
prospect will strongly depend on the success of the current adjustment and the adoption 
of further growth-enhancing reforms. To achieve higher growth in the medium-term, 
raising productivity and competitiveness is the crucial challenge for the country (World 
Bank, 2015). Nevertheless, the country experiences extreme regional differences, 
especially in social indicators such as health, infant mortality and nutrition; for example, 
the South and Southeast regions experience much better results than the North and 
Northeast (World Bank, 2015). Moreover, despite the achievements in poverty reduction 
over the last decade, inequality remains at relatively high levels for a middle income 
country (World Bank, 2015). For example, in 2014 Brazil ranked 51.5 in the Gini 
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coefficient index,70 with the richest 10% of Brazilians receiving 42.7% of the nation's 
income, while the poorest 10% received less than 1.2%. 
 
 
5.3 Biomes and biological diversity 
Brazil is the country with the greatest biodiversity, where between 15 to 20% of 
the total number of species of the Earth is found. Also, the country is home to at least 
103,870 animal species and between 43,000 and 49,000 plant species as well as 
microorganisms, algae and several biological groups never before studied (SECOM, 
2012). Brazil also ranks third on the list of countries with the most number of bird species 
and second with the most reptile species (Palmerlee, 2007). Approximately 700 new 
animal species are discovered each year in Brazil (SECOM, 2012). 
Brazil has its territory divided into six natural biomes (figure 7): the Amazon 
(rainforest), Cerrado (savannah), Caatinga (semi-arid), Atlantic Forest, Pantanal 
(wetlands) and Pampa (lowlands). Around 54.4% of Brazilian territory is still covered by 
forests (table 4), representing the second biggest forested area on the planet only 
behind Russia (SFB, 2013). The remaining lands are used for agriculture, cattle, 
urbanism and infrastructure. Brazil possesses 12% of the world‘s reserve of available 
freshwater (USAID, 2011). However, geographically, these resources are extremely 
unevenly distributed. Nearly 73% of Brazil‘s freshwater is concentrated in the sparsely 
populated Amazon River Basin. The Pantanal is under pressure from expansion of large 
soy and sugar plantations. Water pollution and availability issues exist in the 
industrialised South and Southeast, which is home to the majority of the population. 
 
 
                                                 
70 See at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=BR   
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Figure 7. Biomes of Brazil (Source: ABAG, 2017) 
 
Table 4 Estimated forest areas in Brazil  
Type of Forest Total Area (ha) % of Forests % of Brazilian Territory 
Natural 456,083,955 98.45 53.56 
Plantation 7,185,943 1.55 0.84 
Total 463,269,898 100 54.40 
Source: Adapted from SFB; GEIF; ABRAF, 2013 
 
 Nevertheless, there still are difficulties in calculating the area of natural forests 
within the different biomes in Brazil. This happens on account of the absence of a proper 
systematic mapping of vegetation in each region and the continuous improvement of 
image interpretation methodology, for example, when there are changes in the mapping.  
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Different sources diverge about forest ownership estimations in Brazil: between 
68% (FAO, 2015)71 and 81% (TFT, 2013)72 of the forest area is supposed to be “publicly 
owned”. Public ownership is merely public administration, the other part is owned by 
communities. Also indigenous lands in Brazil are considered of public ownership. 
Between 19 and 23% is supposed to be in private ownership. But such proportion of 
private forest ownership affects implementation of forest policy at the national level (due 
to lack of enforcement) in the country, even though this number is relatively not too high. 
In their country report Brazil, FAO (2015) states that in 8% of the forest area, ownership 
is unknown and there is a great lack of information on the ownership of forests in Brazil, 
probably also caused by differences in the interpretation of “public ownership”.  
Public lands with natural forests can be managed by private companies of by 
traditional communities. There is no plantation management on public lands. The 
management of natural forests may also occur on private land. “Permanent Forest 
Estate” (PFE) is defined as: land, whether public or private, secured by law and kept 
under permanent forest cover (TFT, 2013). This includes land for the production of 
timber and other forest products, for the protection of soil and water, and for the 
conservation of biological diversity, as well as land intended to fulfill a combination of 
these functions. Forest area that is not classified as PFE is open for conversion to other 
land uses. Brazil is one of the countries with the largest public forest area under 
community management. For example, in 2010, 152 million hectares were under 
community-based management in Brazil (FAO, 2015). Brazil also recognises a number 
of tenure regimes for local and indigenous communities, each subject to specific 
conservation requirements such as: i) extractive reserves, ii) sustainable development 
reserves, iii) national forests, iv) agro-extractive settlement projects, v) forest settlement 
projects, vi) sustainable development projects, vii) “Quilombos”, 73 indigenous lands, etc. 
 
 
 5.3.1 Amazon  
The Amazon biome represents about 8% of all the world’s remaining forests 
(SBF, 2013). Originally, the Brazilian Amazon had about 4 million km² of forests. In this 
region, plants alone can hold up to 76 billion tonnes of water in their living tissues 
(carbon composes approximately 45% of dried biomass while water composes about 
                                                 
71 See FAO (2015) Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015. 
72 See TFT Country guide to timber legality - Brazil 
73 Quilombos are the communities’ descendants of Afro-Brazilian slaves who escaped from slave plantations. 
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40% of fresh biomass (Baker et al., 2004)). These forests function as an efficient soil-
atmosphere water pump. For example, on an average day, about 20 billion tonnes of 
water is transpired by plants in the Amazon basin (Manfrinato et al., 2007). The Brazilian 
Amazon overlaps with two other geographic areas: the Amazon Basin and the Legal 
Amazon. Through nine countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, 
French Guyana, Guyana, and Suriname), the Amazon Basin extends over 6.8 million 
km2 (Goulding et al. 2003). Concerning the Legal Amazon, it is an area that 
encompasses nine Federal states in Brazil (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, 
Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins and part of Maranhão). This governmental action 
aims at bringing together the regions of similar economic, political and social problems, 
in order to better plan for the development of the Amazon region. 
 
 
5.3.2 Cerrado 
The Cerrado biome is formed by a complex set of habitat mosaics and plant 
varieties that occupy all of central Brazil and encompasses an area of 2.04 million km², 
(SECOM, 2012). It is characterised by a gradient of grassland, savannah and forest 
formations (Ribeiro, 2013). The savannah formation mostly constitutes this biome which 
is, after the Amazon, the second largest biome of Brazil (Klink and Machado; 2005, 
Ribeiro, 2013). Also, it is considered one of the world’s richest savannahs, representing 
an estimated 5% of all global biodiversity, with 11,627 catalogued native plant species 
(SFB, 2013; SECOM, 2012). 
 
 
5.3.3 Caatinga 
The Caatinga biome covers an area of approximately 844,455 km² equivalent to 
10% of the national territory and is the only exclusively Brazilian biome. Its vegetation is 
a mosaic of thorny shrubs and seasonally dry forests and, despite occupying a semi-arid 
region, its biodiversity is extremely heterogeneous, sustaining various economic 
activities aimed at agro-silvopastoris and industrial purposes (SFB, 2013). 
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5.3.4 Atlantic Forest  
The Atlantic Forest biome encompasses an area of 1.1 million km² or 13% of the 
Brazilian territory and extends along the entire coast from the Northeast to the South. 
However, the forest area in this biome was drastically reduced and currently is extremely 
fragmented. Nevertheless, the Atlantic Forest still hosts a significant portion of Brazil’s 
biological diversity (SFB, 2013). 
 
 
5.3.5 Pantanal 
The Pantanal biome is considered one of the largest continuous wetlands of the 
planet. It has an approximate area of 150,355 km² representing 1.8% of the total 
Brazilian territory. This biome is under direct influence of three major biomes: Amazon, 
Cerrado and Atlantic Forest. In addition, it is also influenced by the Chaco biome – name 
given to the Pantanal located in Northern Paraguay and Eastern Bolivia (SFB, 2013). 
 
 
5.3.6 Pampa 
The Pampas are fertile lowland plains of the far South part in Brazil. It occurs in 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul (encompassing an area of 176,496 km2) and extends 
across Uruguay and Argentina. The dominant vegetation consists of pampa grass 
interspersed with semi-deciduous forests, subtropical forests (mainly Araucaria forests) 
and seasonal forests (SFB, 2013). 
 
 
5.4 Environmental problems 
Brazil faces its own set of environmental issues, for instance, illegal wildlife trade, 
loss of biodiversity, air and water pollution, land degradation and severe oil spills, among 
others. In areas where agriculture is more intense and developed, there are serious 
problems of soil erosion; siltation and sedimentation of streams and rivers, and pollution 
with pesticides (see Blaikie, 1985; Pimentel et al., 1987). Moreover, desertification, 
another important environmental problem in Brazil (see Cavalcanti and Countinho, 2005; 
Vieira, 2007), only received international attention following the outputs from the Earth 
Summit. However, the environmental problem that attracted most international attention 
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in Brazil since the 1980’s 74  was undoubtedly the deforestation rate in Amazonian 
forestlands, even though deforestation was and still is a significant problem in all other 
biomes. The Brazilian Amazon accounts for 48% of the country’s total area, covering an 
area of approximately 419 million hectares and is often used as a proxy for Brazil’s 
tropical forests (SFB, 2013). 
 For many years Brazil has shown the highest deforestation rates worldwide. 
Therefore, for a meaningful study concerning the Brazilian formulation of a national 
REDD+ strategy, deforestation issues must be addressed. Addressing only the 
promotion of sustainable use of forest resources would neglect the most important 
forces behind forest clearance in Brazil. For a better understanding of how to develop 
such strategies, it is imperative to address these issues in an integrated way. Thus, the 
discussion of their roles is required for the design of a realistic set of effective policies to 
curb deforestation and benefit traditional and indigenous communities who depend on 
natural resources for their subsistence. Considering then that deforestation releases 
GHG and aggravates global warming, the next two topics present an overview of the 
state of deforestation underway until nowadays in Brazil likewise the Brazilian GHG 
emissions estimates. 
 
 
5.4.1 Deforestation process in Brazil 
The Amazon rainforest had remained almost intact until the beginning of the 
“modern” era. Since colonial times, settlement of the Brazilian Amazon has been marked 
by violent confrontation and deforestation actions in the competition over natural 
resources and access to land (Hall, 2013). Brazil showed for many years the highest 
deforestation rate globally, which mainly occurred in the Amazon region. For example, 
according to FAO (2006b) from the year 2000 to 2005 Brazil accounted for about 42% of 
total global net forest loss. During this period, the mean annual deforestation rate was 
22,392 km2, representing 18% more than in the previous five years (19,018 km2). About 
17% of the region has now been cleared mainly as a result of cattle ranching, timber 
                                                 
74 While at that time some concepts such as the Gaia Hypothesis and Silent Spring were emerging and 
taking place worldwide, Brazil was beginning to unfold economic megaprojects and launch public 
infrastructure, settlement and fiscal incentive policies that eventually proved to be not merely controversial, 
but often disastrous. In reaction to those projects, which were largely unleashed during the period of military 
dictatorship (1964-1989), social movements expanded and converged in the region, fighting for the rights of 
the peoples of the forest. Their most expressive moment was to take place much later in 1988, in the state 
of Acre, with the murder of the rubber tappers’ leader Chico Mendes; an event that had international 
repercussions (WWF, 2015). 
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extraction and agricultural crops (Hall, 2013). The total deforested area in the Amazon 
increased 51% over the past 20 years (IBGE, 2012).  
 
 
5.4.1.1 The main drivers 
Agricultural expansion (mainly soya and beef for export markets), infrastructural 
development and selective or illegal logging – loggers in the Brazilian Amazon exploits 
weaknesses in the country’s regulatory system to launder illegally logged timber for the 
global market (Greenpeace, 2015) – are amongst the most frequently cited drivers of 
Amazon clearance in Brazilian territory, while public policies, institutional weakness (lack 
of governance, weak property rights and negligence with the environmental legislation) 
and international market demand are considered as important underlying causes (Wertz-
Kanounnikof et al., 2008). Whereas industrial activities are the principal driver of 
deforestation and degradation worldwide, in Asia, the main contributors to deforestation 
are the combination of subsistence agriculture and large-scale farmers and in Africa the 
small-scale subsistence agriculture and fuelwood consumption (Kissinger et al., 2012). 
Within this context, it is important to notice that this support to poor livelihoods through 
the use of natural resources only responds to a minor part of the complex process of 
deforestation in Brazil (Verchot and Petkova, 2009). Small-scale farmers are estimated 
to account for only about one-fifth of the deforestation rate in Amazonian lands (Chomitz, 
2007). 
Concerning infrastructural development, there is a particular case written in the 
Amazonian history, the construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway75 in 1972 (official 
designation BR-230). The construction of the highway has contributed to a large deal of 
deforestation in the Amazon (Skole et al., 1994). Access roads branch perpendicularly 
off BR-230 allowing deeper penetration into the surrounding forested areas. Originally 
these roads were to open up land for agriculture by settlers; however, loggers have used 
these roadways to further deforest the surrounding forested lands (Skole et al., 1994). 
Moreover, the serious debt crisis of the 1980s in Brazil led to large scale-deforestation 
due to massive development projects, for servicing foreign debt (DeShazo et al., 2016). 
                                                 
75 Official named in Portuguese as “Rodovia Transamazônica” is 4,000 km long, making it the third longest 
highway in Brazil. It runs through the Brazilian states of Paraíba, Ceará, Piaui, Maranhão, Tocantins, Pará 
and Amazonas. 
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The region known as “Arc of Deforestation”76 (figure 8) has been the world’s most 
active deforestation frontier in recent decades (Macedo et al., 2011). Beef production in 
Amazonian lands tends to be extensive, with low levels of meat production per unit area 
(Boucher et al., 2011). More than two-thirds of the deforested area in this part of the 
Amazon is used for extensive cattle ranching. For example, the states of Mato Grosso, 
Rondônia, and Pará have converted from 1996 to 2005 an average of 16,600 km2 per 
year of forests (Macedo et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 8. Arc of deforestation in the Legal Amazon (Source: Forest Trends, 2015)77 
 
Domestic beef consumption was used to drive the expansion of Brazil’s cattle 
ranching activities, but international drivers gained greater importance since the year 
2000 (Wertz-Kanounnikof et al., 2008). Brazil has emerged as the largest beef exporter 
(growing by 140% from 1990 to 2003) in the world, surpassing the USA in 2003 and 
Australia in 2004 (Wertz-Kanounnikof et al. 2008). This happened on account of mainly 
                                                 
76  Arc of Deforestation is the region where the agricultural frontier advances towards the native forest 
(having the highest rates of deforestation in the Amazon). It encompasses an area of almost 500,000 km² 
that goes from the East and South of Pará state towards the West, passing through the states of Mato 
Grosso, Rondônia and Acre.  
77 Online available at: http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/indigenous-people-explore-many-
shades-redd/ 
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two reasons: the first change was the improvement of livestock production system, 
which increased the number of animals produced per area. The second and most 
significant reason was the eradication of major diseases (such as bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy), allowing the states of Mato Grosso, Acre, and the Southern half of 
Pará to export beef to Europe (Wertz-Kanounnikof et al., 2008). Both facts have enabled 
substantial increase in profit in the Amazon by farmers, stimulating huge investments in, 
and an expansion of the occupied area.  
The development of new temperature-tolerant varieties of soya enabled the 
expansion of soya production in the late 1990’s into the Amazon region (Fearnside, 
2001). Additionally, the decrease in world supply of animal protein feed production 
caused an increase in soya bean price (Brookes et al., 2005; Hard, 2002). Over the past 
decades, Brazil’s soya bean production has expanded rapidly (TNC, 2010). For instance, 
in 1969 Brazil produced only 1 million tonnes of soya beans. On the other hand, by 1975 
Brazil already produced 11.6 million tonnes and surpassed China to become the world’s 
second largest soya producer. Moreover, by 1989 production rose to 20 million tonnes 
and in 2009 it reached 63 million tonnes. Every year soya production plays a greater role 
in Brazilian exports and is currently the most important commodity in Brazilian 
agribusiness (TNC, 2010). According to TNC (2010), in the 2009 export market, Brazil 
was the world’s second largest exporter of whole soya beans (behind only the USA) and 
of soya meal and soya oil (behind only Argentina). The 2014/15 soya bean production in 
Brazil was forecasted to increase by 8% (reaching 97 million tones), making Brazil the 
world’s largest soya bean exporter, based on augmented available supplies and 
strengthened export capacity (USDA, 2014a). 
 A relationship can be observed between deforestation and soya bean and cattle 
prices in the international market. This means, it can be observed that as the 
commodities prices increase, the deforestation rates increase as well. Thus, the global 
fluctuations of market prices highly influence the production level and the consequent 
pressure on forest resources in Brazil. Figure 978 shows the relation between beef and 
soya production with deforestation: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 The dotted line presented in the graphic represents the threshold level established in the National Policy 
on Climate Change as the deforestation baseline scenario. 
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Figure 9. Relation between deforestation and beef and soya production in Brazil (Source: 
IPAM, 2012) 
 
The share of Amazon clearing for soya bean crops (at least in Brazilian territory) 
is considered low relative to clearings for new pastureland – soya bean farmers usually 
use degraded pasture 79  lands (Brandão et al., 2005; Chomitz and Tomas, 2001). 
However, the soya bean production can be seen as a main indirect driver of 
deforestation, as it induces land sellers (e.g., cattle ranchers and smallholders) to further 
advance into the Amazon to open up new lands (Barona et al., 2010; Wertz-Kanounnikof 
et al. 2008). This happens on account of the increased value of the land because of the 
production of soya bean and this is an incentive for the ranchers to sell their land to the 
soya bean producers and search for new land further into the Amazon (Dalene, 2011). 
Soya bean farming also provides the economic and political basis for new infrastructure 
projects, which accelerate deforestation by other actors (Wertz-Kanounnikof et al. 2008).  
Looking onwards the Amazon region, the Northeast, South and Southeast 
regions concentrate 85% of the Brazilian population (IBGE, 2014). These regions 
underwent the most intense deforestation rates in Brazil, due to urbanisation and 
economic growth. Although the remaining natural vegetation in these regions is 
protected by law, deforestation is still ongoing (Watson, 2005; WWF, 2011) and 
management activities are restricted only to planted forests. Amongst these biomes, the 
most endangered are the Atlantic Forest, whose actual coverage corresponds only to 
                                                 
79  Pasture degradation is defined as the progressive loss of natural vigor, productivity and recovering 
capacity demanded by the animals, according to Assad et al. (2013). 
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7.9% of its original vegetation (SBF, 2013) and the Pampas, which maintains only 10% 
of its original coverage (SBS, 2006). In the Northeast, the Caatinga is continuously 
endangered; in spite of legal restrictions, a large quantity of wood is used as firewood, 
which is the main basis of energy generation in the region, owing to poverty and the 
scarcity of other fuel sources (MMA, 2011). From the 1980’s cattle, agriculture and 
forestry expanded rapidly in the Center-West region. Intensive production expanded 
when new technologies (intense mechanisation, adapted seeds, access to 
macronutrients) made soya bean production viable in lands with low fertility, using a 
land-use model based on large properties, at least 1,200 hectares were considered 
necessary for soya bean production to be economically viable areas (Bessa et al., 
2005). The low price of land combined with official incentives and the favourable 
conditions of the market rapidly made soya bean the most profitable crop in the Cerrado 
region areas (Bessa et al., 2005). This expansion is heavily changing the landscapes of 
this biome. By 2002, 890,636 km² had been deforested; between 2002 and 2008, this 
amount was increased by 85,074 km², totaling 47.84% of the Cerrado’s original forest 
area (MMA, 2011a). This means that the Cerrado has lost around half of its original 
forested cover, with only 66.3 million hectares remaining (MMA, 2011a). 
 
 
5.4.2 Brazil and GHG emissions 
Rapid economic growth and industrialisation over several decades has brought 
increasing reliance on fossil fuels and increasing GHG emissions in Brazil (Chandler et 
al., 2002). However, the country ranks relatively low in energy-related carbon emissions, 
even though the energy sector now emits more than twice as much as it did back in 
1990 (MCTI et al., 2013). On the other hand, the largest share of Brazil’s GHG 
emissions derives from non-energy sources such as agriculture and livestock, land use 
change and forestry. During 1990 and 2005 a total of 55.8 million hectares of forest from 
the entire Amazon Basin were cleared, which corresponds to a release of approximately 
4.8 million tonnes of carbon (FAO, 2010). Brazil is among the top six GHG emitters due 
to deforestation (Marcovitch, 2006). For instance, in 1995, deforestation accounted for 
1,950,084 GtCO2eq (see figure 10) representing almost 80% of total net CO2 emissions 
in the country (MCTI et al., 2013). In 2004 deforestation of Amazonian areas in Brazil 
accounted for almost 5% of global GHG emissions (Boucher et al., 2013).  
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Figure 10. Brazilian GHG emissions per sector (1990-2011)80 (Source: MCTI et al., 2013) 
 
Over the past decades, Brazil has drastically cut its carbon footprint for the 
reason that the deforestation rate has fallen considerably since 2005. The forestry sector 
decreased in 76.1% (table 5) its total CO2 emissions during the period from 2005 to 2010 
in Brazil (MCTI et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Translation: The colours refer to: orange – waste treatment, red – energy, lila – industrial processes, 
green – agriculture and blue – forestry and land use change. 
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Table 5 Brazilian total CO2 emissions per sector (1995-2010) 
 
Sector/Year 
1995 2000 2005 2010 Variation 
Gt CO2eq 2005-2011 
 
Energy 
 
232,340 
 
 
301,096 
 
382,808 
 
399,302 
 
+21.4% 
 
Industrial 
 
63,065 
 
 
71,673 
 
77,943 
 
82,048 
 
+5.3% 
 
Agriculture 
 
 
335,375 
 
347,878 
 
415,713 
 
437,226 
 
+5.2% 
 
Forests 
 
 
1,950,084 
 
1,324,371 
 
1,167,917 
 
279,163 
 
- 76.1% 
 
Waste 
 
 
33,808 
 
38,550 
 
41,880 
 
48,737 
 
+16.4% 
          
Total 
 
2,615,162 
 
2,083,570 
 
2,032,260 
 
1,246,477 
 
- 38.7% 
 
Adapted from: MCTI, 2013 
 
On the other hand, in 2013 all five sectors have increased their emission rates, 
releasing in total about 1.5 million tonnes of CO2eq, representing an increase of 7.8% 
compared to 2012 and the highest value recorded since 2008 (SEEG, 2015). In spite of 
this increase, Brazil is still on track to meet climate goals announced in Copenhagen in 
2009. Brazil could increase its emissions by nearly 66% from 2010 levels and still 
achieve its 2020 targets (Tollefson, 2013). This is exactly a point of disagreement; some 
specialists criticise the country position, declaring that its targets should be more 
audacious and realistic. The overall targets established by the National Policy on 
Climate Change (NPCC) are not divided by sectors, although each sector has it own 
mitigation plans, which means that one sector must compensate the other (SAE, 2014, 
personal communication).81 According to Fraundorfer and Rabitz (2015), it was unlikely 
that Brazil would take more aggressive measures in areas other than forestry, although 
an ambitious contribution to global post-2020 mitigation would require more stringent 
action in all other sectors.  
 
 
                                                 
81 SAE – Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Brazilian Presidency – Personal Communication 
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5.5 GHG mitigation measures non-forest related 
Recent reductions on deforestation rates have helped to reduce CO2 emissions 
in Brazil. However, the forestry issue area is not discussed in detail here as this section 
focuses on non-forest-related mitigation measures. Although Brazil has also been active 
in advancing policies to address emissions from energy use, GHG emissions from the 
energy sector increased 21.4% between 2005 and 2010 (MCTI et al., 2013). The country 
is motivated in part by the desire to address social issues and increase economic 
development, as several GHG mitigation options – both within the country and globally – 
could have strong overlap with these concerns. For example, distributed renewable 
electricity generation can help bring electricity to the rural area, and GHG mitigation 
strategies that rely on Brazil’s growing biofuels business could support economic 
development (Erickson et al., 2009). Brazil’s sectoral mitigation plans are in different 
stages of development and implementation (Gebara and Thuault, 2013). Existing 
national programmes in Brazil focus mainly on efforts to curb deforestation and on 
expanding the use of renewable energy. More than 40% of Brazil’s energy comes from 
renewable sources compared to an average of less than 20% for the rest of the world 
(figure 11 and 12). The figure 13 shows the Brazilian electricity supply in the year 2014. 
 
Figure 11. Energy supply structure in percentage (comparision between Brazil worldwide) 
(Source: Surgacane.org, 2013)82 
                                                 
82 Online available at: http://sugarcane.org/the-brazilian-experience/brazils-diverse-energy-matrix  
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Figure 12. Brazilian energy matrix in 2014 (Source: Brazilian Energy Balance, 2015) 
  
 
 
Figure 13. Brazilian electricity supply in the year 2014 (Source: Brazilian Energy Balance, 
2015) 
  
 Brazil has also used its NDC83 to state what its energy and electricity mixes will 
look like by 2030. Renewables will make up a 45% share of its energy mix by 2030, with 
renewable sources, excluding hydropower, to occupy between 28% and 33% of the 
total. This commitment, however, does not indeed represent progress considering that 
renewable sources already make up more than 40% of primary energy production in 
                                                 
83  Online available at: 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Brazil%20First/BRAZIL%20iNDC%20english%20FI
NAL.pdf  
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Brazil (almost 43% in 2013, for example). Meanwhile, the share of renewable (other than 
hydropower) will constitute at least a 23% share in Brazil’s power supply by 2030. This 
will be achieved by raising the share of wind, biomass and solar and achieving efficiency 
gains of at least 10% in the electricity sector, as stated in the NDC. Moreover, the share 
of sustainable biofuels in the Brazilian energy mix should be increased to approximately 
18% by 2030, by expanding biofuel consumption, increasing ethanol supply, including by 
increasing the share of advanced biofuels and increasing the share of biodiesel in the 
diesel mix. 
Nevertheless, Brazil has been also introducing policies focused on reducing 
energy-related GHG emissions. In the energy sector, examples of national programmes 
include: i) the National Ethanol Programme (ProAlcool); ii) the National Programme for 
Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB) and iii) the Programme of Incentive to 
Alternative Sources of Electric Energy (PROINFA).  
  The ProAlcool is one of the oldest national initiatives aimed to promote ethanol 
use as an alternative fuel in transportation (Erickson et al., 2009). Brazil first launched 
the ProAlcool in 1975 trough the Decree 76.595/1975 to promote ethanol production 
(from biomass, e.g. sugar cane, cassava and sorghum) as a substitute for gasoline 
(Chandler et al., 2002), when energy supply became a main priority due to the oil crisis 
and the low price of sugar (Soccol et al., 2005). At that time, sugar cane was chosen due 
to its great adaptation to the Brazilian weather and soil type (Soccol et al., 2005). 
Between 1975 and 2006, Brazil’s sugar cane production increased by 412%, from 88.9 
million to 456 million tonnes (Moraes, 2008). Currently the production may reach 590 
million tonnes (UNICA, 2015). According to Voegele (2015), for the 2015/16 season, the 
UNICA84 predicts that ethanol production would reach 27.28 billion litres, up 4.33% from 
the 26.15 billion litres produced during the 2014/15 season. 
The main objective was to slow down energy consumption while maintaining 
economic growth, which means to diminish environmental impacts of energy use, and to 
create domestic jobs and income (Chandler et al., 2002). The government offered a 
variety of incentives including low-interest loans to build distilleries, ethanol purchase 
guarantees, favourable pricing relative to gasoline and sales tax reductions (Chandler et 
al., 2002). However, global oil prices had fallen since 1986; also domestic oil production 
had decreased dependence on foreign oil import. On the demand side, rising sugar 
prices led to two ethanol shortages (in 1989 and 1990) and price hikes, dropping the 
                                                 
84 UNICA means Sugar Cane Industrial Union. 
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consumer confidence in alcohol-fuelled cars (Chandler et al., 2002). That trend was only 
reversed with the introduction of dual-fuel or flex-fuel vehicles in 2003 (Moraes, 2008). 
Today, ethanol is used in Brazil mainly as a gasoline additive. Alcohol fuel in the year 
2000 still avoided 5.4 million tonnes of carbon emissions (Chandler et al., 2002). 
The international market for ethanol could be a positive opportunity for Brazil. 
Ever since signatures were gathered on Kyoto Protocol, a number of developed nations 
have been seeking alternatives to petroleum in order to reduce their GHG emissions, 
which could mean opportunities for ethanol. However, the international ethanol market 
must be looked upon as a medium to a long-term undertaking. There are barriers to be 
overcome from issues concerning market protectionism in some developed countries, 
down to cultural differences (Moraes, 2008). Although some countries have shown a real 
interest in pure ethanol for blending with gasoline (such as Japan), very few countries 
have actual experience with fuel ethanol on any large-scaled (Moraes, 2008). Moreover, 
the countries must have source of supply they can rely on – at prices they can work with. 
No country will be willing to risk prices that would result if there were only a single 
supplier – in this case, Brazil. There are also logistical problems to be worked out, if 
exports are to increase.  
In addition to ethanol, the government has introduced the PNPB (biodiesel85 
programme, see page 121) – launched on 6 December 2004 – from raw materials such 
as palm, castor bean and soya bean. The goal of this programme is to introduce a new 
fuel in the national energy mix from self sustained projects that combine fair price, high 
fuel quality, security of supply and social development policies (Erickson et al., 2009).  
Brazilian biodiesel is derived from biomass and is used to power compression-
ignition internal combustion engines. Regulations provide for other types of power 
conversion in which it can partially or entirely replace fossil fuels (Rodrigues and Accarini, 
2009). Hence, there is no shortage of possible applications of biodiesel fuel in urban and 
highway transportation, as well as passenger and cargo shipping, railways, generators 
and stationary engines (Rodrigues and Accarini, 2009). The programme was designed 
to gradually converge on markets mechanisms by means of incentives which provide for 
the inclusion of producers in the poorest regions into the supply chain for this fuel, 
through incentives based on supply and demand (Rodrigues and Accarini, 2009). It is 
based upon laws, executive orders and other legal and normative documents. 
                                                 
85  The biodiesel industry remains regulated by the government which increased biodiesel blend 
requirements to 6% effective (July, 2014) and 7% effective (November, 2014).  As a consequence, biodiesel 
production for 2015 was projected at 4.4 billion liters, up 900 million liters from 2014 (USDA, 2014b).   
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Within this context, Brazil should concern to the fact that biofuel production 
typically takes place on cropland which was previously used, for instance, for growing 
food or feed. Since this agricultural production is still necessary, it may be partly 
displaced to previously non-cropland such as forests areas (being this process known as 
indirect land use change – ILUC). It took a long time for this discussion to be part of the 
EU Renewable Energy Directive (EU-RED) framework, for example. The EU-RED has 
been addressing deforestation due to direct land use change but in 2011, the European 
Commission delayed a decision on whether or not to address iLUC factors (Johnson et 
al., 2012). However, in 2015 new rules86 came into force which amended the current 
legislation on biofuels – specifically the Renewable Energy Directive and the Fuel 
Quality Directive – to reduce the risk of indirect land use change (EU, 2016). Using this 
as a background, economic opportunities for developing countries to export biofuel to 
the EU could appear. The high productivity of biomass in tropical and subtropical regions 
could result in lower land use impacts and lower GHG emissions than result from 
biofuels produced in the EU (Johnson et al., 2012). These incentives could be linked to 
REDD+, stabilising the agricultural frontier, while reducing land use change and GHG 
emissions (Killeen et al., 2011). On the other hand, REDD+ countries my face higher 
costs in meeting the sustainability criteria, due to the lack of technical, financial and 
human resources to support certification (Johnson et al. 2012). 
 Access to electricity is considered essential to social and economic development 
in Brazil. Despite the fact that almost 70% of all energy generated in the Brazilian 
electric sector comes from hydroelectric power plants, in 2002, PROINFA was launched 
(Erickson et al., 2009). On the other hand, the hydropower sector in Brazil is 
unsustainable (Gebara, 2015b). For example, Brazil has never seen such a massive 
displacement of financial and natural resources (the dam prevents migration of the fish) 
and people (mainly indigenous) as in the construction of the Belo Monte hydropower 
                                                 
86 The amendment: 
 Limits the share of biofuels from crops grown on agricultural land that can be counted towards the 
2020 renewable energy targets to 7%; 
 Sets an indicative 0.5% target for advanced biofuels as a reference for national targets which will 
be set by EU countries in 2017; 
 Harmonises the list of feedstocks for biofuels across the EU whose contribution would count double 
towards the 2020 target of 10% for renewable energy in transport; 
 Requires that biofuels produced in new installations emit at least 60% fewer greenhouse gas than 
fossil fuels; 
 Introduces stronger incentives for the use of renewable electricity in transport (by counting it more 
towards the 2020 target of 10% for renewable energy use in transport); 
 Includes a number of additional reporting obligations for the fuel providers, EU countries and the 
European Commission. 
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dam. In some cases, dams can even produce more GHGs (which should be carefully 
measured and estimated) than power plants running on fossil fuels (even though carbon 
emissions vary from dam to dam), representing a significant additional impact of many 
dams, especially in the tropics (Valberg, 2011). 
The PROINFA sets an overall goal for the production of 10% of the total 
electricity from non-hydroelectric renewable sources by 2022, divided into two phases. 
The first phase is to achieve 3,300 MW of renewable energy, divided equally among 
biomass, small hydro and wind. This would be achieved through long-term power 
purchasing agreements between Eletrobrás87 and independent power producers, as well 
as fiscal incentives for each type of renewable energy (Erickson et al., 2009). The 
incentives of the programme are oriented to promote small producers, income 
distribution, the generation of local employment, a correct use of regional potential and 
the development of factories of materials and equipment, and the public partnership 
(Requejo, 2009).  
Conflictingly, the idea to “decarbonise” the Brazilian power sector remains in 
absolute contradiction with current policy developments in the country. For example, in 
November 2014, the Federal Government opened power auctions to coal- and gas-fired 
power plants. The goal of this strategy was to expand the options of the power sector in 
case hydropower plants would not be able to provide enough electricity to reach the 
promptly increasing demand in the country (Climate Action Tracker, 2015). Severe 
occurrences of droughts are having a disruptive influence on hydropower production, 
which down 13% in 2014 compared to 2011 levels (Spencer, 2015). However, the 
success of such power plants in the government’s plans to increase power production 
from gas-fired power plants by 66% until 2023 compared to 2014 (MME, 2014) may 
restrict the options for profound decarbonisation 88  in the forthcoming future of the 
Brazilian economy. Moreover, while the NDC identified a 10% efficiency gain in the 
electricity sector as a key action, it might have also been crucial to have some focus on 
the transport sector and energy efficiency more broadly. For instance, the efficiency of 
transport per passenger kilometre would need to be reduced by 40% by 2050 for a 
relevant decarbonisation scenario in Brazil (Spencer, 2015). The energy intensity of the 
                                                 
87  Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A. (Eletrobrás) is a major Brazilian electric utilities company. 
88 In August 2015, Brazilian ex-President Dilma Rousseff issued a joint statement with Angela Merkel calling 
for the "decarbonisation of the global economy in the course of the century". 
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Brazilian transport sector is about 60% higher than the other BRICS89 countries, for 
example (Spencer, 2015).  
Furthermore, the extraction of the pre-salt layer has been a topic of strong 
discussions in Brazil. The pre-salt oil is of good quality, although it is found in reserves 
that are in deep-sea areas and under thick layers of salt, requiring large-scale 
investment to extract it. It is estimated that it can be explored from this area in Brazil 
between 70 and 100 billion barrels of oil and mineral natural gas (Petrobrás, 2016). The 
government argues that Brazil could become an oil exporter with this amount. In this way, 
the country would acquire greater power of political decision and generate more jobs 
and wealth. However, many environmentalists oppose Brazil's way of thinking about 
investing in oil exploration. They believe that this can make Brazil a global warming 
villain. Efforts on modifying the ways of obtaining energy by means less aggressive to 
the environment such as wind and solar energy have been disseminated. Deciding itself 
contrary to this thought, the Brazilian government is establishing an activity that 
produces great pollution through its many derivatives (e.g., sulfur, carbon dioxide and 
other gases that pollute the atmosphere). 
According to specialists, a domestic climate policy that mainly focuses on anti-
deforestation measures will not be able to sufficiently limit emissions in the post-2020 
period in Brazil (Fraundorfer and Rabitz, 2015; La Rovere et al., 2013). At the same time 
there are several options to boost Brazil’s energy security such as increasing energy 
efficiency or introducing incentives for demand management. More effective utilisation of 
flexible renewable sources, such as biomass, wind and especially solar (for example, 
while Brazil has a considerable solar incidence, ranging from 4.25 to 6.5 sun hours/day 
(Martins et al., 2017), solar power in Brazil generates less than 0.01% of the country's 
electricity demand) as well as development of power grid to take advantage of the 
different sources of energy could also be used to reduce Brazil’s CO2 emissions. This 
has also been emphasised by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in its World Energy 
Outlook 2013, according to which there are numerous measures that can increase 
energy efficiency in Brazil, which are not mentioned in Brazil’s National Energy 
Efficiency Plan – PNE 2030 (Climate Action Tracker, 2015). The PNE 2030 is designed 
to meet energy demand projected for 2030 considering the current standard of economic 
development, consequently (indirectly) considering also, an increase in both, energy 
consumption and supply due to the annual GDP growth rate (Neves, 2012). Further with 
                                                 
89 BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
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Neves (2012), it is then (actually) projected an increase in GHG emissions in the energy 
sector, from 383 million tonnes of CO2 in 2005 to 771 million tonnes of CO2 in 2030. 
 
 
5.6 Brazil and forest conservation context 
 Getúlio Vargas during his mandate in 1934 created the first edition of the 
Brazilian Forest Code 90  (Decree 23.793/1934), along with the Water Code (Decree 
24.643/1934) and measures of protection and defense of wildlife (Decree 24.645/1934), 
as a governmental attempt to standardise the use of natural resources in the country. 
However, the 1934 Forest Code never became operational due to the inertia and the 
inattention of state and local authorities, as well as passive and deliberate resistance 
areas (Bessa et al., 2005). Afterwards in 1962, the Minister of Agriculture at that time, 
Armando Monteiro Filho, claimed for the reformulation of the forest legislation noting that 
the indiscriminate use and deforestation actions had a direct impact on agriculture. The 
reformulation took three years of debate among dozens of experts, and in September 
1965, the then President Humberto de Allencar Castello Branco signed the Federal Law 
4.771. This new Forest Code stated that 50% of the vegetation of each private property 
in the Amazon region should be preserved (these areas were named as Legal Reserves 
(RL)). 91 In other regions of the country, the required portion was 20%. The owners who 
eventually had already harvested beyond this percentage would have to be responsible 
for reforesting the area. For Bessa et al. (2005), the establishment of the 1965 Forest 
Code, the tax incentives for deforestation in 1966 and the creation of the Brazilian 
Institute for Forestry (IBDF) in 1967 marked the definition of a new forest policy, which 
initiated large-scale deforestation in Brazil.  
 Some experts say that the new law also defined the permanent preservation 
areas (APPs)92 that should be mandatorily kept in the countryside or in the cities. These 
areas were intended to preserve the regime of water, prevent erosion, to protect fauna 
and flora, for example. However, Borges et al. (2011) cite that those areas were already 
prescribed in article 4 of the 1934 Forest Code, which referred to the protective forests. 
                                                 
90 The Forest Code governs forest management and outlines the procedures for forest conservation as well 
as the conservation of natural resources in national forested areas, including both private and public lands. 
91 The native vegetation must be maintained in these areas, whether forests or other vegetation, in order to 
ensure the protection of native flora and fauna, biodiversity conservation and rehabilitation of ecological 
processes.  
92 The APPs are designed to protect soils and especially riparian forests. Generally riparian forests are 
relatively narrow on both riversides, rarely exceeding 100 meters wide in each side. This type of vegetation 
has the function of protecting rivers, ensuring the supply of groundwater and the preservation of aquatic life. 
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Nevertheless, the 1965 Forest Code brought limitations to private property, because until 
that time there was little or no standard that patronised environmental resources in rural 
properties (Borges et al., 2011). Also, on account of the used words "goods of common 
interest," the 1965 Forest Code can be considered the forerunner of the Federal 
Constitution of 1988, by conceptualising environment as a common good of the Brazilian 
people (Machado, 2004).  
 During the 1970s, the environmental movements began to influence 
environmental policies. A year after the Stockholm Conference, in 1973, the military 
government responded to these movements and created the Special Secretariat of the 
Environment (SEMA), responsible for creating the new protected areas (Bessa et al., 
2005). However, the contradictions in governmental forest policy also became clear at 
this time. The government demonstrated concern for the environmental conflict; on the 
other hand it promoted the expansion of the agricultural frontier and the occupation of 
the Amazon region regardless of control (Bessa et al., 2005). 
 From the 1980's there is a clear evolution of Brazilian environmental policies and 
specific legislation for environmental protection, especially in its legal and institutional 
aspects, within a tendency towards decentralisation not only through the creation of 
government environmental agencies such as the Brazilian Institute of the Environment 
and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) in 1989 and the Ministry of Environment in 
1993, but also through distribution of responsibilities. Moreover, aiming to enforce the 
Forest Code it was established by the National Environmental Policy (PNMA Law 6.938/ 
1981), the National Environmental Council (CONAMA) and the National Environmental 
System (SISNAMA). In addition, table 6 presents below further examples. However, 
these advances were not enough to consolidate a democratic policy arena in Brazil to 
make feasible the right of public participation in political decisions on the environmental 
heritage of the country (Neves, 2012; Lima, 2011). 
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Table 6 Brazilian environmental laws 
 
Legal Instrument 
 
 
Topic 
Law 4.771/1965 Forest Code 
Law 5.197/1967 Protection to Wildlife 
Law 6.938/1981 Environmental National Policy 
Law 7.347/1985 Civil Public Responsibility for Environmental Damages 
Federal Constitution/1988 Protection to the Environment article 225, Chapter VI 
Decree 750/1993 Harvest, Use and Suppression of Primary Vegetation or 
Advanced Stages of Regeneration of the Atlantic Forest 
Decree 1.922/1996 Private Natural Heritage Reserve (RPPN)93 
Law 9.605/1998 Environmental Crimes Act 
Law 9.985/2000 Conservation Units National System (SNUC)94 
Decree 5.758/2006 Protected Area’s Strategic National Plan  
Law 11.428/2006 Use and Protection of Native Vegetation 
Law 12.651 /2012 New Forest Code 
Source: Adapted from WWF, 2008 
  
 In 1995, Brazil recorded the highest deforestation rate in Amazonian forests 
(29,059 km2). Concerned about the rampant devastation, the then President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso issued the Provisional Measure (MP) 1.511 in 1996, which increased 
the legal reserve in Amazonian forestlands to a percentage of 80% and reduced from 50 
to 35% the legal reserves in the Cerrado areas within the Legal Amazon region. Despite 
being an important law, there has constantly been an immense pressure on from the 
agricultural sector for its modification (SOS Florestas, 2011). In 1998, the Law of 
Environmental Crimes brought tougher penalties for those who disobeyed environmental 
                                                 
93 The Private Natural Heritage Reserve is a category of Conservation Unit created in particular private area 
for voluntary owner act, in perpetuity, established by the government. 
94 The SNUC brought a number of directives and regulations aimed at modernizing the management of 
protected areas in Brazil. This law suggests that states and municipalities also create their conservation unit 
systems to contribute in achieving the goals related to the biological diversity protection at national and 
international levels. Because of the great diversity in Brazil, the Conservation Units are divided into two 
major groups:  
i) Protection of Permanent Conservation Units: aimed to preserve the nature in areas with 
little or no human action, which does not allow the direct use of natural resources. They 
are divided into five categories: Ecological Station, Biological Reserve, National Park, 
Natural Heritage and Natural Wildlife Refuge;  
ii) Protected Areas for Sustainable Use: allow the sustainable use of natural resources. They 
are divided into seven categories: Environmental Protection Area, Area of Relevant 
Ecological Interest, National Forest, Extractive Reserve, Fauna Reserve, Sustainable 
Development Reserve and Private Natural Heritage Reserve. 
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legislation. This law reaffirmed most of the activities defined as illegal by the 1965 Forest 
Code as crimes while including a list of other activities that would also be criminalised 
areas (Bessa et al., 2005). Likewise, it contained a set of restrictive measures including 
bank financing restrictions for producers that had not regularised their environmental 
liabilities. Some representatives of agribusinesses then began to feel pressured. The 
agricultural sector lobby started to build a strategy, related to the substantial decrease in 
deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon, to propose the creation of a new Forest 
Code (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). By the beginning of ex-President Dilma Rousseff’s 
administration in 2010, anew a narrative of growth-seeking as the overriding purpose of 
economic policy has justified reducing the territory of Conservation Units, and licensing 
activities, with a high negative environmental impact on indigenous lands (Abranches, 
2014). New axes have become the structuring forces of the social and economic 
dynamics such as the construction of large hydropower plants, road-building, oil and gas 
exploitation and mining.  
 Until 2012, there were a total of 36 bills that have tried to overthrow the Forest 
Code (SOS Florestas, 2011). A new version – after twelve vetoed points and other 32 
amendments determined by the then President Dilma Rousseff – was approved in May 
2012 into law. The New Forest Code (Law 12.651/2012) involves at least three 
controversial points stressed by the conflict between large landowners and 
environmentalists’ interests. Substantial efforts were allocated to the reduction of the 
percentage of land area that composes the legal reserve zones in private lands. These 
efforts were not effected. However, in the 1965 Forest Code, the APP areas must have 
been computed separately from the legal reserve, while in the 2012 Forest Code, the 
APP areas can be computed inside the legal reserve area. Consequently, this alteration 
indirectly promotes the reduction of these areas and losses of biodiversity (Borges et al., 
2011). Likewise, the permission to perform crops on top of hills (in areas with higher 
altitude than 1,800 m) was obtained, which was earlier not allowed. Finally, the Amnesty 
for loggers – which no longer pay fines related to deforestation made before July 2008 
(after the enactment of the Environmental Crimes Act) – is highly questioned. Specialists 
argue that the instruments that reduce restoration requirements are applicable only for 
areas converted previous to that date (Lima et al., 2011). However, this action will 
reduce the area to be reforested from 500,000 km2 to 210,000 km2 (Soares-Filho et al., 
2014). Moreover, these changes in the Forest Code will affect conservation in all 
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Brazilian biomes and estimates show that the new law allows legal deforestation of an 
additional 400,000 km2 of the Cerrado biome (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). 
 Nevertheless, the 2012 Forest Code introduces new mechanisms to address ﬁre 
management, forest carbon and PES, which could assist in reducing deforestation 
actions and bring environmental benefits even though the 2012 Forest Code reduces 
restoration requirements. According to Soares-Filho et al. (2014) the most important 
mechanism might be the Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA), a tradable legal title to 
areas with intact or regenerating native vegetation exceeding the Forest Code 
requirements. The CRA (surplus) on one property may be used to offset a legal reserve 
debt on another property within the same biome and, preferably, the same federal state. 
They also affirm that implementing the CRA could create a trading market for forested 
lands, adding monetary value to native vegetation, abating potentially 56% of the legal 
reserve debt. Therefore, given the high costs of forest restoration, the exchange of 
CRAs could become a cost-effective way to facilitate compliance, meanwhile protecting 
forest surpluses that might otherwise be legally deforested (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). 
However, depending on regulatory choices, this offset market could also be flooded with 
low-cost titles from private lands inside areas already protected by the Forest Code, 
meaning that no additional forests would be saved (Rajão and Soares-Filho, 2015). This 
would allow landowners with forest debt to purchase inexpensive offsets while others 
could legally clear their own land (Gebara, 2015a). 
 The 2012 Forest Code made it mandatory to map all rural properties in the Rural 
Environmental Registry (CAR). With compulsory registration of all landowners, the CAR 
is a strategic electronic database for controlling and monitoring rural properties (through 
satellite images). Landowners must register their properties defining the area and 
identifying the geographic coordinates, as well as all protected areas within the property, 
especially APPs and legal reserves. It is aimed at integrating environmental information 
regarding the status of forests and remnants of native vegetation, the natural areas of 
restricted use and consolidated areas of private rural properties and state rural 
possessions. However, the registration does not guarantee property rights. While each 
state should decide through their environmental agencies how to establish the CAR 
system, the Decree 7.830/2012 created the Rural Environmental Registry System 
(SICAR), which will integrate the information of all federative units, besides regulating 
the CAR system. Thus, the state environmental agencies should make the information 
available on the internet, which will also serve for consultation and monitoring (by the 
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landowners) of the situation of their rural properties concerning environmental 
regularisation.  
 From the proposed approach, the CAR system could be the one of the most 
important tools lacking by the federal government to improve its cross-coordination 
governance on environmental issues. On the other hand, there is no other measure to 
support environmental regularisation beyond the CAR (Gebara, 2015a). The simple 
registration of rural properties in the CAR is not enough for the landowners to start 
implementing its environmental adjustment programmes (PRAs). According to Pires and 
Ortega (2013), the instrument is losing significance due to several problems such as: i) 
the lack of strategy and coordination of the instrument with other policies and measures; 
ii) the excessive focus on the application and not in the whole process; iii) the lack of 
priority of the federal government with environmental management, since the regulation 
of CAR took two years to be published, and also is not comprehensive enough; iv) the 
lack of strategic aspects such as level of public transparency. With transparency, the 
society could exercise social control over deforestation. But for that to happen, it is 
necessary to reformulate the MMA Normative Instruction 3/2014, eliminating articles 4 
and 11 that limit access to essential information, which is even in contradiction with the 
Federal Law on Access to Information (Law 1.227/2011). In addition, it is also urgent to 
promote the analysis and validation of the records already made in the CAR to 
guarantee its accuracy, respectability and its use in combating deforestation. 
 
 
5.7 Brazilian position on climate change and forests 
  Until recently, Brazil maintained that yearly GHG emissions should not be seen 
as a proxy for a country's responsibility for climate change. This responsibility, it argues, 
is more closely related to the contribution to global temperature increase. Since CO2, the 
most important GHG, remains in the atmosphere for more than one century on average, 
past emissions need to be taken into account (La Rovere and Pereira, 2007). Brazil also 
argued that yearly emissions data generally overestimate developing countries' 
contributions to climate change, and underestimate that of developed countries. As a 
result, in international negotiations, Brazil has refused to accept emission targets before 
the middle of this century. Brazil affirmed that at that time the burden of responsibility for 
the total GHG emissions present in the atmosphere would be the same for developing 
and developed countries (Nielson, 2009).  
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 This stance may have changed due to Brazil experiencing a series of natural 
disasters, starting with an Atlantic hurricane crossing the Brazilian coast for the first time 
documented in weather records in 2004 (Nielson, 2009). Since 2008, Brazil was hit by a 
series of accidents related to landslides, most of them being associated with hydrological 
processes such as rain storms and floods. For example, the torrential rains which 
affected the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2010 and 2011, resulting in about US$13 billion in 
damage (Romm, 2011). Also, the severe drought in Southeastern Brazil in 2014, when 
even after tapping two emergency reserves containing a combined 287 billion liters of 
water, the Cantareira reservoir system – which is intended to supply nine million people 
in São Paulo capital – sat at just 7.2% of capacity at the end of the same year (Dolce, 
2015).  
 Until recently, the most well-known disasters in the country were severe 
droughts, but in the last few years the increasing frequency of floods, high winds and 
storms has become part of this new scenario in Brazil (Kahn, 2011). For the Amazon 
region, studies like Marengo (1992, 2004), Marengo et al. (2008), Ronchail et al. (2002), 
Ropelewski and Halpert (1987, 1989), among others have found that negative rainfall 
anomalies in the Center, North and East part of the Amazon are generally associated 
with El Niño-related events. Several of these studies have also pointed out that some of 
the strongest droughts (e.g. the severe drought in 2005) in the Amazon were on account 
of: i) the occurrence of intense El Niño events, ii) strong heating of surface waters of the 
tropical North Atlantic during the summer to October in the Northern Hemisphere, or iii) 
both as in Marengo et al. (2008).  
 On the other hand, Kasa (2013) argues that economic issues were also decisive 
in motivating this acknowledgment from Brazil. For example, the US Waxman-Markey 
Act on border taxes in 2009 (even though later failing in the Senate) and the biofuels 
industry in Brazil – willing for a strong global climate agreement to boost international 
biofuels markets – made the industrial sector in Brazil to adopt a preference for a more 
flexible Brazilian position in order to get rid of international market barriers linked to 
Brazil’s negative reputation for deforestation, thereby resulting in high GHG emission 
rates (Kasa, 2013). As mentioned, Brazil has played an important role in the evolution 
within the international negotiations on climate change. Relevant facts that shall be cited, 
for instance, Brazil’s hosting of the UNCED in 1992, its participation in the previous 
discussions to the Kyoto Protocol and the suggestion for the adoption of a fund for clean 
development actions, are solid examples of how the country has been involved in this 
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topic. However, after the push to approve the Kyoto Protocol, climate politics took a back 
seat again in Brazil (Hochstetler and Viola, 2012). The political debate focused on 
economic growth domestically and reassertion of Brazil’s claims to sovereignty and 
global leadership abroad, especially in the South (Burges, 2009). 
 Concerning the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil asked 
Annex I Parties for more ambitious actions and targets. On the AWG-LCA, Brazil asked 
for a balanced result, although the main issue to solve would be finance (ensuring 
implementation of the financing commitments by developed countries), in order to also 
negotiate on technology, adaptation and mitigation (Azpíroz, 2016). On the Green 
Climate Fund, Brazil (together with the others countries from the BASIC group) stated 
that a pre-condition was that public resources should be the largest share to support it. 
The AWG-LCA should be closed in a satisfactory manner for all, and the pending issues 
should be solved. For example, Brazil accused developed countries of not wanting to 
deal with issues such as unilateral trade measures (Azpíroz, 2016).  
 For the analysis of the Brazilian position on forests in the climate change regime, 
Carrvalho (2012) concludes that in the big picture of climate change negotiations, Brazil 
has been considered a leader of the G-77 and China95 – the coalition of developing 
countries. This is due to its strong position of fighting for the adoption of quantified GHG 
emission reduction obligations by developed countries and the attribution of appropriate 
commitments for developing countries (based on the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities), which would not be a barrier to their right to development. 
However, on the specific issue of forests, Brazil has strongly resisted discussing 
mitigation measures related to emissions from tropical deforestation and degradation, 
using the argument of sovereignty over natural resources as a shelter. That positioned 
Brazil as a veto state, opposed to the USA and even countries in the G-77 and China, 
such as Costa Rica and Colombia (Carvalho, 2012).  
 Repeatedly, Brazil has opposed the position of several countries of Latin 
America. For example, Brazil was firmly against the inclusion of natural forests and 
small-scales A/R initiatives into CDM framework (anew claiming serious technical 
difficulties), clearly supported by Mexico, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Uruguay. Notwithstanding, Viola (2002) argues that this defensive posture was certainly 
                                                 
95 The G-77 at the UN is a loose coalition of developing nations, designed to promote its members' collective 
economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the UN. China has never officially 
joined the G-77, but provides consistent political support (usually in the name of "the Group of 77 and/plus 
China") and financial donation (since 1994) to the G-77. 
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a concern about the incapability of curbing deforestation rates in the Amazon region 
which were extremely high at that time. Brazil was perturbed by the fact that should 
mandatory GHG reduction emission targets have been established for developing 
nations, the country would have faced a colossal environmental liability. At that time, this 
position was strongly supported by rural agricultural and timber elites, dominant in state-
level politics in the Amazon and with a strong faction in the National Congress (Viola, 
2004). 
 
 
 5.7.1 National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC) 
 In 2007, nevertheless, Brazil began to reformulate its response to climate 
change. The Brazilian Federal Government announced its National Plan on Climate 
Change in 2008 at COP 14, where it outlined a voluntary deforestation reduction target 
by 71% below the average deforestation rate (19,625 km2) between 1996 to 2005 by 
2017 (The REDD Desk, 2011). A year later in Copenhagen (COP 15), Brazil announced 
its National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC), pledging to voluntarily reduce GHG 
emissions by 36.1% to 38.9% in relation to 2020 projections (SECOM, 2011). 
Subsequently, the NPCC was voted into law (Law 12.187/2009) in the National 
Congress; in December 2010, the Brazilian Government approved Decree 7.390/2010 
regulating the NPCC (Gebara and Thuault, 2013).  
 Although voluntary at the international level, this commitment is nationally 
compulsory and mostly relies on GHG emissions reduction in the Amazon, including an 
80% decrease in forest loss in this region, or approximately 55% of the total GHG 
emissions reduction announced (Cenamo et al., 2014). According to Decree 7.390, the 
GHG baseline emission for 2020 was estimated at 3,236 GtCO2eq and thus, the 
corresponding absolute reduction was established between 1,168 GtCO2eq and 1,259 
GtCO2eq (MMA, 2008). The Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change (CIM) and 
its Executive Group (Gex) are responsible for the NPCC governance, established by 
Presidential Decree 6.263/2007. The NPCC is supported amongst several instruments 
such as: the National Plan on Climate Change, the National Fund on Climate Change 
and the Secretariat of Communication of UNFCCC.  
 The Plan is divided into four main areas: i) mitigation opportunities, impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation; ii) research and development; iii) education and training and 
iv) communication. Additional highlights include initiatives to conserve and support the 
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recovery of national biomes, consolidate and expand legally protected areas, enhance 
energy efficiency and create incentives for the adoption of low-carbon fuel and green 
technologies (SECOM, 2011). Furthermore, some other goals are presented: 
 Increase over the next ten years the domestic consumption of ethanol by 11% 
per year; 
 Double the area of planted forests, to eleven million hectares in 2020, with two 
million hectares planting native species; 
 Exchange in of one million old refrigerators per year within ten years; 
 Increase by 2015 the recycling of municipal solid waste by 20%; 
 Increase the supply of electricity from cogeneration in 2030, by 11.4% of the total 
electricity supply in the country; 
 Reduce the non-technical losses in the distribution of electricity at the rate of 
1,000 GWh annually in the next ten years. 
 
 
5.8 Domestic forest-climate related developments 
 After reaching over 27,000 km2 in 2004, deforestation rates in the Amazon 
decreased almost continuously. The lowest rate since 1988 was registered in 2012, 
when 4,571 km2 were cleared between August 2011 and July 2012 (PRODES, 2012). 
However, in 2013, deforestation rates increased once again by 28.8%, reaching 5,891 
km2 (PRODES, 2013). Currently, deforestation rates reached 7,989 km2 (PRODES, 
2016). This is the highest value since 2008, when deforestation reached 12,911 km2 
(figure 14). This increase could be stimulated by the new Brazilian’s Forest Code which 
includes an amnesty for individuals who cleared rainforest illegally before 2008 and it 
may gives a ‘perverse message that if you violate the law and cut down the forest 
without a permit, you will occasionally be pardoned’ (Schiffman, 2015). It could also be 
related to unsustainable rural settlement policies and lobby of agribusiness at the 
National Congress (Alencar et al., 2015; Crisostomo et al., 2015; Moutinho et al., 2016). 
The fact is, when Brazil announced that it would reduce deforestation in the Amazon 
region by 80% by 2020, the rate for that year should be around 3,925 km2. However, 
with the recent increase in the rate, the effort to reach such a goal will be much greater. 
This means, Brazil will need to reduce the deforestation rate by 50% until 2020 
(Azevedo et al., 2016).  
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Figure 14. Deforestation rates from 2006 to 2020 in Brazil (Source: IPAM, 2016) 
 
 Although several reasons may have contributed to the overall decrease of 
deforestation rates in the Amazon, mixed evidence exists concerning the effectiveness 
of different anti-deforestation mechanisms implemented in Brazil in the recent past. 
Different authors as Assunção et al. (2012) and Viola (2010) agree that the 
implementation of command-and-control policies and voluntary mechanisms constitute 
an important factor to halt deforestation. Viola (2010) suggests five main reasons that 
contributed to the fight against deforestation: i) better law enforcement by the federal 
government; ii) the establishment of several protected areas and reserves from 2002 to 
2007; iii) more concrete and intense actions from international and national 
environmental NGOs in the Amazon; iv) higher public awareness regarding 
environmental problems and v) higher level of cooperative actions between federal 
states and the federal government in order to curb deforestation activities. 
 Assunção et al. (2012) suggest that these governmental initiatives were 
responsible for the prevention of almost 62,100 km2 of forest loss, or the avoidance of 
621 million tonnes of CO2. However, it is still unclear to which extent such decrease is a 
concrete outcome of the implementation of these policies or whether it results from 
factors like market fluctuations and lower prices of agricultural commodities. Nepstad et 
al. (2014) and Gibbs et al. (2015) have revealed that macroeconomic forces and 
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measures such as the soya moratorium 96  deserve credit for the initial decline in 
deforestation rates in the Amazon (Tollefson, 2015), but also point out that command-
and-control policies adopted in Brazil may not sustain the low deforestation rate in the 
long-term. The achievement of “zero deforestation” has been challenging under this 
model of economic-environmental governance established in Brazil (Marcovitch, 2011; 
Stokes et al., 2014), marked by a historical negligence regarding environmental 
legislation compliance. 
  According to Assunção et al. (2012), two relevant turning points marked the 
conservation policies aimed at controlling and preventing deforestation in the Amazon. 
The first point was the launch of the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of 
Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm) in 2004, which integrated actions across 
different government institutions and introduced innovative procedures for monitoring, 
environmental control and territorial management. The second was the disclosure of an 
official list in 2008 of municipalities with the highest deforestation rates in Brazil as well 
as the conditionality of credit on environmental regulation compliance (Assunção et al., 
2012). Together, these municipalities accounted for about half of the country’s total 
deforestation in 2007. To get off the blacklist, they had to register at least 80% of their 
private properties under the rural environmental registry (CAR) system and ensure that 
the area deforested every year would fall below pre-determined thresholds (Wunder and 
Duchelle, 2014). With such measures, the government also intended to collect geo-
referenced data and information for the regularisation of land tenure in order to enforce 
the Forest Code and promote the engagement of states and municipalities governments 
in conservation measures (Gil, 2010). Figure 15 shows that these two turning points of 
adoption of conservation policies coincide with decreases in the rate of deforestation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 Actions that were taken in 2006  from different actors as Greenpeace, WWF, other NGOs, soya producers 
as well as the Federal Government to disincentive soya production in the Amazon forests region at the same 
time being effective at curbing deforestation rates. 
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Figure 15. Turning points of adoption of conservation policies vs. rate of deforestation in 
Brazil (Source CPI, 2012) 
 
 The Decree 7.390/2010, which regulates articles 6, 11 and 12 of the National 
Policy on Climate Change (NPCC) establishes that the National Plan on Climate Change 
will be composed of plans for mitigation and adaptation measures, amongst them, the 
already mentioned National Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in 
the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm), the National Action Plan for Prevention and Control of 
Deforestation and Forest Fire in the Cerrado (PPCerrado) and the Low Carbon 
Agriculture Plan (ABC Plan). In the case of land use change, such programmes are not 
sector-specific but rather regional-set based on a range of different policy orientations. 
However, it refers to the targets established by the NPCC to each sector. Since sectoral 
plans must be integrated with measures for forest conservation and increased carbon 
storage (following the Forest Code), these programmes are the basis for the articulation 
and establishment of REDD+ in Brazil. For example, the development of certain 
activities within the framework of theses programmes – such as the mentioned CAR 
(registry system), the approved Forest Inventory in the Cerrado and the National Forest 
Information System (SNIF) – are partly financed through the Forest Investment 
Programme – FIP (Ministry of Finance, 2011 personal communication; SFB, 2014).97  
 
 
                                                 
97 MF – Ministry of Finance -  Personal Communication 
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 5.8.1 PPCDAm  
 The National Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the 
Legal Amazon (PPCDAm) was launched in 2004, initially comprising of 13 ministries 
under the coordination of the Presidency‘s Civil House. Currently, due to Decree 
7.957/2013, the PPCDAm is coordinated by the Ministry of Environment (MMA) and 
includes 17 governmental institutions (MMA, 2013). Its main objective is to promote the 
reduction of deforestation rates through a set of integrated actions, divided into three 
main areas: i) territorial and tenure planning, ii) monitoring and environmental control, 
and iii) incentives for sustainable production activities.  
 Combined with these measures, the PPCDAm emphasised the need to enhance 
institutional integration between government departments, including federal institutions, 
state governments, municipalities, as well as civil society organisations and the private 
sector. The first two areas aimed to clarify land tenure through registers, cartographic 
data, and zoning plans, as well as to strengthen the control of deforestation, monitoring 
and enforcement of capacities. The third, on the other hand, sought to incentivise 
sustainable practices, support sustainable forest management and extractive activities, 
enhance agricultural productivity, and also restore degraded areas (Gebara and Thuault, 
2013). During PPCDAm’s first and second phases (from 2004 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011, 
respectively), the largest decline in deforestation was accomplished through monitoring 
and control. For instance, 649 operational oversights in priority areas were carried out 
(MMA, 2013). The development of the Deforestation Detection in Almost Real Time 
Project system (DETER) and the integrated planning supervision also contributed to that 
achievement (MMA, 2013). For example, it is estimated that this monitoring system 
prevented the clearing of 59,500 km2 of Amazonian forests between 2007 and 2011 
(Assunção et al., 2013). In its third phase (2012-2015), the PPCDAm was supposed to 
focus on areas with less than 25 hectares by strengthening actions of planning and 
territorial development and agrarian sustainable productive activities (Gebara and 
Thuault, 2013).  
 The plan is targeting an 80% reduction in deforestation in the Amazon by 2020 
(relative to baseline 1996-2005). Further important achievements included the creation 
of 25 million hectares of Federal Conservation Units (CUs), 25 million hectares of State 
Conservation Units and 10 million hectares recognised by the federal government as 
indigenous lands (MMA, 2013; SECOM, 2011). On the other hand, by 2013 the Dilma 
Rousseff’s administration (2010-2016) had created only three new protected areas 
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(MMA, 2014, personal communication). 98  Comparing, according to the Socio-
Environmental Institute (ISA) and the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity 
Conservation (ICMBio), under the MMA, the Fernando Henrique Cardoso mandate 
(1995-2002) has created 81 protected areas (totaling 21.5 million hectares of preserved 
area). In two mandates (2003-2010), Lula government made effective protection of 77 
conservation units, totaling 26.7 million hectares. 
 Furthermore, the first and the third pillars, respectively related to tenure 
regularisation and territorial management and incentives for sustainable production have 
not been entirely and successfully implemented (Gebara et al., 2012). Maia et al. (2011) 
made an evaluation of PPCDAm and identified the following barriers to the 
implementation of sustainable production practices: i) problems in planning; ii) difficulties 
of coordination between institutions; iii) lack of budgetary resources and personnel and, 
iv) failure in the use of credit lines created for sustainable production. In fact, the rural 
credit for the forestry sector (management of native forests and reforestation) remained 
negligible due to various policy barriers (Gebara, 2015a). 
 
 
  5.8.2 PPCerrado 
 The PPCerrado (National Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
Deforestation and Forest Fire in the Cerrado) was launched in 2010 as an attempt to halt 
deforestation. The plan, a strategic action from the government, combined with other 
public policies such as the National Biodiversity Policy, the National Policy on Water 
Resources was integrated into the PNMC; the federal government targets 40% in 
reduction of deforestation rates (baseline 2002-2008 – 15,700 km2) by 2020 (MMA, 
2014). The PPCerrado lists 151 actions – divided into four main areas: i) monitoring and 
control; ii) protected areas and territorial planning, iii) sustainable activities and iv) 
environmental education – that are managed by an executive commission comprising of 
representatives from 17 ministries and coordinated by the Civil House (Gebara and 
Thuault, 2013).  
 According to Azevedo (2012), considering the lack of financing for the other 
areas, the most intensively implemented actions derive from the third topic (sustainable 
activities). Six years after the publication of PPCerrado, little has been done. The first 
monitoring report, prepared in 2012 showed that only 30% of the actions planned for that 
                                                 
98 MMA – Ministry of Environment – Personal Communication 
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year had been executed (Greenpeace, 2013). The monitoring had been promised for 
2011, but the needed resource has not been allocated in the budget for the development 
of the systems. The forecast is that the systematic monitoring of the Cerrado (equal to 
the Amazonian system) starts in 2017 (Greenpeace, 2013). 
 
 
 5.8.3 ABC Plan 
 The Brazilian Low Carbon Agriculture Plan (ABC Plan) was launched in 2010 
with the primary objective of reducing GHG emissions directly or indirectly related to the 
Brazilian agricultural sector. Specifically, the plan aims to reduce annual CO2, CH4 and 
N2O sources by 133.9-162.9 million tonnes of CO2eq by the year 2020 (MAPA, 2012), 
through the promotion of seven different programmes (of which six concern mitigation 
technologies and one concerns adaptation to climate change). However, the potential 
from this sector may be much more considerable as the proposed goals. For instance, 
Assad et al. (2015) found that the actual GHG emissions mitigation potential of Brazilian 
agriculture sector is more than ten times larger than the proposed targets. 
 The programmes and their goals include: i) the recovery of 15 million hectares of 
degraded pastures (representing 63% of GHG mitigation targeted); ii) the adoption of 
integrated crop-livestock-forest and agroforestry systems in four million hectares; iii) the 
adoption of eight million hectares of no-tillage systems; iv) the expansion of biological 
nitrogen fixation in 5.5 million hectares of cultivation areas, replacing the use of nitrogen 
fertilizers; v) the expansion of commercial forest plantations currently used to produce 
fibers, wood and cellulose from six million to nine million hectares; and finally vi) the 
adoption of technologies for the treatment of 4.4 million m3 of animal waste aiming at 
power generation and production of organic compost (MAPA, 2012).  
 Although the main focus of the ABC Plan is not related to forest protection, some 
of its practices are expected to contribute directly and/or indirectly to deforestation 
decline in the Amazon and in the Cerrado, particularly the recovery of degraded 
pastures and adoption of systems that decrease the pressure for forest clearance. After 
all, the idea behind the ABC Plan is to improve efficiency in the use of natural resources, 
increase the resilience of production systems and rural communities and allow the 
adaptation of the agricultural sector to climate change. This combination is supposed to 
deliver 22.5% of the GHG emission reduction targets established in the NPCC (article 6 
§1 Decree 7.390). According to governmental estimates, restoring grazing land, could 
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achieve an annual emission reduction of 83 to 104 MtCO2eq (MAPA, 2012). However, 
according to International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) calculations, a 
reduction of this size would require about twice the pasture area targeted by the ABC 
Plan, implying that there are uncertainties regarding the average sequestration potential 
and the implementation of the programme (Elzen et al., 2015). 
 The scope of the ABC Plan is national throughout 2010 to 2020. To achieve the 
goals set by the ABC Plan, between 2011 and 2020, it is estimated that the necessary 
resources will be around US$ 55 billion financed with governmental budget or through 
lines of credit (Gebara, 2015a). The ABC Plan has a line of credit (the ABC Programme) 
approved by the Central Bank (BACEN Resolution 3.896/2010). According to a recent 
report from the ABC Observatory (2015), there was an advancement of the ABC 
Programme disbursement, but the programme has not achieved the expected yet. For 
instance, only 61% of resources were invested at the end of the harvest between 2013 
and 2015. The regional and state distribution of the ABC Programme shows that priority 
areas for receiving the resource (those with a high rate of degraded pasture), as the 
North and Northeast regions have a stake lower than the expected. Likewise, although 
the Legal Amazon had an increase of contracted activities for 2013/2014 the amount still 
falls far short of the number observed in the Southeast and Midwest regions of the 
country.  
 The bureaucracy for access to credit and the difficulty of measuring the return on 
these investments are some of the problems for taking the loan, recognised by both the 
government and the producers. The report makes clear that it is necessary to increase 
efforts for better spatial distribution of credit, strengthening the training process of 
technical assistance, producers and financial analysts to stimulate demand and 
emphasise the systemic aspects linked to the projects. The study concludes by 
indicating the need to monitor carbon mitigation balance linked to the total amount 
already paid since the beginning of the programme in order to evaluate its effectiveness 
related to its main objective – to contribute to GHG emission reduction (ABC 
Observatory, 2015).       
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5.9 Discussion: REDD+ context in Brazil 
 Brazil has been intrinsically involved in global negotiations on REDD since the 
beginning and was in fact one of the first countries to advocate a financial compensation 
for avoided deforestation. In 2003, a group of researchers from the Amazon 
Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) presented in a parallel event at COP9 a 
proposal (‘Redução Compensada do Desmatamento’ (Santili et al., 2005)) that would 
reward developing countries which managed to reduce their GHG emissions trough 
avoided deforestation (the amount to be received would be referenced by the price in the 
carbon market). The Brazilian Federal Government revealed hesitation about this 
proposal especially because the scheme would mostly rely on a carbon market-based 
system. Within the federal governmental sphere, the most relevant institutional actors 
influencing the Brazilian position concerning climate change and forests scope since 
1997 are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation and the Ministry of Environment (Carvalho, 2010). Amongst them, the first 
two have been “traditionally” conservative with regard to climate-forest-related measures 
and offsetting issues. The Ministry of Environment (MMA) held the position as vice-chair 
of the Inter-ministerial Commission for Climate Change but problems with funding, staff 
quality and high personnel turnover provided the MMA with little capacity to use this 
commission as a platform for influencing Brazil’s position in this topic (Kasa, 2013). 
However, as international negotiations started to focus on curbing emissions from 
deforestation opened a policy window – with its strong competencies on deforestation – 
to involve itself in governmental discussions over the position (Kasa, 2013). 
 Afterwards, in a workshop organised by the UNFCCC Secretariat in Rome in 
2006, Brazilian authorities suggested an updated version of the previous proposition (a 
document built by the MMA), outlining a mechanism that would also reward developing 
countries that managed to reduce their deforestation rates below a certain threshold for 
a defined period of time (UNFCCC, 2006). This proposal was the turning point for Brazil 
to become more influential into the climate negotiations (Carvalho, 2010). However, the 
resources for such rewards would come from a fund comprising of voluntary 
contributions from developed countries instead a market-based mechanism. This was 
the starting point from the Amazon Fund99 (Moutinho, 2012). This proposal would not 
                                                 
99 The Amazon Fund is a private fund created by the federal government in 2008 (Decree 6.527/2008) 
aimed at raising donations for non-reimbursable investments in efforts to prevent, monitor and combat 
deforestation, as well as to promote the preservation and sustainable use of forests in the Amazon Biome  
and others tropical biomes (up to 20% of the Amazon Fund‘s disbursements may support the development 
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involve a “mandatory regime” that could include future obligations, which means that the 
achieved GHG emission reductions would be considered as a voluntary additional effort 
to emission reduction by Annex I countries (May et al., 2011). Nevertheless, other 
countries came up with some additional adjustments to this proposal which led to the 
REDD concept. 
 The Federal Government has also frequently questioned how effective and able 
a mechanism like REDD/REDD+ would be to address critical issues such as land tenure 
and market pressure (Gil, 2010). The government has remained reluctant about the 
establishment of a national strategy on REDD+, as well as the use of carbon credits 
obtained through REDD+ projects to achieve emissions reduction targets (MMA, 2014, 
personal communication). 100  Fairness and sovereignty have been on top of 
governmental concerns. The government has argued that REDD+ could be an undue 
intervention of foreign interests in domestic policy (Abranches, 2014). But Angelsen et 
al. (2012) propose to interpret this from another perspective. They state that REDD+ 
could be seen as a mechanism for turning tables, where forest-rich developing countries 
would support developed nations in providing a global public good (climate mitigation). 
Notwithstanding, Fearnside (2008) asserts that this skepticism from the government side 
came from the fear to commit itself and eventually not being able to accomplish 
deforestation reduction targets.  
 Brazil’s official position was (and still is) that the mechanism should not allow 
developed countries to offset their own emissions (MMA, 2014, personal 
communication). 101  Nevertheless, should the option of the compensatory market be 
adopted, developed countries should likewise only be able to offset their emissions if 
                                                                                                                                                 
of systems to monitor and control deforestation in other tropical biomes rather than the Amazon rainforest) 
(NORAD, 2011). The Fund is managed by the National Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES) and should help the targets set by the NPCC for GHG emissions reduction to be reached. BNDES 
holds a bank account in Brazil to collect donations from foreign countries and net return from cash 
investments and is also in charge of raising funds, facilitating contracts and monitoring, supporting projects 
and other initiatives. On March 2009, the Amazon Fund received the first grant of US$ 110 million from the 
Government of Norway (in total, the government of Norway donated US$ 1 billion by 2015), exclusively to 
support REDD/REDD+ projects in the Amazon region. The Amazon Fund comprises two committees: the 
guidance committee, responsible for setting guidelines and following up on the results obtained (including 
the endeavour for the adequacy of projects supported by the Fund); and a Technical Committee, appointed 
by the MMA, responsible for verifying and certifying the calculation of deforestation emissions. The first one 
acts as an advisory committee and is composed of representatives of federal and state officials, NGOs, 
social movements, indigenous people, scientists and private investors. Based on data about emissions 
reduction, BNDES is authorised to raise donations for the Amazon Fund, issuing diplomas equivalent to the 
tons of carbon that correspond to the amount of the financial contribution to the Fund. This means that funds 
raised by the Amazon Fund are based on effective reduction of GHG emissions and that new fundraising will 
only be authorised once it has been proven that deforestation emissions have fallen. 
100 MMA – Ministry of Environment – Personal Communication 
101 MMA – Ministry of Environment – Personal Communication 
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they comply with their domestic mitigation goals in other sectors (Viana et al., 2010). On 
the one hand, the government stated that by allowing developed countries to offset their 
emissions through reduced deforestation, the system would not be encouraging the 
development of a low carbon economy and changes in current patterns of fossil fuels. 
On the other hand, the Brazilian Government sees market-based mechanisms as a tool 
to be domestically used (Zwick, 2015; Lang, 2015), which means to offset its own 
emissions from the growing demand for energy (especially fossil fuels) and the heavy 
emphasis on expansion of oil production. 
 Within this context, in Brazil REDD+ has previously been positively recognised in 
sub-national levels and therefore, since 2008 there are several ongoing state-led 
activities in the country as projects and programmes (Cenamo et al., 2009; Stecher, 
2011). For instance, the state of Pará launched its Plan for Deforestation Prevention, 
Control and Alternatives (PPCAD/PA) in 2009 as well as the Green Municipalities 
Programme in 2011 (Cenamo et al., 2014). In 2013, Mato Grosso created its own 
REDD+ system through the Law 9878/2013. Despite some differences between each 
state’s initiatives, they all express the need to carry out territorial zoning, promote the 
registration of rural properties and give incentives to the rural productive chains as a way 
of supporting income sources that do not put pressure on forests (Gil, 2010). It was 
argued that the absence of the national legislation has led some states of the Amazon 
region to develop their own state REDD+ policies and frameworks (Cenamo et al., 
2014). Nassar (2015) affirms, however, that as the federal government’s position has 
become more positive, some institutions (including states and civil society organisations) 
decided to put more effort into supporting the implementation of sub-national REDD+ 
initiatives. In this context, nevertheless, a major challenge for the REDD+ framework in 
Brazil is exactly to avoid a mismatch between such implemented REDD+ actions under 
the national strategy umbrella. For example, to incorporate different safeguards 
standards, reference levels calculation, monitoring systems from previous experiences 
will be one of the biggest obstacles for the ENREDD+. 
  Sassi et al. (2014) evaluated 23 different REDD+ programmes in six countries: 
Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia and Vietnam. They state, nevertheless, 
that most of the REDD+ pilot initiatives implemented in these countries are struggling to 
make the transition from pilot projects to sustained REDD+ interventions, mostly on 
account of multiple challenges related to both REDD+ specifically monitoring and to 
forest conservation in general. However, sub-national REDD+ interventions require the 
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same design processes and mechanisms, and faces the same implementation 
challenges, as REDD+ implemented at national level (Kempinski, 2015). Moreover, the 
evolution of these pilot-projects/programmes and empirical studies have deepened the 
general understanding of REDD+ and its implications, allowing for the amendment of this 
first piece of legislation towards an effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ approach 
(Gil, 2010). 
 Abranches (2014) argues that REDD+ was admitted as the least costly and most 
desirable solution to reduce GHG emissions only after Brazil faced the political and 
moral obligation to address such emissions. The government thought that reducing 
deforestation would be domestically sufficient as a goal for reduction of total GHG 
emissions, therefore justifying avoiding resolute targets to reduce carbon emissions from 
other sources, such as energy, transport and agriculture (Abranches, 2014). Assuming 
that reducing deforestation would contribute to reduce total GHG emissions increased 
government support to these policies particularly when the then President Luiz Inácio 
“Lula” da Silva started to realise the role that Brazil could play on global climate change 
politics, after the New York Climate Summit in 2009 (Abranches, 2014). The 
conservative position of the Brazilian Government not only in considering the reduction 
of GHG emissions caused by deforestation but also in developing a REDD+ national 
strategy has thus markedly changed after good results in combating deforestation were 
achieved. This means that Brazil’s willingness to firmly adopt a GHG reduction 
emissions framework became concrete, especially due to good results achieved in the 
decrease of deforestation rates in the Amazon. Brazil wanted to say publicly to an 
international audience what it had already achieved in addressing climate change 
(Hochstetler and Viola, 2012). 
 While some authors as Moutinho (2012) argue that this change of attitude was 
influenced mostly by substantial decrease of deforestation rates during 2005 to 2010 in 
the Amazon region, other critics argue that this happened also on account of the 
Decision 1/CP.16 §71, in consequence of the Brazilian acceptance of results-based 
finance for reduction of deforestation (Abranches, 2014). The Decision 1/CP.16 §71 
states that in order to have access to payments by the results of their national efforts, 
developing countries should implement a national strategy or plan on REDD+ actions. 
This process of REDD+ development in Brazil, illustrate well the argument from 
Bernstein and Cashore (2010) that say: ‘several pathways for influences from the 
international to the domestic level can act in a synergic manner’. That is to say that the 
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establishment of national strategies is therefore crucial to convert international 
commitments based on the optimisation of collective interests.  
 But furthermore, the media, civil society and social movements have also 
demanded reducing the high rates of deforestation, pressing the government to take a 
more proactive action to curb deforestation also as a valid response to mitigate climate 
change effects. On the other hand, in interview with Carvalho (2010), Thelma Krug (a 
senior researcher from the National Institute for Space Research – INPE) declares that 
this positive posture from Brazil was not a shift of paradigm but its position has only 
become more malleable, whose principles remained intact. This aspect can be noticed 
when analysing the issued Decree that establishes the Brazilian REDD+ national 
strategy. For example, article 6 states that the use payments or originated carbon credits 
from REDD+ initiatives for offsetting of developed nations under the UNFCCC umbrella 
is not allowed.  
 In 2010, therefore, the Federal Government created Working Groups (WG) to 
start a debate at different levels of government, private sector, social movements and 
NGOs with respect to a national strategy on REDD+ in Brazil. These groups were 
divided into three different categories: i) WG1: Coordination, Institutional Arrangements 
and Participation, ii) WG2: Distribution of Benefits, Dominion and Safeguards and iii) 
WG3: Funding Sources and Financing Mechanisms. They were composed by different 
sectors (120 participants from 58 different federal institutions and civil organisations) to 
discuss the basis for a national REDD+ strategy (MMA, 2011b). Moreover, each of the 
Working Groups submitted a report with conclusions of their dialogues and proposals for 
the national strategy on REDD+ to the MMA in December of the same year (2010). 
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CHAPTER 6 Answering the Research Questions 
 This chapter will present the findings related to the research questions that 
guided the study, meaning that, in this chapter, the findings of the research are 
presented, discussed and interpreted. In also seeking to investigate and analyse the 
overall framework of REDD+ development as a national strategy in Brazil, this first 
section will address the two first research questions: What is the current status of 
REDD+ development as a national strategy in Brazil? and; What is the Brazilian strategy 
on REDD+?, looking in detail at the policy design process.  
 
 
6.1 Development of the REDD+ National Strategy  
 
 
 6.1.1 The governance structure 
 The development of the national strategy on REDD+ (entitled ENREDD+) is 
systemised and coordinated by the Ministry of the Environment (MMA) and the work is 
based on the discussions from the Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change 
(CIM), the Executive Panel on Climate Change (GEx) and the Working Group of 
Technical Experts on REDD+ (GTT REDD+). The GTT REDD+ includes the Secretariat 
of Strategic Affairs of the Brazilian Presidency (SAE), Ministry of Agriculture Livestock 
and Supply (MAPA), Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation (MCTI), Ministry of 
Finance (MF), Indigenous National Foundation (FUNAI), the Brazilian Forest Service 
(SFB), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and 
the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MOP).  
 During 2011 and 2012 eleven meetings were held, which resulted in a draft text 
introducing several technical and key aspects of the national strategy. In August 2012 
the MMA carried out technical bilateral meetings with representatives of all cited 
ministries. From that stage, contributions were synthesised as notes to the step of high-
level meetings. In parallel to this process, a Task Force on REDD+ with Amazonian 
states was conducted. This bilateral effort was coordinated by the Civil House together 
with the MMA, MF, MCTI, MRE and MOP, mostly focusing on issues related to the 
development and improvement of the Amazon Fund. Also in 2012, the Secretary of 
Climate Change and Environmental Quality received representatives of civil society, in 
order for them to contribute to discussions concerning the ENREDD+ (MMA, 2014, 
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personal communication).102 In 2013, the document was revised to incorporate changes 
introduced by the Warsaw Framework for REDD+.  
 A draft of the national strategy on REDD+ was consolidated by the MMA in 2014, 
taking into consideration the input produced since 2010. According to the MMA, they 
have intensified dialogue with civil society, state governments and indigenous 
representatives in a series of meetings for alignment on REDD+ under the UNFCCC and 
the ENREDD+ (MMA, 2014, personal communication).103 However, the GTT REDD+ 
had only three registered meeting in 2014 and one in 2015 (MMA, 2016). Moreover, 
federal states and actors (as NGOs) performing in the Amazon region declared the 
opposite during the interviews. It is clear that interviewees have different opinions 
regarding the same topic, but they have argued that the federal government has not 
taken into account their needs, experiences and opinions in the development of this final 
version of the ENREDD+.  
 On 27 November 2015, the Decree 104  85.767/2015 which established the 
National Commission on REDD+ (CONAREDD+) was issued. The Decree assigned to 
the MMA the task of establishing the ENREDD+, which was concluded with MMA's 
Ordinance 370/2015. The CONAREDD+ shall be composed of representatives from the 
MMA, who will be in authority and coordinate the commission, all ministries from the 
GTT REDD+ as well as the Civil House of the Presidency. It will be also invited to 
compose the commission: two representatives of the federal states, indicated by the 
Brazilian Association of State Environmental Entities (ABEMA), a representative of the 
municipalities appointed by the National Association of Municipal Environmental 
Agencies (ANAMMA) and two representatives of civil society organisations, totaling 13 
seats. The CONAREDD+ will be responsible for coordinating and providing guidelines 
for the implementation of the ENREDD+. The Ministry of the Environment (MMA) will 
also perform the Executive Secretariat functions for the CONAREDD+, being 
responsible for: 
 Preparing, based on inputs produced by the GTT REDD+, 105  the technical 
documents to access REDD+ results-based payments;  
                                                 
102 MMA – Ministry of Environment – Personal Communication 
103 MMA – Ministry of Environment – Personal Communication 
104 A Decree is a secondary legislation and following Denier et al. (2014), it is limited in that it can create 
institutions, but cannot guarantee to those institutions any powers of enforcement. Primary legislation would 
therefore be recommended in cases where law enforcement will be critical, as observed in Brazil. 
105The GTT REDD+ is responsible for: 
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 Developing and implementing the REDD+ Safeguards Information System; 
 Preparing, based on inputs from the relevant Thematic Advisory Board (TAB), 
the summary of information on the implementation of the REDD+ safeguards; 
 Proposing, based on the results of REDD+ actions, the annual fundraising limits 
and the minimum price per tonne of CO2eq for results-based payments;  
 Issuing certificates in recognition of results-based payments received;  
 Presenting, at the international level, information to publicise the achieved 
REDD+ results and related payments on the Lima REDD+ Information Hub. 
 
 The Thematic Advisory Boards (TAB) will be formed by stakeholders and experts 
from civil society, public and private entities invited by the CONAREDD+. The ad hoc 
TABs will operate for one year (throughout 2017) with the possibility to receive a time 
extension to be granted by the CONAREDD+. There are three different components: 
 Thematic Advisory Board on Fundraising and Distribution of Non-Reimbursable 
Resources (related to fundraising of REDD+ results-based payments and 
distribution of benefits). This Advisory Board will focus on supporting the 
definition of criteria, rules and guidelines related to: i) eligibility to access REDD+ 
results-based payments for results recognised under the UNFCCC achieved by 
Brazil; ii) fundraising for REDD+ results-based payments; and iii) use of REDD+ 
results-based payments resources; 
 Thematic Advisory Board on Federative Relations will work to support the 
CONAREDD+ in promoting convergence among climate change and forests 
related public policies at the federal, state and municipal level. This Advisory 
Board will focus on: i) developing a capacity building plan on REDD+ under the 
UNFCCC to state and municipal public servants; ii) developing a survey to 
identify REDD+ related initiatives being implemented by the states; iii) defining 
guidelines to promote coherence between jurisdictional REDD+ programmes and 
the ENREDD+ and iv) preparing progress reports on REDD+ related strategic 
initiatives at the federal, state, and municipal levels and proposing measures to 
promote integration among the relevant public policies; 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Collecting information about results, methodologies to reduce emissions from the land use, land 
use change and forest sector in Brazil; 
 Reviewing the technical content to be used as the basis for Brazil's REDD+ related submissions to 
the UNFCCC; and 
 Interacting with international experts and providing inputs throughout the evaluation process of 
Brazilian submissions.  
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 Thematic Advisory Board on the Safeguards will work to develop inputs to 
support the CONAREDD+ in overseeing if the REDD+ safeguards are being 
addressed and respected throughout the implementation of REDD+ by Brazil. 
This Advisory Board will focus on i) the conceptualisation of the REDD+ 
safeguards in the Brazilian context; ii) the development of the Safeguards 
Information System (SIS); iii) reviewing the summary of information on the 
safeguards; iv) defining a procedure to allow reporting of safeguards violations 
and v) developing a safeguards related capacity building plan. 
 
 The CONAREDD+ has started its work 7 April 2016, when it was approved its 
internal regulation, published by MMA Ordinance 143/2016. The CONAREDD+ will hold 
two ordinary meetings a year. The chair of the Committee may also convene 
extraordinary meetings. All the meetings are open to citizens willing to attend as 
observers (MMA, 2016a).  
 
 
 6.1.2 The Brazilian REDD+ National Strategy 
 
 
 6.1.2.1 Objectives  
 The general objective that guides the REDD+ national strategy is ‘to contribute to 
mitigate GHG emissions defeating illegal deforestation, conserving and restoring 
ecosystems as well as fostering a sustainable forest economy based on low carbon, 
promoting economic, social and environmental benefits’. By 2020 it is expected that the 
national strategy on REDD+ will have contributed to the achievement of targets 
established in the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC). In order to achieve the 
proposed objectives, the strategy is based on three lines of action, namely: i) 
coordination of public policy on climate change, forests and biodiversity ii) measurement, 
reporting and verification of results (MRV) and iii) financing, collection and distribution of 
payments for REDD+ results. 
 Respecting the contemplation of these overall goals, the following specific 
objectives should be established and by 2020 they will be revised (MMA, 2016b): 
 Improvement of the monitoring and impact analysis (Impact Matrix) of public 
policies towards REDD+ in order to maximise their contribution to the GHG 
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mitigation as well as to the socio-economic and environmental safeguards 
agreed under the UNFCCC. The results generated by this tool will facilitate the 
identification of potential complementarities between existing policies and 
initiatives, as well as provide valuable information to support the decision-making 
regarding the investments that will be made coming from result-based REDD+ 
payments; 
 Integrating the management structures of the NPCC and Action Plans in the 
biomes, seeking convergence and complementarities among climate change, 
biodiversity and forests related-policies at the federal, state and municipal levels; 
  Contributing to the mobilisation of international resources on a compatible scale 
with the national commitment to mitigate GHG emissions in the Brazilian biomes 
as established into the NPCC. 
 
 
 6.1.2.2 Safeguards 
 With regard to safeguards, the national strategy considers as a reference the 
Decision 1/CP.16 and guidelines of Decision 12/CP.17 as well as the principles and 
environmental criteria for REDD+ developed by civil society organisations. 106  The 
Ministry of Environment (MMA) and the Indigenous National Foundation (FUNAI) have 
developed additional premises and criteria concerning indigenous issues which will 
constitute the basis for the implementation of the ENREDD+. Brazil already has 
information systems related to the implementation of REDD+ Safeguards such as the 
National Register of Protected Areas (CNUC), the National Forest Information System 
(SNIF), the National Rural and Environmental Registry System (SICAR) and the 
Biodiversity Portal. The safeguards information system (SISREDD+) will be coordinated 
by the MMA in conjunction with existing information systems and in partnership with 
national and state boards towards climate change. Potential users of the SISREDD+ will 
be the participants and beneficiaries of REDD+ programmes and initiatives as well as 
stakeholders involved in the implementation of such actions (e.g. non-governmental 
organisations, investors, donors, international community, etc). This information system 
                                                 
106  “Developing Social and Environmental Safeguards for REDD+: a guide for a bottom-up approach” 
presents a proposed step-by-step development of environmental safeguards processes for REDD+. The 
guide was prepared by a multi-sectoral group of organizations and Brazilian companies including 
environmental NGOs, private sector, research institutions and social movements. The publication was 
launched officially during the COP16. Online available at::  
http://www.icv.org.br/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/24202guiaredd_ingles_digital21.pdf  
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should have been designed and implemented in subsequent phases from 2015, willing 
to be a transparent tool and of easy access to the entire society. However, after 
questions about the progress of the methodological aspects, MMA has chosen not to 
move in this component until the TBA (advisory board) on safeguards has been created, 
which would provide the necessary inputs for the further development of methodological 
aspects. This happened in December 2016, when it was decided that the 
implementation of the safeguards should be concluded until the end of 2017 (MMA, 
2016b). 
 Moreover, one of the requirements in receiving payments for REDD+ results is 
an information summary respecting how the Cancun Safeguards have been addressed 
by the country while REDD+ actions are being implemented. Brazil has already prepared 
its first summary 107  and in this first moment these information reflected the 
implementation of safeguards in the Amazon region, involving the PPCDAm actions 
during 2006 to 2010 and projects financed by the Amazon Fund. Finally, it is important to 
note that the safeguards information summary and SISREDD+ are distinct instruments. 
While the former serves as a communication of the Brazilian State to the UNFCCC on 
how safeguards are addressed and respected during the development of activities that 
generate REDD+ results, the second compiles over time, the necessary information to 
ensure compliance with the safeguards in Brazil. 
 
 
 6.1.2.3 Reference Levels and Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
 The definition of reference levels to ground the payments by result of REDD+ 
actions was adopted by Decision 12/CP.17 and the Warsaw Framework for REDD+. 
Developing countries may annually submit their reference levels108 to the UNFCCC for 
evaluation and, Brazil presented its reference level to the UNFCCC in June 2014. Brazil 
has chosen to set their reference levels by biome, using at first historical data monitored 
in the Amazon. The year of 1996 was adopted as the starting point of the reference 
period in order to exclude the deforestation peak occurred in 1995 and to maintain 
consistency with other initiatives in Brazil, such as the Amazon Fund and the National 
Policy on Climate Change (NPCC). The measurement and verification of deforestation 
                                                 
107 Online available at:  
http://reddplussafeguards.com/reddplus_safeguards/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/sumario_salvaguardas_fin
al.pdf  
108 More detailed information at: http://redd.unfccc.int/submissions.html?country=bra  
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initially focused on clear cutting109 on the Amazon biome carried out by INPE, the IBAMA 
and the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), called the “Monitoring 
Group”. Information is assessed annually trough PRODES and other five programmes 
(see table 7 below).  
 
Table 7 The Brazilian forest monitoring MRV system 
 
MRV Tool 
 
 
Description 
PRODES 
(Amazon Deforestation Monitoring Project) 
 
Launched in 1988 to monitor the forest 
trough LANDSAT satellite images. It 
captures deforested areas larger than 6.25 
hectares 
DETER  
(Real Time Deforestation Detection 
System)  
 
It guides environmental enforcement efforts, 
tracking deforestation polygons on a daily 
basis. Its time series started in 2004. It has 
a lower resolution (only areas larger than 25 
hectares are detected) 
DEGRAD 
(Mapping of Degradation in the Brazilian 
Amazon) 
Monitors forest degradation in the Brazilian 
Amazon. Its time series started in 2007 
DETEX 
(Monitoring System for Selective Timber 
Exploitation)  
 
It generates information on public forests 
(particularly located closed to roads) and 
forest concessions. It was developed by 
INPE and SBF (Brazilian Forest Service) in 
2007 
TERRACLASS 
(Land Use Classification Programme) 
 
Provides data on land use in the deforested 
areas identified by PRODES. It has 
provided until the moment information 
concerning the period between 2008 to 
2012 
INPE/QUEIMADAS 
(Fire Outbreak Control) 
Monitors daily fire outbreaks using satellite 
images (Reference Satellite Aqua_M-T) 
Source: Own Data 
  
 The ENREDD+ does not define very clearly how MRV activities will be adopted, 
improved, financed and extended to all biomes. However, the MMA released in 
November 2015 through Ordinance 365/2015 its Environmental Monitoring Strategy for 
All Biomes (but this strategy is not consolidated within ENREDD+ yet). The 
Environmental Monitoring Programme of All Brazilian Biomes will generate every two 
years, the matrices with the areas used to estimate LULUCF contributions in the GHG 
National Inventory. Apart from deforestation rates, mappings and recovery monitoring 
                                                 
109 Other activities encompassed within the REDD+ scope such as forest degradation and enhancement of 
carbon stocks, were not included, justified by the lack of consistent data. 
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will be developed for the Amazon, the Atlantic Forest and Cerrado, which include areas 
in regeneration or planting of native species, woody and perennial or long cycles. These 
data will be instrumental in monitoring the areas recovering at farm level and will be an 
indicator of the efficiency of the Forest Code’s implementation. The crossing of data on 
native vegetation recovery, spatially explicit, with the data of the CAR (rural registry) in a 
Geographic Information System (GIS), will generate essential data for the estimation of 
CO2 removal, in order to corroborate Brazil’s GHG reduction targets for 2025 and 2030. 
The programme is structured to be implemented in three different phases: i) Amazon 
and Cerrado Biomes (2016); ii) Atlantic Forest (2016-2017) and iii) Caatinga, Pampa and 
Pantanal Biomes (2017-2018).  
 On the other hand, Valberg (2011) argues that although Brazil is considered to 
have a satisfactory system for forest monitoring, there are also problems because the 
monitoring system does not distinguish between legal and illegal logging. This fact might 
slow down the process of reducing deforestation, as legal logging is far easier to stop 
(Valberg, 2011). Furthermore, since the adoption of the DETER system in 2007, which 
improved the monitoring and control over deforestation measures, the dynamic of 
deforestation activities have changed in the Brazilian scenario. This means that a 
behavioural change can be observed from deforestation actors, which became aware 
that they were being monitored and have began deforesting areas smaller than 25 
hectares (ha), logically because only deforested areas larger than 25 ha are detected by 
the system. Thus, this fact must be considered in the development of the MRV system to 
be applied to the REDD+ framework. 
 The government is also developing its Modular System for Monitoring GHG 
Emissions Reductions (SMMARE), which is being designed as a tool to provide 
information, in particular in relation to the mitigation actions implemented in each 
Mitigation Plan and its associated methodologies and assumptions, the progress made 
in their implementation and information on domestic measurement, reporting and 
verification. The SMMARE can also be used for the purposes of performance-based 
payments, once the GHG emissions reduction results can be made available through the 
system. Several institutions are being invited to participate in the SMMARE design and 
implementation and the final list will depend on the results of on-going negotiations. 
 An interesting aspect is pointed out by Salvini et al. (2014), however. They 
assessed 98 documents produced by 43 REDD+ countries (including Brazil) to compare 
how countries link REDD+ interventions to forest deforestation and degradation drivers 
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in their readiness plans, implicating this way monitoring systems. They state that current 
REDD+ monitoring efforts are largely focused to meet international reporting needs and 
thus are concentrated on the assessment of change in forest area (deforestation) and 
related carbon emissions. On the other hand, in only a few cases (explicitly not the case 
of Brazil) is the forest area change analysed by linking it to specific driver activities and 
follow-up land use. 
 
 
 6.1.2.4 Financing 
 The collection of resources will be based on achieved and measured results, 
whereas the distribution of resources will take place in a decentralised manner – guided 
by the CONAREDD+. The fundraising actions will seek bilateral partnerships or 
international financial institutions willing to offer payments by results, through the 
Amazon Fund, using the REDD+ portal updated by the UNFCCC Secretariat as the 
basis for fundraising. Also, there are other national financing instruments supporting the 
implementation of actions towards REDD+, such as the National Environmental Fund 
(Law 7.797/1989), the National Forest Development Fund (Law 11.284/2006) and the 
Protected Areas Fund part of the Amazon Protected Areas Programme (FAP/ARPA). 
However, since the REDD+ framework has broadened its targets, it opened possibilities 
for other sources of financing. However, the main question is to know if whether the 
ENREDD+ will accept these others sources as official funding (Alves-Pinto et al., 2016).   
 The Brazilian entities interested to be fundraisers must meet minimum eligibility 
criteria to be defined by the CONAREDD+. These criteria will be reviewed periodically 
and will comply with current legislation and with the Cancun Safeguards. Should the 
minimum eligibility criteria be met, these entities will then be acknowledged by the 
CONAREDD+ in the UNFCCC REDD+ portal. Once confirmed as fundraisers, these 
entities may start their efforts, according to the guidelines, rules and criteria established 
by CONAREDD+. After signing the contract between the authorised entity and the 
donor, the CONAREDD+ should be informed in order to request the Executive Secretary 
to issue the non-transferable diploma, with the corresponding amount. These diplomas 
and the payments can not be used, directly or indirectly, for offsetting mitigation 
commitments from other countries under the UNFCCC. The chair of the CONAREDD+ 
should then inform the UNFCCC Secretariat about this payment received by these 
results so this information can be available at the UNFCCC REDD+ portal. 
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 6.1.2.5 Implementation  
 The national strategy on REDD+ should be implemented in two phases. This 
division into stages aims to allow its implementation to begin continuously in line with the 
National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC), PPCDAm, PPCerrado, Forest Code and the 
Amazon Region Protected Areas Programme (ARPA). In Phase I (2014-2016), 110 
investments would have been primarily focused on indigenous lands, settlements and 
public and private protected areas. In Phase II (2017-2020), actions aimed at private 
lands would be intensified in line with the deadlines set in the 2012 Forest Code for 
implementation of the rural registry, the Environmental Adjustment Programme (PRA), 
and forest legislation by biome. It is noteworthy that the indigenous lands-targeted 
incentives should be implemented through an indigenous component, created under the 
REDD+ rules and based on the current indigenous legislation, especially through the 
National Land and Environmental Management and Indigenous Lands Policy – Decree 
7.747/2012 (CIM et al., 2013). The implementation model it seems adequate, however, it 
remains unanswered how the distribution of resources between these involved entities 
will be established.  
 
 By contrasting different experts’ opinions, the next section presents major 
associated challenges related to the REDD+ framework in Brazil.  
 
 
6.2 REDD+ Challenges (respondent’s perspective) 
 In a common sense the challenges to implement the REDD+ framework are 
twofold. There are major challenges in the internal order such as what a country desires 
when implementing REDD+? What is understood as REDD+? Also, it is difficult to get a 
shared position among different actors, to know who the potential beneficiaries would 
be, to define what the benefits are, and what the investment in each sector would be, to 
clarify misinformation that builds a great expectation in receiving rewards from REDD+ 
and to bring together the federal government and federal states which have not always 
uniform positions. There are also challenges of international order. Although a higher 
level of transparency may be reached within the Paris Agreement approach (see article 
13 of Paris Agreement), there are still several uncertainties about the REDD+ 
                                                 
110 Some actions have been already delayed.  
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mechanism. This higher level of clarity may increase the willingness of donor countries 
and the credibility of the recipient countries. On the other hand, REDD+ was placed as a 
market mechanism for a long period and the possibility of obtaining a large amount of 
resources has been decreasing over time. 
 Overall, the most significant challenges indicated by most of the interviewees 
with regard to the Brazilian scenario are those related to governance. It is noted that 
governance is considered as an umbrella context that encompasses and leads to other 
major conflicts (e.g social inequality, land tenure conflicts, higher level of corruption, etc). 
Fatorelli et al. (2015) also state that despite significant efforts towards the coordination 
related to REDD+, governance remains a major challenge in the country. This challenge 
is omnipresent whether between government levels (as evidenced in the differences in 
REDD+ perspectives and interests between federal and state governments), civil society 
or between government and the private sector. Although the most cited problems (table 
8) during interviews are acknowledged as “major challenges”, the lack of coordination 
and conflict of interests between different governmental agencies and sectors (e.g. 
private sector and civil society) was the topic with the highest level of agreement among 
respondents (92%). This is followed by lack of participation in decision-making (90%), 
long-term financing (81%), land tenure conflicts (81%), 79% answered 
contradictions/non-aligment among forest-related policies with other sectors (e.g. 
agriculture), lack of coordination of actions at local and sub-national levels with the ones 
at the federal level (78%) and addressing causes of deforestation (73%). 
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Table 8 Most frequently cited challenges by the number of mentions (national REDD+ 
scope) 
Challenges Type of organization Number of mentions 
Lack of coordination and 
conflict of interests between 
different governmental 
agencies and sectors 
 
Ministries and Coordinations 
Independent consultants 
Universities  
Private companies 
Civil Society Organisations 
Institutes, NGOs 
12 
2 
6 
3 
18 
13 
Lack of participation in 
decision-making 
Ministries and Coordinations 
Independent consultants 
Universities  
Private companies 
Civil Society Organisations 
Institutes, NGOs 
9 
2 
6 
4 
18 
13 
Long-term financing  Ministries and Coordinations 
Independent consultants 
Universities  
Private companies 
Civil Society Organisations 
Institutes, NGOs 
15 
2 
4 
4 
13 
9 
Land tenure conflicts Ministries and Coordinations 
Independent consultants 
Universities  
Private companies 
Civil Society Organisations 
Institutes, NGOs 
9 
1 
6 
3 
12 
16 
Contradictions/non-aligment 
among forest-related policies 
with other sectors 
Ministries and Coordinations 
Independent consultants 
Universities  
Private companies 
Civil Society Organisations 
Institutes, NGOs 
6 
2 
6 
1 
18 
13 
Lack of coordination of 
actions at local and sub-
national levels with the ones 
at the federal level 
Ministries and Coordinations 
Independent consultants 
Universities  
Private companies 
Civil Society Organisations 
Institutes, NGOs 
9 
1 
5 
4 
13 
13 
Adressing causes of 
deforestation 
Ministries and Coordinations 
Independent consultants 
Universities  
Private companies 
Civil Society Organisations 
Institutes, NGOs 
6 
1 
6 
1 
17 
11 
Source: Own Data 
 
 In spite of the fact that the background of REDD+ in Brazil is characterised by a 
conflict of interests among group of actors engaged in such context, it is also observed 
that amongst responses there was no significant variation of answers between groups 
(private sector/NGOs/research institutes, etc) of non-governmental stakeholders in 
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relation to major challenges existent in the Brazilian scene. However, it should be 
acknowledged that each group has clearly their own concerns. For example, most of the 
interviewed national NGOs strongly advocate more than the other actors with respect to 
the question of adaptation and conservation of biodiversity within the REDD+ framework. 
Moreover, the federal governmental sphere strongly advocate for REDD+ payments 
based on performance. On the other hand, all groups agree that REDD+ actions should 
promote non-carbon benefits. Within the governmental sphere, those challenges related 
to policies’ implementation and financing of activities are mostly recognised. Concerning 
the aforementioned argument about conflict of interests, Shankland and Hasenclever  
(2011) show in their study that positions within group of actors engaged in REDD+ in 
Brazil are ‘heterogeneous and often highly contested, with struggles for control of the 
agenda driven both by competition for power and resources and by ideological 
differences’. 
 A major driver of deforestation is agricultural expansion and the political lobby 
behind this driver is still incredibly powerful in Brazil (see Paulino, 2014; South and 
Brisman, 2013). While Brazil has been successful in substantially decreasing 
deforestation, in the end, the “business-as-usual” actors that benefit from deforestation 
(e.g. agricultural sector) and forest degradation (e.g. timber sector) have so much to gain 
from these activities that they trump meaningful improvements in forest governance. 
There are “substantial opportunities to engage the private sector, as seen from the 
commodity roundtables and deforestation-free supply chain commitments, but is this 
enough to counter the ‘business-as-usual’ agricultural scenario?” (CIFOR, 2014, 
personal communication).111  
 An environmental consultant responded that the most controversial matters arise 
from the different views about how REDD+ should work between the federal government 
and the sub-national entities, especially federal states (scale), “which also reflects on 
how the baseline is established and what are the main potential sources of funding” 
(Pavan, 2014, personal communication).112 This is also reflected on tenure and property 
rights conflicts, “which is the way that the carbon rights will be distributed among those 
who were responsible for generating them” (Pavan, 2014, personal communication).113 
In the Brazilian scenario therefore there is a clear demand of more secure tenure rights 
for the application of both regulatory and incentive-based REDD+ mechanisms. Some of 
                                                 
111 CIFOR – Center for International Forestry Research – Personal Communication 
112 Mariana Pavan –  independent consultant – Personal Communication 
113 Mariana Pavan – independent cosnultant – Personal Communication 
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the interviewees stated that clear property rights are a pre-condition for the 
establishment of the national REDD+ strategy. Reydon et al. (2015) concluded their 
paper stating that the ‘current institutional framework in Brazil, which regulates land 
allows for a variety of land uses by landowners including speculation, production or 
exploitation’.  
 Without a bottom-up approach “there will be no legitimisation of a national 
REDD+ strategy in the country” (IPAM, 2014, personal communication).114 Brazil has a 
history of imposing policy measures from the top-down, without actually considering the 
local populations and circumstances (UEA, 2014, personal communication).115 In this 
sense, local participation in REDD+ interventions in Brazil is still often limited to passive 
consultation by REDD+ project proponents, which should be enhanced to develop 
REDD+ interventions that reflect local knowledge, land use practices and aspirations 
(Cromberg et al. 2014). Local participation should “promote empowerment and be 
interactive – so local people feel they are part of the process and not marginalised by it” 
(Gebara, 2014, personal communication).116 The process should normally be facilitated 
by collective actions where people collaborate with each other and, this way contributing 
to the achievement of REDD+ initiatives’ goals. It is also important to take into account 
that the “Brazilian State tends to be lethargic and, in the case of the Amazon, 
institutionally weak, and thus may be unable to properly implement REDD+” (UEA, 2014, 
personal communication).117 Cited also as a challenge is the fact that currently, the 
Brazilian REDD+ strategy is limited to addressing deforestation, not addressing the 
“plus” part of the REDD+ scheme (UFMG, 2014, personal communication).118 Thus, 
institutional arrangements must focus on strengthening their monitoring and enforcement 
capacity, since a transition to sustainable development in the Amazon region will face 
resistance (UFMG, 2014, personal communication). 119 In addition, criticisms concern the 
fact that the actions involving REDD+ are not nationwide but only focused in the Amazon 
region (SAE, 2014, personal communication).120   
                                                 
114 IPAM – Amazon Environmental Research Institute – Personal Communication  
115 UEA – University of the State of Amazonas, Forestry Department – Personal Communication 
116 Maria Fernanda Gebara – independent consultant – Personal Communication 
117 UEA – University of the State of Amazonas, Forestry Department – Personal Communication 
118  UFMG – Federal University of Minas Gerais, Institute of Environmental Services – Personal 
Communication 
119  UFMG – Federal University of Minas Gerais, Institute of Environmental Services – Personal  
Communication 
120 SAE – Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Brazilian Presidency – Personal Communication 
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  Another major challenge is long-term financing for REDD+, also given the 
absence of financial flows from carbon markets (CIFOR, 2014, personal 
communication).121 Although the Green Climate Fund is a promising source of results-
based payment financing for Brazil, its current level of funds could never cover the full 
set of planned “results” in the country, and then it comes the question “Where will the 
rest of the financing come from?” (CIFOR, 2014, personal communication).122 Although it 
is clear that conditionality of payments depends on measurable decreases in forest loss, 
another question is whether a donor country will be willing to give money for 
performance that has been achieved in the past, or for actions that will mitigate in the 
near future (SPE, 2014, personal communication).123 A professor from the University of 
Brasília declared: “In my opinion the expectations about REDD+ are inflated because 
there will not be significant money (beyond Norway – Amazon Fund) for middle-income 
countries like Brazil” (UNB, 2014, personal communication). 124  Finance is also a 
controversial topic among the private sector. There is still a strong concern in relation to 
financial risks in REDD+ investments, benefit-sharing systems and the unpredictability 
about the international demand for REDD+ credits in the near future. 
 Interviews revealed three predominantly emphasised opinions regarding 
interaction issues: i) lack of interaction among involved institutions, ii) lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of the Brazilian strategy on REDD+ and iii) lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of how the developed activities could better cooperate 
among them under the proposed REDD+ framework. On the other hand, the challenges 
that provoked the least concern among interviewees included leakage, scope of 
activities and monitoring (MRV) system (even though the monitoring system is still not 
implemented for all biomes in Brazil). The analysis also demonstrates that when 
compared in a range of importance, the major concerns of the respondents were: i) inter-
level policy linkages, this means, to ensure that projects/programmes/policies are 
designed in compliance with the national guidelines; ii) cross-coordination and 
integration among levels and sectors; iii) adoption of participatory processes, which may 
have a significant influence on equity, effectiveness and efficiency aspects. The 
following sections provide a deeper discussion of such topics. Coincidently, the analysis 
of the ENREDD+ corroborates for these topics be appointed as one of the main reasons 
                                                 
121 CIFOR – Center for International Forestry Research -  Personal Communication 
122 CIFOR – Center for International Forestry Research -  Personal Communication 
123 SPE – Secretariat of Public Policy and Economy – Personal Communication 
124 UNB – University of Brasilia UNB, Institute of International Relations – Personal Communication 
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for a plausible inability of the REDD+ implementation in Brazil. It should also be clarified 
that in the following sections Brazil’s NDC was likewise analysed, which includes and 
confirms Brazil’s formal REDD+ commitment targets to the Paris Agreement. Moreover, 
such discussion addresses the research questions related to the weaknesses and 
strengths of the national REDD+ strategy as well as constraints and barriers existent in 
this development design process. 
 
6.3 The pre-existing discourses reasoning 
 A consistent understanding of the development of REDD+ strategies solidly 
depends on pre-existing discourses and the historical context involved (Brockhaus et al., 
2014, Kanowski et al., 2011; van der Hoff et al., 2015). There are two distinct discourses 
identified by van der Hoff et al. (2015) regarding the national REDD+ context in Brazil. 
They have identified a carbon commodification (federal states) discourse as well as the 
sustainable development discourse (federal government). While the first discourse 
underpins the argument that market constitutes the most suitable solution for 
deforestation, the latter emphasises the lack of access to technology and poverty as the 
main drivers of deforestation, seeing REDD+ as financial support for national sustainable 
development policies that aim for similar goals (van der Hoff et al., 2015). They also 
state that given the distance between the two discourses, it is not surprising that for 
dominance the groups of stakeholders on the different sides of this debate have 
struggled between themselves. Moreover, it is difficult to judge whether this parallel 
development of the REDD+ national strategy is reasonable in the long term, leading to a 
conceptual and polarisation of REDD+ stakeholders, meaning a possible collapse of the 
REDD+ identity in Brazil (van der Hoff et al., 2015).  
 For example, representatives of the Cotriguaçu and São Félix do Xingu initiatives 
in Brazil declared that they no longer consider themselves REDD+ programmes 
(Sunderlin et al., 2014). In their opinion the acronym REDD+ is strongly associated with 
the carbon credits market and involves sensitive issues, such as carbon rights and 
extensive consultations with potential participants, including indigenous populations that 
have expressed an aversion towards REDD+. Also, they would potentially incorporate 
REDD+ into their agenda if it becomes more nationally consolidated (Sunderlin et al., 
2014). In this sense, they declared to have broadened their initial project approaches to 
focus on jurisdictional models for green development. In this sense, if actions do not 
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have proper identities, the actuality necessary for such developments will presumably 
not be achieved (Manfrinato, 2014, personal communication).125  
 According to some interviewees, although Brazil has placed effort on issuing a 
Decree establishing the Brazilian REDD+ strategy, the country is far from achieving a 
national strategy on REDD+ (ICMBIO, 2014, personal communication). 126  Another 
interviewee declared, “it seems that the government does not intend to establish a 
policy, but they intend to comply with an international agreement, they already have the 
PPCDAm to fight deforestation (SAE, 2014, personal communication).127 Brazil intended 
to approve the ENREDD+ as an umbrella to the UNFCCC guidelines, and then 
afterwards to regulate more specific issues, which could indeed occur at the same time. 
For Manfrinato (2014, personal communication) 128 related to REDD+ in Brazil, “there is 
a patchwork still disassembled, which includes pieces that are extremely well elaborated 
but not necessarily fitting within the same quilt”. Moreover, Manfrinato says that REDD+ 
was created to be related to carbon emissions but the way this matter has been 
discussed and implemented in Brazil does not have much to do with carbon. In this 
regard, some deforestation reduction policies are not necessarily linked to REDD+ even 
though they result in REDD+ established goals. However, for Turnhout et al. (2017) 
REDD+ frameworks will continue to have a strong focus on carbon since there is no 
strong indication that the delivery of non-carbon beneﬁts may become included in MRV 
(monitoring) systems or in results-based payments. 
 Within this context, Vijge (2016) affirms that currently many existent REDD+ 
manifestations do no have climate mitigation as their prime objective and this makes 
highly questionable the effectiveness of REDD+ scope. The rationale in favour of a “pro-
poor approach” argues that REDD+ will not succeed unless co-benefits for poor forest-
dependents are delivered (DeShazo et al., 2016). Nevertheless, according to Wunder 
(2008), poverty alleviation should never become the primary goal of conservation 
initiatives; otherwise, neither environmental conservation nor improvement of livelihood 
goals is likely to be achieved (Lima, 2014). On the other hand, Turnhout et al. (2017) 
suggest that a pragmatic and heterogeneous approach to conceptualising and 
implementing REDD+ will prevail in this context. This means, there is a high likelihood 
that REDD+ will sustain its focus on different initiatives driven by distinct 
                                                 
125 Warwick Manfrinato – Personal Communication 
126 ICMBio – Chico Mendes Biodiversity Conservation Institute – Personal Communication 
127 SAE – Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Brazilian Presidency – Personal Communication 
128 Warwick Manfrinato – Personal Communication 
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conceptualisations (with a focus on carbon, co-beneﬁts or landscapes). For example, 
some people have been advocating the focus of REDD+ scope mainly on biodiversity 
conservation alongside carbon, claiming that biodiversity increases both productivity of 
ecosystems but also its resilience to impacts, thus conserving more carbon in the long 
run (Alves-Pinto et al., 2016). Others support the idea that forests can also enhance the 
adaptation of populations and economies dependent on climate-sensitive sectors 
including agriculture, fisheries, and energy (Somorin et al., 2016). However, this also 
implies that the paradoxes, dilemmas and trade-offs across diverse conceptualisations 
of REDD+ will remain. Nonetheless, as long as context-speciﬁc conditions may be 
adopted, this might still enable REDD+ to make a distinctive and important contribution 
to keeping forests and their multi-functionality (Turnhout et al., 2017).  
 Amongst interviewees there was no common sense about what the main focus of 
the REDD+ national strategy in Brazil should be. Many of them recognised that a focus 
on curbing tropical deforestation through REDD+ and promoting sustainable 
development for rural people will have the “co-benefit” of contributing to global mitigation 
efforts. That said, it is argued that to reduce deforestation in tropical areas influences 
regional/local climate change caused by forest destruction. This change is related to 
regional changes in rainfall patterns. Recent studies show that regardless of global 
climate change, in the Amazon region a change of regional climate is already happening 
(which is becoming drier) on account of deforestation, even at low rates (IPAM, 2014, 
personal communication).129  For example, large areas in the Eastern portion of the 
Amazon, precisely the region most affected by deforestation and forest degradation, is 
already suffering from the dry period (which is becoming longer), reduction of total 
rainfall in the year and even diminution of rain in the dry season, which makes still 
preserved forested areas become more susceptible to degradation by forest fires 
(Nobre, 2014). Therefore, it is strongly conceivable that the REDD+ mechanism (in 
Brazil) should then be seen not only as actions to reduce carbon emissions, but also as 
a possibility to value the standing forest, attempting to reverse the logic that sustains 
tropical deforestation. 
 The development of the Brazilian national REDD+ strategy has been mostly 
characterised by vulnerability (particularly in the legislative branch of government) as 
well as divergences and disagreements. Within this scenario, a lack of coordination 
between the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC), environmental policies and 
                                                 
129 IPAM – Amazon Environmental Research Institute – Personal Communication 
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development goals is observed (Cenamo et al., 2014). Although nested under potentially 
connected policy arenas, such policies – including REDD+ – still tend to be conducted 
separately in Brazil (Gebara et al., 2014). The lack of dialogue between the civil society, 
federal states and particularly indigenous and traditional communities is another crucial 
barrier to the establishment of REDD+ in Brazil (Cenamo and Lima, 2014). For example, 
the Brazilian Federal Government submitted its reference level (REL) to UNFCCC in 
June 2014. The assessment presented by the UNFCCC in December 2014 stated that 
the REL was in line with COP 16 and 17 decisions and suggested only small 
refinements, whereas, several political questions could be raised on that submission, 
especially considering that the REL was not debated by civil society or state 
governments (Reis et al., 2015). Internationally Brazil stands as a pro-active leader on 
voluntary commitments and implements actions towards a conservationist approach; on 
the other hand, the federal government does not always support such actions 
domestically (Reis et al., 2015). The new 2012 Forest Code is a good example, which 
presented several misinterpretations that could lead to a situation of legal uncertainty 
and/or losses of flora and fauna (Soares-Filho et al., 2014; Sparovek et al., 2010). 
Moreover, another example is the recent harsh reduction of conservation units in the 
Amazon (Gebara, 2016), which may be related to the exploitation of over 1 million km2 of 
forests for mining activities  
 Nevertheless, the ENREDD+ presents some key elements for building a solid 
REDD+ policy in Brazil. For example, the ENREDD+ establishes appropriate links 
among the Brazilian GHG mitigation actions in the forestry sector, the Brazilian 
environmental regulation and the references of the UNFCCC. Comparing the 2013 
version with the final version of the ENREDD+ a betterment particularly concerning the 
objectives could be indicated. The final version reflects a broader set of goals that 
surpass the UNFCCC framework, proposing a development model independent from the 
UNFCCC decisions. In particular, one of the strongest aspects of the Brazilian REDD+ 
national strategy is the fact that REDD+ is regarded as a public policy that, amongst 
several objectives, seeks to identify those who legitimately act towards forest 
conservation and deals with deforestation drivers under the logic of integrating existing 
public policies, being an expansion of governmental actions (even though Brazil faces 
several institutional and governance challenges). However, until the moment there are 
few synergies for aligning the ENREDD+ and previous conservation initiatives as well as 
sectoral policies (e.g. agriculture/livestock, energy and mining). Moreover, although 
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there have been national attempts to involve sub-national actors, contexts and actions 
(e.g. task force of Amazonian states in relation to the national REDD+ strategy 
coordinated by the Casa Civil), these perspectives do not necessarily seem to be 
reflected in national policy formulation (e.g. challenge of how to share REDD+ benefits 
equitably across levels of governance). 
 This also increases the complication to attribute results to REDD+ interventions. 
This means, the reduction in deforestation in recent years in the country was most likely 
mainly due to a mix of several factors (for example, some public policies implemented 
between 2003 and 2008 and the improvement in enforcement strategies) and not just for 
REDD+ actions. On the other hand, this position can help countries to assess gaps of 
the existing legal framework guaranteeing this way enforceability, for example, of newly 
created entities (such as a national REDD+ management body) that need to become 
legally enforceable in order to be effective (Denier et al., 2014). Brazil has also adopted 
this position (even though Brazil mostly relies on existing institutions). In addition, such 
an approach could also contribute to the achievement of other relevant goals as the 
national sustainable development goals (Denier et al., 2014). 
 
 
6.4 Political coordination and cross-interaction among levels and sectors 
 The risks of unintended negative effects will increase if climate change policies 
are designed and implemented without considering broader impacts (G7 Members, 
2015). The implementation of such policies could undermine economic development, 
contribute to political instability, and exacerbate social insecurity. These unforeseen 
effects often arise due to the lack of cross-sectoral coordination130 (G7 Members, 2015).  
Cross-sectoral coordination failures seem to be the predominant characteristic in present 
policy domains, and REDD+ has not yet been able to change this pattern (Korhonen-
Kurki et al., 2015). For example, various REDD+ national strategies from countries that 
work under the UN-REDD and FCPF (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility) readiness 
scope are being criticised because the developed strategies propose many actions to 
reduce conversion of forests in other land uses. On the other hand, they do not suggest 
clear solutions to the underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation, as for 
example, to involve cross-sector interactions especially concerning sustainable 
                                                 
130 In a sense of the integration of diverse elements into a harmonious process, regulating this way activities, 
responsibilities, and command and control structures to ensure that the available resources are efficiently 
used in pursuit of the specified objectives. 
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agricultural measures (Fobissie and Kanninen, 2014, personal communication). 131 
However, this may happen on account of financial constraints, for example, in some 
countries, expected REDD+ finance is not large enough to influence policies and reforms 
(Lee and Pistorius, 2015). Further with Lee and Pistorius (2015), in Vietnam, for 
instance, international REDD+ finance is smaller if compared with finance provided 
through a functional payment scheme for forest ecosystem services (PFES); the same 
situation is observed in Mexico. 
 Furthermore, cross-sectoral interaction will also be important for considering 
equity and the socio-economic impacts of national level REDD+ strategies (Graham and 
Vignola, 2011). Thus, even though Brazil is a pilot-country under FIP/World Bank, it is 
neither a member of the UN-REDD nor FCPF and should be analysed in a particular 
way. First, Brazil has already achieved a significant reduction in deforestation rates. 
Second, countries based on subsistence farming (not the case of Brazil) tend to be 
financially constrained and face greater difficulties in adopting anti-deforestation policies 
– instead relying on projects and short-term policies. Still, the lack of coordination among 
actors, sectors and government will affect REDD+ governance and outcomes in Brazil 
(Gebara et al., 2014), which is reflected in the country’s REDD+ strategy in which 
objectives for coordination and governance have been set but implementation details are 
deficient. According to Corfee-Morlot et al. (2009) a common deficiency regarding 
political coordination happens because relatively few evaluation frameworks have been 
employed to measure the outcomes of climate policies at local scale.  
 As previously explored, it is consistently accepted that the agricultural expansion, 
the commercial exploitation of timber and the opening of roads and tracks are three of 
the main causes of deforestation in Latin America (Salamanca, 2013). REDD+ policies 
at national level will therefore need to address these drivers132 – in case of Brazil also 
energy and mining – of deforestation and forest degradation that are (indirectly) outside 
of the forest sector in order to guarantee that local level food security is not 
compromised to ensure the long-term political and social sustainability of REDD+ 
(Graham and Vignola, 2011).  
 In Brazil due to significant reduction in deforestation rates, the agricultural sector 
represents about a third of Brazilian emissions nowadays and is expected to continue on 
                                                 
131  Kalame Fobissie – REDD+ negotiatior, Government of Cameroon. Climate Change Programme 
Coordinator at VITRI, University of Helsinki, Finland and Prof. Markku Kanninen, VITRI, University of 
Helsinki, Dept. of Forest Sciences, Finland. 
132 Agriculture and energy sectors are very important to consider in Brazil because of their main role as key 
drivers of development in the country. 
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a growing trend in absolute terms (IDDRI, 2015). Therefore, considering Brazil’s large 
land area and the extensive portion of this area occupied by pastures, there is 
substantial physical potential for increasing production and reducing GHG emissions by 
converting degraded pasturelands into crops (Assunção and Chiavari, 2015). Estimates 
show that improving the productivity of Brazilian pasturelands would detach enough land 
to meet projected demands of crops and biofuels through 2040 (Strassburg et al., 2014). 
Brazil has over 40 million hectares of degraded pastureland outside the Amazon suitable 
for the production of crops (Assunção and Chiavari, 2015). Moreover, healthy pastures 
provide better quality forage that can reduce CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation 
(Smith et al., 2007) and absorb greater quantities of soil carbon (Assad et al., 2015). On 
the other hand, restoring degraded pastures involves fertilisation that increases N2O 
emissions (Smith et al., 2007). Also, it involves mechanisation for soil preparation – that 
drives up demand for energy, notably diesel – and frequently supplementary irrigation – 
that drives up demand for electricity (IDDRI, 2015). But nevertheless, the REDD+ 
framework in Brazil should put more effort into the integration among anti-deforestation 
measures, agriculture and livestock production and energy generation policies (Gebara 
et al., 2014).  
 For example, to achieve the goals of its NDC 133  three conditions must be 
accomplished by Brazil according to IDDRI (2015). Mostly Brazil’s GHG emissions come 
from these mentioned sectors: forestry, agriculture and energy. Therefore, considering 
the carbon per tonne price at an average of US$50 in the market, the energy sector 
could comply with the NDC, but only if Brazil also fully complies with the ABC Plan and 
the zero net deforestation throughout the country. This means, without the 
accomplishment of these three conditions in combination, not even with carbon prices 
above US$ 200 (what is unlikely to happen in the near future – carbon prices span a 
wide range from less than US$1/tCO2eq to US$137/tCO2eq during 2015/2016 (The 
World Bank and Ecofys, 2016)) the NDC will be accomplished by the planned policies 
(Angelo, 2015). The net zero deforestation is the most complicated aspect in this 
equation, because the Brazilian regulation allows for “legal” deforestation. Brazil has a 
                                                 
133 This scenario is estimated by a computer model that takes into account the emissions and performance 
of the Brazilian economy in this study from IDDRI. It should be noted that GDP projections had to be 
adjusted to match the recent deviations from a high-growth trajectory, and the forecasts for a reduced 
growth rate in the short-term in Brazil. Official projections by government institutions place it above 3% on 
annual average between 2010 and 2050, with decadal annual growth rates as high as 4.5%. However, the 
average growth rate for the period 2011-2014 was just 1.5% per year. The most recent estimates indicates 
Brazilian GDP shrinking by 2.66% in 2015, shrinking again by 0.78% in 2016, and returning to modest 
growth in subsequent years (IDDRI, 2015). 
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favourable potential to sustainably supply a significant portion of the global demand for 
agricultural products, if the country adopts an enhanced policy scenario among sectors, 
for example adopting the intensification of agriculture and cattle farming measures 
(IDDRI, 2015).  
 In order for Brazil to realise its sustainable agricultural potential, a sustained 
integrated approach is needed. Integrated systems have other significant environmental 
advantages when compared to monoculture crops (apart from its GHG emissions 
reduction potential), including for example, soil, water and biodiversity conservation (Gil 
et al., 2015) However, Gil et al. (2016) suggest that unless training in integrated crop-
livestock is targeted also at farmers in marginal lands and supported through broader 
investment in supply chain infrastructure, its adoption in Brazil in regions with degraded 
pasture will likely remain low. On the other hand, this means that a superior policy 
support and regulation is necessary since such actions lead to higher yields, which in 
turn can drive up the price of land and lead to renewed deforestation pressures (Galford 
et al, 2013; Sparovek et al, 2010). These policies could potentially be implemented as 
part of the ABC Plan. For Elzen et al. (2015), intensification of cattle farming would spare 
land and decrease the pressure on forests. On the other hand, currently few incentives 
exist in Brazil for improving productivity in management practices and incorporating best 
practices (Elzen et al., 2015). Moreover, usually due to bureaucratic processes and strict 
specifications many groups (e.g. smallholders) have been marginalised from such 
schemes, thereby neglecting their chance to have access to the financial resources. For 
Gil et al. (2015), considering environmental and economic benefits potentially generated 
by the adoption of integrated systems, it is interesting to develop small-scale business 
models. Although the challenges of continuing competition for land by the agro-industry 
remain in Brazil, production efficiency increased in several agricultural sub-sectors 
during the past decades. For example, improved production techniques triggered a 
240% increase in grain and oilseed (including soya) production (GIZ, 2013).  
 This integration would be also essential from the financial perspective. That’s 
because the overall financing needed to achieve these NDC’s outcomes will cost some 
billion of dollars. For example, the World Bank suggests that restoration targets 
(established by the Forest Code) will require investments ranging from US$14.8 billion 
for 12 million hectares to US$26.2 billion for 20 million hectares over 15 years (Edwards, 
2016). Therefore, it will be demanded to link restoration programmes with improved 
agricultural activities productivity, valuing carbon and other environmental services to 
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help finance these efforts, and efficient integration of investment at several scale such as 
public and private, international and domestic (Edwards, 2016). Ultimately, issues as 
climate change and deforestation have multiple determinants, affect many livelihoods 
and sectors, and require action by different actors. Therefore, a national strategy for 
REDD+ must be multi-sectoral so as to aggregate efforts and avoid duplication of 
activities and conflict of interests, affecting also coordination (Cenamo, 2014, personal 
communication).134 Conflicting goals (e.g., agricultural policy and land reform policies) 
can influence and even prevent the implementation of REDD+ interventions (Brickell et 
al., 2012). Challenges related to sector coordination and interactions are therefore 
among the most addressed issues shared by countries developing REDD+ (Peskett and 
Brockhaus, 2009). Such multi-sectoral approach is also important from the permanence 
standpoint, given that actions undertaken in different sectors are equally relevant in 
determining how long deforestation reduction obtained through REDD+ projects can be 
ensured for (McFarland, 2010; Valberg, 2011). 
 
 
6.5 Main rationale for local-national policy linkages  
 There are several reasons for national governments to better engage with local 
governments and stakeholders on the issue of environmental policies. Local institutions 
serve as a vehicle for the implementation of nationally driven policies, to ensure that the 
mandates outlined at national scale are actually carried out and deliver consequential 
results at local scale (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). Moreover, local actions will be 
important in providing means of social and technical innovation that is not possible at 
larger scale, eventually providing a vehicle for learning and broader dissemination where 
prosperous innovations occur. Local action will also provide essential insights for 
understanding the political economy of environmental policy complex. It will provide a 
vehicle to identify how incentives and interests interact at different levels of governance, 
to observe and understand direct local costs and benefits of action, including local co-
benefits, and the local beneficiaries and losers of any particular set of policy choices. 
 Moreover, an important factor at national level is how the federal government 
handles design and implementation of environmental policies and strategies. As the 
national government is in charge for the diffusion of responsibility, institutions that 
address sectoral issues should adopt multi-level governance practices into their 
                                                 
134 Mariano Cenamo – Personal Communication 
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mandates (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). There is also a need for focused attention to 
building capacity throughout levels of government to undertake pro-active assessment of 
the costs and effectiveness of policy options. This will take some training but also access 
to standardised tools and up to date information in each area. Within this context, 
national governments will need to take some responsibility for decentralising 
understanding and building ownership and responsibility throughout state government as 
well as across municipalities and local stakeholders (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009).  
 
 6.5.1 The Brazilian context  
 The Brazilian environmental policy has been advancing in a fragmented way 
(Sano, 2011). As previously described, a peculiarity of the Brazilian federalism is that the 
municipalities have the status of autonomous entities within the federation concerning 
several legal processes (Lavalle et al., 2013). A critical element of the national 
development goals is supporting large-scale efforts by states and municipalities to 
reduce deforestation rates within their borders (TNC, 2015). The federal command-and-
control structure has failed to promote conservation approaches (Boyd, 2008; Fearnside, 
2006) while the state level has failed to enforce environmental laws or incentives to 
reduce deforestation (Boyd, 2008; Chomitz et al., 2006). If forests are not seen as a high 
priority in national, sub-national and local development planning, this will create little 
incentive to strengthen sector coordination in REDD+ implementation (Brickell et al., 
2012).  
 This lack of priority also has implications for the available resources particularly 
at the local level where there are not abundant resources to execute the responsibilities 
in a fair decentralised manner, thereby limiting enforcement due to poor capacity of 
execution (Brickell et al., 2012). Likewise, Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2015) argue that there 
is still a gap between REDD+ policy objectives and sectoral and national development 
policies, leading to overlapping regulations and inappropriate resource allocation among 
the sectors also in Brazil. According to Sano (2011), there is an institutional weakness of 
many Brazilian municipalities (mainly those with a smaller population) that do not have 
sufficient and qualified technical labour and face financial difficulties to address 
environmental challenges. Moreover, the lack of a culture of horizontal and vertical 
articulation also creates difficulties for the development of territorial actions (Sano, 
2011).  
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 Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2015) have analysed coordination and cross-sectoral 
integration in REDD+ experiences from seven different countries, including Brazil. They 
argue that despite existing efforts, REDD+ is not yet adequately integrated into existing 
policies in most of the countries (also in Brazil). Clearly, an impediment to the 
development of the national strategy on REDD+ in Brazil is the lack of alignment 
between state-level policies and the federal government. Cunha and Rodrigo (2012) and 
Rezende (2000) agree that Brazilian states and municipalities carry out activities without 
coordination or integration with the federal level. Indeed, many states were/are ahead of 
federal legislation that often adopted what already exists to make it a national standard. 
The State of São Paulo is a good example, since its restrictive legislation on industrial 
pollution provided the basis for federal legislation (Sano, 2011). On the other hand, 
Nassar (2015) says that sub-national initiatives may be effective in putting pressure on, 
and influencing the federal government’s position. In addition, actions at the local level 
can provide essential experience and, when successful, lead to bottom-up diffusion of 
approaches and indeed, influence national and even international levels of initiatives 
(Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005).  
 According to Pavan (2014), incorporating the vision and activities developed by 
the states is extremely important for a flourishing Brazilian national strategy on REDD+. 
A good example is the state of Acre. In 2010, Acre’s state Assembly approved a new law 
(State Law 2.308/2010) called the State System of Incentives for Environmental 
Services (SISA). SISA is s known as the world’s first jurisdictional REDD+ programme 
(Duchelle et al., 2014). In contrast to some other jurisdictions globally, where incipient 
REDD+ programmes operate in seclusion, the state of Acre developed the legal 
framework of its state-wide programme before encouraging the implementation of forest 
carbon projects (Evans, 2013). This involved setting up a range of institutions to regulate 
the system, trade carbon credits, give scientific advice, and negotiate with civil society. 
For Acre, the switch from a forest-depleting to forest-maintaining model of governance 
and its REDD+ incentive-based system was mostly based on improving the sustainable 
livelihoods of communities, increasing intact forests’ economic value and enhancing  
forest protection as well as increasing yields from agricultural and livestock production 
systems in order to reduce their expansion into primary forests (Climate Focus, 2013). 
 Nevertheless, the action of federal states often seems to be contradictory as well. 
For example, the federal government has adopted licensing as a way to control 
environmental impacts, demanding an obligatory Environmental Impact Assessment 
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(EIA/RIMA)135 for plantations greater than 1,000 hectares in size (Abranches, 2014). 
However, some producers virtually sub-divide their lands to avoid the expense of 
producing an EIA/RIMA. Thus, under a flexible interpretation of regulations, statements 
are often formally issued (and accepted by local authorities) saying that such plantations 
are harmless although there is uncertainty about their ecological impact (Abranches, 
2014). Federal states, nonetheless, lack clear procedures for reporting to the federal 
level and the structural conditions for the implementation of natural resources protection 
policies appear incomplete (Valberg, 2011). On the other hand, many activities taking 
place on the state level are not necessarily reported back to the federal government 
either (Valberg, 2011). For instance, the Ministry of Environment (MMA) receives 
inadequate information from the states, which are the ones aware of actual forest uses 
(MMA, 2014, personal communication).136  
 The federal states lack the necessary institutional instruments to approve forest 
utilisation, making it more difficult to achieve a clear distinction in measuring legal and 
illegal logging (Valberg, 2011). In this sense, Brazil lacks a clear distribution of 
responsibilities for following up on the policies and plans established in NPCC, reflecting 
in this way the REDD+ implementation throughout the country. This multiplicity of 
institutions – including the many forest agencies – and changes in their institutional 
responsibilities, divides responsibility and accountability and affects the incentives for 
sector coordination. Also, the high costs of coordination, and the need to overcome 
different approaches and territories, are disincentives to strengthening cross-sectoral 
coordination in countries implementing REDD+ activities (Brickell et al., 2012). 
Ultimately, in the case of Brazil, the ENREDD+ was mostly developed based on federal-
level government policies and previous national efforts (e.g. PPCDAm and PPCerrado), 
resulting, in  few synergies and a small range of opportunities for aligning the ENREDD+ 
and previous sub-national REDD+ actions (Alves-Pinto et al., 2016).  
 
 
 6.5.2 Institutional weaknesses and conflict of interests 
 The Brazilian institutional design is also pointed out as a problem. According to 
Alves (2014), it does not respond to the need of implementing complex environmental 
                                                 
135 EIA/RIMA is required to all projects aiming the change of land use in natural areas such as tourist 
development, infrastructure, industrial, agribusiness, dams etc. However, a controversial point is that this 
assessment is limited to large-scale development projects.  
136 MMA – Miinistry of Environment – Personal communication 
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policies, because the environmental arena affects territorial management and require 
contributing actions from all levels of government, making its implementation more 
difficult. Moreover, the actors involved in institutional structures often do not have the 
same power or influence, and several new actors remain outside of the official political 
system (Alves, 2014). Following Valberg (2011), various inter-ministerial conflicts exist 
due to discrepant interests and forest protection is not always a shared priority. Some 
specialists believe that the Ministry of Environment (MMA) has less power than the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ITAMARATY) has 
traditionally prioritised growth over conservation (Gebara et al., 2014; Valberg, 2011). 
Agriculture is considered the most dynamic sector of Brazil’s economy being a constant 
menace to socio-environmental balance in the country areas (Bessa et al., 2005). Such 
discrepancy among ministries was one of the reasons for former environmental minister 
Marina Silva's resignation137 from MMA in 2008 during former President Lula's mandate 
(Abranches, 2014).  
 On the other hand, MMA representatives have demonstrated their skills several 
times in the game of bureaucratic politics, for instance, by managing to convince 
ministries like the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance about the potential 
positive effects of a voluntary GHG reduction emissions target (Kasa, 2013). Also, as 
already mentioned, the rise of issues related to climate change and deforestation on the 
UNFCCC agenda made the MMA’s competencies on deforestation much more relevant 
for national climate policy. This opened a policy window for competent bargaining by the 
MMA, which systematically managed to increase its influence in intra-governmental 
negotiations (Kasa, 2013). However Gebara et al. (2014) investigated actors’ influence 
in REDD+ policy networks through two network dimensions: i) perceived influence, 
referring to the reputational power an actor has according to other actors in the network 
and ii) relational influence, referring to the actors’ central positions in information 
exchanges and collaboration networks. They found out that although the MMA has 
assumed a leading role on the development of the national strategy on REDD+, it does 
                                                 
137 The then President Lula launched the Sustainable Amazon Plan (PAS), an umbrella plan under which 
PPCDAM, ABC Plan and Amazon Fund would be regulated. He gave the coordination of the PAS to 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger (Minister-in-Chief of the Secretary for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency (SAE) 
at that time) and the Executive Secretary to Marina Silva. This would undermine Marina Silva's political 
authority over major environmental and forest policies. In addition, Roberto Mangabeira Unger defended the 
incorporation of the Amazon into the infrastructure and economic growth plans (Abranches, 2014). However, 
the fight against deforestation had gained such momentum, and its domestic and global exposure was 
robust at that moment. Therefore, Marina Silva team’s was willing to prevent their policies from being 
abandoned, creating a political fact of great impact on the media, public opinion and the political elite, if 
Marina Silva resigned at the right moment (Abranches, 2014).  
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not seem to be able to coordinate state and federal actors nor to link up different sectors 
and levels relevant to REDD+ framework, not including in this policy network arena an 
important role for the private sector,138 for example. 
 
 
 6.5.3 Relevance of the private sector 
 Although some segments of the private sector drive deforestation and forest 
degradation (historically both have been intrinsically linked to economic development), a 
key determinant of REDD+ success will be ensuring effective private sector engagement 
in the process. This outcome was also highlighted in some studies on REDD+ 
governance (see Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Cortez et al., 2010). As funding is a 
major concern in the implementation of REDD+ activities (in the wake of several finance 
crises), capturing the private sector capital will be absolutely critical to scaling up 
investment in REDD+ (Bernard et al., 2012). Moreover, the engagement of the private 
sector promotes higher degree of information flow among stakeholders and facilitates 
spread of innovation and best practices (GEF, 2011). 
 According to European Forest Institute (EFI) the private sector can also support 
REDD+ in several other ways such as: i) reducing the negative impacts of production, 
building forest protection into their routine activities or in response to legislation, external 
policies or incentives; ii) innovation, developing new technologies that respond to market 
pressures, involving environmental, legal, regulatory and fiscal scope to stay 
competitive; iii) influencing consumption, as with the trade in illegal timber, companies 
sourcing or investing in commodities can work to exclude deforestation from their supply 
chain; iv) developing REDD+ projects, creating carbon credits which contribute to 
emission reductions and v) in implementation, innovation and investment require several 
forms of implementation to bring results on the ground (as the largest terrestrial land 
users currently, the private sector will profoundly be involved in activities on the ground). 
                                                 
138 Private sector can encompass all cases of private firms, including sole proprietorships, partnerships 
(general, limited or limited liability), corporations (privately owned or publicly traded), cooperatives and 
franchises, including multinational corporations as well as local businesses, financial institutions and 
financial intermediaries or consultancies and project management firms. Moreover, it may or not also include 
private individuals and households. With respect to forests, private sector may refer to forestry companies 
that harvest timber, agricultural companies clearing forest for palm oil, soya, rubber, coffee, cocoa, 
sugarcane, cattle ranching or other products, and mining companies clearing forests as part of their 
extraction activities. Further along the supply chain are the traders, processors, manufacturers and retailers 
that buy the products and the investors that provide the finance to keep the companies operating. At every 
stage, these stakeholders can also range from multi-national level to small local companies, sole traders or 
individual farmers. 
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However, still, little has been achieved in order to identify who the key private sector 
players are, the roles they play and the sector’s diversity in terms of scale, expertise, 
motivations and forms of involvement in this context (Bernard et al., 2012).  
 Several segments of the private sector could have a critical influence on the 
future of REDD+ such as the group which includes forestry companies and businesses 
across forest-product supply chains as well as agribusiness, mining, and energy 
companies operating in and around forests. Also, informal, small- and medium-sized 
producers, community-based cooperatives and ecotourism companies (which may 
operate in forests) make up an important segment likewise. Decisively, another 
important group is the financial sector (private banks, investors, and financial 
intermediaries) that provide loans and capital to the economic (forestry) sector (CIF, 
2013). 
 Such interface between REDD+ and the private sector is emerging in Brazil, for 
example, the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), which certificates cattle farmers 
and agricultural producers who develop good practices without deforestation under the 
Rainforest Alliance Standard (Alves-Pinto et al., 2016). However, in order to achieve the 
private sector’s potential the current paradigm still needs to change. For example, a 
major concern from the private sector is in relation to financial and management risks 
(also to engage in REDD+ actions). Sanches and Bataglia (2015) indicate in their 
analysis that the Brazilian legal institutions lack efficient mechanisms to support 
economic transactions due to an ineffective judicial system as well as an unstable 
contractual law basis. As a result, this generates high transaction costs and stimulates 
the use of collective and private mechanisms of coordination to minimise risks (Sanches 
and Bataglia, 2015). Thus, since changes in political institutions, property rights, contract 
law, norms, and customs influence the reconfiguration of economic organisation 
(Sanches and Bataglia, 2015), ensuring that this scenario (also applied to REDD+ 
framework) will be efficient, equitable and effective will require modifications in the 
institutional environment139  in Brazil, besides coordination and collaboration between 
private and public sector and civil society. Therefore, it is important broad engagement 
of private sector during the early development stage of national strategies and policy 
design, establishing the legal basis for private investment through an efficient 
governance framework. 
                                                 
139 A country’s institutional environment influences the degree of uncertainty in contractual relations, as it 
defines the frameworks for production, exchange, and distribution through its legal, political, and social rules, 
affecting the forms of governance in risk management (Sanches and Bataglia, 2015). 
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6.6 Participatory nature of the policy 
 
 
 6.6.1 Defining participation 
 Recent discourses on participation in forest policies infrequently reflect local 
forest householders’ needs and expectations – as local defined as any group that 
depends upon the forest to generate income or to subsist (Cromberg et al., 2014). Such 
disassociation usually occurs because participation can have different meanings, 
depending on the context and levels of engagement (Cromberg et al., 2014). Also, 
according to Pimbert and Pretty (1994), there are different levels of participation, from 
passive participation that only involves informative or consultative approaches to transfer 
of power, as described below in table 9. Such typologies have been developed to 
understand the differences between these interpretations and their associated 
approaches and methods as well as to understand the different contexts in which they 
are most appropriate (Reed, 2008). 
 
Table 9 Typology of participation 
Typology of participation Characteristics 
 
Manipulative 
 
Participation is simply pretence, with 
‘people’s’ representatives on official 
boards but who are not elected and have 
no power 
 
Passive 
People participate by being told what 
 is going to happen or has already  
happened; unilateral announcement by 
administrators 
 
Participation in information giving 
 
People participate by answering questions 
for surveys or researches. However,   
people do not have the opportunity to 
influence proceedings, as the findings  of  
such researches are neither shared nor 
checked for accuracy 
 
Participation by consultation 
People are consulted; analysis and 
decisions are made by external agents 
(these external professionals define both 
problems and solutions) 
 
Participation for material incentives 
People contribute resources (e.g., field and 
labour), and receive cash, food, and other 
material incentives. People have no stake 
in prolonging activities when the incentives 
run out 
 
Functional participation 
People’s participation is an answer to 
predetermined objectives formulated by 
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external agents. Although they may be 
involved in decision-making, such 
involvement does not tend to be at early 
stages of project cycles. But tend to 
appear only after major decisions have 
been made 
 
Interactive participation 
People participate in joint analysis, 
development of action plans, and 
formation or strengthening of local 
institutions. Participation is a right, not an 
obligation to achieve a goal. People take 
control over local decisions, and so people 
have a stake in maintaining structures or 
practices 
 
 
Self-mobilisation 
People participate by taking initiatives 
independently of external institutions to 
change systems. They develop contacts 
with external institutions for the resources 
and technical advice they need, but 
maintain control over how resources are 
used. Such self-initiated mobilisation and 
collective action may or may not challenge 
existing inequitable distribution of wealth 
and power 
Source: Pimbert and Pretty, 1994; Gebara, 2013 
 
 
 6.6.2 Participation in context of REDD+ 
 Ensuring effectiveness, equity and fairness in processes of policy implementation 
and decision-making require the broad participation of all involved stakeholders (Lima, 
2014). Besides having public consultation, that entails granting stakeholder’s access to 
information (Bustos, 2014; Roe et al., 2013). Specialists agree that the observance of 
the interests and opinions of indigenous people and traditional communities is a core 
part of the REDD+ framework (Bonfante et al., 2010; Gebara, 2013). Also, REDD+ 
initiatives may have a better chance of success in providing longer-term benefits if 
developers actively include local people in the design and implementation of such 
schemes (Cromberg et al., 2014). Local stakeholders should understand that they will be 
a fundamental element in this process with a stake in the outcome, and should thus 
participate in the discussions likewise in the decisions (Anderson, 2009). As argued by a 
previous study, countries with centralised and/or strong national leadership over the 
policy process may successfully establish the necessary foundations for REDD+ system 
(even though the process is not inclusive). It also states, on the other hand, that 
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inclusiveness may prove to be essential for the later implementation of REDD+ policies 
and for the sustainability and equity of their outcomes (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2013). 
 Literature shows that to realise full and effective participation in conservation 
initiatives is highly challenging (Cromberg et al., 2014). Usually such schemes impact 
several actors with different opinions and expectations. But, there is consistent evidence 
that past activities have failed to engage local people in a legitimised way (Pimbert and 
Pretty, 1995; Wells and McShane, 2004). For instance, Howell (2015) suggests that the 
reluctance of the government in to include the different affected parties in their 
discussions in order to incorporate community interests in the planning of REDD+ pilot 
projects in Central Sulawesi can be considered one of the main reasons for the failure of 
such activities there. On the one hand, diverse opinions will exist, but when working with 
perceptions, a key challenge is the correct identification of potential distortions that may 
arise from unfulfilled over-expectations (Lima, 2014). On the other hand, dialogue within 
and between different stakeholders can help identify areas of conflict and indicate points 
for reconciliation (Cromberg et al., 2014). However, distortions may also occur due to 
lack of information. It seems often that incomplete and inadequate information about 
conservation measures are provided to participants of such schemes, resulting in them 
misunderstanding the core concepts and proposed rules (Kosoy et al., 2008). For 
example, Hayes (2012) examined how the implementation of a PES scheme to promote 
sustainable pasture management and forest conservation in the Eastern Andes (in 
Colombia) interacts with farmers’ decision-making, concluding that only 13% of the 
respondents understood that part of their contractual commitment was to conserve 
forests (Lima, 2014).  
 Lawlor et al. (2013) have examined 41 REDD+ projects across 22 developing 
countries. They conclude that the extent of information transmitted to local stakeholders 
was not always well described in project documents; therefore, it is difficult to analyse 
how properly informed households were before they agreed to participate in the project. 
Details about contract structure were particularly often not included in project 
documents, nor were descriptions of how well participants were informed about possible 
ranges in future carbon payment (Lawlor et al., 2013). Uncertainty about the REDD+ 
carbon market is often the motivation for project developers to delay community 
consultations and information sharing regarding REDD+ initiatives design (Sunderlin and 
Sills, 2012). Allowing for critical judgment by local participants requires that access to 
information in the early stage in the design phase should be promoted and explanations 
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about REDD+, the different interests involved, and associated risks and opportunities 
should be included, reaching also stakeholders who may not directly participate in the 
project (Cromberg et al., 2014). A previous assessment before the implementation of a 
REDD+ intervention should be done to foresee probable problems regarding the 
implementation (Lima, 2014).  
 
 
 6.6.3 Participation in the Brazilian context 
 Local participation in REDD+ is made explicit in the UNFCCC Cancun 
Safeguards as well as in the REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards, the UN-
REDD Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria and the Brazilian Social and 
Environmental Principles and Criteria for REDD+.140 The safeguard principle of access 
to information links to the very basic right of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
regarding interventions on indigenous lands and natural resources, which is 
acknowledged in international law (Cromberg et al., 2014). As interviews revealed, the 
involvement of stakeholders (in the broad sense as those who are affected by or can 
affect a decision) is considered one of the key challenges in the Brazilian context, 
especially assuming the low priority that the Federal Government has placed on civil 
society representation in the CONAREDD+ (CIFOR, 2014, personal communication) .141 
It is argued that the civil society was only effectively called to participate in the 
development of the safeguards and nothing more. In this sense, it is also expected that 
on account of this low representativeness an unbalanced amount of decision-making 
power in favour of the federal government will be promoted. 
 According to Cohen and Arato (2000), ‘the political role of civil society is not 
directly related to the control or the conquest of power, but with the generation of 
influence upon the democracy and in discussions which are not restricted to the cultural 
public sphere’. The ability to influence political decisions, however, depends on 
mechanisms of mediation between civil society and the state (Losekann, 2012). 
Otherwise, their political role becomes "diffuse and ineffective” (Cohen and Arato, 2000). 
In this sense, multi-stakeholder platforms could be better supported where insights from 
the ground can be incorporated into high-level dialogues. Existing social movement 
                                                 
140 A total of 8 Principles and 27 criteria were developed. The purpose of the Brazilian document is to define 
minimum criteria to be complied with in any REDD+ programmes and projects and was not intended to be 
the base for a new certification scheme.  
141 CIFOR – Center for International Forestry Research – Personal Communication 
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networks are also decisive for direct engagement with local stakeholders and promotion 
of active local participation in REDD+.    
 In order to engage stakeholders in the REDD+ national agenda, the MMA led 
several dialogues with civil society started in 2010 to discuss possible pathways for a 
Brazilian national REDD+ regime. For Nassar (2015), information and knowledge are a 
strategic source of power for civil society organisations in world politics. In negotiations  
they  often  use  their  specialised  knowledge  in  the  ambition  of  modifying actions 
taken by governmental decision makers and/or altering how they define their interests. 
Along with Nassar (2015), in Brazil, civil society organisations contributed to the 
development of REDD+ policies at the national level by adopting a cooperative strategy 
to deal with the federal government. They also developed proposals and studies that 
supported both the legislative and executive branches of federal and state governments 
and even acted as consultants to the Brazilian Government concerning international 
negotiations (Nassar, 2015).  
 On the other hand, interviewees declared that, since 2012 the REDD+ scenario 
has substantially changed at the national level. There was a reduction of participation 
and discussion levels within the REDD+ policy processes (IDESAM, 2014, personal 
communication).142 For example, a parallel event (“Brazilian Amazon: integrating climate 
and forest strategies with an eye towards Paris”) was held during the COP20 in Lima in 
2014. The event was attended by about 90 participants, including Environment 
Secretaries of three states (Acre, Amazonas and Tocantins), governmental 
representatives of Amapá, Pará and Mato Grosso, private sector representatives, 
experts and indigenous leaders. However, no representative from the MMA attended the 
debate even though they were invited (Cenamo and Lima, 2014). Two different moments 
can be then recognised in this process in Brazil. Until 2012/2013 dialogue and 
participation opportunities have been created, but it was not clear how it would be used. 
The work plan described in the preliminary version of the ENREDD+ also exposed 
uncertainties concerning the participation process. Afterwards, there were few 
opportunities for interaction and it seems that the contributions had not been effectively 
translated into a strategy or part of the strategy (IMAZON, 2014, personal 
communication). 143  
                                                 
142 IDESAM – Institute of Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas – Personal 
Communication 
143 IMAZON – Institute of Man and Environment in the Amazon – Personal Communication 
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 Several other arguments were expressed during interviews that shed light this 
discussion. Some interviewees believe that the REDD+ arena is still very restricted to 
specialists and actors that are better positioned technically, politically and financially. 
The discussion does not reach adequately social organisations, workers and employers, 
and the society in general. Federal states argue that the federal government opens a 
dialogue, but the processes are always the same; ineffective. The discussion is also 
concentrated in few spheres of the government, more in the environmental area that 
does not have dialogue with other areas that also play an important role in this process. 
Another discussed point is that it is believed that asymmetry of information is a major 
obstacle because people have different ways of dealing with the information. Moreover, 
there are factors that hinder access to information, such as the limited capacity to 
process information by governmental institutions, and to put it on public display. 
According to Angelsen et al. (2012), enhancing and harmonising information flows 
between local and national levels are also essential for effective monitoring and control 
of emissions leakage (displaced emissions).  
 Furthermore, for some respondents this process is having a certain social 
exclusion, because some actors are invited to participate, however, they do not have the 
proper knowledge to reflect on the challenges associated with REDD+ or even to 
understand how the mechanism works. For Gebara (2009) considering that one of the 
contributors causes of deforestation is the lack of knowledge about sustainable forest 
management, education could be able to foster the process of reducing deforestation 
(Lima, 2014). Common approaches of learning can encourage discussions between 
several voices within the same community, resulting in action, reflection, shared 
knowledge (but also the co-production of new knowledge among players), awareness 
and skills that could be learned and put into practice by the several participants (Gebara, 
2015a).  
 Some authors refer to social learning as the distinct equitable participatory form 
of knowledge creation (Crane, 2014; Gummert and Douthwaite, 2010). Social learning 
has emerged as a core concept in natural resource management and environment 
governance over the past decade. The need to generate shared knowledge to advance 
current understandings of change and to apply joint-frameworks in extending individual 
and societal responses was recognised. But these frameworks must account for the 
complexity of governance regimes (e.g., formal and informal institutions, the role of state 
and non-state actors, the relative importance of bureaucratic hierarchies, markets and 
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networks). However, Reed et al. (2010) argue that while considerable evidence suggests 
that participatory processes can facilitate social learning, a participatory process does 
not guarantee that social learning will happen. Nevertheless, adopting a shared 
framework can better address the dynamics and adaptive capacity of resource 
governance; therefore, fostering shared understandings is necessary in overcoming the 
single-loop learning that seems to dominate governance processes in developing 
countries. 
 Through a grounded analysis of the literature, Reed (2008) identified some key 
features of best participation practices. It is argued in the paper that stakeholder 
participation needs to be established by principles that underline empowerment, equity, 
trust and learning. This includes learning between participants who may have very 
different perspectives, and between stakeholders and specialists (Reed, 2008). Also, 
where pertinent, participation should be considered early in the design stage and 
throughout the process, representing relevant stakeholders systematically. The 
participation process needs to have clear goals from the outset, and the need for highly 
skilled facilitation should be not neglected. Local and scientific knowledge should be 
integrated to provide a more comprehensive understanding of complex and dynamic 
natural systems and processes, which may also enforce local solutions to environmental 
problems. Finally, it is argued that to overcome many of its limitations, participatory 
processes must be institutionalised, promoting institutional guarantees for its 
implementation (Reed, 2008).  
 
 
6.7 Indigenous and traditional communities’ rights, benefit-sharing system and non-
carbon benefits 
 
 
 6.7.1 The rights of indigenous and forest-dependent communities 
 The matter of respect of the rights of indigenous and traditional communities had 
come a long way since 1997 – when the UNFCCC did not include this forum under the 
KP umbrella – until 2010, when at COP16 the concept of safeguards to the REDD+ 
framework were introduced to the discussion (Jagger, 2014), although the World Bank 
and other international financial institutions have been using this term since at least the 
1980s (Arhin, 2014). Safeguards can be an effective risk management in the policy 
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arena ensuring social and environmental responsibility. Through the adoption of 
safeguards in conservation measures, environmental and social issues can be evaluated 
in decision making, helping assess and reducing the risks, as well as providing a 
mechanism for consultation and disclosure of information (Moss and Nussbaum, 2011). 
 Several social risks and negative consequences can be potentially identified in 
REDD+ initiatives depending on how these activities are designed and implemented 
(Arhin, 2014). For instance, exclusion from decision-making and participation in such 
schemes (Dooley et al., 2011), misperception of proposed rules (Hayes, 2012), 
displacement of local people (Griffiths, 2008; Hall, 2010), lack of access to benefits 
partly due to unclear land tenure (Larson, 2011) and elite capture (Jumbe and Angelsen, 
2006). Notwithstanding, in Brazil and other developing countries, local communities and 
indigenous groups have been broadly excluded from the design and further 
implementation of REDD+ initiatives (Anderson, 2009; Crippa and Gordon, 2012). 
Moreover, although international as well as domestic legal frameworks144 exist to protect 
indigenous peoples, historically, Brazil has struggled over who has property rights to the 
forestlands and this strife has led to the exclusion of indigenous peoples (Taylor, 2015). 
An interesting perspective is presented on a study from Shankland and Hasenclever 
(2011). They state that the relationships between indigenous groups and the forest are 
often completely different from that assumed by Brazilians REDD+ policymakers and 
promoters. This means, many times the “environmental services” that are defined and 
established in the Brazilian REDD+ framework have no equivalent category within 
indigenous conceptualisations of nature. As a result, often both parties are not in 
agreement on the object of their negotiations likewise (Shankland and Hasenclever, 
2011). Moreover, indigenous leaders interviewed by them emphasised the difficulties 
                                                 
144     
 The 1988 Brazilian Constitution states that indigenous peoples have rights to their own “social 
organization, customs, languages, beliefs and traditions, and rights to the lands they traditionally 
occupy”, establishing legal protection of indigenous peoples’ rights, including the establishment of 
land rights through an official demarcation of the territories of each tribe. On the other hand, these 
rights are not always supported or properly executed. Article 231 of Brazil’s Constitution, paragraph 
five, contains an exception in which the indigenous peoples can be expelled from their lands in the 
“interest of the sovereignty of the country,” so long as it is agreed to by the National Congress 
(Taylor, 2015). 
 In 1989, the International Labour Organization adopted Convention n.169, which requires tribal and 
indigenous peoples’ participation in negotiations concerning any development on their lands. 
 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was adopted by the 
United Nations Human Rights Counsel General Assembly in 2007. 
 The Organization of American States (OAS) consists of thirty-five independent states, including 
Brazil. Article 21 of the American Convention gives indigenous peoples the right to property and 
acknowledges their right to the use and enjoyment of property. 
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they faced in involving their grassroots constituencies in the complex, fast-moving 
negotiations on REDD+ regulation in Brazil, for example. 
 In response to such concerns, environmental and social performance of REDD+ 
initiatives is increasingly being demanded by international financial and technical 
assistance (Swan et al., 2012). For Moss and Nussbaum (2011), if appropriately 
implemented, safeguards would not only help minimise or manage risks, but it would 
also enhance benefits to local population. However, this simultaneous risk/benefit 
potential has a range of implications for REDD+ policy and practice and open to a variety 
of different interpretations (Moss and Nussbaum, 2011). Therefore, a national safeguard 
response must be based on the specific national context, reflecting the present 
capacities and resources at a country’s disposal for implementing a national safeguards 
system (Swan et al., 2012). Nevertheless, although safeguards are a crucial beginning 
toward equitable and fair outcomes, it still remains to be seen if they can truly influence 
REDD+ design (Cromberg et al., 2014). Based on that reasoning, one of the major 
challenges concerning the implementation of safeguards (also faced by Brazil) is the 
difficulty in establishing indicators that truly demonstrate that these safeguards are being 
addressed under a REDD+ system. 
 Indigenous reserves constitute a great part of remaining forests in the world 
(Crippa and Gordon, 2012). Previous studies have offered evidence that indigenous 
reserves and protected areas improved forest conservation in Amazonian lands, acting 
as an effective buffer against deforestation (Anderson, 2009; Ferreira et al. 2005). 
According to Soares-Filho et al. (2010), indigenous reserves account for 60% of all 
protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon, which corresponds to about 32% of the carbon 
stored in the Amazonian territory (or 2.5 times the reduction of GHG commissioned in 
the first period of the KP). The same study estimates that, from 2008 to 2050, should 
these areas not be protected, the same amount of deforestation would be responsible 
for the release of five billion tonnes of carbon into the atmosphere by the end of that 
period (Soares-Filho et al., 2010). Forest management adopted by indigenous and local 
communities in Mexico, Central and South America, has been demonstrated to be 
almost twice as effective in reducing deforestation as any other means of protection 
(Crippa and Gordon, 2012). Moreover, studies as Börner et al. (2013) and Lima (2014) 
suggest that higher conservation levels could be achieved by strengthening the capacity 
of collaborative enforcement of local residents in the protection aspect of reserve areas 
against external threats.  
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 6.7.2 Benefit-sharing systems 
 To deliver safeguards, greater attention must also be given to mechanisms that 
would distribute these benefits (Leventon et al., 2014). While safeguards intend to 
ensure that REDD+ initiatives does not harm people and the environment, REDD+ can 
also have a positive impact through social co-benefits or non-carbon benefits (Duchelle 
and Jagger, 2014). Therefore, benefit sharing is a central element of national REDD+ 
architectures, and its implementation will require attachment to safeguards to ensure 
that contextual, procedural and distributive equity are considered (Brockhaus et al., 
2014). According to Brown (2008) and Peskett et al. (2008), benefit-sharing mechanisms 
can generate compensations (benefits designed to cover the foregone opportunity costs 
of deforestation) and/or incentives (benefits designed to encourage positive behaviours). 
However, for Gebara (2013) compensations can also be considered as a type of 
incentive as they also serve to encourage conservation behaviours. Benefits can be 
directly or indirectly distributed. Direct benefit-sharing involves giving benefits directly to 
forest users (e.g. cash payments, technical materials), whereas indirect benefit sharing 
encompasses benefits that aim to foster broader development and adaptation actions 
that enhance non-carbon benefits, e.g. access to education and health services 
(Gebara, 2013; Luttrell et al. 2012; Peskett et al. 2008).  
 The ENREDD+ still lacks important details on the incorporation and 
operationalisation of national mechanisms for benefit-sharing. The ENREDD+ presents 
neither a formal proposal for benefit-sharing nor a clear statement on what share of 
compensation mechanisms will be related to social aspects of REDD+ (Jagger et al., 
2014). However, Brazil highlights the importance of incentivising non-carbon benefits 
underlying also the close relationship between co-benefits and the safeguards referred 
to in Decision 1/CP.16 (UNFCCC, 2014). Moreover, the ENREDD+ establishes a 
positive precept that could lead to a more equitable outcome at local level. The 
ENREDD+ establishes that in order of importance, family farmers should have priority as 
beneficiaries in REDD+ actions. This is based on the fact that usually such smallholders 
have the least access to other policies. However, the dilemma is the operationalisation 
and implementation of such dogma.    
 One of the most interesting proposals for REDD+ benefit-sharing in Brazil are 
based on stock-flow logic to provide positive incentives to actors situated both in high 
flow reduction areas and large forest stock areas where future deforestation can be 
avoided. In February 2014, the Brazilian GCF (Governor’s Climate and Forest Task 
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Force) members released a document with a proposal for “U-REDD+” (REDD+ Units) 
allocation between the States and the Federal Government. The methodology for 
allocation is based on the concept of “stock-flux”, which allows for a balanced distribution 
of U-REDD+ among the Amazonian states (GCF and IDESAM, 2014, adapted from 
Cenamo et al., 2014). It is based on two parameters: i) flux: contribution of each state to 
the reduction of deforestation (based on its historic rates of deforestation) relative to the 
reduction of deforestation verified for the entire Amazon biome and ii) stock: quantity of 
carbon stored in the forested area of the state in relation to the forested area of the 
whole Amazon biome. They called as a first proposal for 80% of REDD+ benefits 
allocated to the Brazilian Amazon states (evenly distributed between high carbon stocks 
and high flow reduction areas) with 20% to be held by the Federal Government. 
However, such proposal is understood as a fundamental premise that each state should 
establish a specific policies and regulation that determines how REDD+ should be 
managed at the state level and how its potential benefits would be divided among all 
relevant stakeholders (Cenamo et al., 2014).  
 The states argue that allocations based on these two factors allow for a fair and 
equitable distribution of benefits. It will benefit the federal government and federal states 
according to their particular situations and maximise the chances of achieving the 
national GHG emissions reduction targets (GCF and IDESAM, 2014). Many federal 
states are investing heavily in the fight to reduce deforestation, but continue to receive 
very little for it (Cenamo, 2014, personal communication).145  Cenamo complements, 
“Amazonian states are generating the greatest climate assets that Brazil can offer, but 
we still are one of the poorest regions of Brazil” (he cites the fact that the Amazon region 
is responsible for only 8% of Brazil’s GDP). Moreover, Gil (2010) suggests that this 
approach may promote incentives to halt deforestation in states located on the arc of 
deforestation and in those which are still not under direct threat. However, whether the 
government will consider the inclusion of such a proposal into the national strategy on 
REDD+ is still an unanswered question, because this topic is clearly not reflected in this 
final version of the ENREDD+.  
 The choice of policies and measures to establish benefit-sharing mechanisms 
will influence the whole REDD+ architecture by determining who is to be given incentives 
to do what and the kinds of interventions that are needed to facilitate the successful 
implementation of this process (Gebara, 2013). Benefits should be distributed following a 
                                                 
145 Mariano Cenamo – Personal Communication 
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clear set of rules and be strongly monitored by competent authorities. The communities 
through the federal states should be aware of their rights and have the freedom to 
decide what their priorities are, respecting guidelines that guarantee alignment but also 
consider local realities (Pavan, 2014, personal communication).146 However, a major 
problem at local level is related to carbon ownership (see further discussion item 
6.9.2.4), because attributing ownership at local level include the fact that all 
achievements at the individual level would have to tally with national accounts, implying 
the need for integrated baselines, which would be extremely burdensome at 
administrative level (Skutsch et al., 2012). Therefore, some initiatives are focusing on 
PES schemes, in which the carbon rights are held by the government, but in which 
financial benefits from sale of carbon credits are distributed to eligible forest 
communities.  
 One example is the Bolsa Floresta Programme (BFP) implemented in the state of 
Amazonas. The BFP created in June 2007 was developed to benefit families living in 
Conservation Units in the state for leaving the forest stand. It constitutes the first 
Brazilian PES scheme that directly rewards forest dwellers for avoided deforestation 
through the REDD Juma Project (Sato, 2010). Its goal is to increase the value of forests 
vis-a-vis alternative land uses, resulting in improved quality of life of traditional 
communities and reducing deforestation actions. Participants are benefited through four 
main components: i) Bolsa Floresta Family, ii) Bolsa Floresta Income Generation, iii) 
Bolsa Florestal Social and iv) Bolsa Floresta Association. In April, 2008 through the 
Decree 27.600/2008 was created the Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (FAS) to 
manage the BFP. The Amazon Fund specifically supports the components BF Income 
Generation and the BF Association. The programme has received since its 
implementation several positive but also a lot of negative criticism. However, still little 
evidence exists with regard to whether and how the scheme is contributing to improve 
livelihoods within the communities. Moreover, although this initiative has received some 
awards such as the Millenium Development Goals Award from UN in 2014 and the 
Calouste Gulbenkian Award in 2016, some studies (see Gebara, 2009 and Lima, 2014) 
point out weaknesses specially concerning social empowerment, cooperative work, local 
participation in decision-making processes and benefit-sharing system’ design.  
 
 
                                                 
146 Mariana Pavan – Personal Communication 
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 6.7.3 Equity 
 Specialists argue that the success of benefit-sharing mechanisms relies first and 
foremost on the observance of equity (Gebara, 2013; Griffiths, 2008; Peskett et al., 
2008), which in practice implies the equal distribution of benefits between all 
stakeholders. Discussions about equity are very controversial since fairness can be a 
very abstract issue, especially at local level, because the problem is somehow to 
conceive the dynamics among individual interests. Nevertheless, it is also too early to 
analyse any REDD+ policy at national or sub-national level to whether equity is being 
achieved in Brazil. But when analysed in a broader scope, the complexity of this topic 
could be emphasised, for example, from the case of Roraima and Mato Grosso.  
 The state of Roraima has low historic deforestation rates (148 km2 in 2014/2015) 
and claims that they should be compensated because they have been keeping the forest 
while Mato Grosso has high historic deforestation rates (1,508 km2 in 2014/2015) 
(PRODES, 2015). However, since 2009 the state of Mato Grosso reduced their 
deforestation rates by 87.23% (from 11.814 km² to 1.508 km²) showing a great 
representativeness in terms of REDD+ results, and consequently, they claim to be 
rewarded since they have curbed deforestation activities. At this point it gets 
complicated, because of the difficulty in deciding who gets the scarce resource first. If 
the government gives the money to the one that did not deforest, the targeted (GHG 
emission reduction) environmental outcome is not achieved, on the other hand, if who 
deforests receives the money, this will be seen as a discouragement to fight against 
deforestation and keep the forests. Apart from that, it should be not forgotten that threats 
that are currently lower in certain areas, due to the growing demand for wood products, 
minerals, and cattle may increase pressures to deforest in the next few decades.  
 Using that logic, REDD+ needs to be comprehensive to avoid leakage from one 
area to another as well as perverse incentives. Furthermore, bringing this discussion to 
the local level, the definition of who the beneficiaries will be is extremely important in the 
context of the 3Es (equity, efficiency and effectiveness). A PES/REDD+ scheme should 
not provide a benefit just because people are suitable in the socio-economic aspect (e.g. 
poor communities). It is necessary a better qualification of those who are going to 
receive these rewards, at the risk of such resources turning only an extra and temporary 
small income for the beneficiaries. Therefore, monitoring systems needs to be very 
clear. This is a point of criticism to a federal PES initiative in Brazil called Bolsa Verde 
Programme that gives financial incentives to communities in conservation areas. 
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However, when this action is analysed deeper in detail, it is observed that such 
programme is more aimed to achieve poverty alleviation rather than to pay for 
environmental services.  
 Equity could also be achieved in several others ways, including additional 
transfers of forest tenure or codification of carbon rights. As an example, in Cameroon 
through a management agreement with the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, a village 
community could be permitted to manage 5,000 ha of a specific forest area in 
accordance with a simple management plan developed for that purpose (Egute and 
Albrecht, 2014; Egute et al., 2015). Products from the community forest belong solely to 
the community permitted by the ministry and it also has the right to benefit from 
ecotourism in the forest (Egute, 2015, personal communication).147 This serves as an 
incentive for local communities to participate in forest management and conservation. 
On the other hand, in Cameroon the law formally recognises only the portion of 
community land that is “used and occupied”, but not the community land managed as 
common property (Gray et al., 2015). From this perspective the tenure security is 
weakened and may leave the communities vulnerable to losing their land and natural 
resources in the future and, it might encourage people to exploit the land inadequately 
maximising short-term benefits (Gray et al., 2015). Nevertheless, according to Sikor et 
al. (2010), the transfer of tenure to forestland and connected resources is the key 
strategy to overcome people’s exclusion from forest management. According to Crippa 
and Gordon (2012), it is often the case that forest-dependent communities in the 
Amazon region still have no legal land title. Thus, in the Amazon, unclear land tenure is 
a major deforestation driver that serves as a disincentive to sustainably managed forests 
(Lele et al., 2000). This topic addressing the Brazilian context will be further discussed in 
item 6.9.2. 
 
 
 6.7.4 Non-carbon benefits 
 This brings into discussion the importance of promoting indirect benefits that 
enforce several REDD+ strategies to concretely address the core causes of drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation, thereby catalysing change that results in GHG 
emissions reduction (Meyer, 2013). Also, it results in permanence and resilience of 
ecosystems and providing benefits such as improvement of livelihoods and biodiversity 
                                                 
147 Dr. Terence Egute – BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg – Personal Communication 
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maintenance. This means, although the primary goal of REDD+ is the reduction of GHG 
emissions (consistent with the goal of the UNFCCC to achieve “stabilisation of GHG 
concentrations”), a pertinent designed REDD+ framework is expected to deliver much 
more than GHG emissions reductions, contributing also to the promotion of multiple 
benefits. Surely, as mentioned these co-benefits or non-carbon benefits (see figure 16) 
must be associated with a robust safeguard regime (Hvalkof, 2013), as well as prioritised 
and identified according to national goals, perspectives and contexts. Such actions 
would also guide funding allocation decisions. For example, should land tenure be 
largely uncontested in a country, investments of time, effort and funds may be lower than 
in a country with highly insecure land tenure in forested areas (Meyer, 2013). Moreover, 
the approaches in which these benefits are incentivised will be the key to scaling up and 
improving the effectiveness of financing for REDD+ initiatives. 
  
 
Figure 16. Potential non-carbon benefits (Source: EDF, 2013)148 
 
 Community-based benefits do not necessarily address individual opportunity 
costs (Gregory, 2011; Lima, 2014). However, for Bekessy and Cooke (2011), (individual) 
                                                 
148 Online available at: http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2013/08/19/clarifying-the-role-of-non-carbon-benefits-
in-redd/  
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opportunity costs are often higher than PES payments, meaning that such schemes are 
barely cost-effective compared with alternative land uses (Lima, 2014). Thus, it seems 
improbable that the participants will get voluntarily involved exclusively for economic 
reasons; therefore, something else must be driving interest and participation of 
beneficiaries. In this sense, offering indirect benefits could be seen as a great 
opportunity to drive engagement of local participants (Lima, 2014). Two different studies 
Cromberg et al. (2014) and Lima (2014) assessed local perceptions regarding REDD+ 
initiatives in the Brazilian Amazon. Their results indicate that participants consider (in 
many situations) communal benefits such as technical assistance, mechanisation, 
investments in infrastructure, better education for their children and better health system 
more important than direct cash payments. An interesting circumstance is pointed out by 
Lima (2014), though. Although her respondents acknowledged they would prefer indirect 
benefits better as the direct payments, at the time of her research they have declared 
they would prefer the cash payment because some of the agreed improvements have 
not been implemented. They would feel safer with the money in their hands. From this 
perspective it should be remembered that trust among stakeholders also influences the 
achievement of equitable outcomes in such schemes (Gregory, 2011). 
 
 
6.8 Forests and Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)  
 Brazil issued its INDC on 28t September 2015 committing to decrease its GHG 
emissions by 37% (1.300 MtCO2eq) in 2025 and by 43% (1.160 MtCO2eq) by 2030 
below 2005 levels. Since Brazil adopted the Paris Agreement on 12 September 2016, 
these targets are then Brazil’s commitments to the new climate agreement. However, 
applying the 37% and 43% reductions announced in Brazil’s Second National 
Communication implies absolute emissions of 1.440 MtCO2eq for 2025 and of 1.300 Mt 
CO2eq for 2030, which do not correspond to the absolute targets announced (IDDRI, 
2015). All policies, measures and actions to implement Brazil’s NDC derive from the 
National Policy on Climate Change, the 2012 Forest Code and the National System of 
Conservation Units Law (Law 9.985/2000) and relevant further regulations as the 
REDD+ mechanism (MMA, 2016c). Nevertheless, Brazil’s NDC presents some 
inconsistencies (especially related to the forest context). For example, in 2012, the last 
year with available data and the year with the lowest rate of deforestation ever 
registered, Brazil’s total GHG emissions were 1.203 MtCO2eq. Hence, Brazil is 
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committing to residual reductions over the next 15 years, proposing only to stabilise 
emissions in the coming years slightly below the level it was in 2012, less than 10% 
(Gebara, 2015a).   
 On the other hand, the NDC provides a very clear description of the precise level 
of emissions targeted and methodologies used (Spencer, 2015). Moreover, Brazil is 
promoting an important shift because Brazil it is the first major developing country that 
has committed to an absolute reduction of GHG emissions from a base year (2005), as 
opposed to reductions-based on projected emissions or per unit of GDP (Romeiro and 
Biderman, 2015). Brazil has been a proponent in the negotiations of so-called 
“concentric differentiation” in which countries would progressively converge towards 
more precise and rigid climate obligations. Although Brazil pledged to enhance 
cooperation initiatives (particularly in forest monitoring) with other developing countries – 
such so called South-South149 knowledge sharing is unique in the NDC – the forest 
sector can highlight how modest targets are (Gebara 2015a; Romeiro and Biderman, 
2015). The NDC indicates that Brazil aims to restore 12 million hectares of forest. This 
target is markedly lower than the target set out in the 2012 Forest Code, which calls for 
the recovery of 21 million hectares of natural vegetation. This means, this target is a 
reduction of 58% of the legislation’s goal for restoring degraded areas (Gebara, 2015b). 
This number of 21 million means that around four million properties have insufficient land 
set aside for areas of permanent protection and legal reserves within their boundaries 
(Edwards, 2016). In this sense, successful implementation of Brazil’s 2012 Forest Code 
will be critical to achieving Brazilian NDC goals.  
 Also, there is a difference between restoration and reforestation and each of 
them should have gained pledges and more specific details about their implementation 
(Gebara, 2015b). This means, establishing commercial tree plantations can be 
considered as “reforestation” within the multiple-use approach. As previously discussed, 
a natural forest could be clear-cut and replaced with a plantation and this action may not 
be considered as being deforestation (DeShazo et al., 2016). For example, in Brazil, the 
Forest Code (the legislation states that properties must have areas of alternative land 
use) legally allows harvesting on private properties of up to 20% of forestlands in the 
Amazon Biome, 65% of forestland in the Cerrado biome within the Legal Amazon, and 
                                                 
149 Brazil is already involved in others South-South cooperation activities as the case of Brazil’s progamme 
More Food International (MFI), an action inspired by Brazil’s More Food Programme which aims to enhance 
the productive capacity of smallholders farmers in African countries, who are claimed to have similarities to 
Brazil’s family farmers (Cabral et al., 2016). 
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80% of forestlands in the other biomes; opening this way the opportunity to replace 
natural forests. Forests plantations also highlight the conflict about leakage and 
permanence, because occasionally those trees will be harvested. However, Galbert et 
al. (2013) proposes a different perspective. They argue that with each harvest a new 
carbon stock is created outside the forest. They mean that carbon continues to be stored 
over time in durable, long-lived wood products such as furniture and construction 
material, creating a reservoir of carbon storage which lasts after the material is removed 
from the forest.  
 Nevertheless, DeShazo et al. (2016) argue that forest plantations deplete the 
resilience of ecosystems. For example, a tree plantation (usually genetically engineered) 
grows more rapidly than the native species, making this “forest” less able to adapt to 
disturbances. As a result, tree plantations are more susceptible to collapse and the 
release of stored carbon (DeShazo et al., 2016). On the other hand, forest plantations 
can also play important roles in enhancing connectivity between areas of native 
ecosystems and in buffering native forest remnants, thereby contributing to conservation 
of biodiversity (Brockerhov et al., 2008) and delivering  important  ecosystem  services 
(Bauhus and Schmerbeck, 2010). Pawson et al. (2013) such other authors as Carnus et 
al. (2006), Parrota et al. (1997) and Paquette et al. (2009) agree that while the 
establishment of forest plantations that replace natural vegetation typically causes 
several losses locally, plantations established on formal agricultural or degraded land 
may provide significant opportunities for conservation.  
 According to Hartmann et al. (2010) for further development of policies and 
institutional frameworks (e.g. REDD+) a more specialised approach to forest 
management should be addressed. Such developments should assess the contribution 
of forest plantations in protecting biodiversity at higher spatial scales, considering 
whether plantations reduce the pressure of logging on natural forests, what kind of land 
use and/or vegetation they replace, what other potential alternative land uses there are 
to be compared with, whether local species had enough time to colonise and adapt to 
the new habitat. For Pawson et al. (2013), the potential of unmanaged natural forests to 
adapt to climate change impacts is considerably limited, while in contrast, the adaptive 
potential of forest plantations is substantially bigger as forest managers can modify 
silvicultural regimes and tree species composition to maintain the productive and thus 
economic capacity of these forests to adapt to, or mitigate, the effects of climate change. 
Therefore, sustainable forest production could not only lead to significant mitigation 
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outcomes, but contribute to adaptation and social and economic effects as well (Galbert 
et al., 2013).  
 In addition, the Brazilian NDC commits to eliminate illegal deforestation by 2030, 
but this target is actually a step back from the country’s previous commitments (made in 
2008) that envisaged reaching zero-illegal deforestation by 2015. This means that for the 
next 15 years the Amazon and especially the other regions of Brazil will most probably 
be still dealing with illegal deforestation problems. Moreover, considering that the NDC 
aims to halt illegal deforestation only in the Amazon biome is absolutely contradictory 
with the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC) goals (of “recovering and 
conserving all biomes”). 
 The discussion about conservation actions aside from Amazon is even more 
complicated. Although in theory all other biomes are also considered priorities for the 
development of REDD+ initiatives in Brazil, most conservation efforts have been directed 
at the rainforest. While Ribeiro (2013) illustrates the disparities between policies for 
Amazon and Cerrado, by citing the creation of the PPCerrado six years after the creation 
of PPCDAm, Souza (2013) mentions the importance of the Atlantic Forest and Caatinga 
biomes for the REDD+ national strategy establishment. Souza (2013) argues that 
actions to promote forest recovery and preservation of the remaining vegetation of the 
Atlantic Forest (since only 7% of the original cover still remains (SBF, 2013)), as well as 
the adoption of sustainable forest management to supply the intense demand for 
firewood in the semi-arid region (since only 6% of the demand comes from sustainable 
activities (SBF, 2013)), confirm the potential (apart from the necessity) that these biomes 
also have to contribute to the Brazilian REDD+ strategy. In addition, Ribeiro (2013) also 
argues that the anti-deforestation targets (40% of reduction of deforestation rates) 
established for the Cerrado should be stricter given that it has already lost almost 50% of 
its original cover. As a result, deforestation mainly due to agricultural expansion has 
increased in the Cerrado biome, even as it has slowed significantly in Amazonian lands. 
Spera et al. (2016) found out that between 2003 and 2013, farmland grew from 1.3 
million hectares to 2.5 million hectares (75% at the expense of native vegetation) in this 
region. A valuable attempt to hinder this situation would be to extend the soya 
moratorium to the Cerrado areas, for example. 
 The Brazilian NDC also pledges to compensate for “legal suppression of 
vegetation”. Firstly, this also seems to be related only to Amazon, and it remains unclear 
to what extent this can be interpreted as net-zero emissions from deforestation. Outside 
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the Amazonian context, the dilemma becomes even more complicated since the Forest 
Code already allows a great portion of legal deforestation in a rural property (as 
previously showed only 20% must be protected). In addition, it cannot be perceived a 
political will to change patterns where this kind of deforestation is authorised by 
environmental licensing agencies. However, achieving net-zero emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation is crucial to arrive at an economy-wide emissions 
level consistent with the NDC (IDDRI, 2015). It should be noted that the zero net 
deforestation is only possible with large stocks of native forest recovery, which implies 
high costs that do not ensure that all carbon (previously existent) will be reabsorbed 
(Moutinho et al., 2014). Forests in recovery will be increasingly vulnerable to several 
factors such as fire, grass invasion, savanisation and climatic conditions (see 
respectively, Soares-Filho et al., 2012; Brando et al., 2011; Oyama and Noble, 2003; 
Malhi et al., 2008), meaning that even under human intervention the recovery of the 
biomass is not 100% complete (Moutinho et al., 2014). Under these conditions, to 
compensate for the net loss of forests, it would need to recover an area far greater than 
the one previously occupied by the original forests (Balch et al. 2010). 
 Although according to Salvini et al. (2014), most direct interventions (e.g. 
sustainable forest management (SFM) or agroforestry) in REDD+ frameworks will 
precisely affect more forest degradation, rather than deforestation, Berenguer et al. 
(2014) pointed out that currently tropical forest conservation policies does focus 
predominantly on reducing carbon emissions from deforestation, not taking into account 
those emissions from forest degradation. Nevertheless, designing interventions to 
address forest degradation is also important because even if forest degradation has a 
relatively low carbon impact per unit area, it can have large cumulative effects over vast 
areas and hence cause large GHG emissions (Salvini et al., 2014). This can also be 
observed in the case of Brazil. There is no mention neither in the final version of the 
ENREDD+ nor the NDC how Brazil will account for emissions from forest degradation. 
Furthermore, the Paris Agreement follows the Decision 15/CP19 which only reaffirms, 
recognises and encourages the importance of addressing drivers of deforestation and 
forest degradation, but it does not establish a formal guideline for it. 
 This study from Berenguer et al. (2014) shows that disturbances from logging 
and understory ﬁres can lead to severely impoverished and degraded forests that store 
substantially less carbon (on average, 40% less aboveground carbon than undisturbed 
forests and were structurally similar to secondary forests). They also compare estimates 
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of depleted carbon stocks in disturbed forests with Brazilian government assessments of 
the total forest area annually disturbed in the Amazon, indicating that these emissions 
could represent up to 40% of the carbon loss from deforestation in the region (Berenguer 
et al., 2014). They conclude the study affirming that mechanisms as REDD+ which aims 
to ensure the long-term permanence of forest carbon stocks will remain limited in their 
success unless they effectively avoid degradation as well as deforestation (Berenguer et 
al., 2014). 
 
 In order to discuss how Brazil could use REDD+ to enhance domestic forest 
governance involving the concept of sustainable landscape approach, the following 
sections will address the question of what areas of domestic policy should be followed to 
prioritise REDD+ in Brazil. 
 
 
6.9 Improving domestic forest governance through REDD+ in Brazil 
 As previously discussed resolute national-level focus is critical to REDD+, 
implying also a solid domestic governance framework, which should seek for 
opportunities for complementary rather than competing strategic policy developments. 
This would result in more openness for more cross-cutting approaches across 
disciplines, sectors and government spheres, rather than policy issues being dealt with 
on an individual basis which, when developed in isolation, may reduce the impact or 
undermine the impact of other policy domains. At this part of the dissertation, the 
research considers the domestic governance framework necessary to achieve 
sustainable forest landscape under REDD+ scenario, identifying areas of policy, 
measures and instruments that need consideration in this context, in order to enhance 
better governance practices through REDD+. Here, four main topics will be focused: 
anti-corruption measures, land tenure, spatial planning and finance structure. 
 
 
 6.9.1 Anti-corruption measures 
 When challenges to the effectiveness of REDD+ are attributed to problems of 
“governance”, corruption and lack of policing usually are treated as core obstacles to 
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REDD+’s implementation. Corruption150 undermines democracy breeding poverty and 
public mistrust of impartial justice and the government and, as a result, reduces 
economic growth (Winbourne, 2002). What makes the environmental sector distinctive 
from any other area is that corruption is provoked by large amounts of formal and 
informal revenues that can be gained from environmental products (e.g. minerals, 
timber, etc). For those countries that are well-supplied in environmental resources and 
whose economies are mainly based on them (e.g. Brazil), resource distribution, 
extraction and management become fertile grounds for a culture with widespread 
corruption, as exemplified by Renner (2002).  
 Corruption is difficult to measure, often relying on annual perception- or expert-
based assessments (for example the reports from Transparency International) of 
national levels of corruption (Sundström, 2016). However, it has been pointed out that 
the use of such indicators may be dubious in the academic literature on natural 
resources since both the status of various environmental resources and corruption levels 
vary within regions and across different sectors of a country (Barrett et al. 2006; 
Sundström, 2016). Corruption is also an important enabler of deforestation (see table 
10) in developing countries (Bofin et al., 2011). For example, Mendes and Porto Jr. 
(2012) have developed an index model to measure corruption over 538 municipalities 
from the Legal Amazon in Brazil. By performing a non-parametric analysis they have 
constructed a municipal corruption index based on objective data, which means, not 
perceptions-based figures.  
 They first found out, statistically significant effects of the economic growth rate on 
the level of deforestation (based on satellite imagery for the year 2004). However, the 
corruption seemed to have no significant impact. On the other hand, given the first 
results, they divided the information and analysed just the data from 25 municipalities 
from the states Pará and Mato Grosso (the two states with the most severe deforestation 
levels). They found out then that a part of the variance between municipalities within 
these two states is significantly attributed to rates of municipal corruption, which means, 
that in the second approach, corruption was statistically significant. A report from FAO 
from 2001 also identified forest corruption as a sub-category of a wider set of illegal 
                                                 
150 The conventional definition of corruption characterises it as the “abuse of public office for personal 
benefit”, however, there is no single definition of the term. Corruption can include giving or accepting bribes 
or inappropriate gifts, double dealing, under-the-table transactions, manipulating elections, diverting funds, 
laundering money and defrauding investors. Corruption can be illegal, but also can involve legal conduct in 
many countries (see Kaufmann and Vicente, 2005). 
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forest activities, highlighting its detrimental financial, environmental and social costs 
(FAO, 2001). 
 
Table 10 Links between corruption and deforestation 
Stage in 
Process 
Corrupt Activity Possible Impact on Deforestation 
Planning  Interest groups bribe 
public officials to skew 
design and 
implementation of land 
use plans 
  Large-scale farmers 
bribe politicians in 
exchange for agricultural 
subsidies 
  Corruption limits private 
investment in agricultural 
land  
 
 Contributes to deforestation 
by undermining land use 
allocation process and 
enforcement of land use 
plans  
 Contributes to deforestation 
by reducing agricultural 
productivity (farmers 
deliberately use land 
inefficiently to attract 
subsidies)  
 Protects forests by limiting 
investments in extension of 
agricultural land 
Harvesting  Loggers bribe forestry 
officials to harvest without 
legal permits, or to speed 
up the issuance of such 
permits  
 Logging operators bribe 
local officials to obtain 
logging permits not 
recognised by the forestry 
regulatory framework for 
forestry  
 Logging concessionaires 
pay bribes so that over-
harvesting is not 
monitored  
 Contributes to deforestation 
by foregoing legal system for 
allocating harvesting rights 
 Contributes to deforestation 
by facilitating forms of 
harvesting not allowed within 
the legal system 
 Contributes to deforestation 
by foregoing the established 
system for monitoring logging 
activity 
Transporting  Loggers bribe public 
officials to allow transport 
of illegally logged timber  
 Contributes to deforestation 
through facilitation of exit-
routes for illegally harvested 
timber  
Source: Adapated from Bofin et al., 2011; Taconni et al., 2009 and Brown, 2010 
 
 Within the forest sector context (see table 11), corruption undermines the 
framing, implementation and subsequent monitoring of policies aimed at conserving 
standing forests (Angelsen, 2009) and, illicit acts are often associated with interactions 
between public and private actors (Bulte et al., 2007), where financial incentives or 
status-related benefits are offered (or sought) to deviate from an established framework 
of rules and regulations (Williams, 2011). Although illegal logging and acts of forest 
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corruption are not synonymous, it is widely recognised that they can be linked (Bofin et 
al., 2011). Some researches have, therefore, investigated the relationship between 
corruption and illegal logging (see Lawson, 2010 and Palmer, 2001; for example).  
 In a context of forest management, the term “illegality” 151  is a complicated 
concept, because legal actions in the forestry sector are not always justifiable – certain 
logging concessions may be questionable for a range of reasons – and some illegal acts 
may in fact be rather acceptable, for subsistence reasons for example (Sundström, 
2016). The FAO publishes recent data on changes in global forest cover within the 
Global Forest Resources Assessment in five-year intervals (Sundström, 2016). 
However, these reports do not include established measures of illegal actions. The 
extent of illegal activities in the forestry sector is notoriously difficult to estimate in order 
to determine the precise amount of deforestation (and, by extension, carbon emissions) 
that should be attributed to corrupt activity (Tacconi et al., 2009). In spite of the fact that 
the fight against corruption alone will not solve the problem of deforestation in Brazil, as 
previously discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, corruption can be considered 
a pervasive socio-economic problem in Brazil, reaching almost the entire public sector in 
the country. Therefore, to reach the goal of zero illegal deforestation and make REDD+ 
workable (enforcing governance), the authorities in Brazil have to put massive effort in 
adopting anti-corruption measures and, ultimately ceasing the systemic corrupt practices 
culture in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
151 Within this context, illegality can mean failing to conform to national laws and standards regulating forest 
resource allocation, forest management and extraction, processing, transport and trade. 
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Table 11 Examples of corruption risks and corrupt practices focusing on REDD+ scope152 
Governance 
Level 
Corruption Risk 
National  Agricultural or timber conglomerates bribe national politicians to 
undermine establishment of national REDD+ mechanism  
 REDD+ project developers bribe national politicians or senior officials 
to promote fraudulent REDD+ schemes   
 Public officials or politicians bribe technical staff to skew national 
baseline data   
 Politicians and senior officials extract rents from REDD+ revenues 
  Officials responsible for reconciling REDD+ projects with national 
accounting take bribes from project developers to double-count 
projects 
 Agricultural or timber conglomerates bribe national officials responsible 
for forest protection to ignore violations of conservation laws  
 Forest zoning is not done in a way that reflects best environmental, 
public and economic interests to allow logging in a new area 
 Insufficient tax is collected and entered into the system due to lower 
levels of timber extraction that are reported to reduce tax bill 
Sub-
national 
 Agricultural or timber conglomerates bribe sub-national politicians and 
public officials to opt out of REDD+ implementation, or weaken REDD+ 
policies, in their areas    
 Agricultural or timber conglomerates bribe sub-national officials 
responsible for forest protection to ignore violations of conservation 
laws 
Local  REDD+ project host bribes official monitors either to overstate avoided 
emissions or understate problems of permanence/additionality of the 
project 
 REDD+ project host intentionally increases emissions in lead-up to 
implementation in order to benefit from higher credits    
 Local administrators extract rents from environmental service schemes 
aimed at benefiting local communities 
Source: Adapated from Bofin et al., 2011; Taconni et al., 2009 and Brown, 2010 
  
 Furthermore, in the context of REDD+, there is a well-known dilemma. Usually, 
countries with the highest rates of deforestation are those with the weakest indicators of 
good governance, where corruption continues to be a pivotal factor in the political 
economy (Bofin et al. 2011; Williams et al., 2015). Therefore, there is significant 
evidence that corrupt activities undermine the effectiveness of state agencies in 
regulating the forest sector, and that this can occur from the uppermost levels of 
government down to the local level (see for example, Ascher, 1999; Burgess et al., 
2011). Moreover, from the recent literature on REDD+, there are three main areas where 
REDD+ is thought to intersect with corruption risks (Williams et al., 2015):  
                                                 
152  These possible risks outlined are based on considerable analysis and knowledge of past forest 
governance initiatives, and examples of corruption linked to the forest sector. 
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 If there is sufficient finance for REDD+ activities, it will enhance the value of 
forest land thereby strengthening existing incentives for political and business 
elites to secure undue access to forest resources; 
 Since REDD+ is intended to result in performance-based payments, several 
types of data need to be gathered to determine payment levels. In the new and 
complex field of measuring forest carbon (an intangible commodity) opportunities 
to manipulate this data in order to increase REDD+ payments could present 
themselves;  
 REDD+ payments are meant to be shared among stakeholders that play a role in 
forest carbon conservation (the government, private sector, land owners, 
indigenous communities and community based organisations, etc). Corruption 
could be used to capture REDD+ revenues, thereby skewing the intended 
sharing of financial benefits from REDD+ actions.  
 
 Since REDD+ activities are relatively recent, given the cumulative knowledge 
available related to previous forest governance reforms, the intention is that the REDD+ 
framework should contribute to an overall improvement in forest governance, including a 
potential reduction in forest-linked corruption (Williams et al., 2015). However, whether 
these potential corruption risks will be mitigated will depend on the appropriate policy 
responses. For the REDD+ architecture to be successful in the near future, it is relevant 
that efforts establish structures and a culture that supports transparency, accountability 
and integrity. In this regard, some authors have attempted to explicate national 
measures that could support in mitigating REDD+ corruption risks (table 12). 
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Table 12 Possible national anti-corruption measures for REDD+ 
Type of Measure Possible Measures 
Measures to improve regulatory and 
institutional framework 
 Land use planning process 
 Allocation process for logging 
concessions 
 Statutory oversight institutions 
 Framework for broad stakeholder 
participation  
 Clarification of ownership or profit 
rights from forest uses 
Measures to improve accountability and 
transparency   
 Land use planning 
 Creation of REDD+ baseline data 
 Development of REDD framework 
(regulations plus institutions) 
 Regulatory framework for forests 
 Allocation process for logging 
concessions 
 MRV system for non-carbon benefits 
(including field-based monitoring) 
 Demand-side accountability 
institutions 
 Statutory oversight institutions 
 Data on donor support to REDD+ 
projects and programmes 
 Data on private sector involvement in 
REDD+ initiatives 
Measures to improve law enforcement  Capacity building to state prosecutors 
 Formal anti-corruption institutions, 
judges and court officials 
Measures to reduce rents from 
deforestation 
 Reform of national forestry taxation 
system 
 Addressing rents from land uses that 
replace native forests  
Source: Adapated from Bofin et al., 2011; Taconni et al., 2009 and Brown, 2010 
 
 The rationale underpinning such suggestions reveal little about specific national 
circumstances. This means, how political, social and economic contexts will respond to 
the incentives that REDD+ involves is as yet unknown (Williams et al., 2015). Moreover, 
corruption is an adaptable phenomenon capable of altering in response to new policy 
environments, incentives and menaces (Williams et al., 2015). Therefore, the options 
above outlined represent a modest attempt to orientate about the frequent challenges 
and opportunities for REDD+ (applying also for the Brazilian context) in relation to anti-
corruption scope. Moreover, since there is no evidence for the adoption of anti-
corruption measures in the final version of the ENREDD+, the present discussion and 
information are also very useful for Brazil. In this sense, the Transparency International 
has launched in 2012 a structured and practical guideline (context-dependent) 
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explaining how to conduct an assessment of corruption risks for national REDD+ 
development processes, in five steps: i) establishing a risk assessment’s purpose, scope 
and approach; ii) identifying and prioritising existing and potential corruption risks; iii) 
analysing these risks to identify common actors and root causes of corruption, iv) 
identifying existing instruments intended to address corruption risks, assessing current 
application and effectiveness, and pinpointing gaps; and, v) developing an integrity 
strategy, which prioritises what actions should be focused on for advocacy, mitigation 
and monitoring risks, and generating support for further actions (Transparency 
International, 2012).  
 Ultimately, to exemplify the situation of the Brazilian scenario, the Greenpeace 
Brazil has investigated and launched a series of reports suggesting that timber in the 
Amazon region is transformed from illegal logging to legal paper through prevalent 
corruption in government authorities. The timber industry in the Brazilian Amazon is a 
key driver of forest degradation and deforestation. Due to inadequate governance, 
logging opens up intact native forest areas to colonisation, damages the region’s rich 
ecosystems and contributes to GHG emissions (Greenpeace, 2013). In 2013, a 
Greenpeace report, named “The Amazon’s Silent Crisis”, revealed how loggers in the 
Brazilian Amazon were exploiting weaknesses in the country’s regulatory system to 
launder illegally logged timber for the international market. Subsequently in 2014, a 
follow-up report was launched and named “The Amazon’s Silent Crisis: Night Terrors”, 
which identified a number of public forests in the state of Pará that it suspected of 
fraudulently obtaining official documentation for the purpose of laundering illegally 
logged timber. One company called Agropecuária Santa Efigênia Ltda, had declared 
implausibly high levels of valuable Ipê (Handroanthus spp.) timber in the logged forested 
areas. Just like mahogany, Ipê are highly prized, sought-after timber trees, and loggers 
are willing to go deep into intact pristine forest in search of them (Greenpeace, 2013). 
Nevertheless, even after the report, timber continued to be traded with Santa Efigênia’s 
documentation for a further couple of months.  
 Finally, in 2015 authorities in Pará state suspended the company from trading. 
They also fined it for submitting false information to the chain-of-custody system. 
However, by the time Santa Efigênia was suspended over 43,000 m3 of timber had 
already been traded using its documentation (including nearly 12,000 m3 of Ipê timber, 
potentially worth at least US$7 million if processed and exported). This shows that 
authorities – inside and outside Brazil – are failing to efficiently prevent illegal logging 
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among tropical countries even though there are actions to address illegal logging and 
the trade in associated timber products as the FLEGT153 initiative. On the other hand, 
until currently, the Brazilian government has avoided joining the FLEGT, supposedly 
because of concerns about “non-tariff barriers” on its export products, especially those 
from the Amazon region (May et al., 2016). Nevertheless, in disregard of their due 
diligence obligations, several importers in the EU and elsewhere (e.g. USA, Japan, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, France, etc), whose links with Santa Efigênia’s supply chain 
were also exposed by the second report in 2014, continued to buy and market potentially 
illegal timber from the state of Pará sawmills linked to the suspended company 
(Greenpeace, 2015). The figure 17 shows Brazil’s biggest wood export markets in 2014 
(for wood, articles of wood and charcoal): 
 
                                                 
153 FLEGT (European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan or EU FLEGT 
Action Plan) is a European Union initiative to address illegal logging and the trade in associated timber 
products. In 2003, the Commission issued a proposal for an EU Action Plan to prevent the import of illegal 
timber into the EU, improve the supply of legal timber and increase the demand for timber from responsibly 
managed forests. The EU FLEGT Action Plan sets out a programme of actions with a focus on Voluntary 
Partnership Agreements (VPAs). VPAs are bilateral trade agreements between timber-producing countries 
and the EU. The purpose of a VPA is to support countries in producing legally verified timber besides to 
support improved governance in the forest sector of producer countries. Once the licensing system of the 
VPA is functional, timber products from this country can be sold on the EU market but only if it carries a 
FLEGT licence. Another important part of the action plan is the EU Timber Regulation, which bans illegal 
timber from the EU market and requires operators to exercise due diligence and take risk mitigating 
measures when they place timber on the EU market. This means, it requires EU member states to have 
legislation, procedures and penalties in place to enforce the regulation. By July 2015, 24 of the 28 EU 
member states had implemented the EU Timber Regulation. Opinions and facts are divided concerning the 
effectiveness of this initiative. For example, while an independent evaluation of the implementation of the EU 
FLEGT Action published in 2016 (Evaluation of the EU FLEGT Action Plan 2004-2014) confirmed that the 
EU FLEGT Action Plan is “a relevant and innovative response to the challenge of illegal logging and that the 
Action Plan had improved forest governance in all target countries”, in 2015 the European Court of Auditors 
issued a report that was very critical of the FLEGT. Moreover, the Greenpeace investigation above 
discussed demonstrates that EU Timber Regulation will be ineffective if fraudulent paperwork is accepted. A 
major criticism is related to the fact that it has been passed several years since the action plan was 
presented and no FLEGT licensing system is yet in operation and successive target dates for their 
introduction have been missed. Nevertheless, the prevailing international forest initiatives at the moment are 
FLEGT and REDD+. These initiatives offer innovative approaches to longstanding challenges in the land-
use sector in developing countries. Although FLEGT and REDD+ use different approaches, methods and 
concepts, they both aim to address the drivers of forest loss in tropical countries. It is then expected that 
increased cooperation between these initiatives could advance forest governance reforms, strengthen 
stakeholder engagement and balance competing interests, such as using forests for local development, 
generating revenue and income, biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration (Broekhoven and Wit, 
2014). 
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Figure 17. The Top-10 wood exports markets of Brazil in 2014 (Source: ITC, 2015)154 
 
 Within this context, it can be observed that the combination of weak law 
enforcement and inadequacy in the electronic systems established to control Brazil’s 
timber industry has promoted a culture of illicit actions that strongly affect the entire 
sector, pervading through the global market. Therefore, timber companies (also in the 
international market) that are unwilling to face the challenge of carrying out adequate 
diligence and to verify legality independently must stop buying timber originated from this 
region altogether. Also, competent authorities must finally begin to take firm enforcement 
action against companies that fail to comply with the legislation on imports/exports of 
timber and timber products (Greenpeace, 2015).  
 
 
 6.9.2 Clear tenure rights 
 
                                                 
154 Online available at: http://www.timbertradeportal.com/countries/brazil/  
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 6.9.2.1 Statutory Law versus. Customary Law 
 There is increasing recognition that secure access to land – considering that 
what constitutes secure access is relative and the attributes of security will change from 
context to context – is needed for rural households to make use of sustainable livelihood 
development (FAO, 2002).155 In this sense, Mueller (2016) states that property rights are 
often seen as a one-dimensional concept that can be either “secure” or “insecure”, 
although when it comes to understanding how individuals’ and groups’ land use choices 
and behaviors are affected, a more rigorous understanding of property rights would be 
needed. Usually, land tenure is characterised by the relationship, whether legally 
(statutory law) or even customarily secured, among people, as individuals or groups, 
with respect to land, including other natural resources such as water and forests (FAO, 
2002). Statutory tenure systems include state or private ownership where private can 
mean individual or a group of individuals acting as a collective, a communal or common 
property arrangement or an indigenous group (Naughton-Treves and Day, 2012). In 
many tropical countries, national regulation is poorly implemented and executed and 
forestlands are often used on the basis of informal customary system (Cotula and 
Mayers, 2009). Although customary laws give the people the right to use the forests, 
overlapping statutory and customary laws predominantly prioritise the rights of the 
government to manage and profit from forest resources and REDD+ activities (especially 
related to carbon rights). Land tenure is the bundles of rights,156 rules, and institutions 
that define individual or community access to land (in other words, rules invented by 
societies to regulate behaviour related to the use of land). They define how access is 
granted to rights to use, control, and transfer land, as well as associated responsibilities 
and restraints. In simple terms, land tenure systems determine who can use what 
resources for how long, and under what conditions (Bruce et al., 2010). Critical rights 
(table 13) include (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996):  
 Rights of access: rights to enter an area;  
 Rights of withdrawal of resources: rights to extract resources, such as through 
collection of non-timber forest products, timber harvesting, harvesting of 
agricultural products, etc; 
                                                 
155 See FAO Land Tenure Studies n.03. Online available at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y4307E/Y4307E00.HTM (Accessed on 23, March, 2017).  
156 The bundle of rights is commonly taught in order to explain how a property can simultaneously be 
"owned" by multiple parties. The term came into use during the late 19th century and continued to gain 
ground thereafter. 
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 Rights of management: rights to make decisions about access and use, and to 
undertake management activities;  
 Rights of exclusion: rights to determine who can – and cannot – access, harvest 
or manage lands and resources; 
 Rights of alienation: rights to sell and/or lease management or exclusion rights. 
 The rights of management, exclusion and alienation are of great significance for 
tenure reforms, considering their decision-making attributes (Westholm et al., 2011).  
 
Table 13 Relation between “Bundle of Rights” and “Holders of Rights” in the tenure 
context 
Holders of 
Rights 
Bundle of Rights 
Access Use rights/ 
Withdraw 
Management Exclusion Alienation 
State 
(Public Property) 
X X X X X 
Collective 
(Common 
Property) 
X 
 
X X X  
Individual 
(Private 
Property) 
X X X X X 
Source: Adapted from Westholm et al., 2011 
  
  Rules of tenure define how property rights to land are to be allocated within 
societies. Rules are the essential condition to the implementation of both public policy 
and market instruments. No protective measure, contract, transaction or investment can 
be safely and effectively performed in a context of prevalent illegality (Fosci, 2014). The 
lack of secure tenure for local livelihoods is recognised as a main force of deforestation 
actions in many tropical countries (Angelsen, 2008). Therefore, secure tenure is also a 
critical condition for equitable and effective REDD+ frameworks (Cotula and Mayers, 
2009). However, it is not assured that secure tenure per se implies equally distributed 
tenure (Westholm et al., 2011). According to Fosci (2014), secure tenure consists in an 
essential piece of the foundation for the establishment of a rational regime of forest 
governance because it defines the rights and responsibilities of actors in a context often 
dominated by corruption, crime and conflict. On the other hand, during the analysis of 
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common pool resources around the globe, Ostrom (1990) concludes that informal 
institutions with certain characteristics (e.g. collective-choice arrangements allowing for 
the participation in the decision-making process) can successfully manage common pool 
resources even in the absence of a formal system of private property rights. This means, 
forcing new and external rules over an established common resource governance 
system might injure an already well settled local governance regime. Therefore such 
variables must be respected within the REDD+ framework but, nevertheless, the respect 
and recognition of customary rights to lands, territories and natural resources supports 
more effective stewardship of forest landscapes and safeguards against potential 
displacement risk. Moreover, effective enforcement of rights of exclusion also motivates 
responsibility and accountability besides thwarting a resource rush (Sunderlin et al., 
2013). However, in many countries these local systems are not recognised at law yet, 
and the relationship between customary and state tenure is a major challenge in many 
rainforest nations (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). 
 
 
 6.9.2.2 Land tenure in the context of governance 
 Much of the existing literature that addresses the influence of institutional 
arrangements on forest management identifies that secure tenure relies on, and is 
conditioned by, governance. Rights without effective sanctions against their violation are 
insufficient, while institutional effort in support of sustainable forest management in the 
absence of clear forest use rights is likely to be undermined (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). 
Therefore, effective tenure is unexpected to be achieved without supportive policy and 
institutional systems. In countries where tenure security over forest is weakened, 
REDD+ can pose a risk for forest-dependent communities, who could be dispossessed, 
excluded and marginalised (Barbier and Tesfaw, 2012). From this perception, the 
indigenous community has expressed concern about possible negative impacts that 
could emerge from the implementation of REDD+. For instance, many fear that where 
land tenure rights are uncertain and decision-making remains top-down, new conflicts 
could arise among indigenous and local communities and between them and the State.  
 While insecure tenure makes local people vulnerable to dispossession as land 
values increase (might leading to “land grabbing”157), secure resource tenure gives them 
                                                 
157 The illegal grabbing of public lands refers to the practice of creating false documents in order to take 
possession of land illegally. 
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more influence in negotiations with government and the private sector. Insecure or 
contested resource rights may also increase risk for investors – reputational risk, for 
example, in relation to possible conflicts with local communities (Cotula and Mayers, 
2009). Such uncertainties could adversely impact long-term investments in REDD+ 
frameworks, endanger the permanence of forest carbon sequestration, and exacerbate 
poverty and social inequality. In this sense, the devolution (the transfer of administration 
and control of tenure rights) of forest rights to local communities has been proposed as 
an approach to promote participation of indigenous and forest-dependent communities in 
REDD+ actions (see example Box 1). However, at the global level, the management 
rights of publicly owned forests are still dominated by public administration, which could 
trigger a wave of tenure re-centralisation in the context of REDD+ payments (Phelps et 
al., 2010). 
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Box 1.  Community Controlled Forests. Adapted from FAO (2016) 
 Over the past 40 years considerable attention has been paid to Community Forestry 
(CF) and related forest tenure transformations, with the aim of involving communities and 
smallholders in forest management and governance. As also applied to the Amazon 
region, community-based forestry has been seen as one of the most promising options to 
achieve results of combining forest conservation with rural development. For example, 
Brazil’s Alto Juruá Extractive Reserve maintains 99% forest cover after a decade (Ruiz-
Pérez et al. 2005). Community-based forestry has no longer been limited to a few pilot 
projects applied in remote places, but it has found recognition in mainstream 
development as it is estimated that, to date, almost one-third of the world’s forest area is 
under some form of CF management. Failure of top-down approaches, an increasing 
number of stakeholders coming to fore, national legislation and international obligations, 
as well as reductions in availability of financial resources assigned to forestry investments 
of the public sectors, are the drivers propelling the emergence of CF worldwide. Far-
reaching de-centralisation policies that have been applied in many parts of the globe 
have also made CF highly relevant, shifting the forestry focus from national to regional 
and communal levels.  
 The last time that FAO comprehensively documented the impact of Community 
Forestry was in 2001. During this time, while studies on forest tenure indicate a notably 
trend towards increased forest areas under community-controlled forest management, 
reports about the effectiveness of the management have been mixed. Conversely, 
though, CF practices can also been seen – rather than as genuine devolution of forest 
management to local forest users – an extension of state hegemony. This means that 
most countries that have adopted collaborative forms of community-based forestry have 
policies in place to decentralise and devolve rights and responsibilities. However, in 
practice, decentralisation and devolution have been only partially realised and several 
governments retain significant authority over forest management. By creating or giving 
space in a new policy arena, states are making trade-offs with local communities to 
restore and conserve forests lands without providing even nominal incentives to them. 
Moreover, not only local people and government administration, but very often also a 
large number of NGOs – as well as bilateral donor agencies – are actors claiming a stake 
in community-based forestry. At present, several agencies, as well as national and 
international organisations are promoting CF through programmes, projects, legal and 
institutional reforms. Concomitantly, other actors point at several difficulties and call for 
the necessity to make changes to the way CF interventions are executed, meaning that 
the community forestry faces major restrictions.  
 For instance, CF is often applied only in highly degraded forests (those with least 
value to communities); communities rarely have access to valuable resources from 
community forests (commercially valuable timber, for example); emphasis is often on 
community responsibility for protection rather than on authority to manage. Without real 
devolution of power, the objectives of community forestry will be difficult to achieve 
because they are premised on this transfer. While collaborative forms of CF have 
sometimes contributed significantly to improving rural livelihoods and livelihood security, 
they have not always done this in a way that targets the poorest members of 
communities, or in other words, benefits have often been captured by local elites. 
Findings regarding the strong influence that external frameworks of state and civil society 
exert on social choices, make clear that the internal factors of community forestry are 
probably not key. Yet, despite its recent popularity hype, the concept of CF rarely 
receives the attention or analysis it requires from those concerned with forest 
management. Thus, it can be generalised that largely because of internal and external 
constraints, collaborative forms of CF are performing below expectations and are still 
fragile. 
  
 
 212
 Furthermore, unclear or insecure tenure may in itself promote deforestation 
activities. Natural resource users may not feel compromised in protecting the resource if 
they feel they are not involved in reached resolutions. Deforestation may be a way of 
showing occupation where land claims are contested (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). 
Additionally, tenure disputes may influence the distribution of risks, costs and benefits of 
financial transfers linked to forest conservation (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). To reduce 
such uncertainties, REDD+ architecture should therefore draw on the lessons learned 
from successful forest common management, including how customary tenure and 
governance rules reduce internal conflicts within communities and encourage 
sustainable use of natural resources (Barbier and Tesfaw, 2012).  
 On the other hand, tenure is only a piece of this scenario. Even with a secure 
tenure system, governments or users face pressures, or respond to incentives, to 
degrade and clear forests, including for instance, pressures to reduce poverty (e.g. 
through agricultural colonisation of forest areas, as in Brazil), or to address public 
revenue, national debt or balance of payment issues (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). It also 
includes opportunities for corruption and the flouting of weakly enforced law in relation to 
land use measures. To create effective incentives for protecting forests, action to 
strengthen resource tenure must be combined with policy interventions to address these 
forces. In this sense, REDD+ frameworks should also seek to improve the likelihood of 
success by making forest conservation more profitable, which could be achieved 
according to several specialists through sustainable management. Understanding tenure 
requires, therefore, an understanding of the extent to which national legislation is 
actually applied on the ground.  
  
 
 6.9.2.3 REDD+ as catalyst of land tenure reform 
 Improving forest governance in tropical countries is an arduous task requiring 
widespread reforms of the judiciary, law enforcement and (to some extent) also local 
culture and behaviour (Fosci, 2014). Although significant tenure reforms have taken 
place worldwide during the last decades, the lack of balance in ownership continues to 
be remarkable (Westholm et al., 2011). It is also recognised that tenure reforms are 
frequently a long-term process. Changes in land ownership usually follow large-scale 
political change, for example, over the past decades, shifts of decentralisation of 
government responsibilities of forest control to a more local level have happened in 
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various tropical countries (Phelps et al., 2010). Indeed, forest tenure reforms158 have 
been largely driven by international trends such as biodiversity conservation, recognition 
of indigenous rights and decentralisation (Barry et al., 2010). Nevertheless, rarely these 
countries lay the foundations to reach efficiency and equity benefits implied in such 
decentralisation, even though initiatives have been launched in the majority of forest 
countries (Ribot et al., 2006). On the other hand, several multi- and bi-lateral institutions 
advocate with the belief that strengthening local property rights and promoting land 
tenure reform can contribute to promoting social and economic development, 
encouraging local investment in land and resources, enabling access to credit through 
use of titles as collateral, improving land markets, establishing a legal basis for excluding 
competitors and as result reducing resource conflict and encouraging sustainable 
resource use (Sunderlin et al., 2008). Moreover, without clear tenure rights is difficult to 
identify the responsible ones for deforestation, making it also challenging for landholders 
to enter into long-term agreements to commit themselves to reduce deforestation and 
access potential REDD+ benefits.  
 This means that land tenure and property rights are strongly tied to carbon 
ownership and consequently to distribution of benefits in the REDD+ scope. Thus, land 
tenure reform should be prioritised in REDD+ frameworks. However, recent studies such 
as the new research from the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) show that REDD+ 
has not been a catalyst of tenure reforms across REDD+ countries, even though most 
countries with a REDD+ framework have identified the clarification of tenure as a key 
component of their strategy (RRI, 2014). Brazil can be included in this scenario. 
Sunderlin et al. (2013) also suggest that in some REDD+ countries tenure challenges 
are being addressed on a “second-best” basis but nevertheless, national tenure reform 
are well short to be adopted. Nevertheless, extending forest tenure reforms does not 
guarantee maximising in the case of REDD+, legitimacy, effectiveness and equity 
particularly because such approach has been criticised for being top-down through 
which governments formalise tenure rights through communal demarcation and granting 
individual property rights only (Corbera et al., 2010). This also confirms how relevant 
participatory processes are and therefore, such aspects must also be considered in 
designing REDD+ frameworks. 
                                                 
158 Although forest tenure reforms also respond to livelihood demands as the agrarian reforms, it differs for 
the aim of forest conservation. 
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 The background of land tenure and agrarian reform in Brazil is here presented for 
a better understanding of the Brazilian scenario (adapted from Guedes and Reydon 
(2012) and Rezende and Guedes (2008)): 
 
 Brazil's history is marked since the beginning by land concentration. In the 
colonial time, the Portuguese Crown has given land grants in order to stimulate the 
sugarcane production (due to favourable climate and soil fertility conditions). However, 
conditionality in turn, stated that the land granted stay conditional on its occupation and 
productive use, otherwise, the Crown would cancel the concession. It can be observed, 
nevertheless, that the form of property was not full ownership (typical capitalism feature), 
since the principle of conditionality limited the fully free use of property rights of the land. 
The Crown recommended the distribution of land according to the appropriate size for its 
full usage, which in practice was not followed. That's mainly on account of two major 
problems: i) the inaccuracy of land demarcation techniques and ii) due to the imperative 
of generating economic surplus to the Crown, territorial ownership has been fairly liberal, 
since the Crown omitted itself in relation to non-compliance of conditionality by grantees. 
The result was the consolidation of a model of large-scale agriculture of monocultures 
(high yield products in foreign markets, such as sugar) and slavery (workforce which 
guaranteed land ownership by land grantees). Extensive ownership of land occurred, 
moreover, due to rudimentary techniques applied to agriculture, which quickly exhausted 
soils and forced the search of fertile land. 
 Only after the Independence of Brazil could the new Brazilian State desire to 
establish full ownership of land and to have a land policy with minimal control over the 
occupation of the territory. This would be the main target of the Land Law launched in 
1850. However, because the interests of powerful landowners, the Land Law further 
allowed the regularisation of possessions, permitting the occupation of vacant land and 
making it impossible to establish a register. Apart from the adverse possession or 
“squatting” (which permits after a few years that the “squatters” are able to regularise 
their property), the states themselves in some historical moments gave properties with or 
without titles. In 1864, a new institutional obligation enacted an established practice that 
endures until nowadays and which ultimately generates greater uncertainty and inability 
to effectively regulate the land market in Brazil: the need to register the possessions and 
properties in registry offices. Somehow, the registration in the office transmits a legality 
feature without any mechanism to ensure this.  
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 As a result, the process of falsification of possessions and properties by the 
public sector and within the Brazilian registry offices is common and widespread. After 
Brazil proclaimed itself a Federative Republic in 1889 a period of political and 
administrative decentralisation was established, since federal states regained all the 
vacant land within their boundaries. The liberality in managing the inherited territorial 
heritage varied from state to state, but regardless created more ambiguity in granting 
titles and consequently failure to regulate the land market. As consequence, the first 
effect of such change was the abandonment of a national land policy development, since 
federal states gained autonomy to legislate freely on this matter. Secondly, this 
decentralisation afforded to large landowners/leaseholders the ability to decisively 
influence on state policies regarding land tenure and land reforms. 
 During the dictatorship (1964-1989), the agrarian reform (1964 Land Statute) 
allocated rights over unclaimed unproductive (idle) lands to rural people who put them 
back to a productive use. These lands were mainly located in the Amazon, where 
productive use was demonstrated by clearing the vegetation to start an agro-pastoral 
activity. The Brazilian 1988 Constitution states that land should also serve a social 
function (article 5). In this sense, according to it, the Brazilian government must 
‘expropriate for the purpose of agrarian reform, rural properties which are not performing 
their social function (article 184)’. This re-democratisation process, on the other hand, 
allowed for grassroots movements to pursue their own interests against the government 
and the elite, reflecting thus in the background scenario where the Landless Workers' 
Movement – MST (in Portuguese: Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra) fits in this 
context. The MST is a social movement in Brazil, being generally regarded as one of the 
largest in Latin America with an estimated informal 1.5 million membership in 23 of 
Brazil's 26 states.  
 According to them, they fight for general access to the land for poor workers 
through land reform in Brazil and through activism around social issues impinging on the 
achievement of land possession, such as unequal income distribution, racism, sexism, 
and media monopolies. Since in the Federal Constitution the conditions/definitions for 
social function are vague and not defined objectively, the "social interest" principle for 
land reform can be seen in different ways. In this context, the MST participants identify 
what they believe to be unproductive rural land which “does not meet its social function” 
and they occupy such properties throughout the entire national territory. They also claim 
their actions based on 1996 census statistics, that just 3% of the population owns two-
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thirds of all arable land in the country. The redistribution of land through the land reform 
(in the task of establishing a broad layer of small farmers) has been not well succeed in 
Brazil, mainly due to the fact that these farmers do not obtain the land title’s, since as 
established by the Federal Constitution, the title can only be granted after ten years the 
land has been given. In addition, despite numerous government initiatives, demarcation 
and registration of public and private lands have not been carefully carried out 
throughout the country. The consequence is that the land cannot widely be used as 
collateral for agricultural credit. Thus, the scenario in Brazil is characterised by the 
inhibition of mortgage agricultural credit, the dependence on government budget for 
agricultural finance and increasingly recurrent "packages" of agricultural refinancing, 
which only benefit the improvident farmers and those aware that the debt always will, in 
future, be renegotiated. 
 
 
 6.9.2.4 Carbon ownership 
 Many unanswered questions remain regarding the allocation of rights and 
liabilities, and accountability in trade and benefit sharing, under REDD+ actions (Larson 
et al., 2010). In several tropical countries it is considered that in the absence of specific 
legislation and regulation, ownership of carbon rights is somehow tied to land and forest 
rights. On the other hand, the question if ‘will carbon rights be linked to land ownership 
or will the government retain carbon rights’ remains. In national approaches it is 
expected that governments will receive payments linked to emissions reductions across 
the whole forest estate compared to a national reference scenario. In this case, the state 
would be held responsible for liabilities before the international community. However, if 
rights are linked, landowners would experience an increase in the value of their land and 
could potentially obtain a new source of income, on the other hand, probably would also 
become directly liable for future carbon losses (Larson et al., 2010). Although there is no 
single operational definition of “carbon rights” at the international level, it can be 
understood as an umbrella term which includes two concepts: i) property rights to 
sequestered carbon (contained in land, trees, soil etc.) and ii) the rights to benefits that 
arise from the transfer of these rights, for example in emissions trading schemes 
(Peskett and Brodnig, 2011). Moreover, it can be broadly defined as ‘intangible assets 
created by legislative and contractual arrangements that allow the recognition of 
separate benefits arising from the sequestration of carbon in the biomasses’. However, 
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this concept has so far been inadequately understood because it is highly contextual and 
is open to many interpretations. Owning an intangible resource such as sequestered 
carbon poses more challenges to traditional property law systems that provide a basis 
for defining carbon rights (Rosenbaum et al., 2004). 
 That said, carbon ownership is a new and unprecedented type of property right, 
being considered a form of property that “commoditise” carbon and allow it to be traded 
in voluntary and regulatory markets (Streck, 2009). While the stored carbon would be a 
self-contained property independent of the physical biomass, the right to trade carbon 
needs to be created by virtue of legislative and/or contractual arrangements. Thus, 
understanding the nature of carbon (e.g., sequestered carbon, carbon sink and carbon 
sequestration potential) as property and the derivative rights associated with trading are 
important to defining carbon rights legally (Peskett and Brodnig, 2011). This means that 
a legal distinction between ownership and rights to carbon stocks, including any 
increases in stocks (which can be measured as standing, within the trees) and 
ownership and rights to reductions in emissions of carbon (which are measured against 
a baseline) must be differentiate (Skutsch et al., 2012). Moreover, a number of additional 
aspects of carbon rights will need to be regulated for the establishment of a marker-
based approach to REDD+, as determining whether carbon rights can be separated from 
the land, how certificates are classified (e.g. as goods or securities) and electronic 
systems for recording the transfer and tracking of certificates (Lopes et al., 2013). In this 
context, a range of scenarios regarding the ownership of forest carbon have been 
developed based on the idea and empirical observation, presented below (adapted from 
Rosenbaum et al. (2004)): 
 
 The forest owner owns the carbon sequestered in the forest:  
  The carbon sequestered in the forest may not be sold independently of the 
forest. However, the owner may undertake the obligation to manage the forest in a way 
to increase the carbon stock. This obligation could be in the form of:  
 • A contract;  
 • A covenant that runs with the land, binding anyone who owns the property in 
the future; 
 • A covenant that attaches to a person; 
 • An easement or servitude, which may attach to a dominant estate or to a 
person.  
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 In the latter case, the carbon sequestered in the forest may be transferred 
independently of any land transfer.  
 
  The carbon sequestered in the forest is the object of a separate, alienable 
property right, such as a usufruct right, governed under the laws concerning land 
ownership. The owner can sell that right without conveying land ownership. In this 
context, two options may be envisioned:  
 • The owner of the carbon has the right to affect the use of the forest to protect 
the existing forest carbon stock, or to enhance it;  
 • The owner of the carbon has no inherent right to affect how the forest is used. 
However, the land owner may separately grant this right through a contract, or through a 
covenant or other legal mechanism that “runs with the land” and binds any property 
owner.  
 
 The carbon sequestered in the forest is a publicly owned asset  
  The government holds the forest carbon stock as trustee for the benefit of 
forest owners or of the public, with no power to sell it or give it away. In this context, two 
different options may be envisioned:  
 • The government has no particular power to require landowners to protect or 
enhance sequestration; or  
 • The government has the power to regulate the use of land to protect or 
enhance carbon sequestration. 
 
  The government has the power to sell or give the forest carbon stock away. In 
this connection, two main options may be configured:  
 • The acquisition of carbon stocks may be open to anybody;  
 • Only a limited number of entities may be eligible to own carbon stocks, such as 
entities emitting carbon and desiring offsets; “banks” chartered to deal in mitigation 
credits; NGOs interested in environmental protection; indigenous peoples or other 
groups of forest stewards.  
 
 Furthermore, one of the key questions that have arisen in the context of the 
REDD+ debate surrounds which actors have the right to exploit the benefits and the 
associated rights to international payments originated from GHG emissions reductions 
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performances (Peskett and Brodnig, 2011). Clarifying who is legally entitled to receive 
benefits under REDD+ strategies and actions is a complex process, as multiple actors 
have overlapping forest/land tenure and usufruct rights. For instance, the owner(s) of the 
carbon sequestration potential could be same or different from, the owner(s) of the 
carbon sink, who might also be same or different from, the owner(s) of the sequestered 
carbon in case of usufruct rights. The complexity might be eased to some extent through 
careful analysis of the history of forest tenure, ownership and control rights that help 
reforms or transforms the inequitable and imbalance power relations among 
stakeholders. Thus, community groups and indigenous peoples are disquieted due to 
the concern that very little of this money will trickle down to the local communities or 
small forest owners.  
 In collectively owned properties issues arise as well regarding the distribution of 
rights and liabilities. Revenues may be distributed in favour of households with greater 
available capital, disposable income and active participation in project activities, to the 
detriment of those who lack resources but still hold rights over collective forests (Corbera 
et al. 2007). Indeed it is argued that in the design and development of REDD+ actions, 
insufficient attention has been given to the particular issues of collective, community and 
indigenous lands and rights. Therefore, proposals for a “nested” approach to REDD+ 
have been suggested in part to strengthen the position of local communities (Skutsch et 
al., 2012). In some proposals for nested systems, carbon credits would be calculated at 
the local level, and attributed directly to the communities’ involved (Cortez et al, 2010). 
However, the term nesting has also been used in a more general sense, for instance in 
the context of sub-national jurisdictions nesting within national ones and may not 
invariably imply that the local actions will receive all the credits generated at that level. 
Apart from other considerations, attributing all credits to the local level could result in 
accounting conflicts with the national approach to REDD+ besides the major technical 
problems with assessing deforestation achievements at the local level (Skutsch et al., 
2012). Nevertheless, adaptive and flexible models permit initiatives to be developed on 
the specific characteristics of each community or territory (Larson et al., 2010). 
 
 
 6.9.2.5 Perspectives on land tenure and carbon rights in Brazil 
 As previously discussed, while private ownership is permitted in Brazil, in 
practice, experience has created a complicated system of ownership, leading to insecure 
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tenure and even violent disputes over land ownership (Champagne and Roberts, 2009). 
Apart from conflicts and inequality, the bureaucratic environment of land rights 
governance faces several challenges into this context such as institutional complexity, 
limitations of land registry and the lack of an integrated database (Costa, 2016). Multiple 
institutions share responsibilities for governing land property rights in Brazil. Frequently, 
their mandates contradict or overlap, lacking this way coordination and communication 
among their activities. These institutions are responsible for executing a wide range of 
tasks and services related to land management, including agrarian reform, 
environmental monitoring and protection, community rights, and tax collection. To 
exemplify the complexity of this system, according to Costa (2016), just at the level of 
the federal government, eleven institutional bodies share oversight of different aspects of 
land rights and management (more details Annex III).  
 Moreover, due to the lack of integration of records between land-management 
agencies, there is no land register covering the entire Brazilian territory. Furthermore, 
the absence of a proper database aggregating all the public lands (which represents 
over 20% of the national territory) also shows why it is so difficult to develop a clear 
picture of the problem (Costa, 2016). The lack of connection between rural cadastres 
and land registry limits legal security in real estate transactions, preventing the 
implementation of more effective land policies and increasing fraud and illegal 
appropriation of land (Costa, 2016). A differentiation here is needed nevertheless. The 
land registry is a national record of all properties’ transactions (e.g. purchase, sale, 
donation, and inheritance) and all the interests related to the land (e.g. mortgage and 
easement) in Brazil, which is mandatory for all urban and rural properties. Real estate 
buyers are required by law to register their purchasing titles. The notaries159 issue the 
certificate of registration, which is a legal document that certifies ownership rights over a 
declared property. The rural cadastre is a database that indicates the geographical 
location and attributes of rural properties (the CAR mechanism, explained in Chapter 
five). Thus, such activities should be a joint exercise and, to the extent that it is 
consolidated, should be transferred to municipalities (Reydon, 2011). The idea is that 
municipalities should (as they have more resources, structure and trained personnel) 
                                                 
159 In Brazil, notaries do not always properly check the authenticity of documents used to register private 
properties, either due to a lack of capacity of the staff or corruption, and therefore registration based on false 
documents is common. For each individual notary, fees are based on the number of registrations they 
complete, regardless of the accuracy of the information registered.  
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coordinate land registers as well the rural cadastre and all other activities of governance 
and regulation of land use, particularly the collection of land taxes. 
 In Brazil, public lands are administered by the federal government, federal states 
and/or municipalities in the interest of the common good. On public land, concessions 
may be allocated under the Law on the Management of Public Forests (Law 
11.284/2006). This law establishes principles160 for the management of public forests for 
sustainable production (timber concessions by conceding rights to manage public forests 
for the exploration of products and services). Within the structure of the Ministry of 
Environment (MMA), the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB) was created to manage such 
system as well as the creation of the National Fund for Forest Development (FNDF).161 
Also, this law establishes three forms of management of public forests: i) creation of 
protected areas, which allow forest production in a sustainable way, for example the 
national forests, ii) allocation for community use, in the form of forest settlements, 
extractive reserves, quilombo areas and sustainable development reserves and, iii) 
forest management concessions (for private users), obtained through public biding 
processes and demanding payment for the use of natural resources. Conservation units 
are considered part of the public domain, and are therefore owned by the State. This 
means that forest peoples do not own the land, although some may have been living 
there for several generations. However, the federal government grants them the right to 
use the land, and they are responsible for the sustainable use of the land under 
management plans (Champagne and Roberts, 2009). In addition, carbon rights lies with 
the federal government. This policy expressly prohibits the inclusion of terms in a forest 
concession which grant rights to commercialise carbon credits from forestry concessions 
derived from avoided deforestation (Champagne and Robert, 2009). 
                                                 
160 The forest management should be in accordance with the principles of protecting the ecosystem, of 
ensuring the rational use of natural resources and the sustainable development in the region, of respecting 
the local population’s access rights and of seeking to improve their living conditions. 
161 The FNDF will be used primarily for projects in the following areas: 
 • Research and technological development in forest management; 
 • Technical assistance and forest extension; 
 • Restoration of degraded areas with native species; 
 • Rational economic utilization and sustainable use of forest resources; 
 • Control and monitoring of forestry activities and deforestation; 
 • Training in forest management; 
 • Environmental education; 
 • Protecting the environment and conserving natural resources. 
These projects alone will benefit from FNDF resources if they are run by public agencies and entities, or 
private non-profit organizations. 
The Fund predicts that up to 20% of revenue should be used to support the system itself, including 
resources for the SFB and IBAMA. The remaining 80% can be divided into 30% for the federal state where 
the public forest is located, 30% for municipalities and 40% for the National Forest Development Fund. 
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 Forest concessions have been the topic of many discussions. On the one hand, it 
is sometimes praised by environmental groups who believe in greater control of 
deforestation due to the establishment of sustainable management methods in the 
timber sector. On the other hand, criticisms are made by entities linked to environmental 
conservation who believe that the government will benefit large timber companies, 
facilitating deforestation. These organisations fundament their arguments mainly based 
on unsuccessful experiences of some other forest countries (Ferreira, 2006). However, 
after more than ten years (from 2006 until nowadays), the forest concessions system in 
Brazil can not be considered outstanding either. Some critics alleged excessive 
bureaucracy (limiting the participation of small and medium-holders), there are those 
who pointed out legal uncertainty (in terms of long-term contracts) and the lack of 
incentives to be a competitive activity, but according to Rodrigues (2016), what is 
observed is a certain unwillingness of the Brazilian governmental structure to deal with 
the private sector.  
 The fact is, there are only 842,000 hectares under public concession in Brazil 
currently, which are distributed into five national forests: i) National Forest from Jamari, 
ii) National Forest from Sacará-Taquera, iii) National Forest from Sacará-Taquera 
(South), iv) National Forest from Jacundá and v) National Forest from Altamira (SFB, 
2016). Curiously all those areas are located in the Amazon region, being that a criticism 
because theoretically the policy was defined to be applied in all Brazilian biomes, but as 
usually happens, it is only discussed involving the Amazonian thematic. These cited 
areas should be sustainably managed by eight timber companies during 40 years. It is 
estimated that Brazil's potential can reach 13 million hectares. The actual goal is to 
reach 7 million hectares by 2022, meeting 30% of today's demand (SFB, 2016).  
 Within this context, the REDD+ mechanism could be the tool to aggregate all 
these activities. For example, the monitoring and control of public lands is an activity 
extremely dependent on labour and financial resources. Under the umbrella of REDD+ 
and forest concessions this control could be more effectively achieved (but the 
monitoring must happen). The main conception is to change the timber market dynamic, 
ending the illegal logging extraction and offering an ecological alternative for large-scale 
production conciliating also the conservation concept. Adalberto Verissimo from Imazon 
(a non-profit research institution) in interview to Alexandre Mansur (2016) says that 
through forest concessions it is also possible to promote the “preservation of disinterest”. 
This means, the user would have no interest in clearing the forest area to change the 
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land use (for crops or cattle for example) because no one could legally appropriate the 
area. However, this “disinterest” could lead to inadequate logging practices and, it 
should be noticed that such practices disturb the ecological balance increasing forest 
degradation even if the forest cover remain in place. Thus, this endorses the importance 
of monitoring within the policy framework. 
 Ultimately, it is expected that forest concessions will bring the economic 
dynamics to a significant amount of state forest areas. Logically, the implementation of 
such measure can be a good strategy for the conservation of public forests and a 
valuable economic instrument if some aspects are considered. For instance, the federal 
government must be able to evaluate, control and penalise the missteps of beneficiaries 
(Pereira, 2009). In this sense, there is a criticism concerning the human and financial 
capacity (which is limited) of the management and monitoring institutions, respectively 
the Brazilian Forestry Service (SFB) and the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and 
Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) in establishing the legal instrument. During the 
interviews, the respondent from SFB also recognised this fact, declaring: “Brazil is huge. 
We from SFB need to be extended, to receive more resources to work at scale” (SBF, 
2014, personal communication).162 Nevertheless, the allocation of public forests should 
be diversified, with several different goals such as integral protection, tourism, timber 
production, non-timber forest products (NTFP), environmental services, environmental 
education, and scientific research, among others. According to Pereira (2009), it would 
be possible to curb deforestation in public forests through forest concession if these are 
strategically located around conservation units, creating a protection buffer which 
hinders the illegal invasion in such areas. 
 Approximately 80 million hectares of undesignated public forests in the Amazon 
could be allocated as protected areas, production forests or other categories of use 
(Moutinho et al., 2016). This allocation could also preserve a stock of 10 billion tonnes of 
forest carbon and contribute significantly to the conservation of biological diversity of the 
region (SFB and IPAM, 2011). Moreover, land designations would benefit from flexible 
agreements between the government and land users, given the recent evidence that 
flexibility of some use rights for smallholders can increase achievement of conservation 
goals (Moutinho et al., 2016; Pfaff et al., 2013). Thus, pro-active policies toward the 
integration of small-scale logging and processing activities into the formal economic 
sphere are deeply needed (Karsenty, 2007). An attempt to regularise public land but 
                                                 
162 SBF – Brazilian Forest Service – Personal communication 
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also in the Amazon region from the federal government is the programe called Terra 
Legal (Law 11.952/2009) which would distribute land titles to smallholders. The target is 
to distribute land to 150 thousand smallholders; however, up to 2014 the government 
granted 6,500 land titles covering only over 6,000 hectares (Moutinho et al., 2016). 
Some critics fear that this offer of free land may actually trigger deforestation in new 
areas, rather than curb the practice. On the other hand, by establishing clearly defined 
property rights, it is expected that without incentives to move further in to develop forest, 
beneficiaries will stay and improve their land. In addition, once REDD+ framework is 
established, landowners would be incentivised to receive payment not to cut their trees, 
as opposed to moving to clear uncut forest. Moreover, incorporation of more properties 
into the land register would make it easier to ensure landowners are abiding by the rules 
and that benefits are distributed (Champagne and Roberts, 2009). Conclusively, it 
should be understood that secure land tenure is a critical part of forest governance as it 
can ensure the permanence of standing forests. 
 
 
 6.9.3 Benefits of spatial and land use planning and zoning for sustainable 
landscape in REDD+ 
 Land-use planning is a broad strategy that promises to forge a consensus 
between conservation and development at landscape scale (affecting governance), 
where lands should be ranked on the basis of their best uses. But first, a common 
definition of terms and concepts is crucial to significant understanding in land use 
planning and zoning (Sidle et al., 2010): 
 Land use plan: a plan that determines the stratification of land uses within a 
landscape scale, providing basic guidance for each land use zone and the 
integration of these zones;  
 Planning: process in which stakeholders come together to discuss and decide 
how to manage resources in a given geographic area; 
 Zoning: process of delineating geographic areas separated by differing land uses 
as a part of a broader land use planning process. Thus zoning is an intrinsically 
political intervention that reveals underlying power struggles and social conflicts 
(Jacobs, 1998).  
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 Spatial planning may predominantly follow three approaches (Fosci, 2014): i) 
segregative approach, which separates the natural environment from human land uses; 
ii) integrative approach, which seeks to achieve a win-win situation whereby human 
needs are met while maintaining ecological functions (e.g. agroforestry) and iii) driver 
approach, which will depend on how the driver has evolved in a particular geographical 
context. For example, primary native forests can be turned into protected areas, 
whereas less valuable forests could be assigned to croplands when necessary, or 
limiting the impact of industrial logging, most typically by refusing to grant concessions 
for timber and pulp extraction in primary forests, or even allowing for sustainable 
resource extraction that beneﬁts local communities (Wolfersberger et al., 2015). For 
Fosci (2014), when deforestation is caused by small-scale activities such as farming and 
wood extraction, integrative planning approaches are most desirable. Spatial planning 
can help even further as for instance, in the optmisation of production systems of 
managed forests in a more sustainable way. For example, in the context of forest 
protection, such efforts have contributed to reduced harvesting quotas, which may have 
resulted in an imbalance of the environmental functions of the forests and forest 
management in terms of wood supply, for instance (Kašpar et al., 2016). Thus, 
considering economic and spatial factors (apart from environmental) in production 
systems (e.g. during harvest stage) may reduce production costs by increasing the 
logistic efficiency as well as conserve biodiversity (since incorporating maximum 
harvesting opening size constraints into planning can help to minimise biodiversity 
losses). 
 Sustainable practices can also be promoted through a participatory process that 
limits tenure rights through local land use plans, providing incentives (e.g. carbon 
payments) to subsidised credit for sustainable activities, promoting compliance with such 
plans. In this sense, zoning is a sensitive given topic because it requires strong clarity of 
property rights and usually it faces several inherent challenges such as increased 
conflict over land and resource use. For example, in some situations, zoning helps solve 
land use dissensions, but it also has the potential to create new disagreements or 
intensify existent disputes. Moreover, zoning does not always include equitable access 
for different resource users and therefore, some local people may see conservation 
areas as an imposition on their land and rights. Furthermore, zoning does not always 
reﬂect transitory and moving aspects of biodiversity and conservation, such as migratory 
wildlife (Jackson et al., 2007). This conveys that opportunities to adapt and rezone for 
 226
biodiversity purposes need to be included into plans, just as such opportunities are 
offered for future economic development (Naughton, 2007). Thus, some have been 
advocating the use of wildlife corridors in parks and zone planning. 
 In the context of REDD+, it is argued that present large scale use decisions are 
being densely influenced by global demand for resources and economic considerations, 
and consequently, the significance of transparent and coordinated land use planning and 
zoning combined with a participatory planning at local level is preeminent (Sidle et al., 
2010). By participatory it should be understood as a collaborative process mutually 
respected by all actors, including a participatory consultation process involving all 
relevant stakeholders, which should be enforced in REDD+ actions. In this respect, 
spatial planning can therefore become a tool that will channel participation in land use 
decisions, although such participation occurs mostly in the early stages of development 
(Fosci, 2014). Moreover, it would provide a permanent institutional structure that can be 
used by stakeholders on a regular basis to receive information, provide further inputs, or 
file complaints. However, institutions strongly shape outcomes. New national policies 
promoting participatory planning open opportunities for negotiation but might also create 
uncertainty (Naughton, 2007).  
 On the other hand, experiences in developed countries (e.g. The Netherlands, 
Belgium and Poland) demonstrate that land use plans and zoning can be flexible and 
adaptive if adequate regulatory and institutional frameworks are adopted (Halleux et al., 
2012). This institutional structure needs therefore to facilitate communication across 
levels of government, and between stakeholders and the public sector using a nested 
system (Fosci, 2014). To improve participatory land use planning and zoning outcomes, 
it is critical to evaluate and observe global experiences. For example, case studies 
(mostly of the cases engage the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve model) have shown that 
participatory zoning has succeed in attempts to link conservation with development, 
resolve conflict, and promote sustainability (Rotich, 2012). These cases reveal that 
governance, funding commitments, ecological context, and the use of science and 
innovative mapping techniques can restrict or improve spatial planning outcomes. 
 According to Rotich (2012), there are several novel techniques that may be used 
in the zoning process. Some approaches feature high-tech methods while others 
highlight local participation, including: 
 Geographic Information System (GIS): a system of hardware, software, and 
procedures designed to support the capture, management, manipulation, 
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analysis, modeling, and display of spatially referenced data for solving complex 
planning and management problems (see Harris and Hazen, 2006); 
 Participatory 3-Dimensional Modeling and Community Integrated Geographic 
Information Technology (GIT): these methods emphasise community 
participation in the mapping and zoning process to capture the cultural 
importance of land as well as geographic characteristics. It refers to physically 
building 3-D maps with communities; while community integrated GIT uses 
technologies such as GIS to capture community knowledge and perceptions of 
place (see Harris and Hazen, 2006); 
 Quantitative Zoning: Sabatini et al. (2007) have formulated a quantitative method 
to “expeditiously zone” protected areas by assigning potential land uses based 
on land aptitude, priority of use, biodiversity conservation, and the inﬂuence of 
the surrounding areas;  
 Zoning with Satellite Images: satellite images allow practitioners to see and 
compare large areas of land and to differentiate land types. In this technique, 
zones are delineated according to the analysis and weighting of land attributes 
such as type of soil, topography, hydrology, and prevalent agricultural use (see 
Salm et al., 2000); 
 Adaptive co-management: an approach that recognises the evolving, place 
specific nature of governance over social ecological systems. The emphasis is 
on collaborative planning and decision-making among multiple stakeholders that 
cross community, regional and national levels. Recognising that socio-ecological 
urgencies and stakeholder needs may change over time, adaptive co-
management promotes trust building as the basis for governance, which involves 
dialogue and feedback from stakeholders, periodic monitoring, and a willingness 
to modify process, goals and outcomes. 
 
 Spatial and land use planning and zoning can be a key prescriptive tool for 
administration and management of protected areas also. However, the lack of zoning is 
common for most protected areas in developing countries and, as result several 
protected areas are not effectively achieving the goals for which they were created 
(Rotich, 2012). This indicates that zoning procedures may lessen communities’ 
traditional management practices in common areas and lead to an acceleration of 
ecosystem degradation if communities do not understand and accept the reasoning of 
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zoning or were not involved in its design and implementation (Rotich, 2012). Under such 
rationale, REDD+ should consider targeting its actions. A collaborative planning would 
generate political support for REDD+ scope, since REDD+ actions compete with others 
policies objectives and it would create synergies with others environmental initiatives.  
 Moreover, it would assist REDD+ actions to enable the coordination and 
integration of national policies across sectors and levels of government, generating 
investor confidence to adopt more sustainable land uses, apart from the fact that it would 
provide more accurate information on drivers and reference levels (Fosci, 2014). 
However, perhaps not all stakeholders would be benefited, yet building alliances and 
collaboration among multiple stakeholders can lead to more equitable and less costly 
management and monitoring of land use plans (Rotich, 2012). Nevertheless, for Fosci 
(2014), land use planning and zoning could lead to a direct reduction of forest carbon 
emissions in all cases where a low-carbon solution comes at little extra cost. He states 
that even when relocating development initiatives or achieving sustainable resource use 
is costly, costs may still be lower than trying to implement a REDD+ framework without 
previous spatial planning since the fragmentation of land use decisions at the individual 
level (estimates show that around 50 to 80% of climate mitigation actions depend on 
decisions made at sub-national and local levels, (UNDP, 2014))163 would not facilitate 
the identification of cost-effective options to business-as-usual emissions.   
 In Brazil, the Ecological-Economic Zoning (EEZ) is considered as a strategic 
point to enable sustainable development by reconciling socio-economic development 
with environmental conservation. The EEZ is an instrument of the National 
Environmental Policy of Law 6.938/1981, and regulated by Federal Decree 4.297/2002. 
The EEZ is shared competence of the three governmental spheres: the federal 
government, the states and the municipalities. The Supplementary Law 140/2011, which 
establishes rules for cooperation between these entities in the exercise of common 
jurisdiction over the environment (article 23 of the Federal Constitution), constitutes the 
administrative action of the federal government for the preparation of the national and 
federal states to elaborate the state-level EEZ, and the municipalities for the elaboration 
of the management plan. The new 2012 Forest Code establishes a period of five years 
                                                 
163 See at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/focus_areas/climate_strategies/
undp_projects_thatcontributetogreenlecrds/national_sub-nationalstrategies.html (Accessed on 22, March, 
2017).  
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(article 13 §2) for all federal states to prepare and approve their EEZs, according to a 
unified methodology established by the federal norm.  
 This collaboration takes place through the Coordinating Commission for the 
Ecological-Economic Zoning of the National Territory (CCZEE) (Decree n. 28/2001), a 
political body responsible for planning, coordinating, monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of EEZ efforts. The technical support comes from the EEZ Brazil 
Consortium (article 6 of Decree 28/2001), composed of 15 public institutions (such as 
Geological Service of Brazil – CPRM) to advise the CCZEE and the federal states, 
elaborate methodologies and guide the preparation of the EEZ reference term. It has 
been elaborated mostly for priority macro-regions of Brazil as the Amazon. However, it 
has not been conceived to include urban regions in the planning. With increasing 
recognition in recent years on Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol and palm oil diesel biofuels 
programmes, the federal government began researching the introduction of agro-
ecological zoning for sugarcane and palm, which became a fact through presidential 
decrees from June 2009 and May 2010, respectively. On the other hand, agricultural 
zoning is not a new phenomenon and indeed, has been practiced in Brazil since 2002 
but has been primarily focused on agro-economic criteria (Leopold, 2010). The REDD+ 
framework in Brazil should therefore contribute to consolidate such actions, combining 
the efforts on agro-ecological zoning with environmental conservation measures 
integrating actions and information under a consolidated national system. Moreover, it 
can assist in enforcing the Forest Code to establish the EEZs nationwide. 
 
 
 6.9.4 Managing the national finance structure 
 
 
 6.9.4.1 Market-based versus international allowances 
 In contrast to the simple economic model from which REDD+ was previously 
established – from a project-level scheme, similar to the CDM mechanism, with funding 
from private sector, predominantly from the voluntary market – REDD+ became a 
national or jurisdictional-level mechanism with funding provided by international donors 
to national or sub-national governments (Laing, 2014). However, it is difficult to predict 
which REDD+ finance architecture would be the most appropriate. According to Streck 
and Parker (2012), there are four major challenges associated with REDD+ finance 
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context, which affects the national structure as well: i) defining the costs and estimating 
the financial needs of REDD+ frameworks; ii) mobilising sufficient international and 
national funding to cover the costs of REDD+ policies, programmes and measures, iii) 
allocating and disbursing REDD+ finance efficiently, effectively and equitably to produce 
reliable and measurable performances (results) and iv) pairing the requirements and 
needs of political authorities and other actors in developing countries with those of 
investors and donors in REDD+ finance, strengthening and/or creating (new) institutions 
to implement policies and instruments and manage REDD+ funding. 
 There is tremendous debate over whether REDD+ should be linked to carbon 
trading system, which would allow countries to offset their GHG emissions by financing 
forestry projects mainly in developing countries. Many critics, particularly indigenous 
groups and traditional communities, fear that REDD+ will lead to investors and 
speculators buying up forestlands to earn carbon credits, threatening their homes and 
livelihoods (Chivers and Worth, 2015). Moreover, the carbon market has also shown in 
the past years its unpredictability. Nevertheless, the capacity and experience developed 
through the carbon market is still very much needed (Schneider et al., 2015). On the 
other hand, although there is an evident need to move away from a dependence on 
public funds alone (Palmer, 2013), there is also an apparently and contradictorily 
consensus that, whatever the architecture decided for REDD+, there is a need of public 
funding for supporting policies and measures (Karsenty, 2012). Furthermore, regardless 
of whether the REDD+ mechanism can be considered a cost-effective measure as a 
climate mitigation strategy, numerous studies have demonstrated that REDD+ 
implementation even at a regional scale will have a high annual cost. For example, the 
Global Canopy Programme estimates that around US$30 billion will be needed annually 
to protect the world’s forests, following an initial spending of US$81 billion. 
 The real problem is that the likelihood of a viable market-based financing 
mechanism remains a moving target (IFF, 2014). The evolving landscape of carbon 
offsetting (post-Paris) will be a byproduct of market adoption and the eventual 
functionality of the regime (Gehring and Philips, 2016). Nevertheless, developing 
appropriate REDD+ carbon markets pools is a potentially significant tool to give value to 
forest ecosystem landscapes (Bluffstone, 2013). On the other hand, currently there is no 
source of demand to pay for medium to long-term emission reductions from REDD+ at 
the scale to meet emission reduction targets in tropical forest nations before 2020. There 
is a US$15 to 48 billion funding gap for REDD+ until 2020, because it is estimated that 
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the supply of REDD+ credits is 13 to 39 times greater than the potential demand, for a 
50% reduction in the rate of global deforestation by year 2020 (IFF, 2014). As 
uncertainties surrounding the offset-based carbon market exist, it is therefore important 
to have some control over supply and demand of REDD+ credits (Gil, 2010). This can be 
done through the establishment of purchasing commitments and price floors/ceilings, 
limitations to the number of REDD+ units eligible for compliance and continuous 
issuance of carbon credits during commitment periods, which can avoid unexpected 
disturbance in supply associated with ex-post crediting (Gil, 2010). Moreover, an indirect 
threat imposed by market solutions is the dogma that often ignores questions as justice 
and fairness and therefore, questions on distributive justice must be consider in policies 
developments. 
 Furthermore, concerns over the rent seeking behaviour of market participants 
looking for short-term economic returns continues to raise questions relating to the use 
of carbon offsetting as a policy instrument (Gehring and Philips, 2016). As the carbon 
market expands, increased diligence must therefore be placed on ensuring the carbon 
credits being generated actualise sustainable development. A further criticism to offset-
based payments according to Fosci (2013) is that the approach is not as efficient as 
assumed, because only a carefully crafted policy design can reduce costs. As explained 
before inaccuracy in setting reference levels may impulse the so-called transaction 
costs, that is, the price paid for activities that do not generate emissions reductions 
(Knox et al., 2011). Moreover, if payments are made through the purchase of carbon 
offsets priced internationally, the actual opportunity cost of a REDD+ action would be 
overlooked. The divergence between the opportunity cost of implementing a REDD+ 
activity and the amount paid for it at the level of offset purchase generates a private 
profit (or rent) for the seller or the financial intermediary. If payments were based on the 
international price of carbon offsets, they would not match highly variable opportunity 
costs, creating huge profits where emission reductions are inexpensive and failing to 
protect forested areas where deforestation action is highly profitable (Fosci 2014; 
Eliasch, 2008). 
 Nevertheless, as previously shown the international financing support slowed 
after 2010 (Norman and Nakhooda, 2014). In addition, even though ambition concerning 
investments from the private sector were high, the absence of a compliance market for 
REDD+ credits has determined that private sector engagement and investments 
consequently have been low (Diaz et al., 2011). Bluffstone (2013) asserts that this fact 
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may be particularly seen as problematic, because when prices are absent for something, 
some people may perceive the value as null, which can be interpreted as meaning 
carbon sequestration services are not at all scarce and therefore (i) there is no reason to 
provide them and (ii) forests should be used for other purposes. While public sources 
are essential in the initial preparation stages, the private sector may play a role in 
financing REDD+ implementation activities. This could be an opportunity for bilateral and 
multilateral funding to mobilise the dynamics and the liquidity of the private sector. By 
co-sponsoring the active integration of existing activities into their surrounding 
landscapes, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other public donors have the chance to 
support the private sector in standing firm with the existing local/sub-national REDD+ 
actions and taking advantage of their experience and local support (Dutschke and 
Manfrinato, 2016). 
 In 2007, a proposal was submitted to the climate negotiations that would facilitate 
early actions by private investors in REDD+, the so-called “nested approach”. The basic 
idea was to create “forest conservation nests” within national boundaries that used third-
party monitoring, reporting and verification services to generate carbon credits. These 
offsets would partially be provided to the government as a mandatory reserve for later 
use under the UNFCCC, while the remainder could be sold to private-sector investors 
(Dutschke and Manfrinato, 2016). Consequently, private finance would be motivated and 
attracted, while creating capacities to deal with conservation interventions at local and 
sub-national level, with a view on integrating these actions into a national policy 
framework afterwards.  
 For example, the California Climate Action Registry has developed rules for 
nesting and the VCS launched its “Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+” Standard in 2012 
(Dutschke and Manfrinato, 2016). However, although REDD+ was adopted in the Paris 
Agreement, the basis for the nests – sub-national approaches – were no longer 
supported. That’s why countries should adopt a national framework. But there is no 
implemented mention in the Paris Agreement how and/or if sub-national actions should 
be integrated into the national scope. Nevertheless, further with Dutschke and 
Manfrinato (2016), a question remains: What will happen to the privately funded REDD+ 
activities already implemented in tropical countries? Under some national regulations 
these emission reductions may still qualify under a domestic accounting system, 
although with limited market liquidity. However, in Brazil even this possibility was 
removed by the presidential decree ruling out any private REDD+ emission reductions to 
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be used for compliance purposes (Dutschke and Manfrinato, 2016). Therefore, without 
the possibility to market carbon credits from REDD+ private initiatives for now, non-
carbon motivations need to be explored to make such actions financially viable. Hence, 
the most successful REDD+ interventions feature a combination of different modalities 
targeting the improvement of rural livelihoods, including energy production and demand-
side measures. 
 
 
 6.9.4.2 Results-based financing  
 In this scenario, both bilateral and multilateral164 foreign allowances, which were 
initially envisioned as a temporary measure to drive REDD+ mechanism into existence, 
became one of the main funding sources for REDD+ initiatives (Angelsen and McNeil, 
2012; Sunderlin et al., 2014). However, the literature identifies the need for a weighty 
new forest fund for climate, biodiversity and poverty with an appropriate scale of 
ambition which bases performance on a set of shared principles which frame targets at a 
national level and require demonstrated political commitment and engagement against 
nationally adopted strategies to achieve these goals (Karsenty, 2012). Funding sources, 
access modalities and disbursement remain points of disagreements between 
beneficiaries and donor countries and financial arrangements are often perceived as 
inadequate (Well and Carrapatoso, 2016).  
                                                 
164  2015 has seen few approvals for REDD+, although there has been some progress in disbursement. 
While since 2008, US$ 2 billion has been approved for REDD+ activities just US$ 17 million has been 
approved in the last 12 months (Watson et al., 2016). According to the Overseas Development Institute, 
Germany, Japan, Norway, the UK and the US provided 83% of all REDD+ finance delivered between 2010 
and 2012. Norway was the largest contributor, with a total of US$ 968 million. 
Each of these donors focuses its support for REDD+ according to its own priorities: 
 Germany: focuses its support on the biodiversity benefits of REDD+. Another area of focus is 
delivering technical assistance to REDD+ countries. Germany's REDD+ Early Movers programme 
promotes forest conservation and strengthens performance-based payments for reduced emissions 
in countries that have already taken independent action to mitigate climate change; 
 Japan: support has focused on building capacity for monitoring, reporting and verification, and on 
technology transfer; 
 Norway: has made large-scale commitments to REDD+ financing as part of its International Climate 
and Forest Initiative, which aims to ensure REDD+ is a credible component of an ambitious global 
climate change agreement; 
 United Kingdom: finance for REDD+ focuses on forest governance, including commodities, markets 
and the role of the private sector; 
 United States: funding for REDD+ features market-based approaches, a strong role for global 
conservation organisations and commodity supply chain initiatives such as the Tropical Forest 
Alliance 2020. 
The three main multilateral initiatives on REDD+ are the FCPF, UN-REDD and FIP (as presented in 
Chapter  four). However, other multilateral channels for REDD+ finance include: 
 The World Bank's BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes 
 The Green Climate Fund, set up under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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 Experiences with funds have shown that there is often a trade-off between (i) 
funds embedded in national budgets being misused or channeled to other priorities, and 
(ii) funds managed by an independent body which are often plagued by complicated 
disbursement procedures and fail to create a critical mass of expertise in the national 
administration (Karsenty, 2012). In 2013, the negotiations on REDD+ resulted in the 
Warsaw Framework for REDD+. Through this framework, REDD+ becomes an 
operational mechanism with formal rules for creating institutions, establishing reference 
levels, recognising mitigation activities, ensuring safeguards, and adopting performance-
based approaches. Performance-based (or results) funding is receiving increasing 
attention as an innovative tool to effectively disburse climate finance. Results-based 
financing approaches are characterised as a modality under which links payments to 
outcomes, whereby finance is dispersed upon achievement of pre-defined results 
(Schneider et al., 2015).  
 In December 2011, in Durban, parties agreed during the COP17 that “results-
based finance provided to developing country parties that is new, additional and 
predictable may come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and 
multilateral, including alternative sources” and that “appropriate market-based 
approaches [. . .] to support results-based actions by developing countries” could be 
developed and established (UNFCCC, 2012).165 In the context of REDD+, results are 
defined as mitigation outcomes, (carbon emission reductions) and/or enhancements in 
forest cover and carbon stocks (sinks) measured against a benchmark (FREL/FRL) 
expressed in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents per year (Voigt and Pereira, 2015). 
However, as the focus of REDD+ has broadened progressively, from emission 
reductions to the inclusion of other goals such as biodiversity conservation, the 
improvements of livelihoods, strengthening of indigenous rights and good governance, a 
performance-based incentive structure that stimulates a broad range of measures 
(imperative to reduce forest loss) is needed. Results-based payments for REDD+ should 
consequently also be based on monitoring outcomes of key governance, social and 
environmental elements, consistent with the Cancun Agreements (adopting tools to 
evaluate, monitor and enforce them). On the other hand, safeguards addressing 
fiduciary risks and financial transparency for REDD+ are restricted. Therefore, there is a 
                                                 
165 See Decision 2/CP17 § 66. Online available at: 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf  
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need for comprehensive consideration of the instruments required to ensure effective, 
transparent and accountable financial flows for REDD+. 
 According to a document from the Green Climate Fund (2016), performance-
based finance can produce meaningful incentives as long as it is on a sustained and 
regular basis, and that it can leverage other forms of finance, including domestic and 
private finance, available for land-use activities, with the vision of shifting the paradigm 
towards low-emission development. However, the scale and predictability of result-
based finance has been too limited to trigger the necessary transformational changes in 
the forestry and land-use sector. Moreover, another concern with results-based 
payments is that such approach may fail to address the root causes of ecosystem 
degradation and might based on the notion that financial gains are the primary 
motivation for action (Lovera et al., 2016). Experiences on result-based finance schemes 
are still limited, but these experiences provide remarkable lessons learned in setting the 
specific arrangements for receiving such funding (GCF, 2016). Nevertheless, such 
experiences also show how difficult it is to actually establish performance criteria and 
benchmarks (including reference levels). Thus, it would be almost unrealistic to think that 
all REDD+ financing must be performance based, even though it can still play an 
important role in the mechanism. Integrating and enhancing existing projects and 
initiatives as investment finance for REDD+ is therefore a necessary, practical and 
efficient way forward for achieving results.  
 Despite the suggestion in Decision 1/CP.16 that REDD+ should over time 
gradually evolve towards performance-based finance, there is no specific requirement 
for developing nations on when or how to follow this pace (Voigt, 2016). The adopted 
phased approach may suggest that national strategies should be the first step of the 
process towards performance-based finance, but this may not necessarily be the case of 
countries that already have established policy and legal frameworks for the forest sector 
as in the example of Brazil. Brazil has established a financial infrastructure to cover 
different finance needs of the three REDD+ phases. The core part of this architecture is 
the Amazon Fund established in 2008 (but its REDD+ national strategy was launched in 
2015), which is based on a payment-for-performance fundraising model supported by 
international climate finance and national contributions, as previously explained in 
Chapter five. In December 2013, Brazil and Norway expanded and extended the 
Amazon Fund to December 2021. While Norway remains the largest donor to the 
Amazon Fund, Germany and Petrobrás (oil state company) have also contributed 
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(Birsdall et al., 2014). Since the international community is increasingly interested in the 
role that national climate funds and financial institutions can play in delivering climate 
finance, the Amazon Fund experience offers practical insights, and suggests both 
challenges and opportunities (Forstater et al., 2013).  
 Dalene (2011), who analysed the governance framework of the Amazon Fund, 
describes the fund’s principles as being based on credible forest monitoring and 
politically acceptable reference levels against which annually avoided deforestation is 
measured. However, the Amazon Fund does not take degradation into consideration 
regarding the measurement of emission reduction, and this can be seen as a 
disadvantage. Authors as Birsdall et al. (2014) and Dalene (2011) agree that such 
agreement has helped the government to improve domestic political legitimacy of forest 
policies. For example, the standing of the MMA in relation to other ministries has been 
enhanced (Birsdall et al., 2014). On the other hand, aspects like lack of transparency 
lower the overall political legitimacy in the scheme. This could be related to the fact that 
as BNDES (which has been set as the regulator on conceding projects investments) is a 
bank that mostly gives loans and, in a loan context should be less transparent. This can 
be seen as negative aspect because activities that apply for loans and activities that 
apply for donations are different issues and BNDES has only partially changed its 
methods for approving initiatives for the Amazon Fund in comparison with activities that 
receive loans (Dalene, 2011). Nevertheless, Forstater et al. (2013) argue that the 
Amazon Fund has shown that developing country-based institutions can meet high 
fiduciary standards, and provide relevant transparency on fund operations. However, 
competent fund administration does incur costs and the full costs of administering the 
Amazon Fund were higher than budgeted (Forstater et al., 2013). 
 According to Forstater et al. (2013), there is room to strengthen the active role of 
multi-stakeholder governance, to help advance a more strategic approach that is better 
aligned with national needs and priorities. However, as a result, currently there is only a 
small contribution to the overall national policy on deforestation (Dalene, 2011). This 
means, it is questionable if the approved projects will be able to really tackle the drivers 
of deforestation and forest degradation. Some respondents from Birsdall et al. (2014) 
state that the Amazon Fund’s initial approach is too focused on projects and not 
sufficiently strategic; they would prefer to see the fund aim for larger, more systemic 
impact by engaging in policy-level initiatives. An example of such actions would be to 
support for large-scale implementation of cadastral registration of private lands under the 
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new 2012 Forest Code, which will in turn support a new market that promotes efficient 
land use. Another respondent proposed using the resources to purchase VER from 
REDD+ initiatives, resounding other discussions of the possibility of managing funds on 
a payment-for-performance basis to sub-national jurisdictions or project-level initiatives 
such as the Zero Deforestation Pact166 (Birsdall et al., 2014).  
 Although small compared to the size of Brazil’s economy, the amount (US$1 
billion) can be considered as a significant addition to funding in support of reduced 
deforestation (Birsdall et al., 2014). However, in practice, payments are not being 
delivered through the Amazon Fund on the scale that it would take to really shift 
incentives structures (Forstater et al., 2013). Hence, one of the major criticisms is related 
to the difficulties to get the projects financed, promoting a mismatch between the 
resources available and the disbursement to support projects. Therefore, due to 
bureaucratic processes and strict specifications many of the possible beneficiaries are 
excluded from the Amazon Fund. This is marginalising indigenous, small landowners 
and forest communities and neglecting their chance to get projects supported. Moreover, 
during interviews it was suggested the necessity of more flexible mechanisms, which 
would shorten the distance between the resources’s source (e.g. Amazon Fund) and the 
application of such financial resources. Nevertheless, committed national action on low-
carbon development requires political will and policy reforms which must be established 
domestically (Forstater et al., 2013). Thus, climate funds need to be part of domestic 
efforts to drive sustainable development.  
 Forstater et al. (2013) say that the international funding can assist this transition, 
but it cannot impel it. The UN-REDD Programme asserts that identifying domestic 
budget and aligning them towards REDD+ strategies will contribute to developing 
REDD+ countries to send a strong political signal and show their commitment to REDD+ 
goals. Under that logic, the Brazilian Government should also pursue financial channels 
within its own range of existing national mechanisms to establish the REDD+ in the 
country. This would enable Brazil to identify opportunities to align existents investments 
with anti-deforestation policies in sectors such as agriculture, whose expansion is one of 
the main drivers of deforestation in the country. On the other hand, since 2014, Brazil 
has been facing a challenging macro-economic crisis, with negative GDP growth, tight 
fiscal constraints, and higher inflation and interest rates than during the previous decade 
                                                 
166 This policy has given incentives and concessions to local governments and cattle ranchers in areas of 
high deforestation in exchange for what the government hopes will be cooperation on stemming further 
deforestation in the Amazon. 
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(Edwards, 2016). Under these circumstances scaled-up international climate finance for 
REDD+ will be even more critical to assist Brazil in mobilising domestic resources and 
leverage private investment to achieve and go beyond its NDC goals.  
 
 
 6.9.4.3 Command-and-control measures versus economic instruments 
 In a classical context, regulatory command-and-control measures have prevailed 
in the environmental policy arena across the globe. More recently, market-based 
incentives have begun to play a noticeable role in this context (Karp and Gaulding, 
1995). Command-and-control approach to public policy is commonly defined as the 
imposition of (environmental) standards – a mandated level of performance enforced 
through a piece of legislation, e.g. limits on the volume of timber harvest – where 
governments mandate individuals and/or a corporate sector, by enacting a law, steering 
behaviour, leading people to obey the law (at least theoretically) and delegating 
authorities to enforce the law, for example, by imposing fines, sanctions or penalty to 
violators. Moreover, in the environmental policy context, it basically involves setting 
standards to protect or improve environmental quality and avoid pollution.  
 The origins of command and control lie in Machiavelli's idea (about 1515) of 
acquiring and maintaining political power. Machiavelli saw in command and control a 
way of maintaining political power in a monocentric manner (Gebara, 2015a). On the 
other hand, in order to reduce or eliminate pollution and emissions, the economic-
oriented regulatory approach works by creating an incentive for the private sector to 
incorporate pollution abatement into production or consumption decisions and to 
innovate in such a way as to continually seek for the least costly method of abatement 
(EPA, 2010). Examples of economic instruments include measures such as taxes, 
subsidies, funds, payments for environmental services, among others. Reducing market 
barriers can also help to curb environmental damages, since, in some cases, substantial 
gains can be made in environmental protection simply by removing existing government-
mandated barriers to market activity (Stavins, 2003). Incentive-based approaches are 
often referred to as market-based approaches because the market, including private-
sector companies, is driving the change. This approach is also based on the polluter 
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pays principle,167 which ensures that the costs of environmental control (considering the 
environmental factor as valuable) fall, in the first place, on the polluters. Thus, market 
forces take these costs into account and resources are allocated accordingly in 
production and consumption.  
 Much of the policy discussion has to do with the efficacy and relative advantages 
of different approaches to environmental problems (Karp and Gaulding, 1995). However, 
specific policy tools will work better in some situations than in others. In deciding which 
approach to adopt, political authorities must be cognizant of constraints and limitations of 
each approach in addressing specific environmental obstacles. There are a number of 
strengths as well as weaknesses in such approaches. For example, a direct approach as 
the command and control has the advantage of a rapid implementation process; it also 
sets out clearly defined limits and shows the government or regulator to be acting 
decisively. On the other hand, it can also be a somewhat heavy-handed and complex 
approach to regulating activities. 
 A major challenge for governments is to ensure that regulatory measures are 
both effective and efficient: effective in the sense that they resolve the problem achieving 
the main goal they were introduced to address; and efficient in the sense that they 
minimise both the direct compliance costs borne by those subject to the regulation, and 
other, often more indirect, costs which may be imposed on the public (Hepburn, 2006). 
On the other hand, it should be noted that efficiency differs from cost-effectiveness. A 
policy is cost-effective if it meets a given objective at least cost, but cost-effectiveness 
does not encompass an evaluation of whether that objective has been properly placed to 
maximise social welfare. All efficient policies are cost-effective, but it is not necessarily 
true that all cost-effective policies are efficient. A policy is considered cost-effective when 
marginal abatement costs are equal across all polluters. This means, for any level of 
total abatement, each polluter has the same cost for their last unit abated (EPA, 2010). A 
lack of effectiveness in policy development commonly occurs because often objectives 
are not explicitly stated, poorly specified or there may be several potentially conflicting 
objectives. Thus, these aspects must be considered during design and during outcomes 
evaluation of policy implementation, establishing indicators to measure such efficiency.  
 It is frequently asserted that economic instruments have advantages over 
command-and-control measures. For instance, Zhang (2013) argues that economic-
                                                 
167 Internationally the polluter pays principle was introduced in the 1970s by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and reaffirmed globally in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development. 
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based instruments provide greater ﬂexibility and ﬁnancial incentives inciting producers 
and the companies to adopt the new technologies and equipment, creating better results 
in order to solve environmental problems. That is why in theory, economic-incentive 
instruments allow such achievements to be realised at the lowest possible overall cost to 
society. This means, rather than equalising pollution levels among individuals and 
companies, economic-incentive instruments equalise the incremental amount that 
producer and companies spend to reduce their pollution and/or environmental damage 
(their marginal abatement costs). Zhang (2013) states that actors will accept a policy 
more easily if either the beneﬁt increases or the cost decreases, which could be reached 
through incentives, which would inﬂuence the individual’s behaviour to a considerable 
extent.  
 Moreover, Zhang (2013) argues that market-based solutions try to change the 
logic of results in the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). This concept refers to a 
situation where individuals exploit scarce and rival common environmental resources for 
their own rational, self-interested aims, leading to over-production and the possible 
permanent depletion of the resource for all (Riley, 2011), because there is no incentive 
to stop gaining beneﬁts in such an easy and cheap way (Zhang, 2013). However, it is 
mostly agreed that instead, a market failure occurs. Such over-utilisation happens when 
the natural resource in question has poorly defined (or non-existing) property rights 
attached to it while too many private economic agents engage in activity simultaneously 
for the resource to be able to sustain it all. Examples range from over-fishing of fisheries 
and over-grazing of pastures to over-crowding of recreational zones in urban areas. 
Some argue that the command-and-control approach that does not categorically 
consider varying performance of polluters, thus ignoring the efficiency principle, offering 
this way opportunities for other policy alternatives for environmental management 
(Elazegui, 2002). However, according to Grossman and Cole (1999), although the 
command-and-control approach has a number of limitations, when institutional and 
technological costs (e.g. monitoring costs) are considered, command-and-control 
regulations appear neither inherently inefficient nor invariably less efficient than 
theoretical economic approaches (e.g. emission trading programmes). 
  Usually the first response by governments is often to regulate, but in many 
situations there may be a range of options other than command-and-control regulation 
available, including more flexible forms of traditional regulation (such as performance-
based and incentive approaches), co-regulation and self-regulation schemes, incentive 
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and market based instruments (such as tax breaks and tradable permits) and 
information approaches (Hepburn, 2006). However, policy makers remain reluctant to 
consider the use of alternative instruments in many situations, perhaps because of the 
uncertainties and perceived risks attached to alternative approaches, or because of 
institutional impediments (Hepburn, 2006). Nevertheless, to the extent such measures 
are replaced by market mechanisms, it should only be after case-by-case examinations 
of expected costs and benefits, including implementation and monitoring costs 
(Grossman and Cole, 1999).  
 Some authors as Gunnigham (2002) argue that deterrence should not be 
assumed as the principal tool available to authorities, regulators and policy makers. 
Instead, other motivational drivers are equally important, because policies differ by the 
motivational incentives they draw upon to achieve their goals; for example, command-
and-control policies rely upon fear of sanctions and market-based instruments upon 
financial gain (Karp and Gaulding, 1995). In this sense, Karp and Gaulding (1995) also 
state that environmental policy process would benefit from a more explicit consideration 
about human behaviour. Within this context, Gebara and Agrawal (2016) argue that 
instruments that offer rewards and/or punishments relies only on supporting limited 
behavioural changes on the ground, generating negative adaptations of deforestation 
practices, and perhaps producing only short-term outcomes at the expense of positive 
long-term land use changes. Furthermore, both approaches ignore local heterogeneities 
and power relations168 as for example, usually in the case of Amazon, most of the times 
only smallholders are reached by administrative fines against environmental liabilities 
(Gebara and Agrawal, 2016).  
 
 
 6.9.4.3.1 The context of incentives versus sanctions in the Brazilian scene 
  In Brazil, the main strategy adopted for forest conservation and ecosystem 
maintenance is command-and-control measures. As discussed in Chapter five these 
instruments may have played a meaningful role in reducing deforestation in recent years 
(see for example, Assunção et al., 2012). However, a major problem in Brazil concerns 
enforcement of environmental policies, meaning that a policy instrument is not very 
effective if there is an inadequate level of compliance. Thus, Brazil should strengthen 
                                                 
168 The term “power” has diverse definition, but all meant to describe the ability of a person or a group of 
people to influence and control the behaviour of others in the direction that is against their will (Makatta et al., 
2015).  
 242
implementation of environmental policies and enforcement capacity at local level. 
Effective enforcement will also depend on the local actor’s capacity to respond to 
environmental problems, thus, the importance of information, education and bargaining 
power (Elazegui, 2002). Therefore, regulatory policies will only gain leverage if 
programmes to instruct and educate the communities and targeted groups are also 
adopted. 
 In this sense, this dissertation argues that instead of prioritising a short-term gain 
through command and control, measures for forest conservation and reduction of 
deforestation should promote long-term results that recognise the heterogeneity of forest 
landscapes. In other words, the main pillar of the REDD+ national strategy should not 
only be the enforcement of the national forest regulation, in this case the Forest Code, 
which mostly focus on command-and-control actvities. The importance of economic 
instruments for environmental policy is emphasised in the UNFCCC (see Decision 
2/CP17), which states that the use of economic instruments represents an advance for 
the national authorities (Gebara, 2015a). On the other hand, such instruments may not 
replace command-and-control measures; instead, may reduce some of the regulatory 
burden that undermines environmental policies (Karp and Gaulding, 1995). Moreover, in 
the search of self-interest motivations, rather than in the prevention of penalties, 
economic-oriented instruments may allow for a higher level of efficiency that command-
and-control approaches cannot accomplish (Karp and Gaulding, 1995). On the other 
hand, the REDD+ national framework in Brazil should also go beyond implementing PES 
actions, which offers rewards. However, PES and command-and-control measures have 
been at the heart of several REDD+ initiatives on the ground in Brazil.  
 Schemes as PES might be effective to cover opportunity costs only concerning 
activities where the same are low, while regulation, proportionate law enforcement, 
demand-side measures and political will are needed to hinder the more profitable drivers 
to deforestation. Therefore, effective combinations between regulations and incentives 
will be needed in order to avoid important drifting of the costs and prevent the capture of 
financial resources by opportunistic and powerful actors (Karsenty, 2012). However, the 
REDD+’s institutional framework should go even further and include a broader set of 
policies such as demand-side measures and crop-livestock-forest integration, especially 
focusing on capacity building, technology transfer and social learning. 
 In Brazil, the main economic instruments used to encourage changes in 
behaviour are fiscal and financial instruments (Gebara, 2015a; Nogueira and Borges, 
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2012). However, several of these instruments (such as the differentiation of taxes and 
financial subsidies for agriculture and livestock) are actually encouraging deforestation, 
especially in the Amazon region (Gebara, 2015a; May et al., 2011; McFarland et al., 
2015). Thus, rather than just controlling, environmental policies should be based on an 
understanding of the pivotal processes and practices that structure and drive 
deforestation, such as increasing demand for forest and agricultural commodities and 
subsidies that encourage the production of such commodities, prioritising sustainable 
landscapes and reflecting the natural stages of the ecosystem as well. Under that logic, 
the REDD+ framework should be aimed at changing this scenario, considering to 
redirect, remove, replace or at least to reduce such perverse incentives. For example, 
the total REDD+ investment has been 70 times smaller than the subsidies provided to 
the agricultural sector in the country (Denier et al., 2015). Moreover, recognising the 
multiple functions of landscapes, and having finance directed to local landscape scale 
actions, REDD+ would maximise its impact in tackling the varied drivers of deforestation 
and ecosystem destruction within a landscape (Denier et al., 2015).  
 
 
 6.9.4.4 Forest transition theory  
 The concept of “forest transition” was first proposed by geographer Alexander 
Mather from Aberdeen University to describe an empirical regularity observed in several 
countries, namely a national-scale shift from a shrinking to an expanding forest area 
(Mather, 1992). He discovered how the people in Scotland cleared most forests by the 
end of the 16th century and then reforested such areas in the 20th century with active 
State support (Kant and Shuirong, 2013). Forest transition theory (figure 18) follows the 
“depletion-melioration model” proposed by Whitaker (1940), which argues that at an 
early stage, natural resource destruction is inevitable to meet the human needs (Indarto 
and Mutaqin, 2016). This means, this theory suggests that initially a country has a high 
forest cover and low deforestation rate. However, in order to foster economic 
development, countries start using their natural resource base in the form of agricultural 
products and timber, leading to damage of natural ecosystems, and the conversion of 
forests for expanded agricultural systems (Angelsen, 2007). As a consequence, 
countries will then have high forest cover and high deforestation rate. This can be 
considered the current case of Brazil (see figure 19).  
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 According to Mattsson et al. (2016), additional development can reinforce and 
accelerate deforestation as a result of advancing infrastructure establishment that allows 
better access to markets with increasing demand for forest goods, resulting in low forest 
cover and high deforestation rates. Moreover, forest cover stabilises as countries 
develop economically, reducing the profitability of deforestation giving a low forest cover 
and low deforestation rate. At a later stage of development, economic activities shift from 
agricultural and resource extraction to an economy based on industry, agricultural 
expansion, higher incomes, increased environmental awareness and migration from 
rural to urban areas, reducing pressure on forests, and finally leading to forest recovery 
(Breitling, 2016). At some point, likewise forest scarcity increases the value of forest 
products which hinders further forest conversion leading to low forest cover and a 
negative deforestation rate. As a result, transition happens when declining forest cover 
trend reverse into increasing forest cover trend. 
 
 
Figure 18. Forest transition theory (Source: Köthke et al., 2011) 
  
 Forest transition theory is, on the other hand, a highly contested framework due 
to its general tendency to oversimplify a very complex process. Evidence suggests that 
the theory adequately describes processes currently under way in Africa and Latin 
America, as well as patterns in the USA and Europe (Roessing, 2015), even though the 
theory has been criticised as an example of an unfounded “grand theory” with limited 
empirical support (Perz, 2007). In sum, the forest transition theory is best viewed as a 
historical generalisation about a recurrent pattern of change in forest cover over time. In 
this sense, the theory has regained momentum in the scope of the REDD+ discussions 
and some have used it as a conceptual framework for setting reference levels for forest 
cover change (baselines) for REDD+ strategies (Angelsen and Rudel, 2013).  
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 Along the transition curve (figure 19) if a country’s location can be identified, an 
“anticipated deforestation rate” could gain more reliability (Leischner et al., 2011). The 
environmental effects of these forest transitions are very variable, depending on whether 
deforestation of old-growth forests continue, the proportions and types of tree plantations 
versus natural regeneration of forests, and the location and spatial configuration of the 
different types of forests (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2011). By integrating the theory into the 
establishment of REDD+ baselines, a baseline could be set in a manner which firstly is 
based on national historic deforestation and secondly takes into account local 
circumstances, both requirements for baselines established in UNFCCC negotiations 
(Leischner et al., 2011). Moreover, since experience has shown that REDD+ policies 
must be tailored to the specific national circumstances, given the different characteristics 
at each stage, and the need for different policies and the differences in ability to 
implement policies, it is argued by Angelsen and Rudel (2013) that different policies or 
sets of policies might be more appropriate and effective if they are established at 
different stages of the forest transition process. This means, policy makers would be 
able to derive some policy alternatives from this theory (Indarto and Mutaqin, 2016). 
Accordingly, two main policy directions can be derived from this theory, which are 
policies to curb deforestation and policies to accelerate the transition towards increasing 
forest cover (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2010). 
 
Figure 19. Forest curve (Source: CIFOR, 2017)169 
   
                                                 
169 Online available at: http://www1.cifor.org/pmrv/activities/rsgis/introduction.html  
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  Within this context, nevertheless, it is also argued that the forest transition theory 
may influence the REDD+ governance. For example, REDD+ actions could be directed 
to shortening the forest transition period, leading to a quicker stabilisation and recovery 
of forest areas (Roessing, 2015). Following this reasoning, it appears the potential that 
REDD+ may have to galvanize meaningful support for the broader architecture of global 
forest governance (Roessing, 2015). This can be analysed in the case of Brazil. For 
instance, at some point the transition turnover would occur as a result of the Brazilian 
economic development. With regard to the Amazon, this could occur now, with about 
80% of Amazonian forests still intact, or it could occur when there will be only 1% of the 
remaining forestlands. However, this does not mean that attention should no be given to 
other biomes. Probably the result in more degraded biomes would be visible and 
strongly significant, even though it would be more moderate in its overall magnitude. 
Nevertheless, the REDD+ should be used – if financing appears and is well applied – to 
foster economic activities that will give economic sense to the maintenance of the forest 
(involved in a heterogeous landscape) and, in this way, will assist for this transition to 
happen earlier. 
  In this context the concept of pro-active policy may be applied. It is argued by 
Drechsler et al. (2011) that that a delay-and-repair outcome may actually be much more 
expensive than a pro-active policy. They advocate that pro-active policies may lead to 
win-win situations where better conservation can be achieved at lower costs (Dechsler et 
al., 2011). Thus, if REDD+ may be capable of enhancing a forest-based economy 
(acting as a pro-active action), supported by sustainable forest management at 
landscape level, probably forest felling would not make further sense. The problem is 
that forest management requires a very high initial investment, for returns that will only 
come in the medium and long term. Should REDD+ provide that initial capital, which 
would support entrepreneurs (in the broadest sense of the word, e.g. large landowners, 
cooperatives within protected areas or indigenous groups, etc), REDD+ could leave as a 
legacy a forest transition period resulting from the implementation of a forest-based 
economy. These forms of systematically-managed forest landscapes represent 
important opportunities that relate directly to the fight against climate change and it might 
constitute necessary additions to the current REDD+ structure (Galbert et al., 2013). 
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CHAPTER 7 Conclusions 
 
 
 7.1 Lessons learned 
 The relationship between trees and global warming is more complex than the 
elementary question of the GHG they absorb and emit. However, it is known that 
deforestation and forest degradation release great amounts of GHG and aggravates 
global and local warming. Around the world, particularly in developing countries, land 
use change is one of the major causes of a large share of GHG emissions. Deforestation 
is considered the most frequent land-use change in Brazil. Most of this deforestation 
process is attributed to the expansion of pasturelands and agriculture. In spite of the 
profits provided by agricultural activities, recent data suggests that the conservation of 
forested areas is extremely important for climate balance. The natural dynamics of any 
forest ecosystem guarantees the balance of carbon flows, as well as the good health of 
other biogeochemical processes (e.g. water cycle, recycling of nutrients, photosynthesis 
etc.). In this context, deforestation results in considerable changes in the cycles of these 
elements and allows carbon stocks to quickly reach the atmosphere, altering 
atmospheric composition (Manfrinato et al., 2007). 
 Hence, the argument that an economic value needs to be attributed to natural 
resources has taken a different perspective over the past decades. Markets have valued 
resources that are used for industrial purposes, such as minerals, water, soils, and a 
myriad of natural resource that can be introduced into the productive process and added 
value through transformation (even timber can be possibly thought in that way). 
Nonetheless, the forest itself has been introduced to the center stage in recent decades 
given the role it plays in so many processes related to things less tangible, such as the 
natural regulation of climate. Thus, the question related to the fact that if such a natural 
resource be transformed due to the economic development of a given region, affecting 
the characteristics of nature elsewhere, then the matter of attributing a value to the 
transformed forest to be taken by development and turned into agricultural areas, this 
has impacted the debate to a different level. The complexity of such hypothesis might 
give difficulties for our modern society to discuss and accept the issue that humans can 
impact nature in such a way that it will change the natural world to an extent that is 
irreversible or create impacts to our planet that externalities become something rather 
larger then the desired development. 
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 In this context, the role of forests to mitigate climate change has been fully 
recognised also in the Paris Agreement during COP21. With a specific article devoted to 
REDD+ (article 5), the document establishes that tropical and sub-tropical countries can 
receive both public and private funding if they succeed in reducing their GHG emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation. Together with the fact that the Agreement 
comprehends REDD and the ‘plus’ part of REDD (the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries), this is claimed to be a clear call to action for countries to endorse policies that 
conserve standing forests. In Brazil, the REDD+ debate has also moved forward over 
the past years. In 2010, the federal government started developing its national strategy 
on REDD+, the so-called “ENREDD+”. Efforts have been made to (i) ensure the 
successful implementation of a REDD+ policy aimed at promoting sustainable forest use 
while accounting for the driving forces of deforestation, and (ii) integrate REDD+ into 
existing conservation instruments. Brazil also incorporated REDD+ in its INDC to the 
UNFCCC, now Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution since the Brazilian 
Government adopted the Paris Agreement on 12 September 2016. In 2015, REDD+ was 
also regulated in the Brazilian environmental legislation through Decree 8.576/2015. 
However, exactly how REDD+ is to be inserted into national development and climate 
strategies prevail as the major questions (Angelsen and Verchot, 2015) and different 
aspects of the mechanism remain disputed.  
 The ENREDD+ is the document that formalises how the Brazilian Government 
has structured efforts until the moment and how it intends to improve them by 2020, 
focusing on coordinated actions to prevent and control deforestation and forest 
degradation, promote forest recovery and promote sustainable development. The overall 
objective that guides the ENREDD+ is to contribute to mitigate GHG emissions defeating 
illegal deforestation, conserving and restoring ecosystems, promoting socio-economic 
and environmental benefits. The National Commission on REDD+ (CONAREDD+) will 
coordinate monitoring, finance and benefit-sharing systems, but it will be highly 
influenced by three thematic advisory board based on three pillars for fostering a 
sustainable forest economy: (i) coordination of public policy on climate change and 
forests, (ii) measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of results and safeguards, 
and (iii) financing, fundraising and distribution of payments for REDD+ results.  
 Brazil has chosen to set their reference levels by biome, using at first historical 
data monitored in the Amazon, adopting the historical average from 1996 to 2005 
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(19,625 km2) and, for the Cerrado the historical average from 1999 to 2005 (15,700 km2) 
and will later encompass all biomes. However, the ENREDD+ does not define very 
clearly how monitoring (MRV) activities will be adopted, improved, financed and 
extended to all biomes. On the other hand, the Ministry of Environment (MMA) released 
in November 2015 its Environmental Monitoring Strategy for All Biomes. Moreover, the 
government is developing its Modular System for Monitoring GHG Emissions Reductions 
(SMMARE), which may also be used for the purposes of performance-based payments, 
once the GHG emissions reduction results can be made available through the system. 
On the other hand, although Brazil has a sophisticated satellite-based forest monitoring 
system, a critical point relies on the inability to distinguish between legal and illegal 
logging.  
 The collection of resources will be based on achieved and measured results, 
whereas the distribution of resources will take place in a decentralised manner guided by 
the CONAREDD+. However, it remains unanswered how such distribution of resources 
will be established and implemented. The fundraising actions will seek bilateral 
partnerships or international financial institutions willing to offer payments by results 
through the Amazon Fund. The Amazon Fund is a private fund created by the federal 
government in 2008 aimed at raising donations for non-reimbursable investments in 
efforts to combat deforestation, and to promote the sustainable use of forests (NORAD, 
2011). Nevertheless, it should be noted that international financing support slowed after 
2010 due to the global economic crisis (Norman and Nakhooda, 2014). On the other 
hand, the likelihood of a viable performance-based market mechanism remains 
uncertain. Furthermore for some specialists, much of the claimed climate financing 
mobilisation is relabeling of existing official development ﬂows, meaning that financing 
issues will remain the most important dilemma into the REDD+ context. Regardless this 
impasse, the reluctance of the Brazilian Government to be against financial options on 
market mechanisms, may result in loss of opportunities in the future. The government 
should also pursue financial channels within its own range of existing national 
mechanisms to establish the REDD+ in the country. This would enable Brazil to identify 
opportunities to align existents investments with anti-deforestation policies in sectors 
such as agriculture, whose expansion is one of the main drivers of deforestation in the 
country. Moreover, since the REDD+ framework has broadened its targets, it opened 
possibilities for other sources of financing. However, the main question is to know if 
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whether the ENREDD+ will accept these others sources as official funding (Alves-Pinto 
et al., 2016).   
 In the strategic scope, the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC) and the 
Forest Code provide the groundwork guidelines for REDD+ actions throughout Brazil. In 
the tactical-operational dimension, the action plans for prevention and control of 
deforestation in biomes are the main instruments for the integration and articulation of 
REDD+ initiatives. The Amazon and the Cerrado are the two out of six Brazilian biomes 
that have plans of action in execution phase – the PPCDAm, since 2004, and the 
PPCerrado, since 2010. The PPCDAm and PPCerrado have interfaces with sectoral 
plans for mitigation and adaptation to climate change such as the Low Carbon 
Agriculture Plan (ABC Plan) and the Plan for the Reduction of Emissions of the Steel 
Industry (Charcoal Plan), for example. 
 Nevertheless, the Brazilian Federal Government still fails to channel the 
necessary level of resources into REDD+ and environmental initiatives often stumble 
over economic interests, especially regarding agriculture expansion and infrastructure 
development. Problems such as lack of governance, poorly defined property rights, land 
use conflicts and negligence with the environmental legislation persist (Fatorelli et al., 
2015; Gebara et al., 2014) also add uncertainty about REDD+’s potential to halt forest 
clearance. The high level of corruption and bureaucracy in the public sector has 
contributed to the emergence of environmentally damaging policies and laws in the past 
(Alves, 2014; Valberg, 2011) and the recent decrease in deforestation rates in Brazil is 
threatened by agricultural growth expectations in face of increasing commodity prices 
(The World Bank, 2015). Altogether, these problems pose obstacles to the 
establishment of an effective and efficient REDD+ strategy, putting already vulnerable 
groups of society at greater risk. At the same time, they suggest the need to build a new 
vision on what development pathway Brazil should pursue considering the natural 
aptitudes of all Brazilian biomes and integrating environmental protection with economic 
interests while addressing social constraints. 
 REDD+ has been proposed as a potentially paradigm-shifting alternative to 
previous forest-climate related policy interventions. Moreover, REDD+ has become 
highly politicised (with the possibility of substantial international payment for results). In 
this sense, it was recognised that in order to succeed, REDD+ should be seen as more 
than just a framework focused on forests and the rate of deforestation, but rather, it 
should be considered within the broader context of economic development (Albani et al., 
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2012). Moreover, it was noticed that only by providing a direct market incentive it would 
be probably insufficient for deforestation rates to be reduced, because the opportunity 
costs of land users are exceedingly high. Furthermore, there are also complex issues of 
governance involved (i.e. land tenure and rights of indigenous and local communities), 
while at the same time strong economic interests exist to convert forests to agricultural 
land (Hein et al., 2012). Paradoxically, with the increase in scope of REDD+, the 
institutional and technical challenges to implement such framework have also drastically 
increased. This means, in the exercise of trying to make REDD+ implementable and 
serve a wide variety of interests, its implementation becomes more and more difficult 
(Vijge, 2016).  
 This research converges on its goal from different main directions. 
Questionnaires and interviews were applied and conducted to collect primary data 
focused on addressing the major challenges and barriers existent in the Brazilian 
context. In total, 58 different respondents have participated, among them, 15 ministries 
and secretariats (comprising federal and state level). Moreover, two independent 
consultants; six universities (four national and two international); four private companies; 
18 Civil Society Organizations, Funds, Foundations (twelve national and six 
international); 13 Institutes, NGOs, Non-Profit Organizations (ten national and three 
international). Secondary data spanned recent scientific literature on topics such as 
climate change, the REDD+ mechanism, forest governance and several other 
documents – strategic, policy studies, legislative (e.g. ENREDD+ official public 
document) – were examined. 
 The approach to determining the relative importance of constraints to the 
development of REDD+ at national level in Brazil is peculiar to this research which 
conceptualised policy development as a bridge building exercise. In terms of constraints, 
the most significant challenges indicated by most of the interviewees with regard to the 
Brazilian scenario were those related to governance. The most cited problems were the 
lack of coordination between different governmental agencies, contradictions among 
forest-related policies (agriculture/livestock, conservation, energy and mining), 
coordination of actions at local and sub-national levels with the ones at the federal level, 
lack of participation in decision-making, land tenure conflicts, lack of cross-sectoral 
interaction and deficient long-term financing. Within the governmental sphere, those 
challenges related to policies’ implementation and financing of activities were mostly 
recognised. Interviews revealed three predominantly highlighted opinions regarding 
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interaction issues: i) lack of interaction among involved institutions, ii) lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of the Brazilian strategy on REDD+ and iii) lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of how the developed activities could better cooperate 
among them under the proposed REDD+ framework. On the other hand, the challenges 
that provoked the least concern among interviewees included leakage, scope of 
activities and monitoring system. 
 In order to completely achieve its mitigation potential, the REDD+ architecture 
requires changes in the form of modified economic (by offering new economic 
incentives), regulatory and governance frameworks, removal of perverse incentives and 
reforms of forest sector and agribusiness policies (Angelsen et al, 2012). The question is 
to know if REDD+ will be able to enhance the combat to deforestation or whether 
business as usual policies will be maintained. The idea is that REDD+ as a policy 
domain enforce policy actors to disrupt existing policy monopolies that have engendered 
unsustainable patterns of forest loss (Jodoin, 2015). Moreover, to catalyse the 
development and adoption of transformative policies that can enhance carbon 
sequestration in the forests, tackling problems at the intersections of forest governance, 
climate change, and sustainable development. 
 In this sense, it has been argued throughout this dissertation that alongside the 
technical issues, there are also concerns over equity and the role of the forest-
dependent communities in the context of REDD+. Furthermore, successful REDD+ 
strategies require strong multi-level coordination, linking the global need and ‘willingness 
to pay’ for climate action with national and sub-national institutions and local people’s 
needs and aspirations as well as linking effective information, incentives and institutions 
across levels (Angelsen et al., 2012). REDD+ might be the opportunity to promote 
sustainability, based on a new development paradigm, even though engagement and 
commitment of actors or the coordination of policies and actions are not easy tasks (Gil, 
2010). Governments must therefore assume their role in this transition process, setting 
up a national strategy to be followed in all levels, agreed upon between all stakeholders 
and ensuring the political, legal and institutional conditions for the implementation of 
sustainable solutions. The following are central obstacles identified during the analysis 
that need to be overcome for a worthwhile establishment of the Brazilian national 
strategy on REDD+: 
 
 253
 Brazil in its NDC is committing to residual reductions over the next 15 years, 
proposing only to stabilise GHG emissions in the coming years; 
 The restoration targets implied by the Forest Code are greater than the 12 million 
hectares of forest indicated in the NDC goal; 
 The multiple-use approach of reforestation demands great attention because 
“reforestation” activities could mean establishing commercial tree plantations 
(replacing natural forests); 
 The Brazilian NDC commits to eliminate illegal deforestation by 2030, but this 
target is actually a step back from the country’s previous commitment (2008) that 
envisaged reaching zero-illegal deforestation by 2015; 
 Although in theory all other biomes are also considered priorities for the 
development of REDD+ initiatives in Brazil, most conservation efforts have been 
directed at the Amazon; 
 The Brazilian NDC also pledges to compensate for “legal suppression of 
vegetation”. Firstly, this also seems to be related only to Amazon, and it remains 
unclear to what extent this can be interpreted as net-zero emissions from 
deforestation; 
 There is no mention in the final version of the ENREDD+ how Brazil will account 
for emissions from forest degradation. The Paris Agreement follows the Decision 
15/CP19 which only reaffirms, recognises and encourages the importance of 
addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, but it does not 
establish a formal guideline for it. Furthermore, degradation is also not 
considered regarding the measurement of emission reduction within the Amazon 
Fund scope; 
 Interviewees declared that, since 2012, the REDD+ scenario has substantially 
changed at the national level. There was a reduction of participation and 
discussion levels within the REDD+ policy processes; 
 There is a low level of representativeness from the civil society, indigenous 
groups and forest-dependent communities in the National Commission on 
REDD+ (CONAREDD+); 
 One of the major problems concerning the implementation of safeguards is the 
difficulty in establishing indicators that truly demonstrate that these safeguards 
are being addressed under the REDD+ system; 
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 The ENREDD+ still lacks important details on the incorporation and 
operationalisation of national mechanisms for benefit-sharing;  
 Objectives for coordination and governance have been set but implementation 
details are deficiently described in the final version of the ENREDD+; 
 An impediment to the development of the national strategy on REDD+ in Brazil is 
the lack of alignment between state-level policies and the federal government; 
 The ENREDD+ must consider the incorporation of previous REDD+ sub-national 
and local actions into its scope under the national umbrella; 
 Brazil lacks a clear distribution of responsibilities for following up on the policies 
and plans established in the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC), 
reflecting in this way the REDD+ implementation throughout the country; 
 The Brazilian institutional design is also a problem. Actors involved in institutional 
structures often do not have the same power or influence, and several new 
actors remain outside of the official political system. Various inter-ministerial 
conflicts exist due to discrepant interests and forest protection is not always a 
shared priority (Valberg, 2011); 
 Brazil‘s legal framework in the environmental and forestry areas spreads 
governance responsibilities among a number of state- and federal-level 
institutions, which can create confusion and disputes; 
 Although the Ministry of Environment has assumed a leading role on the 
development of the ENREDD+, it does not seem to be able to coordinate state 
and federal actors nor to link up different sectors and levels relevant to REDD+ 
framework, not including in this policy network arena an important role for the 
private sector (Gebara et al., 2014). 
  
 Additionally, it is already commonplace to observe that sustainable development 
may only occur if a country has “good institutions” in place. Therefore, implementing a 
framework as REDD+ requires substantial policy change and governance reform 
(Angelsen, 2009; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Brockhaus et al., 2014) which involves 
conflicting interests, power disputes and complicated policy processes in a complex 
governance system of different actors from different sectors and levels (Brockhaus et al., 
2014). On the other hand, an appropriate REDD+ framework might be a catalyst for 
these changes as well as contributing to their occurrence. In this sense, this dissertation 
also deliberated the domestic governance framework necessary to enhance sustainable 
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forest landscape under REDD+ scenario, identifying areas of policy that need 
consideration in this context in Brazil, focusing on four main topics: 
 
 Anti-corruption measures 
 When challenges to the effectiveness of REDD+ are attributed to problems of 
“governance”, corruption and lack of policing usually are treated as core obstacles to 
REDD+’s implementation. Corruption undermines democracy breeding poverty and 
public mistrust of impartial justice and the government and, as a result, reduces 
economic growth (Winbourne, 2002). What makes the environmental sector distinctive 
from any other area is that corruption is provoked by large amounts of formal and 
informal revenues that can be gained from environmental products (e.g. minerals, 
timber, etc). For those countries that are well-supplied in environmental resources and 
whose economies are mainly based on them (e.g. Brazil), resource distribution, 
extraction and management become fertile grounds for a culture with widespread 
corruption. Within the forest sector context, corruption undermines the framing, 
implementation and subsequent monitoring of policies aimed at conserving standing 
forests (Angelsen, 2009) and, illicit acts are often associated with interactions between 
public and private actors (Bulte et al., 2007), where financial incentives or status-related 
benefits are offered (or sought) to deviate from an established framework of rules and 
regulations (Williams, 2011). Although illegal logging and acts of forest corruption are not 
synonymous, it is widely recognised that they can be linked (Bofin et al., 2011).  
 In a context of forest management, the term “illegality”  is a complicated concept, 
because legal actions in the forestry sector are not always justifiable – certain logging 
concessions may be questionable for a range of reasons – and some illegal acts may in 
fact be rather acceptable, for subsistence reasons for example (Sundström, 2016). The 
extent of illegal activities in the forestry sector is notoriously difficult to estimate in order 
to determine the precise amount of deforestation (and, by extension, carbon emissions) 
that should be attributed to corrupt activity (Tacconi et al., 2009). In spite of the fact that 
the fight against corruption alone will not solve the problem of deforestation in Brazil, 
corruption can be considered a pervasive socio-economic problem in the country, 
reaching almost the entire public sector in Brazil. Therefore, to reach the goal of zero 
illegal deforestation and make REDD+ workable (enforcing governance), the authorities 
in Brazil have to put massive effort in adopting anti-corruption measures and, ultimately 
ceasing the systemic corrupt practices culture in the country. 
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 Land Tenure 
 There is increasing recognition that secure access to land is needed for rural 
households to make use of sustainable livelihood development at landscape level. 
Much of the existing literature that addresses the influence of institutional 
arrangements on forest management identifies that secure tenure relies on, and is 
conditioned by, governance. Rights without effective sanctions against their violation 
are insufficient, while institutional effort in support of sustainable forest management 
in the absence of clear forest use rights is likely to be undermined. Therefore, 
effective tenure will remotely be achieved without supportive policy and institutional 
systems. In countries where tenure security over forest is weakened, REDD+ can 
pose a risk for forest-dependent communities, who could be dispossessed, excluded 
and marginalised. While insecure tenure makes local people vulnerable to 
dispossession as land values increase secure resource tenure gives them more 
influence in negotiations with government and the private sector. Furthermore, 
unclear or insecure tenure may in itself promote deforestation activities. 
Deforestation may be a way of showing occupation where land claims are contested. 
 In Brazil, inadequate access to land and insecure land tenure are factors behind 
rural poverty, violence, human rights abuses, etc. In the Amazon, unclear land tenure 
is a major deforestation driver that serves as a disincentive to sustainably managed 
forests. Moreover, the uncertainty about property rights indirectly leads to the 
exclusion of local populations in the political process and benefit-sharing processes, 
as they lack the opportunity to participate in the implementation of REDD+ initiatives, 
for instance. Thus, tenure and rights link closely to safeguards for REDD+. That said, 
the fair distribution of REDD+ benefits will not be achieved without a prior reform in 
forest governance and more secure tenure systems, which is not explicitly reflected 
in the national strategy on REDD+. Approximately 80 million hectares of 
undesignated public forests in the Amazon could be allocated as protected areas, 
production forests or other categories of use (Moutinho et al., 2016). This allocation 
could also preserve a stock of ten billion tonnes of forest carbon and contribute 
significantly to the conservation of biological diversity of the region. Moreover, land 
designations would benefit from flexible agreements between the government and 
land users, given the recent evidence that flexibility of some use rights for 
smallholders can increase achievement of conservation goals.  
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 Ultimately, clarifying tenure rights is pivotal to an equitable and effective REDD+ 
framework as it can help identify who the key REDD+ stakeholders are, who should 
obtain benefits, who should participate in decision-making processes, ensuring the 
permanence of standing forests. It is believed that strengthening local property rights 
and promoting land tenure reform can contribute to promoting social and economic 
development, encouraging local investment in land and resources, enabling access 
to credit through use of titles as collateral, improving land markets, establishing a 
legal basis for excluding competitors and as result reducing resource conflict and 
encouraging sustainable resource use (Sunderlin et al., 2008). Moreover, without 
clear tenure rights is difficult to identify the responsible ones for deforestation, 
making it also challenging for landholders to enter into long-term agreements to 
commit themselves to reduce deforestation and access potential REDD+ benefits. 
This means that land tenure and property rights are strongly tied to carbon 
ownership and consequently to distribution of benefits in the REDD+ scope. Thus, 
land tenure reform should be prioritised in REDD+ frameworks. 
 
 Spatial and land use planning and zoning 
 Land-use planning is a broad strategy that promises to forge a consensus 
between conservation and development at landscape scale (affecting governance), 
where lands should be ranked on the basis of their best uses. In the context of 
REDD+, it is argued that present large scale use decisions are being densely 
influenced by global demand for resources and economic considerations, and 
consequently, the significance of transparent and coordinated land use planning and 
zoning combined with a participatory planning at local level is preeminent (Sidle et 
al., 2010). By participatory it should be understood as a collaborative process 
mutually respected by all actors, including a participatory consultation process 
involving all relevant stakeholders, which should be enforced in REDD+ actions.  
 In this respect, spatial planning can therefore become a tool that will channel 
participation in land use decisions, although such participation occurs mostly in the 
early stages of development (Fosci, 2014). Moreover, it would provide a permanent 
institutional structure that can be used by stakeholders on a regular basis to receive 
information, provide further inputs, or file complaints. It would also assist REDD+ 
actions to enable the coordination and integration of national policies across sectors 
and levels of government, generating investor confidence to adopt more sustainable 
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land uses, apart from the fact that it would provide more accurate information on 
drivers and reference levels. The REDD+ framework in Brazil should therefore 
contribute to consolidate such actions, combining the efforts on agro-ecological 
zoning with environmental conservation measures integrating actions and 
information under a consolidated national system. 
 
 Finance 
 The relatively high opportunity costs of conservation compared to more profitable 
land-use options and the lack of viable alternatives to generate income in forested areas 
mostly result in high deforestation rates. A key question is to find avenues for extracting 
value from forests other than from timber. Moreover, even though extensive monitoring 
and strict legislation are the fundamental basis to any policy that seeks to extinguish 
deforestation, they have not been sufficient to reach this goal, as observed in the 
Amazon region. Thus, by attributing a financial value to the carbon stored in forests and 
offering tropical countries economic incentives to fight deforestation, REDD+ started 
gaining support as an adequate alternative tool to halt forest destruction while reducing 
GHG emissions. In this sense, although the value of forests can be hardly calculated, 
REDD+ payments may outline the economic balance away from loss of forests and in 
favour of sustainable forest management. 
 Finance has been a pivotal issue for the prosperity of REDD+ since its inception 
and is a continual topic in international negotiations. However, knowledge remains 
incomplete and still there are challenges and gaps that make it difficult to have 
comprehensive and conclusive remarks about the state of REDD+ finance. REDD+ has 
evolved from the idea that forest conservation could attract relevant financial resources 
by allowing the generation of carbon credits that could be used for compliance in cap-
and-trade programmes in developed nations, towards a national framework in 
developing countries with funding provided by international donors. However, there is 
tremendous debate over whether REDD+ should be linked to carbon trading system. 
Many critics, particularly indigenous groups and traditional communities, fear that 
REDD+ will lead to investors and speculators buying up forestlands to earn carbon 
credits, threatening their homes and livelihoods. Therefore, with the delayed 
development of these compliance markets, the REDD+ framework relies primarily on 
public sources of funds. Nevertheless, the World Bank estimates that investments 
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needed for such actions far exceed all international development assistance, suggesting 
an opportunity for carbon market activities.   
 On the other hand, although there is an evident need to move away from a 
dependence on public funds alone, there is also a contradictorily consensus that, 
whatever the architecture decided for REDD+, there is a need of public funding for 
supporting policies and measures. However, there is also a growing awareness that 
contributions and investments from the private sector are necessary in this context. 
Political authorities could choose from an array of relevant instruments such as: from 
changes in fiscal policies, to advance market commitments de-risking private 
investments to the use of green bonds raising capital for delivering REDD+ results. 
However, in Brazil several of these instruments (such as the differentiation of taxes and 
financial subsidies for agriculture and livestock) are actually encouraging deforestation, 
especially in the Amazon region. Hence, the REDD+ framework should be aimed at 
changing this scenario at landscape level, considering the re-direction of these financial 
flows that currently support and enable such environmental damages, promoting this 
way a transition towards alternative forms of development. 
 REDD+ finances are used for implementation, monitoring and “readiness” plans. 
The Warsaw Framework adopted at COP 19 brought REDD+ closer to being operational 
as a global mechanism under the UNFCCC. Parties agreed that the Green Climate Fund 
would play an important role in channeling REDD+ payments to developing country 
governments, and that performance-based payments will depend on result-based 
actions. This means, payments will come after the recipients prove that deforestation 
rates have been reduced. Experiences on result-based finance schemes are still limited, 
but these experiences provide remarkable lessons learned in setting the specific 
arrangements for receiving such funding. Nevertheless, such experiences also show 
how difficult it is to actually establish performance criteria and benchmarks (including 
reference levels). Emerging outside of these formal multilateral institutions the most 
interesting are perchance the bilateral agreements. For example, in 2008, Norway 
pledged up to US$1 billion to Brazil for verifiable proof that deforestation had decreased. 
This was the starting point from the Amazon Fund. On the other hand, it is argued by 
some specialists that funding sources, access modalities and disbursement remain 
points of disagreements between beneficiaries and donor countries and, that bilateral 
financial arrangements are often perceived as inadequate. In the case of Brazil, since 
the Amazon Fund will remain the ruling instrument of REDD+ actions financial source, 
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there are several improvements that should be implemented, as explored in this 
dissertation. 
 REDD+ raises questions about how result-based approaches works in practice, 
its advantages, and its limitations. Performance-based finance may produce significant 
incentives tackling climate change or a broad range of other social and economic 
challenges with the vision of shifting the paradigm towards low-emission development. 
However, the scale and predictability of result-based finance has been too limited to 
trigger the necessary transformational changes in the forestry and land-use sector. 
Moreover, another concern with results-based payments is that such an approach may 
fail to address the root causes of ecosystem degradation and might be based on the 
notion that financial gains are the primary motivation for action. Thus, while 
performance-based finance is meant to align incentives to improve governance, this can 
not be promised or guaranteed. 
 Ultimately, finance for REDD+ can come from a variety of sources, but no single 
source may be sufficient for a triumphant outcome. Some critics state that much of the 
claimed ﬁnancing mobilisation is relabeling or redirection of existing official development 
ﬂows, which means that financing issues will remain the most important dilemma 
influencing how rapidly developing countries will move on implementing their NDCs. On 
the other hand, one of the key messages in this context is that although international 
finance is distinguished and necessary, identifying domestic investments and aligning 
them towards REDD+ frameworks may contribute to REDD+ countries sending a strong 
political signal and show their commitment to REDD+ goals. 
 
 In summary, sharing power and responsibility in REDD+ policy and governance 
development involves cross-sector and cross-scale stakeholders’ links among 
government and non-governmental organisations, financial institutions and targeted 
groups (e.g. indigenous people) as well as the effective implementation of the rule of 
law. Ultimately, it is argued that the environmental and socio-economic aspects are not 
the only variables in the climate crisis equation. Combating deforestation and climate 
change should be transforming the existing relations of power, hierarchy and 
exploitation, revamping the manner in which the entire society consumes natural 
resources. For Gorz (1980), the global ecological crisis is largely addressed in terms of 
problem-solving and technical approaches. He states that policy makers and managers 
of capitalism usually attempt to assimilate ecological necessities as technical constraints 
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rather than a political or social problem, which enables their capacity to “adapt” the 
conditions of domination and exploitation of natural resources. Although techno-
institutional and behavioural arrangements are significant in this equation, such 
occurrence on a global scale can not be limited to it. Therefore, the contemporaneous 
“social“ crisis related to the politics of climate change should not be preserved and 
sustained only by a set of bureaucratic and administrative manoeuvres but rather by a 
fundamental alteration in social equations of power (D’Souza, 2005). This implies for 
REDD+ that unequal power relations might be a relevant explanatory factor for 
inequitable access to natural resources and since debates on REDD+ are linked to 
climate justice and rural development, the success of REDD+ can not be based on a 
design promoting uneven development.   
 
 
 
 7.2 Final remarks 
 The present dissertation set out to investigate the overall framework of REDD+ 
development as a national strategy in Brazil, identifying the major challenges and policy 
constraints of this development design process. Moreover, the research discussed the 
pertinent domestic governance framework (identifying tools, mechanims and policy 
areas that should be prioritsed) necessary to achieve sustainable forest landscape under 
REDD+ scenario, in order for REDD+ to enhance governance practices. This 
dissertation has assisted this understanding and highlighted the importance of 
institutional strength and politics in shaping domestic REDD+ policies. Through the 
challenges and obstacles associated with the findings presented in this context, this 
dissertation may have shown several reasons that might lead to the REDD+ failure 
because so far REDD+ efforts have not been entirely able to change the basic 
deforestation logic. Instead, the main message is the opposite. The prospective 
discussion developed throughout the dissertation established the main features that 
should be pursued for enabling REDD+ to work in achieving its core goals, especially 
within the Brazilian context. As stated by DeShazo et al. (2016), it is important to 
understand the weaknesses of any policy before it would be possible to make the 
necessary adjustments to improve the chances of success of such policy.   
 Chapter one introduced the research background and provided the information 
needed to understand the research context. Also, the research problems, the research 
objectives, the methodological approach and the research limitations were introduced. 
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The next chapter, Chapter two, explored the sustainable forest landscape governance 
approach as the overarching concept for the effective implementation of REDD+ in 
Brazil. Chapter three focused on the role of forest issues in international politics. It 
examined the forest development context in international agreements centering the focal 
point on the relationship between forest and climate change. In Chapter four, the 
REDD+ mechanism was introduced. The chapter explored several aspects of the 
mechanism in order to provide a substantial understanding of its role in the climate 
agreement umbrella. It also examined the high complexity of technical requirements, as 
well as social, political, economic and institutional issues related to the REDD+ 
framework. Chapter five, focused on the Brazilian context in the climate debate. It 
started with an overview of Brazil. It described the context of forest conservation in the 
country and explored the evolution of the Brazilian position concerning climate change 
and forest-related issues as well as the development of domestic forest-climate-related 
measures. It ended discussing and introducing the context of REDD+ in Brazil. Chapter 
six presented the findings related to the research questions that guided the study, 
meaning that, in this chapter, the findings of the research were presented, discussed 
and interpreted. 
 As argued throughout this dissertation, Brazil faces several institutional 
challenges such as the lack of appropriate forest resource governance, weak property 
rights, land use conflicts and poor enforcement of the environmental legislation. 
Nevertheless, the National Strategy on REDD+ presents some key elements for building 
a solid REDD+ policy in Brazil. In particular, REDD+ has been framed as a public policy 
that, amongst several objectives, seeks to identify those which legitimately act towards 
forest conservation and deals with deforestation drivers under the logic of integrating 
existing policy initiatives. At the moment, the major challenge is to design an institutional 
framework that ensures the successful aggregation of all decisive features as well as the 
achievement of a permanent solution to remaining land use issues – including the 
promotion of sustainable development activities and land use regularisation, zoning and 
planning.  
 Clearly, the focal point should not only be sustaining low deforestation rates, but 
also tackling the institutional weaknesses driving deforestation. Understanding (not only 
identifying) the drivers behind forest disturbance and identifying the local demands is 
indispensable to the formulation of a sustainable solution to curb deforestation, 
disqualifying actions that destroy and degrade forests. Despite the achievements, more 
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than ever, this is the moment to act since the deforestation rates have been increasing 
since 2012 throughout the country, but mostly in the Amazon region. As argued, Brazil 
must develop an economic model without promoting deforestation; otherwise, 
deforestation rates will continue to increase as it is already happening. Should this be 
the new trend in Brazil, it will be extremely difficult for Brazil to achieve its GHG 
reduction targets until 2020 and forward.  
 The arguments of different specialists suggest that the design of a strategy is 
needed prior to the establishment of an operational system, meaning that setting 
regulations is essential for building a national strategy on REDD+. The establishment of 
an adequate institutional arrangement for REDD+ should be integrated into the national 
development interests and be in accordance with the national environmental policy. 
Otherwise, issues such as the growing demand for food and infrastructural development 
are likely to take precedence over the goals of environmental preservation. Thus, the 
successful formulation of the national REDD+ strategy must be concerned not only with 
the promotion of a more sustainable use of forest resources, but also take into account 
the forces behind deforestation, being integrated into a mix of existing conservation 
instruments. In this sense, adopting a consolidated and cooperative landscape approach 
would integrate multiple options and generate useful key-scenarios to formulating 
strategies for maintaining standing forests, dealing with the trade-offs between 
conflicting issues such as food security, energy needs, and the preservation of natural 
resources.  
 Since the Earth Summit, an increased emphasis is placed on environmental 
challenges whose solution requires addressing social aspects. Although Brazil is 
advancing on this aspect, the analysis reveals that the country must still shift its focus 
towards a broader and more holistic view on sustainable development. Many years have 
passed in the evolution of environmental policies in the country. However, as re-affirmed 
with the findings, the environmental conflicts that Brazil faces, it seems continuously to 
be the same ones, happening also in the context of REDD+. The evaluation indicates 
that an ineffective development of sustainable policies towards conservation still prevails 
in the country. In fact, these policies often result in misconceived land occupation, badly 
planned conservation areas, lack of financing and technical support, and absence of 
environmental monitoring and can even stimulate deforestation. Brazil should therefore 
emphasise the socio-economic and environmental aspects of this multi-dimensional 
context that also includes cultural ties as well as spiritual commitments. For example, by 
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turning forests into an economic asset and strengthening institutions and laws through 
sustainable participatory political processes (adopting for instance measures of conflict 
mediation), Brazil will be in a much better position to deal with the environmental 
challenges it has been facing. For instance, observing the economic history of the 
Amazon region is sufficient to notice that when a forest located in an accessible place is 
kept idle from an economic perspective and without the presence of traditional and 
indigenous communities, this asset becomes the target of clandestine exploitation. 
REDD+ should therefore be used to overcome the limits of command and control and 
create positive incentives to induce behavioural change. 
 This shift of paradigm still did not happen in Brazil, however. In certain aspects 
Brazil is even receding as by the fact that almost 70% of the planned investments on 
energy will go to fossil fuel in the next ten years. Although over the past two decades 
Brazil has “evolved” its stance and has gained political prestige in climate change and 
forest negotiations, it seems that the Brazilian Government only supports more 
sustainable activities according to the possibilities in achieving a higher political status in 
the international arena. But even this aspect is weakened within the governmental area 
at the moment. For instance, the federal government still has not signed the New York 
Declaration on Forests from 2014 (even though the state of Acre and several Brazilian 
NGOs supported the pledge), which endorse a global timeline to cut natural forest loss  
in half by 2020, and strive to end it by 2030. The economic and political crisis in which 
the country has plunged does not contribute to the defense of forests either. 
Nevertheless, sustainability in all its dimensions must be internalised and 
institutionalised into concrete actions of the government. This is required in cases where 
law enforcement is critical, as observed in Brazil. 
 Finally, REDD+ frameworks may be sufficiently broad to accommodate different 
interests. This means, REDD+ can make a significant contribution to climate change 
mitigation while also serving other goals (e.g. adaptation). Policies that support drivers of 
deforestation and related institutional arrangements hamper transformational change 
and create path-dependencies that are difficult to escape. Over time, these policies 
create institutional structures that drive up the profitability of competing land uses, 
effectively consolidating the power of key sectors driving deforestation and forest 
degradation. The question is therefore how to avoid such path dependencies. In this 
sense, REDD+ should be used – if financing appears and is well applied – to foster 
economic activities that will give economic sense to the maintenance of the standing 
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forest, enhancing pathways for consistent forest governance in Brazil. This way, Brazil 
would have the opportunity to lead the transition process from an unsustainable 
development model to a more sustainable one, based on the rational use of natural 
resources and using forest activities as a comparative regional advantage. 
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ANNEX I Face-to-face Interview Guidelines 
 
1. What is the role that XXX plays in the formulation and implementation of the national 
strategy on REDD+? Should/could this participation somehow be more effective? Yes, 
no, how?  
 
2. What is your understanding about the national REDD+ strategy? 
 
3. What is the Brazilian strategy on REDD+? Which institutional model should be 
adopted for its implementation? 
 
4. What should the main focus of the national strategy for REDD+ be?  
i) Combating climate change,  
ii) Combating deforestation/degradation or  
iii) Supporting sustainable development 
Would this definition be important for the formulation of the national strategy REDD+? 
(Yes, no, why)? 
 
5. In your opinion, how the Federal Government stands concerning the national strategy 
on REDD+? Does the government really intend to adopt a national REDD+ policy? 
What would the principles of this policy be? 
 
6. What is the current scenario of implementation of the national REDD+ strategy in 
Brazil? (what has been done and what remains to do in order to achieve a effective 
implementation) 
 
7. What are the bureaucratic procedures to be followed regarding the implementation of 
REDD+ in the public sphere? How does this bureaucratic model adopted by Brazil 
influence the implementation process? In what aspects could this model be optimised? 
What are the major challenges to develop REDD+ in Brazil? 
 
8. Some experts consider as “flawed” a REDD+ strategy that do not promote interaction 
among sectors. For example, they claim that a number of REDD+ initiatives do not 
focus on directly dealing with the main drivers of deforestation, such as agricultural 
expansion. How does Brazil aim to deal with it? 
 
9. How strategies of coalition between the Federal Government and other stakeholders 
as state governments influence the decision-making process concerning REDD+? How 
to engage and use the experiences of federal states? Could decentralsation jeopardize 
the success of REDD+ implementation? 
 
10. How to involve traditional communities, indigenous people and other actors such as 
NGOs, media and the society in the formulation of the national REDD+ strategy? 
 
11. How adaptation measures to climate change would/should be involved in the 
formulation of the national strategy on REDD+?  
 
12. How the concept of conservation would/should be incorporated into the formulation 
of the national strategy on REDD+? 
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13. What concepts could be incorporated into the strategy in order to promote a more 
holistic approach and take full advantage of the co-benefits that can be generated by 
REDD+? 
 
14. The deforestation scenario shows that converting forests into other land uses can 
be a lower-cost option than conservation measures. What financial alternative could be 
offered to discourage the destruction of Brazilian forests? How to involve the REDD+ 
framework in this context? 
 
15. Do you think the performance based REDD+ mechanism is feasible and why? 
 
16. The Amazonian forestlands show its importance due to the fact that 55% of the 
overall CO2 reduction emission target should be achieved through the decrease in 80% 
of deforestation rates in this region. While the land-use change sector decreased by 
76% its emissions, the energy sector increased by 21% (2005 to 2011). Moreover, since 
the year 2012 deforestation rates rise again in this region. Should the strategy adopted 
be risky to reach the NPCC goals? How does this scenario influence the implementation 
of the REDD+ national strategy? 
 
17. In the book of Jacques Marcovitch (Management of the Amazon) there is a 
sentence of Adalberto Verissimo (from Imazon) that says "Brasilia understands very 
little about the Amazon". The author adds and says that is not to deny that important 
national decisions should be taken in the relevant spheres of power. He claims, 
however, less political and more influence of local knowledge in this delicate 
management process. What is your opinion concerning this passage from the book? 
 
18. Although there is no international regime on forests, the Ministry of Environment 
encompasses its activities in premises of international agreements. How about 
concerning REDD+? 
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ANNEX II Questionnaire 
 
 
 
(Non-governmental Stakeholders) 
 
The present questionnaire is part of the student‘s (Patricia Gallo Barbosa Lima – 
Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus-Senftenberg) PhD dissertation. It 
consists of 12 questions. The answers provided by respondents will be kept under 
absolute confidentiality. Please do not hesitate to get in contact if any further information 
is needed: pgblima@gmail.com. A copy of the results can also be requested later per e-
mail. The questions below were adapted from (Gebara, 2009) and (Gil, 2010).  
I appreciate your cooperation! 
 
Respondent: 
Organisation: 
Experience with forest and/or climate change issues (years): 
 
Gebara, M. F. 2009. Distributing Benefits on REDD: exploring a Flexible Approach, a Case Study of the Juma Sustainable 
Development Reserve, State of Amazonas, Brazil. Master Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
London, UK. 
 
Gil, J. 2010. Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) as a tool for climate change 
mitigation in Brazil. Master Thesis, Universität Hohenheim, Institute of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the 
Tropics and Sub-tropics. Stuttgart, Germany. 
 
 
1. What is your perception about the Brazilian (Federal Government) position concerning 
the REDD+ scope? 
 
2. Enumerate what the most controversial points are for the REDD+ implementation as a 
national strategy in Brazil? (Please number the answers from most controversial to less 
controversial. Some of the options may have the same importance for you feel comfortable to 
rank them with the same weight). 
 
(        )  Addressing causes of deforestation  
(   ) Rights of indigenous communities, forest dwelling and forest dependent 
communities (livelihoods/participation on decision-making)  
(        ) Transparent Safeguards System 
(        ) Institutional weakness  
(        ) Tenure and property rights conflicts 
(        ) Level of Corruption and Bureaucracy 
(        ) Scale  
(        ) Baseline line/Reference line  
(      ) MRV (Definition of forest, deforestation, degradation; net deforestation vs. gross 
deforestation)  
(        ) Multiple benefits (fair distribution, equity, definition of benefits) 
(        ) Permanence (temporary nature of credits)  
(        ) Sustaining low deforestation rates 
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(       ) Leakage  
(        ) Scope 
(        ) Opportunity Costs 
(        ) Financial Risks 
(       ) Other 
Please give reasons to your answer:  
 
3. The REDD+ mechanism (is) will be an effective tool mainly: (Please enumerate them to 
what should be the main priorities of action). 
(    ) as a mitigation action to combat climate change  
(    ) to curb deforestation in tropical areas 
(    ) as a tool to enhance sustainable development/forest governance 
(    ) other: 
Do you believe this definition will be essential for the formulation of a national REDD+ 
strategy? Why? 
 
 
4. Enumerate, in your opinion, what the underlying reasons are for the inefficient manner 
of addressing forest governance in Brazil? (Please number the answers from most relevant 
to less relevant. Some of the options may have the same importance for you feel comfortable to 
rank them with the same weight). 
 
(     ) Administrative insecurity 
(     ) Misguided government policies 
(     ) Low institutional capacity 
(     ) Negligence with the environmental legislation 
(     ) Weak property rights and unclear land tenure 
(     ) High level of corruption and bureaucracy 
(     ) Lack of political will 
(     ) Conflict of interests (national development goals X forest conservation) 
(     ) Economic/ Market interests 
(   ) Lack of dialogue with civil society, states and indigenous and traditional communities 
(  ) Lack of coordination between the national policies and state-led policies/programmes 
(   ) Low development of cross-sector interactions 
(   ) Low level of power and influence from actors such as the Ministry of Environment  
(   )  Lack of efforts in other biomes regarding forest protection as in Amazonian areas 
(    ) Other 
Please give reasons to your answer. How these issues will affect the development of the 
REDD+ framework in Brazil? 
 
5. How to use the REDD+ approach as tool of forest governance in the Brazilian 
context?  
 
6. There is a recognised need for institutional initiatives on the development of REDD+ 
framework. In your opinion, what should the role of institutions in this scenario be? 
(Please, rank according to what should be their main priorities of action). 
(  ) Establishing property rights where they do not exist  
(  ) Facilitating bargains (between beneficiaries and resource right owners)   
( ) Regulating, enabling, monitoring, enforcing trades so as to reduce costs and avoid 
administrative inefficiency  
(  ) Acting in behalf of disadvantage groups 
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(   ) Coordinating active stakeholder engagement 
(   ) Addressing capacity gaps under the current forest management system 
(   ) Providing technical guidance 
(   ) Mobilising and disbursement of resources 
(   ) Enforcing governance    
(  ) Ensuring that projects/programmes/policies are designed in compliance with the 
national guidelines 
(  ) Monitoring social and environmental impacts   
(  ) Other:  
Please give reasons for your answer. What should the institutional and regulatory model 
be to be adopted for the development of the national strategy on REDD+ in Brazil? 
 
7. In your opinion, how should/could local participation be incorporated into institutional 
structures and decision-making processes for the development of a national strategy on 
REDD+? 
 
8. Enumerate in order of importance what the conditions should be to avoid unfair 
REDD+ payments? (Please number the answers from most important to less important. Some 
of the options may have the same importance for you feel comfortable to rank them with the 
same weight): 
 
(  ) Clear definition and equitable allocation of carbon rights    
(  ) Provision of information on economic, cultural risks and potential costs and benefits   
(  ) Develop clear social strong mechanisms for community monitoring and verification of
 delivery of local benefits  
(  ) Use of participatory processes in the design and implementation of REDD+   
(  ) Access to and funding for legal and technical assistance to communities   
(  ) Transparent and accountable benefit distribution mechanism  
( )Compliance with relevant international social, human rights and sustainable 
development standards   
(   ) Long term and focused investments for land tenure reforms  
(   ) Other:   
How and according to which principles do you think benefits should be distributed in a 
REDD+ national strategy? 
 
9. What is your opinion about a dual market proposal (also creating a new trading unit 
specific for REDD+ mechanism)? Which financing mechanisms would be more suitable 
for the establishment of a national REDD+ strategy?  
 
10. In order of importance, what should the priorities of REDD+ investments be? (Please 
number the answers from most important to less important. Some of the options may have the 
same importance for you feel comfortable to rank them with the same weight). 
(   ) Financing capacity building and local adaptation   
(  ) Financing costs of implementing policies to reduce deforestation (law enforcement, 
taxation of forestland, restrictions on road building, agricultural zoning…)     
(  ) Financing costs of monitoring and verification of reduced deforestation    
(  ) Financing costs of monitoring social impacts    
(  )  Financing costs of implementing national baselines and improvements on nation 
carbon accounting   
(  ) Financing opportunities costs from adopting more sustainable forest use   
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(  ) Financing costs of creating national REDD+ dialogue, REDD+ offices, and REDD+ 
consultation (including indigenous people and traditional communities) 
(  ) Financing costs of new governance mechanisms and institutional capacity   
(  ) Other:  
Please give reasons for your answer:  
 
11. In your opinion, is REDD+ able to delivery positive changes in Brazil? If so, what 
these changes may be? 
 
12. Please, think about the existing REDD+ related policies and likely directions of policy 
design and implementation in Brazil. Do you believe these policies will effectively 
address the drivers of deforestation and degradation?  Will these policies be effective in 
reducing national level carbon emission from REDD+ related sectors? 
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ANNEX III Brazil’s land governance institutions and respective duties – Federal 
and State level (adapted from Costa, 2016) 
 
Federal Government Executive institutions/bodies:  
• Presidency of Brazil – responsible for titling of indigenous land and creating protected 
areas.  
• National Institute of Colonization and Land Reform (INCRA) – responsible for land 
reform, establishing rural settlements, maintaining the National System of Rural 
Cadastre (SNCR), managing public/ federal lands, regularization and titling of 
quilombolas.  
• Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) – responsible for land reform policies and 
land regularization in the Amazon biome.  
• Department of the Environment (MMA) – responsible for forestry and environmental 
policies.  
• Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio) – responsible for 
proposing, implementing, managing, protecting, inspecting, and monitoring federal 
protected areas, such as national parks and extractive reserves.  
• Brazilian Forestry Service (SFB) – responsible for public forest concessions, managing 
the National Public Forest Registry (CNPF), and implementing and managing the Rural 
Environmental Registry (CAR).  
• Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) – 
responsible for the environmental control, law enforcement, and licensing of the Brazilian 
forests.  
• National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) – responsible for mapping out and protecting lands 
traditionally inhabited and used by indigenous peoples.  
• Palmares Cultural Foundation (FCP) – responsible for recognising and certifying 
quilombolas communities.  
• Federal Property Management Office (SPU) – responsible for managing the federal 
properties, which includes vacant lands, federal floodplain areas, others. 
• Federal Revenue – responsible for collecting the rural land tax (ITR) and maintaining 
the Rural Land Cadastre (Cafir).  
 
Legislative branch: Competent to enact laws on property rights, agriculture, 
environment, land expropriation, and land reform.  
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Judicial branch: Decisions on land tenure conflicts concerning federal lands.  
 
State Government Executive institutions/bodies:  
•   Governor – responsible for creating state protected areas.  
• State Land Institutes – responsible for establishing state rural settlements, 
managing public/state lands, regularization and titling of quilombolas.  
• Environmental Agencies – responsible for proposing, implementing, managing, 
protecting, inspecting, and monitoring state protected areas. It is also responsible for the 
environmental control, law enforcement, and licensing of rural activities.  
 
Legislative branch: Competent to enact laws on environment protection.  
Judicial branch: Decisions on land tenure conflicts concerning private properties and 
state lands.  
 
Note: In May 2016 President Michel Temer signed decrees extinguishing the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development and transferring the responsibilities of Incra and land reform policies to the Chief of 
Staff. 
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